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ABSTRACT
Science and technology has developed considerably and discovered lots of new ideas
for the benefit of humankind. The advancement of DNA technology has contributed
significantly to various fields. Forensic use of DNA information has great potential
to assist in the delivery of justice. At the same time ‘human rights and privacy
violations’ as well as ‘other challenges’ that exist in relation to its use cannot be
ignored. Therefore the forensic use of genetic information has created two major
mutually dependent yet sometimes opposing contexts — one is ensuring justice by
protecting public interest and security, and the other is protecting human rights and
privacy of the data subject.
This thesis, therefore, explores the implications of one of the most successful (yet not
universally accepted or uncontroversial) developments of science and technology:
the forensic use of DNA information in the justice delivery system. The thesis
examines the issue via two case studies, one of the National DNA database
(NDNAD) of the UK, and the other of the National Forensic DNA Profiling
Laboratory (NFDPL) of Bangladesh, representing developed and developing
countries respectively. These case studies reveal the intentions of governments in the
use of the technology and the establishment of the associated databases. The views of
ordinary people regarding emerging challenges are also canvassed both in the context
of the developed and developing countries. More specifically, the thesis addresses
the following central questions: ‘Are there any human rights and privacy
violations?’; ‘To what extent are developing countries concerned about the issues of
human rights and genetic privacy violations?’; and ‘How can any gaps between
developed and developing countries be minimised?’. It also considers whether the
international community is considering these issues as emerging threats to
sustainable development, the enforcement of justice, and to international human
rights norms.
The main argument developed in this thesis is that there is some scope for human
rights and privacy violations while using human DNA data for the justice delivery
purposes, though the nature and scope of such violations differ to some extent
depending upon the DNA facility selected (that is, the NDNAD or the NFDPL).
i

Some financial-technological and administrative challenges are also revealed by the
analysis of these case studies. Findings in this thesis suggest that since both the
forensic use of DNA information is vital for detecting criminals and exonerating the
innocent; however, at the same time, such use should not compromise human rights
and privacy protection. Taking an ‘absolute’ approach to combating crime or to
maintaining human rights in that context is fruitless. Neither one nor the other can
prevail absolutely and to the detriment of the other. Time and again, it is a question
of ‘balance’ or ‘proportionality’. In such a situation, the present study makes a
number of specific recommendations in regard to encouraging and reinforcing the
proper utilisation of genetic information in the justice delivery system. Among these
recommendations, the author of this thesis considered that the confidence of data
subject in the system is crucial; this is because a trustworthy system helps ensure
justice and enhances social harmony. The possible solutions to these human rights
and other challenges (such as resource levels and so on), of course, depend on the
country context, as well as political will and/or policy of the government.
Governments and the international community should consider all these factors when
looking at and making recommendations for the exploding growth of forensic use of
DNA data and databases in the justice delivery system, and acting upon those
recommendations.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to many individuals and institutions for their sincere support during the
course of my study. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the University
of Wollongong, specially the Faculty of Law, for giving me a unique opportunity for
undertaking this research, and also the AusAID Program for offering me the
Australian Leadership Award (ALA) which allowed me completing this study with
all necessary supports, including their financial supports for fieldwork and data
collection. I am also thankful to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary
Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for allowing me to
pursue this study.

I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to my supervisor,
Associate Professor Jakkrit Kaupoth, for providing me with excellent guidance,
advising wisely and giving extremely helpful well thought out comments on my
research work. I am also thankful to my co-supervisor, Dr Charles Chew, for giving
his insightful and clearly articulated remarks.
My special thanks to Ms Elaine Newby for her excellent editorial services. I am also
grateful to all other academic and administrative staffs of the Faculty of Law for their
sincere cooperation in carrying out this research. I am also thankful to all staff
members in the library, research services office, research student centre, and the
Information Technology Services helpdesk of UOW for their unfailing assistance.
This work has benefited from various research organisations. My special
appreciation goes to the Director and other staff of the Multi-Sectoral Programme on
Violence Against Women (MSP-VAW), as well as the entire unit of the National
Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, Bangladesh, for their time and cooperation in
interviews and data collection. I am grateful to my friends and colleagues for
encouraging me all the time and providing supports in a number of ways.
With a feeling of my highest respect, I would like to pay the richest tributes to the
memory, life and work of my father, who passed away. My limitless gratitude to my
mother who always hides her pains for my joys even at her age.
iii

The incomparable appreciation to my husband Md Zahurul Haq who has been my
best guide and friend all through my study, for his care, sacrifice, and excellent
support during this painstaking research. I specially acknowledge the role played by
my young daughter, Juhainah who demonstrated wonderful patience when I really
needed to concentrate in my studies.
I offer my regards to all those who supported me in any respects in the completion of
this thesis.
Above everything, I must express heartiest gratitude to the Almighty for providing
me with His wonderful blessings that helped me to have patience at critical times and
complete the project successfully.

iv

ACRONYMS
ACPO

Association of Chief Police Officers

AD

Appellate Division

ALRC

Australian Law Reform Commission

APA

Association of Police Authorities

ASN

Arrestee Summons Number

BDT

Bangladeshi Taka

BTRC

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission

CAQDAS

Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software

CODIS

Combined DNA Index System

CJPOA

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act

CJPA

Criminal Justice and Police Act

CJA

Criminal Justice Act

CJ

Criminal Justice

CTA

Counter Terrorism Act

CDFD

Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics

DANIDA

Danish International Development Agency

DNA

Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DEB

DNA Executive Board

DZ

Dizygotic

DHHS

Department of Health and Human Services

EU

European Union

ECtHR

European Court of Human Rights

EDNAP

European DNA Profiling Group

ECHR

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

ECOSOC

Economic and Social Council

ENFSI

European Network of Forensic Science Institutes

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FSS

Forensic Science Service

FSR

Forensic Science Regulator

GINA

Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act

GovCo

Government-owned Contractor-operated

GT

Grounded Theory
v

HCD

High Court Division

HGP

Human Genome Project

HGC

Human Genetics Commission

HIPAA

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

HLA

Human Leucocyte Antigen

HOC

Home Office Circular

HSD

Health Sector Database

HO

Home Office

HREC

Human Research Ethics Committee

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICO

Information Commissioner Office

IDHGD

International Declaration on Human Genetic Data

IO

Investigating Officer

IT

Information Technology

INTERPOL International Police Organization
IBC

International Bio-ethics Committee

IPP

Information Privacy Principles

IVS

Intervening Sequence

LDC

Least Developed Country

LCN

low copy number

MDH

Medical Director of Health

MLP

Multi-locus Probe

MtDNA

Mitochondrial DNA

NPIA

National Policing Improvement Agency

NDNADSB National DNA Database Strategy Board
NFDPL

National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory

NDNAD

National DNA Database

NHMRC

National Health and Medical Research Council

NPP

National Privacy Principles

NCIDD

National Criminal Investigation DNA Database

NSPCC

National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children

OECD

Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
vi

OCC

One-Stop Crisis Centre

PIU

Project Implementation Unit

PIS

Participation Information Sheet

PLA

Privacy Legislation Amendment

PLS

Pendulum List Searching

PD

Paternity Discrepancy

PHI

Protected Health Information

PACE

Police and Criminal Evidence

PNC

Police National Computers

PPP

Public-Private Partnership

RFLP

Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism

SC

Supreme Court

SGM

Second General Multiplex

SLP

Single Locus Probe

SNP

Single-Nucleotide Polymorphism

SOC

Scene of Crime

SOCPA

Serious Organised Crime and Police Act

STR

Short Tandem Repeat

STADNAP

Standardisation of DNA Profiling in the European Union

TTT

Technical Teaching Team

TIGR

Institute for Genomic Research

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UDHGHR

Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights

UDBHR

Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights

UNGA

United Nation General Assembly

UN

United Nations

UNESCO

United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization

UCLA

University of California at Los Angeles

UK

United Kingdom

US

United States

VNTR

Variable Number of Tandem Repeats

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................. i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................iii
ACRONYMS........................................................................................................v
TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................................viii
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... xii
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................ 1
1. 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 1
1.1.1

INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 1

1.1.2

BACKGROUND OF THIS THESIS ................................................... 1

1.1.3

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.................................................... 6

1.1.4

RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................ 15

1.1.5

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH................................................ 16

1.1.6

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH ............................................. 17

1.1.7

CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH ......................................... 20

1.1.8

DELIMITATION OF SCOPE............................................................ 22

1.1.9

THESIS STRUCTURE ...................................................................... 23

1.1.10

LIMITATION OF THIS STUDY ...................................................... 26

1.1.11

CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................. 27

CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................................. 29
2. 1

GENERAL BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION...................................... 29
2.1.1

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................. 29

2.1.2

HUMAN GENETICS: THE BASIS OF DNA PROFILING............. 30

2.1.3

DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF DNA PROFILING ....... 50

2.1.4

SIGNIFICANCE OF FORENSIC USE OF DNA PROFILING........ 68

2.1.5

ASSESMENT OF RELIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DNA

TECHNOLOGY ..............................................................................................71
2.1.6 FORENSIC DNA DATABASES: EXISTING SCENARIO IN THE

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT........................................................................ 74
2.1.7

CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 83

CHAPTER 3 .............................................................................................................. 85

viii

3. 1

FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION V HUMAN RIGHTS AND

PRIVACY .................................................................................................................. 85
3.1.1

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................. 85

3.1.2

HUMAN RIGHTS, RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND GENETIC

PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW ............................................................................ 87
3.1.3

RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND GENETIC PRIVACY: EXISTING

LEGISLATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS................................................................ 113
3.1.4

FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION V THE RIGHT TO

PRIVACY ........................................................................................................ 155
3.1.5

THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION .. 168

3.1.6

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 170

CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................ 172
4. 1

SOCIO-LEGAL METHODOLOGY: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CASE

STUDIES ................................................................................................................. 172
4.1.1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 172

4.1.2

SOCIO-LEGAL METHODOLOGY: A MULTI-STAGE RESEARCH

DESIGN .......................................................................................................173
4.1.3

QUALITATIVE METHOD ............................................................. 180

4.1.4

QUANTITATIVE APPROACH ...................................................... 213

4.1.5

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 219

CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................ 221
5. 1

NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (NDNAD) OF THE UK: THE CASE

STUDY OF A DEVELOPED COUNTRY.............................................................. 221
5.1.1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 221

5.1.2

FORENSIC USE OF

DNA INFORMATION: DEVELOPED

COUNTRIES CONTEXT................................................................................ 222
5.1.3

A CASE STUDY ON NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (NDNAD) OF

THE UK: A DEVELOPED COUNTRY ......................................................... 224
5.1.4

ASSESMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE STUDY ON THE

NDNAD.........................................................................................................225
5.1.5 A BRIEF IDEA ABOUT THE UK AND ITS HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION .................................................................................................... 225
5.1.6 NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (NDNAD) .......................................... 231
ix

5.1.7

RISKS OR CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NDNAD 276

5.1.8

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 294

CHAPTER 6 ............................................................................................................ 297
6. 1

NATIONAL FORENSIC DNA PROFILING LABORATORY (NFDPL)

OF BANGLADESH: A CASE STUDY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY ............. 297
6.1.1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 297

6.1.2

A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESHI DNA LABORATORY: A

DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT ........................................................ 299
6.1.3

SOCIO-POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS IN

BANGLADESH............................................................................................... 301
6.1.4

NATIONAL

FORENSIC

DNA

PROFILING

LABORATORY

(NFDPL) .......................................................................................................311
6.1.5

ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA: RISKS OR CHALLENGES

ASSOCIATED WITH THE NFDPL............................................................... 334
6.1.6

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 357

CHAPTER 7 ............................................................................................................ 362
7. 1

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE WAY FORWARD .................. 362
7.1.1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 362

7.1.2

COMPARATIVE

STUDY

BETWEEN

THE

UK

AND

BANGLADESH............................................................................................... 363
7.1.3

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE NDNAD AND THE

NFDPL .......................................................................................................368
7.1.4

OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................... 388

7.1.5

THE WAY FORWARD................................................................... 404

7.1.6

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 407

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................411
APPENDICES......................................................................................................476

x

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The Structure of DNA ................................................................................ 34
Figure 2: Research Scheme...................................................................................... 175
Figure 3: Grounded Theory: Constant Comparative Analysis ................................ 194
Figure 4: Coding Process for Constant Comparative Analysis................................ 205
Figure 5: Open Coding Interpreted in Free Nodes................................................... 208
Figure 6: Axial and selective Coding Interpreted in Tree Nodes............................. 211
Figure 7: Data Collection Steps for Survey ............................................................. 216
Figure 8 Quantitative Data Analysis Steps .............................................................. 217
Figure 9: Governance, Management and Oversight of NDNAD............................. 237
Figure 10: Tripartite Arrangements of the NDNADSB........................................... 238
Figure 11: Organisational Structure of the NFDPL ................................................. 317
Figure 12: Nvivo Model Developed Based on Some Interview Responses ............ 341
Figure 13: Nvivo Model for Human Rights and Privacy Violations ....................... 345
Figure 14: Nvivo Model about Future of NFDPL ................................................... 354
Figure 15: Nvivo Model for Gap between Developed-Developing Countries ........ 356

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Global Overview: Countries using Forensic DNA Databases..................... 76
Table 2: Categories of DNA Test up to November 2011 ........................................ 316
Table 3: Frequency Distribution of Maximum Period of Retention of DNA Samples
.......................................................................................................................... 325
Table 4: Frequency Distribution about the Method of Obtaining Informed Consent
.......................................................................................................................... 338
Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Opinion about Privacy Policy.......................... 343
Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Concern about Job Security of the NFDPL
Employees ........................................................................................................ 349
Table 7: Segments Where Laboratory are Facing Challenges or Support Need to be
Increased from All Sources.............................................................................. 352

xii

CHAPTER 1
1. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1.1

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to what has been
produced in this thesis. It summarises the main topics of this research (which are
elaborated in their designated chapters), such as, the background to this thesis,
statement of the problem, research questions, aim and objectives, methodology,
contribution , and scope and limitations of this research. It also provides an overview
of the content of whole thesis.
1.1.2

BACKGROUND OF THIS THESIS

The completion of the sequencing of the human genome in 2003 represents an
unprecedented milestone in the advancement of knowledge on the molecular basis of
life itself. The information generated by genomics is providing major benefits for
health care1 and is ‘a revolutionary tool for ensuring justice’.2 Advancements in
scientific knowledge and technology have profoundly changed the temporal and
spatial order of society. Knowledge of potential future health problems made
available through identifying genes with their disease risks, essentially translating
possible future health problems to the present,3 is contributing significantly to further
development and growth in the field of medical science and health care.
Technological development and innovation in the life sciences (that is, genomics and
bioinformatics in the area of genetic research) are further contributing to this
growth.4 The past few decades could be referred to as the ‘genetic era’. The sudden

1

Major benefits from genomics include, ‘the prevention, diagnosis and management of communicable
and genetic diseases as well as other common killers or causes of chronic ill health including
cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes, and mental illnesses’: World Health Organization (WHO),
'Genomics and World Health Report of the Advisory Committee on Health Research' (2002)
1(Foreword from the Director General).
2
Yale H Yee, 'Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution For Law Enforcement or Threat to Individual
Privacy?' (1995) 22 American Journal of Criminal Law 461, 461–62.
3
Hans Harbers, 'How Much Time Can We Stand? DNA Evidence and the Principle of Finality in
Criminal Law' (2005) 13(3) Configurations 357, 357, 370.
4
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Guidelines for Human
Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases (HBGRDs) (25 September 2008) Directorate for Science
Technology and Industry <www.oecd.org/sti/biotechnology/hbgrd>.

1

increase of scientific and technological advances has enabled researchers, scientists
and/or governments around the world to collect more and higher quality genetic
material and more accurate information than has ever before been possible. Online
databases are becoming accessible in regard to each and every individual from any
part of the world. Bioinformatics is the discipline which deals with genetic data and
its increase everywhere, which could be characterised as an ‘information
implosion’.5 Bioinformatics is an interdisciplinary research area that provides a
process for research, development, or application of computational tools. It also
offers approaches for the wider use of biological, medical, behavioural or health data,
including its collection, storage, categorisation, archivisation, as well as the analysis,
and/or visualisation of such data6 with the utilisation of IT.
An increasing ‘need for bioinformatics capabilities has been precipitated by the rapid
growth of publicly available genomic information’7 that has resulted from the
existence of various kinds of human genetic research databases throughout the world.
Communities around the world are increasingly supporting bioinformatics research
because of the potential benefits of large scale utilisation of human genetic
information, such as in molecular medicine (for instance, preventive medicine and
gene therapy). Governments of the developed countries (namely, the USA, the UK,
EU and Australia) as well as some of the developing countries (such as India,
Singapore, Malaysia and Bangladesh) are establishing comprehensive human genetic
databases or laboratories to facilitate various uses of genetic material and
information.
Current research in human genetics is not confined to the health sector and the
identification of the genetic reasons for certain diseases and to the discovery of
5

Kenneth M Weiss, 'Coming to Terms with Human Variation' (1998) 27 Annual Review of
Anthropology 273, 273.
6
Biomedical Information Science and Technology Initiative (BISTI) The BISTIC Definition
Committee, NIH Working Definition of Bioinformatics and Computational Biology (17 July 2000)
<http://www.bisti.nih.gov/docs/CompuBioDef.pdf>.
7
Dharmendra Kumar Meena et al, Bioinformatics: Its Application and Perspective in Fisheries and
Aquaculture (23 September 2011) Central Inland Fisheries Research Institute (Barrackpore, Kolkata)
<http://aquafind.com/articles/Bioinfomatics-In-Fisheries.php>; see also Rishikesha T Krishnan,
Anshu Gupta and Varun Matta, 'Biotechnology and Bioinformatics: Can India Emulate the Software
Success Story? (Paper to be presented at NSF-sponsored Workshop on The Indian Development
Experience, School of Public Policy, George Mason University and Department of Management
Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 3–5 March 2003) 3.
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effective pharmaceutical or gene therapies, rather, there are some other very
important areas where genetic material and information is being used, such as in
criminal investigations, employment, insurance, education, immigration cases and
paternity testing.8 Among them, the use of human genetic information in the justice
delivery system is one of the significant advances of DNA science and technology.
At present, genetic material and information is widely used in order to ensure social
harmony and justice; however, the increasing utilisation of genetic information for
justice delivery purposes is causing some challenges, such as intrusions into genetic
privacy and the further development of existing disparities between developed and
developing countries in a number of areas and the creation of new gaps. It is also
obvious that the impact of genetic research and development and its uptake in society
is highly dependent on the reaction of political, economic and social institutions. At
the same time, interdisciplinary studies, such as the relation between law, IT and
legal or social uses of genetics, should be recognised as an important phenomenon.
The use of scientific genetic-based evidence (that is, DNA profiling)9 in legal case
investigation processes brings into collaboration the disciplines of science and law,
which have their own institutional needs, standards and imperatives. But
combination of these two disciplines is broadly geared toward ensuring justice for
various cases, without completing retaining and relinquishing their autonomy.10
Recent scientific advances through DNA technology play an important role in
providing legal protections in the terms discussed below11 and the preservation of
law and order. The widespread use of DNA data to detect offenders and protect the
rights of the innocent (that is, exonerating the wrongly-accused)12 is one the most
8

See, eg, Merryn Ekberg, 'Governing the Risks Emerging from the Non-Medical Uses of Genetic
Testing' (2005) 3(1) Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 1, 2–16; see generally
Australian Law Reform Commission, Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic
Information in Australia, Report No 96 (2003) vol 2.
9
It is also known as ‘DNA Fingerprinting’ or ‘DNA Typing’. For further details, see sections 2.1.3.1
(b) and 2.1.3.2 of Chapter 2.
10
Sheila Jasanoff, 'Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process' (2006) 34 Journal of
Law, Medicine and Ethics 328, 329.
11
Leigh M Harlan, 'When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of
DNA Samples' (2004–05) 54 Duke Law Journal 179, 179. The same article points out that ‘[y]et
current law, which fails to mandate the destruction of voluntarily provided DNA samples, falls well
short of providing genetic privacy to innocent individuals’, see Harlen: at 180 (citation omitted).
12
Helen Wallace, Prejudice, Stigma and DNA Databases (July 2008) Council for Responsible
Genetics [1] <http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/PDAFXSTDPX.pdf>.
For ‘an extract’ of this full parper see Helen Wallace, 'Prejudice, Stigma and DNA Databases' (2008)

3

notable examples of such advancements and revolutionary impact of DNA
technology.
The identification of offenders and the protection of innocent suspects are two of the
main goals for ensuring justice.13 DNA samples and profiles are very useful for
identification purposes, for example, in identifying victims of disasters, as well as
suspects (including rapists and murderers). It is also useful for conducting parentage
testing and for resolving immigration cases where a familial relationship (or identity)
is in question.14 The capability of DNA analysis results to accelerate the justice
delivery process by identifying actual offenders is particularly significant. In many
instances, suspects who are actually innocent are relatively quickly acquitted or
excluded from legal proceedings. This technology is, in effect, upholding the
principles of ‘presumption of innocence’ which requires that ‘guilt must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt’, upon which each and every criminal justice system is
based. Therefore, every accused person irrespective of his or her status has a right to
get fair trial. This legal right even applies to those who have been convicted of
similar offences committed in the past.15 The right of a ‘fair trial’ is derived from the
principles of natural justice. This right has also become the norm of international and
regional human rights law16 and it is also adopted by many countries in their

21(3–4) eMagazine: GeneWatch
<http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=60&archiv
e=yes>. See also UK Home Office, 'Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and
Public Protection' (2009) 60; Liz Campbell, 'A Rights-Based Analysis of DNA Retention: "NonConviction" Databases and the Liberal State ' (2010) (12) Criminal Law Review 889, 889.
13
George Clarke and Janet Reno, Justice and Science: Trials and Triumphs of DNA Evidence
(Rutgers University Press, 2007) Foreword by Janet Reno, ix.
14
US Department of Energy Genome Programs, Human Genome Project Information, DNA Forensics
(16 June 2009) Genomics.energy.gov
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml>. see also 'Genetic
Analysis System Boosts Criminal Justice' (30 August 2002) BusinessWorld [1]
<http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/pqdweb?did=158291071&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=209
01&RQT=309&VName=PQD> For the Australian experience see, eg, Australian Law Reform
Commission, Essentially Yours, above n 8, 935–37[37.12], [37.17].
15
Tania Simoncelli, 'Dangerous Excursions: The Case Against Expanding Forensic DNA Databases
to Innocent Person' (2006) 34 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 390, 390.
16
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GOAR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg,
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) (‘UDHR’), art 10 provides that ‘everyone is entitled in full
equality to fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of
his rights and obligations of any criminal charge against him’; art 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 99 UNTS 171(entered into force
23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’) reaffirmed the objects of UDHR and provides that ‘everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.’ See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

4

procedural law, though the form and practice of the principles of natural justice may
vary from system to system on the basis of prevailing conditions of the society
concerned.17 This is one of the fundamental canons of modern democracy and is
reflected in legal jurisprudence throughout the world. With the support of DNA
technology, the right for a fair trial has been enhanced, particularly in developed
countries. It has also contributed to the speedier administration of justice.18
During the mid-1980s, the potential application of DNA typing or profiling was
initiated by laboratories in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and
Canada.19 The modern forensic DNA typing invented by Professor Alec Jeffrey was
first used in the Colin Pitchfork case in 1985 in the UK.20 This was the first criminal
case in which DNA was used and the resolution of this case provided an effective
demonstration of this method’s potential. It also demonstrated for the first time how
a small DNA sample could be used to identify a perpetrator from amongst a large
population.21 By the late 1980s the technology was being used in the US by
commercial laboratories and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The
pioneering Colin Pitchfork case and the rapid development of DNA technology
databases firmly pointed toward the future of DNA profiling as the most important
forensic investigative tool to be developed in the 20th century.22 Within relatively few
decades, DNA technology became commonly used in the investigative processes of
many countries (including both developed and developing nations) and also by their
local forensic and/or DNA laboratories. However, the forensic use of DNA data is
always subject to particular scrutiny because of its potential benefits for criminal and
civil justices, but also due to the possibilities for its misuse or abuse. Some important

opened for signature 4 November 1950 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953)
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'Genetic Analysis System Boosts Criminal Justice', above n 14.
19
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science et al, DNA Technology in Forensic Science
(National Academy Press, 1992) 28.
20
For further detail see section 2.1.3.1 (b) of Chapter 2.
21
Peter Gill, 'DNA as Evidence — The Technology of Identification' (2005) 352(26) The New
England Journal of Medicine 2669, 2669.
22
Peter Gill and John Buckleton, 'Biological Basis for DNA Evidence' in John S Buckleton,
Christopher M Triggs and Simon J Walsh (eds), Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation (CRC Press,
2005) 1, 2.
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ethical, legal and social concerns have been raised about its use since it was first
trialled in the 1980s.
The following section will discuss the issues and problem areas identified by this
thesis.

1.1.3

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

It is well recognised that genetic science is one of the most dependable sources of
truth, particularly in disputes concerning human identity. Sheila Jasanoff has rightly
pointed out that:
Genetic science produces truthful facts about human identity, and that
establishing the truth in matters of identity is equivalent to ensuring justice.23

As a result, DNA profiling or ‘fingerprinting’ is increasingly used for human
identification in the legal proceedingsof many nations. 24 Forensic DNA technology
is used to analyse DNA profiles which normally originate from human DNA
samples. These samples could be collected either from the crime scenes or from the
body of suspects or victims. Then DNA profiles (that is, the analysis results of the
DNA samples collected) are compared with previously stored profiles in the DNA
database to locate matches. The forensic use of DNA samples and profiles has,
therefore, enhanced the success of civil as well as criminal investigations and the
process has already proved to be a valuable tool for delivering a speedy trial and
justice. Recognising the potential of DNA Technology, in the case of People v Wesly
it was observed that ‘DNA Typing is the single greatest advance in the “search for
truth” ... since the advent of cross-examination’.25

23

Jasanoff, above n 10, 332.
Richard Hindmarsh and Barbara Prainsack, 'Introducing Genetic Suspects' in Richard Hindmarsh
and Barbara Prainsack (eds), Genetic Suspects: Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and
Databasing (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1, 1–2; see also Lawrence F Kobilinsky, Thomas F
Liotti and Jamel Oeser-Sweat, DNA: Forensic and Legal Applications (John Wiley and Sons, 2005)
xiii; Ian Freckelton, 'DNA Profiling: A Legal Perspective' in JRobertson, A M Ross and 1990) L A
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Press, 1990) 156–7.
25
People v Wesley 198 3d 519 243 (Cal App, 1998) (Joseph Harris J), cited in C Thomas Blair,
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Evidence ' (1990) 76 Virginia Law Journal 853, 853; see also Stephen M Patton, 'DNA
Fingerprinting: The Castro Case' (1990) (3) Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 223, 223.
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Now countries are establishing and expanding human DNA databases26 for their use
in civil and criminal intelligence with such bases ‘ranging in size from a few hundred
to a few million samples’.27 DNA databases are, therefore, an extraordinary resource
for forensic evidence.28 Use of DNA profiling by law enforcement agencies was
initially justified for identifying rapists, murderers and other heinous offenders, but it
has gradually been expanded to involve suspects of various other crimes. Since the
events of 9/11 in the US, law enforcement agencies around the world have expanded
their areas of investigation and the techniques used. The expansion and use of
forensic DNA databases has also been justified on the basis the threat of terrorism.
However, there are several ethical objections to such uses. The implications to
society have been raised because of extensive uses of human DNA data and DNA
databases.
One of the important issues is that the increasing utilisation of human genetic
information in the justice delivery system can lead to violations of ‘human rights and
privacy (including genetic privacy)’. DNA samples are a potential source of human
genetic information and can reveal sensitive health information. It can, therefore,
violate

bodily

integrity,

privacy

(information

concerning

health,

familial

relationships and so on) and facilitate discrimination against people and have other
social consequences.29 At the same time, while addressing human rights and privacy
issues and also to ensure proper use of DNA data, some gaps (financial,
technological, cultural and social) possibly exist between developed and developing
countries that need also to be addressed. So, the following two main problem areas
have been identified by this research project:
Firstly, the issues with regards to human rights and privacy challenges in the context
of forensic use of DNA or genetic information; and, while using such information in
26

Currently ‘56 countries worldwide operate national DNA databases from Asia to Europe and the
Americas’: Andrew D Thibedeau, 'National Forensic DNA Databases' (Council for Responsible
Genetics, 2011).15.
27
Tania Simoncelli and Helen Wallace, 'Expanding Databases, Declining Liberties' (2006) 19(1)
Genewatch: A Bulletin of the Committee for Responsible Genetics
<http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=191&archi
ve=yes>.
28
Simoncelli, ‘Dangerous Excursions’, above n 15, 393.
29
Annemie Patyn and Kris Dierickx, 'Forensic DNA Databases: Genetic Testing As a Societal Choice'
(2010) 36 Journal of Medical Ethics 319, 319.
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case of criminal or civil case investigations, how these issues could be balanced with
public interest or state security measures.
Secondly, evaluation of gaps between developed and developing world, more
specifically the capacity of the developing countries to ensure proper use of this
newly emerged technology in their justice delivery systems.
1.1.3.1 Human Rights and Privacy Objections
It has already been argued that the modern justice delivery system has become
increasingly efficient and significantly more accurate through the advent of ‘DNA
profiling’.30 However, the forensic use of DNA databases (containing DNA samples
and profiles) has the potential to incur costs in terms of civil liberties and human
rights violations, including genetic privacy. Most objections are connected with the
collection, retention, access and use of DNA samples that are the basis of DNA
profiles.31 Many forensic DNA databases retain DNA samples from various persons,
including innocent people where the person has been acquitted after conclusion of
the judicial proceedings, or where the charges were dropped or not proceeded with,
or even where the samples are from persons excluded from investigation by that very
sample. When DNA samples are kept and retained in any databases, it is possible to
gather the utmost personal information about any individual (and including his or her
family) with regard to certain characteristics, including predisposition to certain
diseases.32 This is because ‘[g]enes are considered to be good predictors of many
facets of human identity’.33 They can indicate human physical traits (for example,
eye colour) and a predisposition to certain diseases (for example, heart disease,
inherited breast cancer). An examination of DNA samples can also detect genetic
conditions that affect intelligence (for example, phenylketonuria) but sometimes not
the degree to which a genetic condition may manifest itself (for example, Down
syndrome). It can also indicate a predisposition to certain mental illnesses (such as,
schizophrenia). Some researchers believe that DNA contains information regarding

30

Harlan, above n 11.
Patyn and Dierickx, above n 29.
32
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Law, Medicine and Ethics 545, 551.
33
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‘a series of behavioural characteristics, ranging from thrill-seeking34 to aggression’35
and ‘the propensity for aggressive, addictive, or criminal behaviors’.36 A number of
authors and researchers, however, dispute the claims made in regard to the usefulness
of DNA samples as predictive of such behaviours (rather than associated in some
instances with certain behaviours), and point to the complex interactions of genetics
and environment.37 In addition, it is also ‘well recognised that DNA contains
information regarding familial lineage’38 or pedigree. Such sensitive data has raised
concerns for individual and familial privacy. As Simoncelli has observed:
DNA data banks pose a number of significant individual privacy concerns ...
Unlike fingerprints ... DNA samples can provide insights into personal family
relationships, disease predisposition, physical attributes, and ancestry. Such
information could be used in sinister ways and may include things the person
herself does not wish to know. Repeated claims that human behaviors such as
aggression, substance addiction, criminal tendency, and sexual orientation can
be explained by genetics render law enforcement databases especially prone to
abuse.39

Further the DNA identification of a suspect can potentially bring police officers to
the doors of his or her relatives to ask questions about their genetic relationship to the
offender (or arrestee) and their whereabouts at the time of the crime.40 An even more
striking intrusion of privacy is when law enforcement agencies directly interrogate a
suspect’s family members, very often to request their DNA.41 This has some obvious
societal as well as practical implications. For instance, it can potentially destroy a
person’s marital life, disrupt his or her career, or even ruin his or her whole life. In
this regard Sonia M Suter has rightly pointed out:
34

N Angier, 'Variant Gene Tied to a Love of New Thrills', New York Times 2 January 996 A1, cited in
Jasanoff, above n 10, 337.
35
Virginia Morell, 'Evidence Found for a Possible 'Aggression Gene'' (1993) 260 Science 1722, 1722–
3; see also R W Stevenson, 'Researchers see Gene Link to Violence but Are Wary', New York Times 9
February 1995, cited in Jasanoff, above n 10, 337.
36
Fred W Drobner, 'DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification Testing'
(2000) 28 Capital University Law Review 479, 479–80, cited in Harlan, above n 11, 181.
37
Avi G Haimowitz, Heredity Versus Environment: Twin, Adoption, and Family Studies (24
November 2011) Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT)
<http://www.personalityresearch.org/papers/haimowitz.html>; see also Samantha P Lumbert,
Addictive Behaviors: Heredity or Environment? (24 November 2011) Rochester Institute of
Technology (RIT) <http://www.personalityresearch.org/papers/haimowitz.html>.
38
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39
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40
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Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 310, 349.
41
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Testing and the Hispanic Community' (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 1164, 1164–6.

9

All of these actions imply that the relative is a suspect or, at least, a person of
interest, which itself can be threatening, intimidating, and intrusive. At best,
such an investigation is a hassle or form of harassment. At worst, it violates the
relative’s privacy interests by subjecting them to a “lifetime [of] genetic
surveillance”.42

There are some important uses of DNA by the law enforcement and judicial
proceedings, but it is also true that neither law enforcements nor the courts
adequately consider the full extent of the privacy threats posed by DNA profiling.43
Furthermore, the ‘forced or non-consensual’ collection of DNA samples from
individuals constitutes a possible threat to bodily integrity.44 The potential further use
of DNA data stored in DNA databases constitutes a potential threat to bodily
integrity and genetic privacy. Rules and policies concerning DNA sample collection,
entry and removal criteria of DNA samples on a database generally as well as the
placement and retention of profiles on forensic DNA databases specifically imply
some more ethical challenges.45 In general, ethical issues surrounding obtaining
DNA data focuses on the concept of ‘informed consent’.46 Upon obtaining fully
informed consent, taking and storing DNA data is no longer unethical. There are
some instances where subsequent access by a third party has been permitted, where
the question of ethics appears to have been ignored, such as where a DNA profile of
42

Suter, above n 40, 350. See also Frederick R Bieber, Charles H Brenner and David Lazer, 'Finding
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43
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45
Helena Machado and Susana Silva, 'Informed Consent in Forensic DNA Databases: Volunteering,
Constructions of Risk and Identity Categorization' (2009) 4 BioSocieties 335, 336.
46
In this regard Amy Harmon argued that:
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researchers starting in 1990, for the express purpose of looking for genetic clues to the tribe’s
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Amy Harmon, 'Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA', The New York Times (online)
21 April 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?ref=general&src=me&pagewanted=print>; in
the case of R vs Dyment [1988] 2 SCR 417, the Supreme Court of Canada maintained that the ‘use of
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a suspect is uploaded onto a national forensic DNA database, and access to this
database (including that suspect’s profile) is later given by police to another
government agency for studying behavioural genetics. Such access and use, however,
is justified only with ‘free and informed consent’ of the sample provider. Such use is
also granted only for the purposes it was originally collected. In this regards, some
could argue that convicted persons have fewer civil rights; however innocent donors
or suspects who are later acquitted do not lose their right to informed consent, and
they should have a legitimate claim before a court of law.47 This is, of course,
contingent upon whether the consent given is fully informed or not, as this is
required to make the decision. Some additional ethical issues associated with
informed consent include: what ‘informed’ truly indicates, and how to ensure that the
consent provider is actually informed.48 Further, it is very often argued that for the
future collective well-being of society or public good, individuals’ should provide
their DNA samples. Rules and practices of informed consent, therefore, supply a
framework for what has become a moral duty for citizens, that is, to comply with
technical interventions for the sake of the administration of justice. However, little
attention has been paid to the duties of the management or custodians of forensic
DNA databases49 with regards to the protection of sample providers’ rights.
Other than law enforcement purposes, DNA information is being used for statistical,
educational and medical research purposes.50 Consequently, a group of individuals,
corporations, and agencies are interested in such sensitive information about the
human body.51 Release of this sensitive genetic information could have some farreaching familial and social implications. It could, for example, influence placement
decisions by adoption agencies, allow prospective spouses to select their mates based
on perceived genetic advantage and so on. It could also give rise to discrimination
against and stigmatisation of an individual or groups. Moreover, such biological
47
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information could give rise another class in the society: a ‘genetic minority’ or an
underclass of those perceived as genetically inferior. This could mean that solely on
the basis of biological information, society could discriminate against individuals
deemed ‘substandard’ subjecting such persons to custodial arrangements or to
specific eugenic measures designed to eliminate those whose DNA manifested the
undesirable trait.52 Such measures could include compulsory sterilisation of those of
reproductive age, and compulsory pre-conception or pre-implantation testing, or
termination of foetuses conceived with the undesirable DNA trait. This could
theoretically occur even though it is a mere prediction or a possibility not a certainty
that some undesired trait or characteristics may be manifested in them.53
In some jurisdictions, human rights and privacy objections are sometimes overlooked
by stressing that collection and use of DNA data as very useful for maintaining law
and order.54 Many DNA databases around the world retain DNA samples, including
those of innocent suspects, for a period of time even after finishing the investigation.
The main justification for such retention is that persons who later commit more
crimes can be identified and apprehended quickly.55 Indefinite retention of DNA data
collected from suspects and other individuals has given rise to questions about
privacy rights. In he case of S and Marper v the UK,56 S and Marper claimed that
retention of their DNA samples and profiles interfered with their right to respect for
private life because this sensitive information is linked to their personal identity.
They argued that such types of information should be kept within their control. The
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administrative court rejected their application and an appeal to the UK House of
Lords was also dismissed.57 Lord Steyn concluded that the mere retention of
fingerprints and DNA samples did not constitute any interference with private life
and it was proportionate to what was necessary for detection investigation and
prosecution of crime.58 UK legislation does not require the destruction of DNA
samples and they may be retained even after fulfilment of the purpose for which they
have been collected.59 Finally, however, on appeal to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), the Court ruled that the ‘blanket and indiscriminate nature of the
powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons
suspected but not convicted of offences’ violates the right to respect for private and
family life.60 The case pioneered developments in this field, the rules it
recommended be adopted and the procedures it advised to be followed have been of
considerable influence in other contexts around the world. Although the ECtHR has
provided its ruling protecting human rights and privacy in 2008; at this stage it is
essential to analyse how many national jurisdictions (including the UK) have taken
appropriate measures in pursuit of the principle and rule set forth by this judgment.
Finally, it can be argued that there are two opposite but essential interests: one is
human rights and privacy; the other is law enforcement for public safety and
security. It is, therefore, important to take appropriate measure for balancing the
constitutional guarantee of right to privacy and other human rights with the
government’s duty to ensure public safety as well as secure the well-being of its
citizens. The main idea or notion is respect and lawful protection to society without
hindering individual privacy. In this respect Laura A Matejik highlighted that:
In the case of DNA collection there is a delicate balance between an
individual’s freedom to drink, spit, or blow his nose without fear that law
enforcement will collect his genetic information and society’s interest in
efficiently resolving tragic crimes.61
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It can be argued that technology is a powerful force for protecting human rights.
However, such technology can also slowly and steadily link humankind with ‘an allpervasive monitoring system’ leading towards a surveillance society.62 What Laura A
Matejik argued in her earlier quotation, the editorial of the journal Nature similarly
pointed out that in order to honour and uphold the spirit of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, a balance needed to be struck between individual
freedom and social interests.63
1.1.3.2 Gap between Developed and Developing Countries
The use of a forensic DNA database generates enormous financial expenditures (that
is, costs related to management, DNA testing, maintenance of advanced technology,
manpower and training, and so on), as well as non-financial burdens (that is, the
protection of human rights and privacy). A society or a state that wants to use a
system of forensic DNA databases therefore needs to balance the ‘costs’ and
‘benefits’ of such a system. A society or state has to be willing and have the ability to
cover these costs. The financial costs are a particular burden for developing
countries, which cannot bear the same costs as developed countries to maintain
sophisticated technology like DNA databases. The correlated activities of DNA data
sharing, co-operation and co-ordination between developed and developing countries
then falls into some uncertainty. Questions of equal standards, quality and ability (in
terms of financial, technological and human resources) raise important issues.
Another variance between nations emerges when concentrating on the non-financial
costs, with fundamental social and political choices to be made between security and
liberty (that is, human rights and privacy protection). Although ‘forensic DNA
databases increase security, at the same time they restrict the liberty of citizens’.64
All countries, but arguably most particularly developing countries, are therefore
challenged to determine ‘what importance it [should] attach to these different
values’.65
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According to the statistics given by the INTERPOL DNA Unit,66 it is evident that
almost all over the world the techniques of DNA profiling and its related databases
have gained immense popularity, and, depending on their capabilities, countries from
different regions are taking initiatives to establish DNA databases. One point that
should be noted here is that the number and success rate of establishing or running
these databases is higher in developed countries compared to the figures for the
developing world.67 In the age of high technology and globalisation it is important to
address why there are such inconsistencies or gaps. This thesis will address these
issues in chapters 5, 6, and 7.
In summary, a second but equally important issue that has been identified by this
project is that there are some extra challenges for the developing world compared to
the developed countries in the area of the forensic use of DNA information and
databases. These include a lack of knowledge and expertise as well as lower levels of
financial and technological resources. This study focuses first on the human rights
and privacy issues related to the forensic use of DNA information. It will then
address relevant gaps between developed and developing countries in this area.
1.1.4

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.1.4.1 Primary Questions
The central questions to be addressed by this research project are:
1. Is there any scope for human rights and privacy violations in the context of
forensic use of DNA data, and how can these issues be balanced with public
interest or state security measures?
2. Is there any gap between developed and developing countries concerning the
forensic use of DNA data in the justice delivery system, and how can this gap
be addressed and/or minimised?

66
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1.1.4.2 Secondary Questions
i.

Is there any scope for revealing health information from DNA samples and
profiles collected for case investigation purposes?

ii.

What are the collection and storage mechanisms for DNA samples and for
profiling in the forensic DNA database?

iii.

How far it is possible to take voluntary and informed consent from suspects
and other individuals while collecting their DNA samples?

iv.

How long should a DNA sample be retained in the database?

v.

Which parties should have access and the right to use the genetic data stored
in the forensic DNA database?

vi.

Is it possible to violate privacy (including genetic privacy) while using DNA
samples and profiles for forensic purposes?

vii.

How far are the developing countries well equipped to ensure the proper use
of DNA database in the justice delivery system?

viii.

What kind of standard should develop between and among both developed
and developing countries to protect human rights and privacy without
compromising public interest or state security measures, and to minimise
gaps between them?

1.1.5

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The main aim of this research project is to look for the human rights and privacy
violations issues in the context of the forensic use of DNA or genetic information,
and how such issues could be balanced with public interest or state security
measures. Another intention is to illuminate the gaps between developed and
developing countries, more specifically the capacity of developing countries to
ensure the proper use of this newly emerged technology in the justice delivery
system. In order to achieve this aim, this study has determined some objectives and
goals. The main objectives of this research project are to:
•

Conduct two case studies on two forensic DNA databases, one from the UK,
as a developed country, and the other from the Bangladesh, as a developing
country.
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•

Examine the current practices of these two forensic DNA databases,
including their management, governance frameworks and guidelines (for
instance, rules regarding the collection, storage or retention, access and use of
genetic information);

•

Investigate the scope for human rights and privacy violations in the context of
forensic use of DNA data and databases;

•

Investigate the gap between the developed and developing countries
regarding forensic DNA database management (including technological and
economic gaps), and also to evaluate the needs and concerns of developing
countries regarding forensic use of DNA information;

•

Assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the current mechanisms, and
investigate some measures regarding how to balance individual privacy rights
and public interests in the forensic use of DNA information.

The achievement of these above mentioned objectives are significant for the current
research project.
1.1.6

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

Choosing an appropriate research methodology is an essential part of any research
project. There are several research methodologies, but the combination of qualitative
and quantitative research (that is, mixed methods) has been particularly welcomed by
social science researchers. In recent years mixed methods have also been used in
socio-legal research projects.68 In addition, the diversification of research methods
allows a better understanding of the research phenomena and the use of multiple
research methods also increases the validity of the collected data and derived
outcomes.69 In order to achieve the aim and objectives of this project and answer the
research questions, this study has pursued three different approaches to gather
research materials:

68
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1. Analysis of Literature and Legislation;
2. Case studies of selected countries; and
3. Qualitative (semi-structured interview) as well as quantitative (survey) data.
This thesis analyses national and international legislation, case-law and literature
relevant to the field of genetic information. Following this analysis, two case studies
have been selected regarding two different human DNA facilities or service systems
— one from the UK (representing the scenario of developed countries) and another
from Bangladesh (highlighting the problems of developing countries). In order to
understand the legal, administrative and management process as a whole, these DNA
databases have been critically examined and analysed from different perspectives.
For instance, attention has been paid to how they collect, store and retain genetic
information, how they allow third parties to access such information and to what
extent such practices are perilous to human rights and individual privacy. But
collecting, storing and accessing information is not the whole picture: how these
databases are operating in the existing legal paradigms that address all these issues
both in the UK and Bangladesh is a central issue addressed in this study. The
analysis identifies some weaknesses regarding the usual practices of such databases
in the area of human rights and privacy. Significantly, the two case studies illuminate
the gaps between developed and developing countries regarding the establishment of
DNA databases and the forensic use of DNA information. That is how the case
studies and data analysis results address the two main focus or research questions
(that is, human rights and privacy violations as well as gaps between developed and
developing countries) of this study.
The first case study involves the UK National DNA database (hereinafter referred to
as the NDNAD) and represents a developed country’s approach. This case study has
been critically analysed through a range of information sources, including
international treaties or conventions, national legislations, judicial decisions, journal
articles, reports, and newspaper publications. On the other hand, as a part of the
second case study on the Bangladesh National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory
(hereinafter referred to as the NFDPL), semi-structured interviews as well as survey
methods are employed as a primary data collection technique. Use of DNA
technology in the Bangladeshi justice system is a new trend and, consequently, there
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is a shortage of archival or secondary sources (that is, legislative and other
literatures). The author has therefore had to analyse and argue this case study based
on primary data (semi-structured interviews and survey). Semi-structured interviews
were conducted before a survey was administered. The mixed methods of qualitative
(interview) and quantitative (survey) strategies have been used to explore the
objectives of this case study.
Further, in order to argue the research questions and analyse the qualitative data, a
part of the second case study has used grounded theory (GT). GT has been applied in
collected data (the responses to the semi-structured interviews) in order to generate a
theory. Although Glaser70 discourages in depth literature reviews in the studies
where the GT method is applied, he does not intend that the researcher ignore the
literature altogether. The initial literature review for this study was undertaken when
the research proposal was being written in order to determine the scope, objectives,
and type of research that had been conducted in the area under study.71 One
important point should be noted here that with regards to the case study on the
NFDPL (Bangladesh), there is a serious lack of secondary research materials. The
scenario of this case study is, therefore, more suitable for the application of the GT
method. As a result, the capacity of the NFDPL of Bangladesh (as representative of a
developing country) to handle human rights and privacy challenges as well as its gap
with the NDNAD has been revealed from this qualitative data analysis (that is,
through the application of the GT method). These data analysis results are also
verified and supported by the quantitative data analysis results. While collecting data,
and applying both qualitative and quantitative methods, the author has chosen nine
participants from the NFDPL of Bangladesh. The use of mixed methods was also
helpful in providing evidence to support or disprove the hypothesis or problem
statements, particularly with regards to the case study on the NFDPL (Bangladesh).
This section gives an overview of the research methodology and design adopted. A
more detailed discussion of the methodology and approach used in this study is given
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Barney G Glaser, Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence v Forcing (Sociology Press,
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Research in Nursing (Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1986) 39, 43–5.
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in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the research
design (that is, how this research has been undertaken ‘step by step’).
1.1.7

CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH

Research about human genetics is highly significant both for the contemporary world
community and for the future generations. Michael Kirby J rightly pointed out that:
Perhaps, from the perspective of history, the most important scientific
breakthrough of this century may be seen, in time, to be neither nuclear fission,
nor interplanetary flight, nor even informatics, but the fundamental building and
basal molecular biology which permits the human species to look into itself and
find, at last, the basic building blocks of human and other life. Who knows
where this discovery will lead the imaginative human mind? Lawyers, and
indeed citizens everywhere, should begin thinking about the issue. In its
resolution may lie the very future of our species?72

The debate about research in human genetics and use of genetic information reveals
two major yet mutually dependent opposite views. One is based on the notion of the
positive, often medical use of genetic information, such as its use in research leading
to the discovery of gene-based therapies (or pharmacological products) and
consequent health care benefits as well as the forensic use of DNA to assist in the
detection of criminals or the exoneration of innocent people. The other is based on
the violations of human rights and privacy that may be involved in case
investigation, or the negative uses to which genetic information may be put. This
study is therefore significant, as it will identify the areas or scope of misuses of DNA
data (that is, violation of human rights and privacy), particularly in the justice
delivery system of both developed and developing countries. The findings of this
research will also contribute to the discovery of issues related to the violation of
human rights and privacy as well as to the prevention of such violations.
It is argued that DNA information, particularly that of a sensitive nature, can be
subject to misuse if it is not properly managed. The privacy of such information can
be abused and the information can be used to discriminate against individuals.
Negative attitudes towards populations able to be genetically identified as having
72
MD Kirby, 'Man's Freedom and the Human Genome' in The Human Genome Project: Legal Aspects
(Fundacion BBV, 1994) vol 1, 265, 267–8, cited in Mathew Stulic, 'Genetic Non-Discrimination,
Privacy and Property Rights' (June 2000) 7(2) eLaw Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal
of Law [6] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n2/stulic72.html>.
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‘less than optimal’ characteristics (for example, prone to arthritis, diabetes or heart
disease, or as sufferers from cystic fibrosis or someone who will develop
Huntington’s or Parkinson’s Disease or is a carrier and so on) could also give rise to
a new concept, that of a ‘genetic minority’, and new forms of discrimination. Such a
population could be identified as ‘genetic sub-class’ in society. The adoption and
popularisation of such a concept would be as harmful as racism, leading to
employment and health insurance discrimination against them,73 including ‘potential
social and psychological consequences (for example marital decisions, reproductive
choices) for the individuals’74 and their families. It is, therefore, important to identify
specific instances and causes of existing genetic discrimination to gain some idea of
a probable picture of future discrimination issues that might arise due to large scale
research databases being mined for information and act now in a proactive manner to
protect people rather than in response to individual instances as they arise with all the
delays that such an approach necessarily involves. This study also significantly
contributes in addressing the debate about the creation of a ‘genetic minority’, and
also suggesting mechanisms to combat these new challenges.
It is important to consider that a cautious use of sensitive DNA data is critical to
realise public benefits, especially for poorer nations, rather than impeding the
development and application of genetic technology. The ‘cautious use’ refers here to
the use of DNA data, being aware of and considering its associated problems. This
project has worked to pinpoint or determine the problems faced by developing
countries as they use the DNA data in their justice delivery systems.
As alluded to earlier, two case studies have been selected in this study. The
comparison of these case studies (that is, the NDNAD of the UK and the NFDPL of
Bangladesh) will reveal the existing scenario of both these DNA databases, including
73
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their contribution in their respective justice systems, the scope of privacy and human
rights violations, as well as gaps between these two forensic DNA service systems.
The case study on Bangladesh is more realistic and concrete with qualitative (semistructured interview) and quantitative (survey) data. The data collected illustrate the
existing scenarios and challenges faced by Bangladesh with regard to DNA
information handling. As a result, the outcome of this part of the research (that is, the
Bangladesh DNA service system case study) will significantly contribute to the
improvement of the justice delivery system of Bangladesh. Further, the study will
reveal the gaps between developed and developing countries in regard to the use of
DNA databases for forensic purposes, and also uncover areas where more emphasis
needs to be given to minimise such gaps. This way the research outcomes will be a
good guide for the world community in developing its awareness of these challenges.
The research outcomes will similarly contribute to ensuring the proper use of human
genetic information for both developed and developing countries.
In addition, this research will be a valuable contribution in the area of the forensic
use of DNA information. The intention is to ensure that, even in exceptional
circumstances, human rights, justice and sustainable development are not
compromised. This project will propose some mechanisms to ensure the proper use
of human genetic information that will be applicable across both developed and
developing countries. A suitable legal approach is essential for the global community
to ensure the proper use of genetic information worldwide. Finally, to the best
knowledge of the author, there has been a shortage of legal analytical research on the
core theme of the thesis. There is also lack of socio-legal research in this field.
Therefore, this research project will make an original contribution in the field of
‘forensic use of DNA information: human rights, privacy and other challenges’.
1.1.8

DELIMITATION OF SCOPE

The scope of this study did not cover the research related to human genetics which
deals with the health sector to identify genetic reasons for certain diseases and to
discover effective drugs as well as identify the area of misuses of such information.
Rather this research project has focused only on the issues related to human rights
and privacy violations in the context of forensic use of DNA information, and the
gap between the developed and developing countries in addressing these issues. As
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has been mentioned earlier, this study has concentrated on two case-studies — one in
the UK and one in Bangladesh — in order to gain an overview and examine the
existing situation of both developed and developing countries. Such case studies
have revealed the existing scenario about the issues involved in two different
countries that have completely different political, economic, social and cultural
backgrounds. Finally, this project particularly concentrates on balancing the two
opposite but essential interests to ensure proper use of human genetic information
(that is, its use while protecting human rights and privacy) in the justice delivery
system. Finally, this project particularly concentrates on balancing the two opposite
but essential interests — the use of DNA information to ensure justice (that is public
safety and national security) as well as to protect individual’s right to privacy — in
other words to ensure proper use of human genetic information in the justice delivery
system.
1.1.9

THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the problem
associated with the forensic use of DNA information, particularly human rights and
privacy challenges, as well as gap between the developed and developing countries
in addressing these issues. It also contains the research questions and objectives, the
adopted methodology and approach, the anticipated contribution of the research, and
the delimitation of scope of this thesis. The discussions are divided into a number of
sections. Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 give a brief introduction and background of this
research. Section 1.1.3 identifies research problems and issues and section 1.1.4
focuses on the research questions. Section 1.1.5 describes the research objectives and
then section 1.1.6 elaborates on the methodology and approach whilst sections 1.1.7
and 1.1.8 highlight the contribution and delimitation of scope of the research. Section
1.1.9 describes the thesis structure. Section 1.1.10 presents the limitation of this
study and finally section 1.1.11 provides summary and a brief conclusion.
Chapter 2 (which includes sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) begins with the basis of DNA
profiling and a brief scientific background of DNA. Then section 2.1.4 examines the
significance of the forensic use of DNA profiling. Section 2.1.5 subsequently
discusses forensic DNA databases and the existing scenario in the international
context. The last section (section 2.1.6) of this chapter comprises the conclusion.
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Overall, Chapter 2 sets out a brief account of how research relating to human genetic
information has increased in recent years through technological development and
what kinds of threats are involved in such developments (such as, the use of DNA
profiling in the justice delivery system) from a very general point of view. The
purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide a clear understanding of the
background information relating to the issues identified by this research. At the
introductory stage, the discussion also gives an overview about the justification and
foundation for this research.
Chapter 3 focused on the ‘forensic use of DNA information v human rights and
privacy challenges’. This chapter begins with the discussion on human rights, right to
privacy and genetic privacy and provides an overview. Then section 3.1.3 of this
chapter provides details about right to privacy, genetic privacy and its existing
legislative justifications both in a national and international context. This section
further examines case law related to privacy and genetic privacy issues. Section 3.1.4
subsequently compares the forensic use of DNA information and the right to privacy;
and then section 3.1.5 outlines the future of the forensic use of DNA information.
Finally, this chapter concludes (section 3.1.6) with a brief consideration of how these
two mutually opposite but inter-dependent issues could draw on one channel so that
fair use of forensic DNA data can contribute in the maintenance of social harmony
and justice.
Chapter 4 describes and explains the strategies related to research methods and the
design of this study. It mainly describes the study methodology, case study process
and the data collection methods. Section 4.1.2 justifies the applicability of sociolegal research methodology, including the reason for using multi-stage research
design in this study. The discussion of this section further deals with the analysis of
relevant legislation and other relevant texts, and then it provides an overview of the
empirical analysis of case studies that have been undertaken in this research. Later,
section 4.1.3 discusses the qualitative method (including how two case studies have
been undertaken and semi-structured interviews conducted). This section also
discusses ethical considerations pertaining to the data collection methods. Subsection 4.1.3.4 then describes the qualitative data analysis strategy (which includes
the constant comparative method of GT, the process of coding of interview data, and
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the data analysis). Section 4.1.4 provides information on the how the quantitative
method has been applied, the justification and limitation of quantitative method, and
includes survey questionnaire design as well as procedures, and the quantitative data
approach to analysis. Finally, section 4.1.5 provides a brief conclusion.
The empirical part of this thesis begins with chapter 5 which focuses on the case
study of the NDNAD of the United Kingdom (UK that is, England and Wales). It
provides a general framework to understanding the DNA database managing
capacity of a developed country. The main factor involved in this process is ‘human
rights and privacy violations’ in the context of developed countries (that is, the UK).
Section 5.1.2 of this chapter sketches the forensic use of DNA information in the
developed countries context. Then section 5.1.3 gives an overview of the case study
of the NDNAD representing the developed countries context and section 5.1.4
provides a brief idea about the UK and its human rights situation. Section 5.1.5
mainly focuses on the background to and nature of the NDNAD of the UK; its
governance, management and oversight; technology in use; and the database
governance regulatory or legislative framework of the UK. This section also
highlights the NDNAD practices of DNA sample collection, storage or retention, and
access and use. This section further analyses the benefits of the NDNAD. Section
5.1.6 explores the challenges (particularly human rights and privacy violations)
regarding the access and use of the NDNAD. This section mainly analyses the
Marper Case (2008)75 focusing on the debate about the right to individual privacy v
public interest. Finally, section 5.1.7 concludes with a brief consideration of the
impact of these risks and challenges.
Chapter 6 focuses on the second case study of this thesis: the NFDPL of Bangladesh.
Firstly, section 6.1.2 provides an overview of the historical, social, economic,
political and legal background that contributes to understanding the conditions under
which the country is developing and the extent of its capacity to manage a new
technology with limited resources. Section 6.1.3 then provides a brief description of
Bangladesh and its human rights situation. Section 6.1.3 mainly focuses on the
background to and nature of the NFDPL; its governance, management and oversight;
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technology in use; and the uses and benefits of the NFDPL. This section also
highlights and examines existing practices (that is, of DNA sample collection,
storage or retention, access and use), as well as the legislative framework for the
NFDPL. Section 6.1.4 provides an analysis of collected data, focusing on the risks or
challenges associated with the NFDPL. In this section, collected data (via by both
qualitative and quantitative data) have been thoroughly analysed. Overall, Chapter 6
addresses how the Bangladeshi government manages the financial and technological
issues as well as other challenges in governing the NFDPL. Finally, section 6.1.5
provides a brief conclusion.
Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and recommendations of this study. This chapter
mainly focuses on the comparative analysis between the NDNAD of the UK and
NFDPL of Bangladesh. Section 7.1.2 begins with a comparative study of the legalpolitical, socio-economic and human rights situation of the UK and Bangladesh.
Section 7.1.3 then compares the findings from the two case studies. This section
mainly compares the case studies issue by issue. Based on the findings from the
comparative analysis, sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.5 provide some recommendations and
way forward respectively. Finally, section 7.1.6 summarises the whole chapter and
draws a general conclusion of the entire thesis.
1.1.10 LIMITATION OF THIS STUDY
One of the main limitations of this study is the shortage of secondary materials or
archival sources of materials about the NFDPL, Dhaka, Bangladesh — the subject of
the case study which had been selected to represent the scenario of a developing
country — and where is a big gap between theory and practice with regard to DNA
profiling and their use in the criminal justice system of Bangladesh (as allueded
above). This is because its use is fairly new in Bangladesh; and, therefore, there is a
serious shortage of archival sources of information. As a result, the researcher had to
concentrate on the collection of primary data using both qualitative and quantitative
methods. Data has first been collected applying qualitative method (semi-structured
interview), and then quantitative method (a survey of the same nine participants) has
been utilised in order to support and to verify the qualitative data analysis.
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Another limitation of this research project was to complete the first case study based
on literature review and secondary data due to time constraints on empirical data
collection. However, the breadth and depth of the secondary research material related
to this UK case study were such that the primary data collection was not considered
to be a high priority. Data collected from secondary sources was suitable and updated
enough to answer the research questions.
1.1.11 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Science in the twenty-first century serves the law in indispensable ways, by
providing evidence for and against particular accounts of how things happened that
are of concern to the law. Genetic science, particularly through the powerful
technique of DNA-based identification, has come to play an increasingly crucial role
in the conduct of legal investigations and in the resolution of a myriad of civil and
criminal disputes. In little more than 25 years, DNA profiling has moved from the
status of novel and contested scientific evidence to a ‘taken for granted’ implement
in the toolkit of forensic science. Much progress has been made toward standardising
the process of DNA profiling and ensuring high levels of quality control in DNA
testing facilities.76 Yet although the admissibility of DNA evidence is no longer in
doubt, its use in the legal system continues to raise new questions about civil liberties
(that is, human rights and privacy issues).
Doing justice, in most cases, ‘demands a complex balancing of multiple
considerations’77: using DNA data while considering its human rights and privacy
issues in general, and also keeping in mind the needs and capacity of the developing
countries to use such technology. The emerging use of DNA profiling, which causes
human right and privacy violations, requires special measures to address such
violations. In addition, it is essential to take measures to control or reduce the gaps
between developed and developing countries regarding the use of DNA technology
in their justice delivery systems. It is, therefore, essential to guide and control the use
of technological discoveries so that they can bring benefits for all. If research related
to genetics and forensic use of DNA data in the justice delivery system is not
controlled, protracted controversy and counterproductive inter-jurisdictional conflict
76
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may arise. Therefore, national and international measures are potentially important in
order to control misuse and also to ensure proper use of genetic samples and related
information in the justice delivery system.
It should be noted that the study of human genetic information and its use does not
necessarily contradict support for pro-social technological development for the
forensic purposes. Genetic technology is similar to any other technology in that it has
both merits and demerits. The purpose of this study is not to develop any completely
new philosophy about how to deal with challenges associated with human genetic
material and information; rather it addresses a few issues, some mechanisms or
solutions that that could guarantee for the proper management of human genetic
information and also ensure the appropriate use of DNA technology.
In the post-September 11 world, concepts of security and privacy have been
redefined. Many new security measures are routinely taken worldwide that clearly
contravene traditional concepts of privacy. Identifying personal information, such as
finger prints and blood samples, are collected to make comprehensive databases of
personal information (of citizens, visitors and/or foreigners) to enhance national
security. It is really difficult to determine, however, if large scale human genetic
projects or their databases could be utilised in the fight against terrorism in the future
instead of focusing purely on medical research. Generally, all individuals have the
right to determine what information should be collected about themselves and how it
should be used. However, no right, including that of privacy, is absolute, but rather is
subject to a number of conditions. When it comes to the handling of sensitive
information like genetic data, extra attention is required. Privacy is always an
important human rights issue and current trends in genetic research have raised
several new questions. An appropriate international legislative or other mechanism
has to be sought in order to solve the new challenges related to genetic information.
Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to review the challenges and to recommend
some mechanisms to protect human genetic material and information.
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CHAPTER 2
2. 1 GENERAL BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

2.1.1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a combined study of law and genetic science. It is therefore critical to
pinpoint some terminologies related to genetic information in the field of legal study.
This chapter will concentrate on key terms or introductory ideas about human genetic
information, such as DNA and its brief scientific development, and DNA Profiling
and its various features. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear
understanding of the background information relating to the issues identified by this
research (that is, human rights and privacy violations). It should be noted from the
outset that this chapter does not intend to discuss these issues as it will be dealt with
in chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7. Rather, it sets out a brief account about how research
relating to human genetic information has increased internationally in recent years
through technological development. The discussion also addresses the nature of
threats that are involved in such developments (such as, the use of DNA profiling in
the justice delivery system and its associated challenges). It also highlights the
significance of human genetic information in the course of the case investigation
process, for instance the potential of DNA profiling in detecting the offenders with
some precision. At the introductory stage, the discussion will also give an overview
of the justification and foundation for this research.
In order to analyse the ideas sequentially, this chapter is organised into six different
sections. Section 2.1.2 begins with the basis of DNA — a brief scientific
background. The discussion also includes (in sub-section 2.1.2.4) the basics of
human genetic information. Section 2.1.3 identifies the discovery and development
of DNA profiling. Subsequently, section 2.1.4 looks at the significance of its forensic
use. Section 2.1.5 then provides a description of the current development of forensic
DNA databases (that is, the existing scenario of DNA profiling databases in the
international context). Finally, section 2.1.6 concludes by looking at the issues with
regards to human rights and privacy violations as well as related concerns in the
process of the administration of justice.
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2.1.2

HUMAN GENETICS: THE BASIS OF DNA PROFILING

2.1.2.1 A Brief Scientific Background of DNA
This section will discuss DNA and provide brief scientific background. It will also
provide a foundation for further discussions on issues related to human genetics
(more particularly issues regarding the forensic use of DNA profiling and databases)
that are going to be addressed in the later chapters of this study.
2.1.2.2 What is DNA?
(a) Terminology and Definition
DNA or deoxyribonucleic acid contains the hereditary materials that are used in the
development and functioning of all known living organisms.78 In other words the
instructions that are needed to direct the activities of human body cells are contained
within the DNA.79 The reason it is called ‘deoxyribonucleic acid’ is because it is an
acid that is found in every cell of the human body which contains lots of sugar group
(ribo) attached to it and each sugar group has a missing oxygen molecule (deoxy).80
It contains genetic instructions which pass from adult organisms to their offspring
during reproduction.81 In other words, DNA is the molecule that encodes and carries
the entire hereditary information82 of each individual in almost every cell of the body
and which is the same in each cell. With the exception of identical twins, the DNA of
every individual is unique.83 The exception arises from the fact that monozygotic or
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‘identical twins come from the same fertilized egg and, thus, they share … identical
DNA profiles,’84 unlike dizygotic (DZ) twins which ‘arise from a pair of separate
eggs, fertilized by two different sperm [and] ... [a]s a result, share only 50% of DNA
sequence variation, on average.’85
Samuel K Moore has described the composition of DNA as being:
made up of units called nucleotides and each of the nucleotides consists of a
deoxy-ribose sugar, a phosphate, and one of four chemicals which are called
bases — adenine, guanine, cytosine, or thymine. ... The nucleotides are the
backbone of DNA.86

Therefore DNA is the chemical store-house of an individual’s genetic material. It is a
tiny interconnected thread-like molecule, a double helix that contains all the
information required for the life process. It is also referred to as the ‘hereditary blue
print’87 and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime. DNA is the
fundamental building block for an individual’s entire genetic makeup.88 All
hereditary characteristics of an individual (such as eye colour, hair colour, blood
group and so on)89 are determined by the information that is contained in the DNA
molecule and such information passes from one generation to the next.90 As DNA is

84

Freckelton, ‘DNA Profiling’, above n 24, 167; see also Andrei Semikhodskii, Dealing with DNA
Evidence: A Legal Guide (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 2. However, some recent studies have shown
that ‘[i]dentical twins apparently do not have identical DNA’ and there are minute differences:Anahad
O’Connor, 'The Claim: Identical Twins have Identical DNA', The New York Times (Online) 11 March
2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/health/11real.html>; see also Anne Casselman, Identical
Twins' Genes Are Not Identical (3 April 2008) Scientific American
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=identical-twins-genes-are-notidentical&print=true>.
85
Albert H C Wong, Irving I Gottesman and Arturas Petronis, 'Phenotypic Differences in Genetically
Identical Organisms: The Epigenetic Perspective ' (2005) 14(Review Issue 1) Human Molecular
Genetics R11, R11.
86
Samuel K Moore, 'Understanding the Human Genome' (2000) 37(11) IEEE Spectrum 33, 33–4.
87
Natalie Hyde, DNA: What Makes You the Person You Are? (Crabtree Publishing Company, 2010)
4.
88
Giggins, above n 82, 3.
89
Barbara M Newman and Philip R Newman, Development Through Life: A Psychosocial Approach
(Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 10th ed, 2009) 85. See also Donald E Riley, 'DNA Testing: An
Introduction for Non-Scientists an Illustrated Explanation' (6 April 2005) Scientific Testimony: An
Online Journal <http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/riley/riley.html>.
90
Newman and Newman, above n 89. See also National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory,
'Introduction to Forensic DNA Profiling:' (Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women,
Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,
November 2006) 7–8; see also Sharif Akhteruzzaman, DNA Technology in Criminal Justice System
(11 October 2011) National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, Dhaka Medical College [1]
<www.jatibd.org/DNA.doc>. Note: their manifestation in the subject, however, can be disguised by

31

present in almost every cell, almost any biological sample (like blood, saliva, semen,
hair, teeth and bone tissue) is, therefore, a potential source of DNA. Section 7 of
Genetic Privacy and Non-discrimination Bill 1988 of Australia has defined the term
DNA as a ‘genetic material that is composed of nucleotides that encode genetic
information’.91
2.1.2.3 Its Brief Scientific Background
(a) Location of DNA
The human body is a multi-cellular organism. It is composed of approximately 100
trillion cells, and has about two hundred different kinds of cells.92 A ‘cell’ is the
smallest unit93 of an organism which represent a self-stabilising system, and it
contains all the information required for the life process and reproduction. Cells
integrate the activity of the genes and their products into a functional entity to form
the basic units of all living organisms.94 Every cell in the human body contains a
‘nucleus’ with the exception of mature red blood cells.95 Within the nucleus there are
a tightly curled fibre like structures, which are known as ‘chromosomes’96 or the
‘coloured bodies’ (a term derived from the Greek word chromo means ‘coloured’
and soma means body’).97 Each chromosome is ‘a linear structure found in all cells
of an organism’.98 Normally, there are 46 chromosomes in every cell of human
body,99 arranged in 23 pairs. One of those 23 pairs consists of the ‘sex
chromosomes’, with the presence of two X chromosomes determining a child is
the use of coloured contact lenses and hair dye – but matching the samples accurately identifies the
person.
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female, and one Y determining a child is male (though there are other combinations,
such as XXY (Klinefelter’s Syndrome or XYY syndrome). The other 22 are
homologous, referred to as ‘autosomal chromosomes’.100 A child inherits one set of
chromosomes (23) from his or her mother and another (a further 23 chromosomes)
from his or her father, and a parent passes one set of his or her chromosomes down to
each of his or her children.101 Chromosomes differ in their shape and size, banding
pattern, and location of the centromere102 (that is the constricted region of linear
chromosomes, joining the two sister chromatids that make up an X-shaped
chromosome).103
‘Each chromosome contains a strand of tightly coiled DNA. The DNA strand is
divided into small units called ‘genes’104 and each gene occupies a particular site
called its “locus”, plural “loci”)’ on the strand.105 Genes transmit genetic information
through chromosomes.106 The chromosomes in the human body contain
approximately 35000–45000 genes,107 and this complete set of genes is known as the
‘human genome’.108 This genome is the hereditary basis of every living organism.109
Therefore, each gene ‘with a specific location and consisting of the inherited genetic
material known as DNA’.110 DNA serves as the building blocks of genes which are
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the units of heredity. DNA is located inside the cell nucleus111 and tightly packed
with chromosomes. If the DNA inside one cell was stretched out end to end, it would
be approximately 1.8 metres (or six feet) long.112
Any biological sample from a human body (apart from sex cells) taken at any time
can reveal the genetic information about that person.113 This means that a single
sample of blood, hair, saliva or any other biological material can be analysed and reanalysed114

to obtain genetic information about a person, his or her parents,

ancestors or heritage as well as his or her potential future offspring.
(b) Structure of DNA
The following figure represents the whole structure of DNA and it has been cited
from the Glossary of the National Human Genome Research Institute of the US.115

Figure 1: The Structure of DNA116
DNA consists of two molecules joined in a double helix and it can be visualised as a
twisted ladder. The ladder sides consist of smaller sugar and phosphate molecules.117
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Each strand of the ladder consists of four different sub-units or bases. These bases
are: adenine (A), guanine (G), thymine (T) and cytosine (C) and are represented by
four letters (A, G, T and C). Pairs of these bases make up the rungs of the ladder.118
Adenine can only be paired with thymine, and cytosine can only be paired with
guanine.119 ‘The human genome contains roughly 3 billion bp [base pairs]’.120 The
information contained in DNA is the sequence of these four letters (called the genetic
alphabet) along the strand. This basic structure DNA is the same for all organisms;
the differences are in the length of the code and the order of the letters. For example,
the sequence ACGCT represents different information than the sequence AGTCC, in
the same way that the word STAR has a different meaning than ARTS or RATS even
though they use the same letters.121 As Pilnic explains:
[H]uman DNA, for example, is not fundamentally different to viral DNA,
except in the way these four bases are ordered and repeated. Just as words only
make sense in phrases or sentences, a length of DNA becomes meaningful when
it makes up the recipe for a gene.122

DNA is also popularly known to as the ‘genetic code’ or ‘genetic program’, a
program that is coded by those four bases, or sub-units.123 That means that when the
four bases of DNA are arranged in triplets (codons) in various orders, it represents
the ‘genetic code’. The four bases or sub-units direct the cells ‘to construct proteins
which provide structure to and mediate chemical reactions within a cell’.124 These
proteins therefore ‘determine the characteristics of cells, which in turn collectively
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determine the characteristics of the individual’.125 For instance, the sequence
ATCGTT might determine blue eyes, while ATCGCT might determine brown.126
Likewise, changes or mutations which occur in that sequence of DNA code have
been known to cause genetic defects, abnormalities, and inherited diseases or a
predisposition to a particular disease. Therefore, the basis of genetic disease is based
on changes in the DNA sequence.127 Moreover each pair of autosomal homologous
chromosomes carries the same sets of genes. Although they are homologous and
potentially have identical functions, some of the genes have a slightly different DNA
sequence. Between individuals only 0.1 per cent of the precise DNA sequence varies;
the remaining 99.9 per cent of the DNA sequence is identical.128
(c) Discovery of DNA
The beginning of modern genetic science is considered to be the publication of
Charles Darwin’s ‘Origin of Species’ in 1859,129 where he outlined ‘the theory of
evolution’.130

‘Darwin

termed

the hypothetical process involved

‘natural

selection’.131 The main argument of this theory is that all life forms are not
independently created; rather they are related and are descended from a common
ancestor, and their variation is explained by this process.132 Later, in 1865, the Czech
monk Gregor Mendel completed a series of experiments with peas and developed the
concept of ‘heredity’.133 He was able to show that there are certain traits in the peas,
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such as their shape or colour, and that ‘these characteristics are inherited by a special
“factors” [what] we now call genes’.134 Mendel’s findings (his two laws of genetics
or what is now termed Mendelian genetics) were followed by a number of other
hallmark discoveries.135 In 1905, William Bateson136 coined the term genetics (from
the Greek, means ‘to give birth’) and in 1909 Wilhelm Johanssen used the term gene
to describe the Mendelian units of heredity.137 Johanssen also made the distinction
between ‘phenotype’ (an organism’s outward appearance) and ‘genotype’ (its genetic
traits).138
The significance of DNA became clear in 1953 with the major contribution of James
Dewey Watson (a biologist from Indiana University)139 and Francis Crick (a
physicist at the Medical Research Council Unit for the Study of the Molecular
Structure of Biological Systems, Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge),140 and that of
Maurice Wilkins (a New Zealand born physicist) and Rosalind Franklin (a 30 year
old English chemist).141 The significance of their work was recognised by the Nobel
Committee and Watson, Crick and Wilkins were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine in 1962 for their efforts (‘for their discoveries concerning
the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its significance for information transfer
in living material’).142 However, Franklin was not nominated nor would her
contribution have been able to be so acknowledged due to her early death from

Watson, Molecular Biology of the Gene, above n 132, 8; Pilnic, above n, 98, 8–9; Cherfas, above n
117, 10–2; Allore, above n 129.
134
Nigel English, Revise for GCSE Science: Higher AQA Modular (Heinemann, 1st ed, 2002) 32.
135
Kristine Barlow-Stewart, 'The Human Genetic Code-The Human Genome Project and Beyond'
(Centre for Genetics Education, Australasian Genetics Resource Book, 6th Ed, June 2007) 1–2.
136
See generally Peter S Harper, 'William Bateson, Human Genetics and Medicine' (2005) Human
Genetics <http://www.genmedhist.info/Historical_Perspectives/Bateson>.
137
Ted Everson, The Gene: A Historical Perspective (Greenhood, 2007) 166; see also Colin J
Sanderson, Understanding Genes and GMOs (World Scientific Publishing, 2007) 45.
138
Lenny Moss, 'The Meanings of the Gene and the Future of the Phenotype ' (2008) 4(1) Genomics,
Society and Policy 38, 39.
139
Francis Leroy, A Century of Nobel Prizes Recipients: Chemistry, Physics, and Medicine (CRC
Press, 2003) 287; see also Michel Morange and Matthew Cobb, A History of Molecular Biology
(Michel Morange and Matthew Cobb trans, Harvard University Press, 2000) 105–8; Sanderson, above
n 137, 50.
140
Ibid. See also Francis Crick, 'The Double Helix: A Personal View' (1974) 248 Nature 766,766–9;
Linda L McCabe, Edward R B McCabe and Victor A McKusick, DNA: Promise and Peril (University
of California Press, 2008) 14; Watson, Molecular Biology of the Gene, above n 132, 74.
141
Watson, Molecular Biology of the Gene, above n 132, 74; see also Crick, ‘The Double Helix’,
above n 140; McCabe, McCabe and McKusick, above n 140, 14–15.
142
Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1962: Francis Crick, James Watson,
Maurice Wilkins (1962) <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/>.

37

cancer.143 Watson and Crick published their discovery in the journal Nature,144 where
they presented the double helix structure of DNA that carries genetic information
from one generation to the other.145 This structure of DNA, which was ‘based on Xray diffraction studies and molecular model building, explained for the first time not
only how this molecule could encode biological information but also how the
information could be precisely replicated during cell division’.146 Watson and Crick
had therefore discovered DNA as the ‘secret of life’. In this regards Macgregor and
Poon rightly pointed out that:
1953 witnessed the birth of a science icon with the publications of James
Watson and Francis Crick’s proposal of a double helix structure of DNA ... The
proposal rationalized and accommodated a great deal of current experimental
information and pointed the way to other experiments that could verify it. The
process of verification provided additional revelations about the molecular
mechanisms of cellular processes, and it provided a model on which many other
ideas could be based. ... [The discovery also] offered an entirely new way of
understanding the molecular mechanisms underlying many cellular processes,
such as cell division, genetic inheritance, and protein synthesis.147

Some other scientists had turned their efforts towards elucidating the structure of
DNA in the early 1950s, such as Linus Pauling, a chemist who received the 1954
Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his research into the nature of chemical bonding and its
application to clarifying the structure of complex substances.148 Additionally, Erwin
Chargaff, a professor of biochemistry at Columbia University, contributed by
discovering DNA base composition (that is, the molar base ratios of A equal T and G
equal C), however he failed to see base pairing.149
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Finally, after realising the future of the potentiality of the human gene, in 1990 the
Human Genome Project (HGP) was established as an international research effort
and completed in 2003.150 The goal was to produce a variety of biological maps of
human chromosomes and determine the complete chemical sequence of human DNA
— the sequence of which genes are composed — and thus be able to use such
knowledge in the diagnosis and prediction of genetic conditions, which indeed has
been greatly assisted by the research.151 However, some time earlier, on 10 May
1998, J Craig Venter, a biologist and the director of the Institute for Genomic
Research (TIGR), announced that within three years he would be able to discover the
complete genetic code of human life instead of seven years that it would take the US
government’s HGP.152 Subsequently he formed a private company, ‘Celera’ and set
himself to achieve this highly ambitious goal and he published his completed
sequence of the human genome in February 2001 in the journal, ‘Science’.153 He
recounted this extraordinary achievement in his book, ‘A Life Decoded’.154
The National Human Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes of Health
(under a leadership team headed by Francis Collins) and Celera never managed to
combine their efforts. Indeed, two books exist due to the existence of their rival
teams,155 who ‘were unable to mend their differences and pool their data’.156 The

150

Sharon J Durfy and Amy E Grotevant, 'The Human Genome Project' (1991) 1(4) Kennedy Institute
of Ethics Journal 347, 348–49; see also Kristin Harley, 'The Human Genome Project: Community
Conversations at the Brooklyn Public Library' (2011) 50(3) Public Libraries 38, 38; Trisha
Greenhalgh, 'The Human Genome Project' (2005) 98 Journal of the Royal Society Medicine 545, 545;
Charlotte A Robidoux, Human Genome Project Discoveries: Dialectics and Rhetoric in the Science of
Genetics (PhD Thesis, The Catholic University of America, 2008) 2–6;Genome.gov, National Human
Genome Research Institute and National Institute of Health, All about the Human Genome Project
(HGP) (13 October 2010) <http://www.genome.gov/10001772>; McCabe, McCabe and McKusick,
above n 140, 18–20, 22.
151
Ibid.
152
James Shreeve, The Genome War: How Craig Venter Tried to Capture the Code of Life and Save
the World (Ballantine Books, 2004) 3, 6; see also Richard W Oliver, The Biotech Age: The Business
of Biotech and How to Profit From It (McGraw-Hill Professional, 2003)131; McCabe, McCabe and
McKusick, above n 140, 20. See generally Robidoux, above n 150, 3–6.
153
Oliver, above n 152, 32; see also J Craig Venter et al, 'The Sequence of the Human Genome'
(2001) 291 Science 1304,1304–51; McCabe, McCabe and McKusick, above n 140, 21–2.
154
J Craig Venter, A Life Decoded: My Genome: My Life (Viking Adult, 2007).
155
One is the genome sequence compiled by J Craig Venter and colleagues at Celera Genomics, a
biotech company started in 1998 in Rockville, Maryland. The other appears in the 15 February issue
of Nature and was produced by the International Human Genome sequencing consortium, see
generally Robidoux, above n 150, 3–6.
156
Elizabeth Pennisi, 'The Human Genome' (2001) 291 Science 1177, 1177.

39

rivalry may, however, have served to make the efforts mobilised within the public
institutions ‘unexpectedly unified’.157
The discovery of DNA has a significant impact on genetics in particular and biology
in general. This discovery could be termed as a ‘pearl’ because this very valuable
knowledge is essentially ‘hidden’ as a single DNA molecule is far too small to be
seen by the naked eye and yet contains a virtually infinite number of different genetic
messages. It is the most central substance in the workings of all life on earth.158 DNA
forms the basis of biological inheritance of every human being.159

(d) Function and Significance of DNA
Human bodies are composed of ‘billions of individual cells and DNA is the controlcentre of each and every cell’.160 DNA contains the code for the structures and
properties of proteins and therefore it determines the cells behaviour, function, and
structure. Human characteristics, including various genetic diseases can be
determined through DNA testing.161 The numerous biological ‘instructions’ are
encoded in the DNA and this enables various developmental and functional
processes to occur in the biological organism.162 Here Calladine and Drew have
made an elegant analogy for DNA, where DNA in the human body functions like a
computer tape, which can store many programs in order to run a large computer.163
Genetic information about any organism is contained in the DNA molecules of that
organism. This information provides exact instructions for the creation and
functioning of the organism. DNA molecules of all organisms contain the same basic
physical and chemical components, arranged in different sequences and this stores
the genetic material. The main role of DNA molecules is the long-term storage of
information.
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DNA is a valuable resource for medical, legal and social applications for which DNA
testing is generally used. For medical purposes, DNA can provide information about
several thousand genetic conditions and diseases. Another important feature of DNA
is that it can identify a person and also indicate something about possible human
behaviour. The sequence of DNA is unique to every human being (except identical
twins). It is identical within all tissues (that is, whether it is extracted from hair bulbs,
white blood cells, or a semen specimen) of the same body.164 It is similar to a ‘barcode’ for identification.165 This principle of ‘individual uniqueness and identical
DNA structure within all tissues of the same body provide the basis for DNA
profiling’.166 Almost all criminal justice systems use this method of identification
because the results of the tests are generally ten to one hundred times more accurate
than is required by the courts. Among the most significant applications of DNA
technology are genetic testing, genetic engineering, cloning, and DNA profiling or
‘fingerprinting’. In its subsequent chapters, this thesis will concentrate on the
application of DNA profiling for justice delivery purposes.
The DNA sequence becomes understandable when it turns into information. All the
concerns related to human DNA commences when it become easy to understand, use
and access in the form of genetic information. The following section will discuss the
basics of ‘human genetic information’, how it is useful as well as source of risk for
humankind.

2.1.2.4 The Basics of Human Genetic Information
Upon considering the scientific background of DNA, it is now imperative to clearly
outline what it is about ‘human genetic information’ that distinguishes it from other
forms of health or personal information. This section discusses the meaning, nature
and some basic features of ‘human genetic information’ which are available as a
result of emerging technologies. Generally speaking, almost all information about
human beings’ health, genes or heredity and physical characteristics is known as
their ‘genetic information’. A person’s gender, race, and a number of other bodily
features ‘are related, in whole or in part, to that person’s genetic inheritance’.167 A
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predisposition to a number of genetic disorders, diseases or other kinds of health
conditions can be identified using DNA analysis.
The following discussion will analyse the genetic material and information, their
relationship, and if there is any differences between them. Later it will examine the
meaning and definition of genetic information.
(a) Genetic Sample and Genetic Information
In general a clear distinction between the term ‘biological resources’ and ‘genetic
material’ is made by the Convention of Biological Diversity, 1992 — ‘biological
resources includes genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any
other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for
humanity’. On the other hand ‘Genetic material means any material of plant, animal,
microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity’.168 That means a
biological resource is wider concept than the genetic material. Among these human
genetic material is sub-unit of those materials.
Though human genetic samples or material and genetic information169 derive from
the same source — human DNA — there are some differences between DNA
samples or genetic material, and genetic information. A ‘DNA sample’ or ‘genetic
material’ refers to all human biological specimens, such as human tissue, blood
sample, semen, saliva, hair, nails or any other source of DNA from which genetic
information are extracted. The Australian National Health and Medical Research
Council (NHMRC) has defined the term ‘genetic material’ in the ‘National Statement
on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans’.170 According to this document,
‘genetic material’ means:
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any source of DNA or RNA which can be tested to obtain genetic information.
It thus includes cells, whether as single cells or as part of tissues, and extracted
DNA and RNA.171

Therefore, the information which is derived from that a genetic sample or source
through the process of genetic analysis is called ‘genetic information’ (or DNA
profiles172). According to the view of Spinello, both genetic material (or the DNA
sample or bodily source) and genetic information can be referred together as ‘genetic
source material’.173 The derived genetic information can readily be stored in a hard
copy form (for example, on paper in a file) or on any database. Currently all the
collected human genetic information is stored in the ‘human genetic databases’174 as
well as in the forensic DNA databases, depending on their purpose of collection. In
addition, the collected genetic information can easily be preserved as well as used for
a long time, unless it is destroyed, and if the sample provider consented for its
unlimited use. Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has defined the term
genetic information which ‘includes both DNA sequence information as revealed by
a genetic test and inferences that can be made from knowledge of the sequence.’175 A
similar but more comprehensive definition is provided by the NHMRC, according to
that definition, genetic information includes and or can relate to:
both DNA sequence information and inferences that can be made from
knowledge of the sequence. ... information that allows inferences to be made
about DNA sequence. ... a condition that is clinically apparent ... or latent.176

In other words, it is information about someone’s DNA, his or her hereditary
characteristics, and may include some diseases that can be determined by various
genetic testing. It can also reveal sensitive information about his or her families. The
171
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wider application of genetic technology has made the whole process easier and
faster.
Stulic argued that very few attempts have been made in Australia to provide ‘a wider
legal definition of genetic information or to articulate a legal perspective of DNA’,177
but this inadequacy is in fact international one. Nevertheless, some national
legislation and at least one case have defined the term ‘genetic information’ from a
legislative point of view. Section 7 of the draft Genetic Privacy and NonDiscrimination Bill 1998 has defined ‘genetic information’ as:
Genetic information means (a) information from a DNA sample about
genotypes; or (b) information from mutation analysis; or (c) information about
nucleotide and polypeptide sequence(s) or; (d) information about gene(s) or
gene products.178

However, the Bill has not been enacted by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia. Rather the Privacy Act 1988 was amended and the Privacy Legislation
Amendment (PLA) Act 2006 (Cth) introduced. The PLA Act amended the definition
of ‘health information’ and ‘sensitive information’ in the Privacy Act to expressly
include genetic information.179 Under this law, health information means (among
other information) ‘genetic information about an individual in a form that is, or could
be, predictive of the health of the individual or a genetic relative of the individual’.180
Similarly, the US Government has passed Executive Order 13145 in 2000 that adopts
a policy of not discriminating in federal employment on the basis of genetic
information. This Order has defined the term ‘Protected Genetic Information’.
According to this Order, ‘Protected Genetic Information’ means:
A. information about an individual’s genetic tests;
B. information about the genetic tests of an individual’s family members; or
C. information about the occurrence of a disease, or medical condition or
disorder in family members of the individual.181
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Further, the US Genetic Information and Non-discrimination Act has defined the
term in almost the same manner. According to this Act, ‘genetic information’ is
information about the genetic tests of any individual, his or her family members, and
also the manifestation of a disease or disorder in such family members.182 One
judicial attempt was made by Heerey J in the case of Genetics Institute, Inc v KirinAmgen183 to provide a legal definition of genetic material and information, or DNA:
The genetic material of any organism is the substance that carries the
information determining the properties of that organism. It is the information
contained in the genetic material that determines, for example, the colour of
flowers and that fish have gills. The genetic material is also responsible for
transferring the genetic information from parent to progeny. All the genetic
information of an organism is collectively referred to as its genome. The genetic
material in all organisms, apart from viruses, is a form of nucleic acid called
DNA (short for deoxyribonucleic acid).184

This is the general scenario of most of the countries. All the above mentioned pieces
of national legislation and a judicial decision have provided a legal phenomenon of
the term ‘genetic information’ and such determination of the legal scope of ‘genetic
information’ is very significant for the protection of genetic privacy. However, as the
concept of genetic information is a newly emerged idea and many countries are not
sufficiently aware of its significance. Therefore, the conceptual framework from the
legislative point of view has not yet developed in most countries, especially the
developing ones. No Bangladeshi law, for instance, has defined the ideas of ‘genetic
sample’ and ‘genetic information’. Finally, there is also a lack of a well-defined
common standard regarding the idea of human genetic sample and or information in
any international convention or treaty.
After analysing all these definition, it can be said that genetic samples and any
information derived from them are vital for human beings and such information is
contributing significantly to changing the lives of human beings.185 The following
section will analyse about these life changing types of characteristics that contain
human genetic information.
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(b) Characteristics of Genetic Information
From the above discussion it has been highlighted that the whole idea of human
genetic information (which is derived from human genetic samples) comprises some
basic characteristics or features. Therefore, there are several characteristics of genetic
information which make it unique from other kinds of medical or health information.
For the purposes of the argument presented in this discussion, it is worth noting here
some of the distinctive characteristics of human genetic information.

Familial and Social Nature of Genetic Information
As the DNA sample or genetic material is collected from human bodies, it is
therefore, highly intimate and personal. Genetic information is considered uniquely
private and personal information. Though such information is personal, one of its
vital features is that it can reveal information not only about an individual but also
information about his or her family members, in both succeeding and preceding
generations. Therefore, it can reveal information about ‘a person’s parents, siblings,
and children’.186 For example, if someone is a carrier of cystic fibrosis, it implies that
one of his or her parents is also a carrier of that disease and that a sibling may to be a
carrier.187 In some cases genetic information may even be pertinent for some ethnic
minority or racial group.188 For instance, ‘Tay-Sachs disease is primarily (but not
exclusively) found in persons of European Jewish descent’.189 On the other hand,
sickle cell anemia, primarily affects persons of Spanish-speaking regions (South
America, Cuba, Central America); Saudi Arabia; India; and Mediterranean countries
such as Turkey, Greece, and Italy190 and black African descent191, while
‘haemochromatosis is very common in persons of northern European descent’.192
The familial and social nature of human genetic information can thus affect how
family members and members of particular racial groups perceive and relate to each
other.
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Genetic Information is Unique and can Reveal Information about Person’s Identity
Another important characteristic is that genetic information is unique and can reveal
individual’s identity. The mechanism of DNA Profiling is very useful in case of
detecting criminals, identifying missing or deceased persons, and mass disaster
victims, and paternity testing more particularly. Because, each human being has a
unique DNA sequence and this very uniqueness is a major contributor to their
individuality. Therefore, genetic analysis of DNA samples has the potential to reveal
information about individual identity and differentiate one person from another. This
analysis is made possible by the fact that an individual’s DNA is unique to that
person, except for genetically identical twins.193 This DNA analysis process is
commonly known as ‘DNA fingerprinting’ or ‘DNA profiling’.194 The potential and
pitfalls of this technique and its applications will be examined in the following
chapters.

Genetic Information as a Human’s Future Diary
Mostly because of the complex interaction between human genes, lifestyle and
environmental factors, numerous genetic disorders are multi-factorial by nature. In
these circumstances, the role of the genetic information is that it can reveal the
possibilities of diseases or disorders, rather than the certainties. For example,
although ‘BRAC1 testing may establish that a woman has the particular genetic
mutation associated with breast cancer, this does not mean that she will definitely
contract that disease. It simply means that the probability of her doing so
increases.’195 As a result, genetic information can only predict whether an individual
has an increased susceptibility to develop a particular disease or not.196 For some
conditions, however, genetic testing can do so with great accuracy a long time before
the symptoms appear (for example, Huntingtons). Such tests cannot predict exactly
when symptoms will develop and also unable to predict sometimes which features of
the disorder will occur,197 or their severity or exact progression of the disease.198
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Genetic information, therefore, can be predictive of future health as it can reveal a
significant amount of information about present and possible (in some cases
probable) future physical as well as mental health conditions of a person and
members of his or her family, by identifying a person’s predisposition to, or carrier
status for certain diseases or disorders. George J Annas has thus, portrayed ‘genetic
information’ as similar to one’s ‘future diary’ (though a ‘probabilistic’ one).199 It
must be recalled, however, that a degree of inexactitude remains, depending on the
gene/s and the characteristic/s or disease selected. As Brant Pridmore has noted:
[A] person’s genetic characteristics influence many of the things (like physical
appearance and some psychological characteristics) that affect his or her sense
of personal identity; by-and-large, a person's genetic characteristics are with
him or her for life — they cannot be changed; some genetic testing information
has great predictive power about a person’s future experiences ... [but] in
making predictions about the future, genetic testing information often only tells
us about the chances that something will occur — it does not tell us that it
certainly will.200

Genetic Information is Sensitive
Genetic information is also perceived as ‘sensitive information’, because such
information can be used to indicate a predisposition towards certain health
conditions201 and may predict (within a varying degree of statistical certainty) future
health conditions of an individual and members of his or her family. Genetic
information obtained by genetic testing can also be used due to the knowledge of the
genome sequence to predict the incidences of particular diseases or disorders in the
family However, there is a debate about the issue of whether genetic information is
so unique and sensitive that it requires a special protection against threats to privacy
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and against its misuse, or not. Many scholars believe that genetic data should be
considered like all other medical data202 and should have the same standards of
privacy protection. However, others believe that due to its sensitive nature, genetic
information is distinct from other health and medical information. For instance, one
of the UNESCO declarations, namely the International Declaration on Human
Genetic Data,203 has recognised the special status of genetic data on the basis of its
sensitive nature204 and it also requires member states to provide protection for such
kinds of sensitive information. Due to its sensitive nature, genetic data may have
significant impact on the family, their generations, in some cases on the whole
groups or communities. Therefore, special measures are needed to protect genetic
privacy and to prevent its misuse.
Through the increasingly widespread use of genetic technology, genetic testing and
DNA sample analysis have become easier and more publicly available. Genetic
information is very significant since it can provide data on the current health
conditions of an individual as well as open an horizon into his or her future, in regard
to predisposition to certain diseases, and potential for inheritance of genetic defects
both in the person (whether manifested or not) and possible risk of transmission to
the next generation. It is also a unique source of health information a person’s
ancestors, descendants and lateral relatives. Such information is also considered as a
useful tool by employers and insurers. Hence the privacy concerns frequently
expressed. For employers, such information could be used to predict future health
risks (and possible associated costs) of potential employees; while for insurers it
could be used to identify high risk individuals among those who desire insurance
coverage for life or health, or their relatives. Very often much interest has been
expressed in the results of individual genetic tests by those third parties.205 Thus
knowledge of such information (among potential employers or insurers) could result
in an individual’s failure to gain employment or life, medical, income or other
202
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insurance. Generally disclosure of such information is already often required by
applicants for insurance.206 Consequently, it is important to protect the wider use of
human genetic information. Close consideration must be given to the handling of
such information.
2.1.3

DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF DNA PROFILING

2.1.3.1 History and Background
(a) Early Markers
Over the past two decades the development and application of genetics (that is, DNA
profiling technology) has revolutionised forensic science. This advancement in the
forensic science discipline ‘has great additional potential to help law enforcement in
identifying criminals’.207 In the past when a crime was committed, the investigator
collected information and evidence from a number of sources, such as witnesses,
various kinds of physical evidence (fingerprint, shoe print and so on).208
Conventionally, in 1900 in his studies on the patterns of agglutination between red
blood cells and serum of different healthy individuals, Karl Landsteiner effectively
described the ABO blood group system, and in 1940 he discovered the Rhesus
factor.209 The use and analysis of ABO (and Rhesus positive/ Rhesus negative) blood
groups served the purpose of identification.210 Identification techniques based on
variations on serum proteins and red blood cell enzymes were used and also ‘the
human leukocyte antigen system’211 until the 1960s. However, these systems ‘have a
relatively low exclusion power’ and also they suffer from some limitations, such as it
is much more difficult to get a reliable result from blood stains or body fluid
206
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collected from a crime scene than from a venipuncture sample.212 During the 1960s
and 1970s further developments, particularly in molecular biology have occurred.
This includes the identification of restriction enzymes, Sanger sequencing,213 and
‘southern blotting’214. During the 1980s the highly polymorphic nature of the locus
of material comprising markers in the DNA sequence was detected and reported by
the US geneticists.215 Such loci of repeat sequences (and the repeats themselves) are
‘extremely variable between people’,216 and new genetic markers continue to be
discovered. DNA techniques continue to improve and new techniques are adopted,
enabling easier DNA analysis and increasing the reliability of DNA results.

(b) DNA Fingerprinting: Discovery and Application
Sir Alec Jeffreys, a British professor and geneticist pioneered what is now known as
‘DNA fingerprinting’ in 1984.217 Professor Jeffreys had an interest in studying
human genetic variations, but initially he could not detect the genetic differences in
human body.218 He and a number of his students first studied myoglobin genes in
sea-dwelling mammals (seals). As Aronson recounts:
There they noticed that a particular 33-neocleotide sequence appeared in a
variety of repetitive patterns that were present in almost all of the globins.
Further examination revealed that these patterns seemed to be present in the
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genomes of most mammals and that the patterns they generated appeared to be
different in each animal.219

In September 1984, Jeffreys and a graduate student, Vicky Wilson, took the
initiative220 and set up an experiment to look for similar sequences in the human
genome. They therefore analysed ‘the human myoglobin gene’ and while conducting
this analysis, ‘they discovered a region consisting of a 33 base-pair (bp) sequence
[which was] repeated four times within an intervening sequence (IVS)’.221 They
referred ‘this tandem repeat’ ‘as a mini-satellites’ and noted that similar regions were
hyper-variable ‘because the number of tandem repeats is variable both within a locus
and between loci’.222 They also discovered a degree of commonality as ‘each repeat
unit contains a smaller 16-bp core in common with other mini-satellites’.223 In their
second paper (published in the journal Nature in 1985), they ‘concluded that the
probability that two individuals would have the same DNA fingerprint was less than
1 in 33 billion (3×10−11–5×10−19)’.224 Professor Jeffreys’ discovery therefore
recognised that the repeating sequences (mini-satellites) are ‘highly variable’ and are
‘informative genetic markers’.225 In this regard Jobling and Gill remarked that the
DNA revolution began with this discovery by Jeffreys.226 The ‘hypervariable multiband patterns’ discernible by DNA analysis and so specifically characteristic of an
individual became known as ‘DNA fingerprints’.227
In the process of examining and comparing various samples of animal and human
myoglobin using a multi-locus probe technique, Professor Jeffreys and a group of his
students discovered DNA ‘fingerprints’, a term that appears to have been coined by
Jeffreys and alludes to the markers as being as individual as those of traditional
219
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fingerprints. Utilising this and other later techniques of ‘genetic fingerprinting’, it is
possible from DNA samples to extract unique markers and this ensures almost
conclusive proof of individual identification. This substantial achievement was first
applied as a forensic tool in the following two significant cases and contributed
enormously securing justice in the mid-1980s in the UK. The successful application
of DNA fingerprinting for the first time in the world for identification purposes
provided a remarkable example for the world community.

Sarbah v Home Office (UK)
Sarbah v Home Office (UK) was the first practical test of DNA fingerprinting. In this
instance, genetic fingerprinting was used to demonstrate to the UK Home Office that
Christiana Sarbah and Andrew Sarbah were indeed mother and son.228 Andrew, who
was a Ghanaian descent, had been born in London; but due to the separation of his
parents he went back to Ghana with his father at the age of four. Later, at the age of
eleven years, he returned to the UK to live with his mother.229 The dispute arose
when the immigration authority doubted his identity as a British citizen. This case
was solved by applying Jeffreys’ DNA fingerprinting method.230 Since it was first
application of a new type of scientific evidence, therefore to get scientific credibility
Jeffreys and his co-author sent a report of the Sarbah case to the journal, Nature.
Through this case, DNA fingerprinting received its first major validation for the
scientific community, the courts and public, regardless of a negative peer review by
one referee.231

R v Colin Pitchfork
Later this method was again applied, this time in a criminal case — the Case of Colin
Pitchfork.232 In this case, a 15-year old girl, Lynda Mann was found murdered near
the village of Narborough (Leicestershire) in 1983. Due to the lack of evidence the
228
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case could not be resolved and was eventually wound down. Three years later, a
similar type of crime was committed and again a 15 years old girl, Dawn Ashworth,
was found raped and murdered in the nearby village of Enderby. This time the
investigator’s had a local suspect — a 17-year old boy, Richard Buckland who
worked at the Carlton Hayes Psychiatric Hospital. He confessed to the murder of
Dawn Ashworth, not to that of Lynda Mann. Here again Professor Jeffreys applied
his DNA ‘fingerprinting’ technique and along with other scientists from the Forensic
Science Service (FSS) compared the semen samples from both murders with a blood
sample from Richard Buckland, the initial suspect. The results proved that two of the
murders were committed by a same person, but that in neither instance was Richard
Buckland the offender. Thus he was eliminated from the case based on this DNA
evidence. Again in order to catch the true offender, the Leicestershire police
(undertaking the world’s first DNA-intelligence screen) asked a total of 5000 adult
men within the vicinity of the crimes scenes to volunteer to provide DNA samples.
Even after this mass screening, the murderer eluded them. Finally police arrested the
real offender — Colin Pitchfork — after receiving a phone call from a lady who had
overheard a conversation between the murderer and his friend, Lan Kelly, where they
discussed how the murderer had escaped by convincing his friend to provide a
sample in his name. Colin Pitchfork’s DNA was matched with the crime scene
semen and he was sentenced to a life term for each of the two murders.233
Gradually, because of the success of this technology and its application in a number
of areas (for example, paternity testing for child support, forensic investigations),
private companies started to establish DNA-based profiling databases. Originally
some UK and US based private companies, such as, the Lifecodes Corporation
(USA) and Cellmark Diagnostics (UK and USA) offered DNA profiling and
marketed their services to the public and, more particularly, to law enforcement
agencies, which subsequently used services.234 In Australia there are also a small
number of DNA profiling databases that are managed by private companies.235 This
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kind of service by the private companies was and is criticised widely.236 This
indicates a cause of the subsequent growth of government DNA databases ie rather
than relying on private companies. Subsequently the creation of state or government
DNA profiling databases gained immense popularity worldwide over time. The
British police first used DNA testing in criminal matters in 1985 in the Pitchfork
Case (above). In the UK, the government-owned FSS is today the largest supplier of
forensic services to police in England and Wales. In the USA, the government started
using DNA profiling in its Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) laboratory in late
1988.237

Other parts of the world gradually started to use the DNA profiling

technology and it has gained great recognition over time in almost all legal systems.
2.1.3.2 DNA Profiling: An Overview
The DNA techniques have been further developed and recently a more sensitive and
reproducible system — ‘DNA profiling’ — has been produced that uses a method
involving Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)238 which compares short tandem repeat
(STR)239 regions of human DNA.240 One advantage of these advanced techniques is
that they are amenable to use for identification purposes. The evolution of the
techniques used and the analysis applied continues to be a subject of research.
DNA profiling is sometimes referred to as ‘DNA fingerprinting’ or ‘DNA typing’.241
While investigating and deciding a case (whether a paternity dispute, an immigration
issue, or identification of disaster victims or detection of a criminal), the DNA
profiling mechanism has provided law enforcement agencies worldwide with a
significant tool242 for ‘identifying individuals by detecting differences in cell
structure’ as well as a means to arrive at appropriate judgments.243
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The process of DNA profiling involves following important steps:
•

Sample Collection: Collection of samples from the crime scene (unknown
samples) or from victims and or suspects (known sample);244

•

Analysis: First, extraction, purification and quantification of DNA from all
obtained samples are conducted; then copying or amplification of short
tandems or segments of DNA is undertaken; the fragments are then visually
examined under high powered microscopes; and finally the results are then
analysed and transformed into a series of alpha-numeric code.245

•

Comparison: A comparison is made of the profiles obtained to existing
samples to determine if there is any match (indicating the identity of the
source is possible) or an exclusion (such identity is unlikely).246

•

Matching: When a match is found between the two DNA profiles, the
likelihood of the match is estimated through statistical probability analysis.
Such analysis is conducted in order to determine what proportion of persons
in the same population as the suspect’s have the same DNA patterns.247

In order to obtain DNA profiles, at present STR regions (which are sections or areas
of non-coding DNA in the human genome) are compared around the world using
PCR techniques. The following illustration exemplifies what are STRs and how STR
sequences are repeated, such that if a section of DNA is stretched the following base
sequence can be found:

Prainsack (eds), Genetic Suspects: Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 40, 40.
243
Robert W Schumacher II, 'Expanding New York's DNA Database: The Future of Law
Enforcement' (1999) 26 fordham Urban Law Journal 1635, 1639.
244
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), 'INTERPOL Handbook on DNA Data
Exchange and Practice: Recommendations from the Interpol DNA Monitoring Expert Group' (1st Ed,
June 2001) 40; see generally Goodwin, Linacre and Hadi, above n 207, 17–9.
245
Schumacher II, above n 243. See also INTERPOL, ‘Recommendations from the Interpol DNA
Monitoring Expert Group’, above n 244; Goodwin, Linacre and Hadi, above n 207, 27–36.
246
Schumacher II, above n 243; INTERPOL, ‘Recommendations from the Interpol DNA Monitoring
Expert Group’, above n 244.
247
Schumacher II, above n 243; see also Goodwin, Linacre and Hadi, above n 207, 83.

56

ATCTTCTAACACATGACCGATCATGCATGCATGCATGCATGCATGCATGC
ATGCATGCATGCATGTTCCATGATAGCACAT248
The above base sequence shows that at the beginning it appears random, but
subsequently towards the middle sequence ‘CATG’ has repeated. Finally near the
end the sequence becomes random again. The repetitive section of this sequence is
referring to as an STR. In a given STR, individuals inherit different numbers of the
repeated sequence from each of their parents. That means an individual may have
inherited 11 repeats of the CATG sequence, on a chromosome from the mother, and
3 repeats of such sequence from the father. Thus, ‘the different numbers of repeats
within an STR results in DNA of different lengths. Statistically, no two people
(except identical twins) are likely to have the same numbers of repeats in all of these
STRs.’249 Electrophoresis is used to reveal how many repeats the person has.250
Therefore it can be argued that each and every individual has a unique DNA profile
or DNA fingerprint. Jeremy Gans and Gregor Urbas have defined DNA profiling as:
...a small set of features of non-coding DNA. ... [these] can be represented as an
ordered series of numbers. … The features comprised in a DNA profile must be
sufficiently variable throughout the population to have an acceptable statistical
likelihood that the profile is unique in that population, but also sufficiently
regular to be amenable to cheap and efficient mass analysis.251

DNA profiling is a process by which the DNA presents in a biological sample (such
as blood, saliva, semen, bone, hair and so on) from a human body is collected and
analysed. The human body concerned could be that of a victim, a suspect or an
accused person. It is a high-quality identification technique which compares two
DNA samples and determines whether they are derived from the same body.
Matching both the DNA samples indicates that they are from the same person
(except in the case of identical twins).252 That analytical process generates digital
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output which is similar to bar codes found on supermarket products253 or ‘read’ by
grocery store scanners. This has become the standard forensic DNA analysis system
throughout the world.
2.1.3.3 Technological Basis of DNA Profiling
It is evident that each human cell (except reproductive cells) contains approximately
3 billion-base pairs (bp) of DNA.254 These comprise genes whose bp range from
several hundred to a ‘couple fo million’ bp. Less than five per cent of human DNA,
comprising 30 000 to 40 000 genes,255 is responsible for particular characteristics.
The rest (that is more than 95 per cent of DNA) is essentially non-functional and has
been called ‘non-coding’, ‘non-genic’ or ‘junk’ DNA.256 Non-coding DNA was long
thought not to have any role in developing biological differences and while it may
not include information about human physical, psychological characteristics, or
disease,257 However, it just may be that the function of this material has not yet been
correctly and reliably identified,258 and its effects may be subtle in regard to
disposition to diseases and other matters.259 About 99.9 per cent DNA is identical for
all human beings and only 0.1 per cent DNA is different. This 0.1 per cent DNA
exists in the non-coding regions. It has been found that certain DNA sequences are
repeated again and again in these regions. And the numbers of repetitions are
different for different individuals. This kind of changes is called ‘polymorphism’ and
areas are known as ‘polymorphic loci’ which exhibit detectable variations (called
alleles)’. In human DNA there are two types of polymorphic sequences,260
‘variations in the sequence of DNA bases; and length variation arising from
differences in the number of DNA bases between two defined end points’.261
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(a) Variable Number of Tandem Repeats (VNTRs)
The Variable Number of Tandem Repeats (VNTRs) are made up of repeated DNA
sequences and located at different chromosomal sites.262 These are also known as
‘minisatellite’ sequences.263 The pioneer of the use of restriction enzymes in the
DNA analysis, Alec Jeffreys, detected that the existence of variations in the length of
certain DNA sequences. According to his findings these minisatellite sequences or
tandemly repeated DNA sequences are hyper (that is, highly) variable between
different individuals.264 In VNTRs, the core repeat sequence ranges in size from 6 to
100 base pair (bp).265 Such ‘core repeats are represented in some alleles thousands of
times and the variation in repeat number creates alleles that range in size from 500bp
to over 30kb’.266 This is the length variation referred to earlier. The VNTRs or
‘minisatellites are visualised by digesting the DNA with restriction enzymes to cut it
into fragments of differing lengths that range between 1 and 20 kb in size’.267
VNTRs were the first polymorphisms268 used in DNA fingerprinting through the
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) technique and were successfully
used in resolving some identify related forensic cases.269

(b) Short Tandem Repeats (STRs)
The other polymorphic sequence of human DNA is the ‘microsatellite sequence’270
or ‘Short Tandem Repeats’ (STRs). The core repeats in STRs are normally shorter
than VNTRs, such that the loci of STRs consist of simple tandemly repeated
sequences of 1–6 bp in length.271 They appear to be abundant throughout the human
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genome and occur, on average, every 6–10 kb272 and are highly polymorphic.273 In
human DNA there are several hundred (approximately) of these STRs or microsatellite sequences, ‘[b]ut 10–15 are sufficient to give exceedingly high levels of
discrimination between individuals’.274 For instance, in the case of National DNA
Database of the UK, 10 different STRs are analysed;275 and in the case of the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) of the US, 13 loci are analysed in order to
get a person’s profile.276 STRs have become the standard method and are ‘currently
most commonly analysed genetic polymorphism in forensic genetics’ and have been
successfully used in casework since the mid-1990s.277 Because STRs are smaller in
size (< 300 bp)278 and length than VNTRs, they are easily and efficiently amplified
and more accurately compared as opposed to VNTRs. STR testing also has other
advantages over VNTR testing — in STR testing less DNA is required and the
analysis is completed far more quickly even with degraded DNA samples and it is
also highly discriminatory.279
These samples (VNTRs and STRs) are used for the following two most used
techniques for DNA profiling:
(i) Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP);
(ii) Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR);
(i) Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)
The Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) is a technique was used for
the first time in the world in the 1980s by the British biologists, Professor Alec
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Jeffreys for DNA fingerprinting.280 RFLP analysis can be subdivided into two stages:
the Multi-locus Probe (MLP) and the Single Locus Probe (SLP).281 At first the probe
used was an MLP,282 which Jeffreys also used while inventing DNA fingerprinting in
1984.283 Two years later, the SLP was introduced in the US and then used in the UK
from 1989 until the mid-1990s. They are almost the same; the only difference is that
in SLP, VNTRs analysis is conducted using a single locus probe rather than multilocus probe.284 The whole RFLP analysis process comprises the following steps:285
•

First, the collection of cellular samples (for example, skin, blood, saliva,
bone, teeth, semen or hair of the human body).

•

Next, long DNA samples are extracted from the samples and with the
application of ‘restriction enzymes’ they are cut into specific fragments or
short sequence (4–6 bases). In order to produce diverse groupings of
fragment lengths, the DNA of different people is generally cut at different
places,286 producing approximately 1 to 10 million fragments. ‘Gel
electrophoresis’ is then used to sort the huge number of DNA fragments
according to their length so that they could be analysed efficiently. This
laboratory technique is used to separate the fragments into bands. In this
technique, the molecules are placed on a slab of gel and then electric current
is applied. DNA is a negatively charged molecule and the electric current
moves it through the matrix of gel.287 When the current is applied, the
molecules run at different rates. The smaller the fragment, the faster it moves
through the gel, and when the current is stopped they are found in separate
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bands according to their respective sizes.288 DNA fragments are thus prepared
for next step of sequencing using a process called ‘probing’.289
•

Because a large number of fragments (1–10 million) are produced from
human DNA, a further step is required so that a specific small region of DNA
can be examined.290 In this process, DNA fragments are first denatured in the
gel so that two strands of molecules are separated. The fragments are then
transferred from the gel to a nylon membrane291 in a process called ‘Southern
blotting’ or ‘southern transfer’.292 The transfer of the single-stranded
fragments transfer from the gel to the nylon membrane produces a replica of
what was originally in electrophoresis gel.293 At this stage the membrane is
allowed to react in solution containing a probe labelled294 either radioactively
or chemically, and the pattern of DNA is detected by exposing the membrane
to x-ray film. Adding radioactive or chemical probes to the nylon membrane
produces a pattern called the ‘DNA fingerprint’. The result is a pattern of
DNA bands that looks like bar codes found on supermarket products.295 The
pattern of fragments is unique for each individual.

Finally it can be said that the process of DNA fingerprinting involves extracting and
cutting the DNA into small pieces of fragments of varying lengths. These are further
analysed to reveal patterns in their occurrence (composition, location, length).
This technique requires a good amount of non-degraded DNA, which sometimes is
very difficult to obtain from a crime scene. Moreover, the RFLP technique takes a
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long time to process for results to be obtained for comparison testing.296 Because of
its limitations and concurrent improvements in the DNA profiling method, most
laboratories do not use the RFLP method,297 rather they currently prefer to use the
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) in DNA profiling.
(ii) Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
As mentioned earlier, once DNA is extracted from human cells, it begins to rapidly
degrade. This begins to occur as soon as it is no longer within the living organism.
Another problem is that it is very often impossible to get sufficient DNA from the
crime scene to supply a sample adequate to for use in DNA profiling. Both problems
are solved by the PCR technique. An American biochemist and Nobel Prize laureate,
Kary Mullis, discovered the PCR technique.298 Kary Mullis produced a chain
reaction which replicated the original DNA.299 Newton and Graham has defined the
term PCR as:
an in vitro technique which allows the amplification of a specific
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) region that lies between two regions of known
DNA sequence.300

McPherson and Moller describe it as a ‘DNA photocopier’.301 The PCR technique ‘is
a simple and elegant procedure’.302 The PCR process involves the following three
steps:
•

First, the extraction of DNA after collecting the DNA from a biological
sample.303

•

Secondly, amplification in the thermal cycler. This means that the DNA is
denatured at a temperature of approximately 95° C for 30 seconds and 97° C
for 15 seconds. Amplifications are normally carried out for 28 to 32 cycles.304
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•

After amplification, the two strings of the double helix become separated.305
First, a (10–15) STR sequence copy is made from this DNA by applying the
PCR method where differences or polymorphisms exist. Then this PCR
product is separated using the process of ‘electrophoresis’.306 In order to copy
the STR sequence of a particular segment of DNA, one pair of small primers
is required which copied that STR sequence from both sides and ‘fluorescent
dye’ is attached inside one of those primer molecules. As a result, a laser
beam inside the Genetic Analyser converts this fluorescent signal into a peak.
Two computer software programs, ‘Gene Scan’ and ‘Genotyper’, which are
attached to the Genetic Analyser gradually analyse the collected data and
produce data in a digital format.307

PCR is a molecular biological technique through which a particular DNA sequence
can be amplified or copied from a small amount of DNA. This technique is ‘fast,
reliable and extremely sensitive’ and can compare and analyse the short length of
STRs.308 Moreover with this process it has become possible to analyse a small
amount of DNA and even severely degraded DNA samples. The discovery of the
PCR has contributed enormously to modern forensic science particularly forensic
genetics,309 as it allows unrestricted amplification from very small and old sources
(for instance, from samples collected from dried bone or skin).310 As a result, PCR
has proven (and continues to be) very useful in criminal case investigation. After the
discovery of the PCR techniques and its application to STRs, DNA profiling has
taken the place of DNA fingerprinting and it has become widely popular. Currently,
most forensic scientists examine 13 STRs loci. If the patterns match at every locus,
then they might have come from the same person, and if they do no match at every
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locus, it means they must have come from different sources, or the result is
inconclusive.311
Apart from the RFLP and PCR, in some cases ‘mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)’ and
‘Y chromosome STR’ process are used for identification purposes.
(iii) Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing is another important method of DNA profiling.
The mtDNA is found outside the nucleus of cells and the mtDNA fragment is
considerably smaller than nuclear DNA (nDNA).312 It is inherited maternally.313
There are only one or two copies of a nDNA in a human cell, but ‘in most cell types
there are several thousand mitochondria, each containing 10–20 copies of a circular
DNA molecule’.314 The main advantage of mtDNA sequence analysis is that mtDNA
is available in degraded samples, such as, hair and bone, and dental material that has
proved completely unsuited to other techniques.315 MtDNA ‘is extremely valuable in
such testing, as it has high copy number and has no recombinational events’.316
However, there are some limitations, such as a person inherits mtDNA only from
their mother, rather than from both of the parents. MtDNA profiling is also
particularly susceptible to contamination and extreme care must be taken during
processing.317 Moreover, it is the most time — as well as cost — consuming as well
as the most rigorous of all DNA profiling techniques.318
(iv) Y Chromosomes STR Analysis
Kayser has noted that ‘[m]icrosatellites from the nonrecombining portion of the
human Y chromosome have an important role in forensic genetics’.319 A man’s Y
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chromosome is inherited through the male line of a family320 and represents a unique
record of his paternal inheritance. STR analysis on the Y chromosome is another
useful method for identification and it has proved to be very useful for identification
purposes, such as it is very significant when the paternity of a male offspring is in
question.321 It is also useful in regard to sexual crime cases322 where samples may
contain mixed male and female cells. Y chromosome STR analysis allows the
resolution of a mixed DNA sample from a male and female. Roewer et al have
observed that:
Y-chromosomal microsatellites are used in two ways: (1) to distinguish lineages
(the number of markers and their variability will determine the degree of
discrimination) and (2) to provide information about lineage relationships (the
number of markers and the extent to which their properties are understood will
influence the reliability of the inferences). Standard forensic databases use
either 9 or 11 Y-chromosomal microsatellites.323

In terms of useful STR markers, ‘there are a total of 219 useful STR markers
available on Y chromosome.’324
All of these technologies form the basis for DNA profiling. Generally, the developed
countries have more advanced technology and are well equipped with experts. On the
other hand, this is one of the biggest challenges for the developing countries and
there is a lack of training for the technicians before commencement of using any new
technology. The proper use of these technologies, and the experience of technicians
are crucial in this arena, otherwise contaminated or erroneous results might be the
outcome. At the same time, the technological basis of DNA profiling and databasing
is growing very rapidly. Different techniques are useful for different situations. In
order to get reliable results and detect criminals, scientists are still trying to develop
some more accurate techniques for DNA profiling. Until now, the RFLP and the
PCR have been the two most widely used technologies for DNA profiling.
Technicians found the PCR method to be the more reliable and easy method
320
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compared to RFLP. While using the PCR techniques, some countries use 13 STR
loci and some others use 6 or 10 STR loci depending on their technological
advancement and capacity. In some cases mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and Y
chromosome STR analysis are also useful, depending on the circumstances and
requirements of the case. Accurate and well defined technology is vital for this newly
emerging area for delivering justice.
2.1.3.4 Sources and Functions of DNA Profiling
There are lots of potential sources of DNA samples which are very useful for DNA
profiling purposes. Two main sources of DNA samples are: (i) samples collected
directly from the human body (the suspects, victims or accused); and (ii) samples
that have been dropped at the time of commission of the crime.325 Again, people
sometime leave behind biological samples as a part of their daily life activities, such
as when dropping chewing gum in the rubbish bin. The DNA or cellular samples can
be collected by applying various forensic procedures. It can be collected from the
victim’s body (for example, semen through vaginal swab in rape cases where the
rapists ejaculate the fluid inside the victim’s body), or from their clothes (skin cells).
Furthermore, sometimes DNA samples (blood stain, fallen hair with its root and
saliva from a discarded cigarette butt or chewing gum) can also be collected from the
crime scenes.326 It is also possible to collect a biological sample from a suspect, for
example a buccal swab.327 Finally, all the biological samples can be collected from
the suspect, depending on the nature of the case and necessity, either voluntarily or
involuntarily (in the latter instance force may be used by the law enforcement
officers).328
DNA profiling of the samples collected is undertaken by the forensic scientists in the
laboratory before a comparison analysis of the results of these samples with the
results of other similar tests on other materials. The DNA profiles and the profiles
derived from crime scene samples are compared or matched in a number of
instances:
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•

Crime scene samples of DNA other than the victim’s (for example, skin cells
or hair found on the body or victim’s possessions) are compared with a
known person’s profile where there is a reasonable belief and also other
circumstantial evidence of that person being the offender in order to establish
prior contact;

•

Crime scene samples of the victim’s DNA are compared with material found
on a suspect or their possessions to establish prior contact;

•

DNA comparison is also done of a known person (for example, a relative of a
particular missing, unidentified or deceased person) with that of an unknown
person in order to identify DNA from a missing person or unidentified person
or dead body;

•

Samples from two separate crime scenes are compared to infer the possible
involvement of someone in both of the crimes.329

A positive DNA profile matching helps to identify and confirm the real offender, and
at the same time it nullifies the suspicion directed at innocent people. When it is
difficult particularly to detect the actual perpetrator, then mass screening or screening
of a group of people from a particular locality or community is done by the
investigators. A positive match with one person from such a screening would directs
strong suspicion on that person, while a negative match for all would eliminate the
entire group from suspicion.
2.1.4

SIGNIFICANCE OF FORENSIC USE OF DNA PROFILING

The advantages offered by DNA testing over other techniques are manifold. As
pointed out by Richards, ‘it is much more likely that tissue containing DNA can be
found. And using computer technology, it is also simpler to store and search a DNA
data base than a photograph or finger print collection’.330 At present the technology
is used all over the world both in civil and criminal proceedings and for other
matters. The DNA profiling technique has lots of potentialities, but currently it has
contributed an enormously in the criminal case investigation process, parentage
testing, the identification of missing persons or of an unknown dead body, be that
329
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person a victim of a disaster or murder, and also some other kinds of disputes where
identity is a question. Some notable uses are discussed below:
2.1.4.1 Use in Criminal Proceedings
(a) Using DNA to Identify Criminals and Suspects
Traditionally, photographs or facial appearance and fingerprints have proved to be
effective in the criminal investigative process. However, there are some limitations to
using these tools, such as fingerprints are not always left at all the crime scene or eye
witness is not always available or reliable for every incident.331 DNA profiling or
fingerprinting has, in these and other circumstances, proved to be a very useful
mechanism in detecting criminals around the world and it is now widely used in the
criminal investigative process. In this process samples from the suspects are used to
match with samples collected from a crime scene or victim. In addition, DNA testing
is also useful to acquit a convicted person, where the person is shown to have been
wrongfully convicted on the based on false or limited evidence without recourse to
the benefits of DNA profiling.

(b) Identity of Disaster Victims
DNA information is also useful to identify deceased persons who are either homicide
victims or victims of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. In this situation where the
deceased person is not easily recognisable, due to the cause of death or delay in
locating the body, DNA profiling is used to identify those deceased victims. This tool
is also useful in locating missing persons. In this context Frederick R Bieber in the
Book on ‘DNA and the Criminal Justice System’ has outlined that:
[The DNA profiling mechanism] ... can be utilized in humanitarian
identification of bodies from natural disasters or accidents (eg, identification of
plane crash and other victims from September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States), identification of war crime victims (eg, Kosovo and Bosnia),
reunification of family members separated by wars, natural disaster, or political
oppression (eg, in Argentina), and identification of recovered remains from
“unknown soldiers”.332
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DNA analysis has also brought together individuals and their separated family
members in the aftermath of natural or manmade disasters (for example, separated
infants claimed by more than one family after a flood) as well as identifying
deceased persons who are the victims of such disasters or of massacres.
2.1.4.2 Use in Civil Proceedings
(a) Parentage and Legitimacy
DNA identification has also proved to be ‘a … technique for paternity and kinship
determinations’.333 DNA profiling is used for the purposes of paternity testing, in
other words to resolve the paternity discrepancy (PD).334 Advances in the genetic
identification mechanisms and their extensive public access have provided scope for
the individuals and courts to determine the PD issues. Genetic information is
therefore very important in instances where parentage or other familial relationships
are to be ascertained. Once there is an uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of a
family relationship, especially in case of paternity, the accurate relationship can be
identified through their DNA information. Some other greatest benefits of parentage
testing through DNA information include settlement of inheritance disputes,
maintenance issues and so forth.335

(b) Immigration Cases
Immigration departments are also interested in human genetic information due to its
significant role in a number of issues. For instance, DNA information is useful in
immigration screening process in order to assess the health status of applicants, as a
proof of family relationships,336 and also detecting false identities. Therefore, it
contributes in reducing fraudulent claims. For instance, the Minister for Immigration
333
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and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has indicated that ‘in future, genetic testing
might also be used ... to identify asylum seekers; to ensure that they do not already
have protection elsewhere; and to ensure that they have not previously been refused
refugee status by another country’.337
2.1.5

ASSESMENT OF RELIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DNA
TECHNOLOGY

DNA profiling technology has been proved to be a powerful tool in forensic science.
However, the scientific validity of its application by laboratories and or its reliability
has been questioned in many cases. The process of ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of any person based on presumptions or probabilities of DNA data could
be dangerous. In criminal cases, there are concerns over the use of DNA evidence.
The reliability of DNA evidence has been challenged in many cases, for instance, in
the case of the People v Castro ‘some doubt [had been] cast upon its scientific
acceptability’.338 After discussing the scientific merit of the case, the four scientists
(defendants) who were involved in the hearing, concluded that ‘serious doubts
[existed as to] the reliability of the DNA evidence’.339 They drew such conclusion
‘based on the test procedures used and the interpretation of the results’.340
The question of ‘efficiency associated with new technologies, the concept of
infallible scientific truth and the neutrality of DNA science’341 are therefore, now
called into question in many cases. Some problems are purely technical in nature
such as degradation, deterioration of the sample, poor sample condition,
contamination of samples and laboratory error which could give rise to false results.
Many such problems could also arise because of the use of DNA analysis done by
laboratories with little experience. Problems may also arise because of biased
interpretation, fraud and the intentional or unintentional human errors. The
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followings are some common areas where scientific validity or reliability is subject
to some challenges:
2.1.5.1 DNA Profiling is Not Conclusive Evidence
Although it is claimed that DNA patterns are ‘unique’, at the same time scientists
acknowledged that there was chance that ‘one individual's DNA pattern may have
similarities with another's DNA pattern’342, and in some cases DNA pattern is
identical, for instance, in case of identical twins. The probabilities of one person
having an identical DNA pattern with another are remote. It means the chance of
matching DNA profiles of two unrelated individuals is on average less than one in a
billion.343 Nevertheless, the reality is that the chance is there. For this scientific
feature of DNA data, DNA profiling is not conclusive evidence and such evidence is
needed to be corroborated by other evidences.
2.1.5.2 DNA Evidence Subject to Human Errors
In the case of DNA profiling, like many other technologies, there is always room for
mistakes or human errors. This is because this technology relies on people to carry
out actions or make judgments. Mistakes or human errors may happen in a number of
occasions, such as, mishandling of this technology, such as, DNA samples collected
from scene of crime can be misinterpreted or misplaced. They can also be
inadvertently mixed with other samples. In this regard, Scutt has argued that:
The reality has to be acknowledged that sometimes, sadly, 'over enthusiasm' can lead to
forensic evidence being manufactured. 'Over enthusiasm' can also lead to unintentional error.
Australia has too many instances of forensic evidence being misused and abused (the
Chamberlain case, the Perry case. the Splatt case...) for enthusiasm for new tests to be
allowed to carry the day.344

The consequence such errors is that either an innocent person could be wrongly
accused or alternatively an offender might escape punishment. The possibility of
errors therefore undermines the reliability of DNA evidence, although the extent of
such errors is not determined yet and still under dispute. This error could lead to
miscarriage of justice.
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However, the opponent view is that if there is any defect in the sample or in the
testing procedures, it will result in a complete failure to produce any result. DNA
fingerprinting was approved by the Florida Court of Appeals in the case State v
Andrews. In this case the Court argued against the possibility of error and concluded:
The testimony here was that if there was something wrong with the process, it would
ordinarily lead to no result being obtained rather than an erroneous result. Further control
samples are employed throughout the process which permits errors, if any, to be discovered.
These factors are further indicia of reliability.345

2.1.5.3 Contamination of Samples
In a crime scene there may have DNA sample from persons other than the real
offender. DNA samples of one person can therefore, be contaminated if they come
into contact with DNA from another person. This can happen if a sample is
mishandled by the police while collecting the evidence or the laboratory staff
carrying out the analysis.346 Therefore, errors and mishandling demonstrate fallibility
and limitations of DNA technology in quest of justice.
Simon J Walsh rightly argued that ‘[d]espite some disagreement regarding
substantiveness of this technology, general consensus seems to have been reached
that DNA evidence has an important role in the pursuit of criminal justice’.347 It is
important to note that ‘the Castro case did not question the fundamental scientific
value and acceptance of DNA profiling’.348 In fact, the forensic use of DNA test has
finally got the approval of the Congressional Office of Technological Assessment
(OTA). In its report this office concluded that DNA profiling is ‘reliable and valid
when properly performed and analysed by skilled personnel’.349
Finally it is to be argued that the scientific reliability and accuracy of DNA profiling
is well accepted by the forensic scientists. Consequently, DNA profiling has gained
popularity as an identification tool in law enforcement. However, some doubts have
been raised against the technology, which must be resolved in order to ensure its
wider applications. The Castro case has identified the importance of standardised
345
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procedure for DNA evidence.350 There has always been a good deal of faith in DNA
profiling as evidence.351 DNA profiling is a rapidly changing and complex
technology. If such technology is used properly and fairly, it could be a reliable and
supportive technique.352 Therefore, some mechanism should be there to rigorously
monitor DNA profiling process and to support independent research, which will
protect and improve the reliability and accuracy of DNA technology.
2.1.6

FORENSIC DNA DATABASES: EXISTING SCENARIO IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

A Forensic DNA database is a digital repository of DNA profiles generated from
biological samples. DNA profiles are electronically stored in such repository for
comparison with profiles generated from samples obtained either from the scene of a
crime, or from the body of a suspect.353 One of the main objectives of such DNA
database is to ‘link individuals to unsolved offences and unsolved offences to each
other by means of DNA profiling’.354 Nowadays, it is also used for civil proceedings,
such as parentage testing, identification of missing persons or an unknown dead
body, disaster victims and so on. A forensic DNA database generally stores DNA
profiles of unidentified crime scene stains, that of suspects, victims, convicted
offenders and in some cases also of missing persons. Some databases store only
DNA profiles, whereas some others stored both sample and profiles, for instance, the
UK National DNA Database retains both DNA samples as well as DNA profiles.
DNA samples are retained in order to resolve any test result disputes, or for retesting
purposes,355 for in the event upgrading of the technology, and also for the purpose of
quality control.356 Currently the potential of DNA profiling have stimulated law
enforcement agencies around the world to establish forensic DNA databases as one
of their key investigative strategies. During the past decade, the establishment and
maintenance of forensic DNA databases has been a priority of many national and
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international law enforcement agencies.357 The technique gains immense popularity
throughout the world.
A significant piece of research on the current establishment and uses of forensic
DNA databases across a number of countries has been undertaken by INTERPOL. In
order to obtain a global overview of the use of DNA profiling in criminal
investigations, INTERPOL has conducted three surveys since 1999 among its 188
member countries.358 In 2002, the INTERPOL DNA Unit conducted another survey
into the use of DNA analysis in criminal investigations among the 179 member
countries. According to this report, 41 Member States (23 per cent) have an operative
DNA database and a further 38 per cent of the member countries were expected to
establish a DNA database in the next few years.359 INTERPOL DNA Unit began to
conduct its third survey of its 188 members to the use of DNA information in support
of criminal case investigation in June 2006)360. By the end of 2008, a total of 172
member countries had replied to this latest INTERPOL global DNA survey.361
INTERPOL has analysed these replies together with the results from previous
surveys, and data obtained from other official sources such as INTERPOL’s DNA
Monitoring Expert Group.362 According to the report, 120 countries use DNA
profiling in their police investigations and 54 countries have a national DNA
database.363 The survey also shows that ‘over 50% of the countries in all regions
(except the African region) use DNA profiling in criminal investigations’.364 Region
specific survey results are given below.
2.1.6.1 Analysis Results
In order to identify the differences between and among the countries and regions, and
also to determine global trends, INTERPOL has divided its member states into five
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different regions: Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, America, Asia and the
South Pacific, and Africa365:
Table 1: Global Overview: Countries using Forensic DNA Databases
Global

European

North

Distributions

Region

Africa

Americas
and Region

Asia and the African
South

the Middle

Pacific

East

Region

region

Region
Regions use 46 countries 13 countries 27 countries 20 countries 14 countries
DNA

(94%)

(76%)

(73%)

(57%)

(29% )

Profiling
Regions have 31 countries 9 countries 5 countries 7 countries 2 countries
National

(63%)

(53%)

72%

No

(14%)

(20%)

(4%)

43%

50%

DNA
Database
Regions

DNA 40%

DNA

database

database

legislation

Legislation
Source: INTERPOL Global DNA Profiling Survey Results and Analysis (2008)366
With regards to the use of DNA profiling, the INTERPOL survey reports pointed out
that the European region has the highest percentage of countries (94 per cent),
followed by 76 per cent of countries in North Africa and Middle East which is
closely followed by the Americas (73 per cent) using DNA profiling. In Asia and the
South Pacific region 57 per cent countries and in the African region 29 per cent
countries are known to use profiling.367 A similar trend is found in terms of the
number of countries which have national DNA databases; such that Europe again has
the highest percentage of countries with national databases (63 per cent) while the
365
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second highest percentage belongs to the North Africa and Middle East region (53
per cent). While in this category the Americas region has smaller percentage (14 per
cent) when compared to the Asia and South Pacific countries (20 per cent). Finally,
the African region has the smallest percentage of countries with national DNA
databases (4 per cent).368 With regards to the issue of the number of countries that
have adopted specific DNA database legislation, 28 countries of a total of 54 (that is,
based on countries that have replied) have DNA database specific legislations.
Among them, 72 per cent countries from Europe have national DNA database
legislation, whereas none of the countries in the North Africa and Middle East region
has such legislation.369

(a) European Region
From this survey’s results it is evident that the European region which consists of 49
member states has the greatest penetration rate of DNA profiling technology, as
among these 49 countries, 46 countries (94 per cent) use DNA profiling techniques
in their investigative process (see Table 1). From an analysis of this survey’s
findings, it can be argued that Europe followed by the North Africa and then the
Middle East and Americas regions are the highest level of participation in forensic
DNA analysis (see table 1). Due to its advantages to the criminal justice system, the
techniques of DNA analysis were acknowledged by the Council of Europe more than
15 years ago.370 Since that time member states have made rapid and marked progress
in using DNA information in the determination of innocence or guilt.371 In its
Resolutions of June 1997372 and June 2001373 on the Exchange of the Results of
DNA Analysis, the EU council has urged for properly operated databases in member
states. Up until 2008, 31 European countries have successfully introduced national
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DNA databases,374 notably, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and France in 1998,
Finland and Belgium in 1999, and Denmark in 2000. Sweden has already a database
of unknown crime samples. Switzerland and some Eastern European countries also
took steps in this direction. It should be noted here that the UK National DNA
Database (NDNAD) is six times larger than the second largest database (that of
France) in this region and the database size is 2.3 times greater than that of the other
European member countries.375 It is recognised as the first operating as well the
largest European national DNA database for offender identification. Sources of
samples for those databases are the DNA samples from suspected and convicted
criminals, as well as the DNA stains collected from the crime scene of unsolved
cases. Moreover, within the European region, research on the EU databases is
conducted by a number of groups or institutes. The European DNA Profiling Group
(EDNAP), the Standardisation of DNA Profiling in the European Union
(STADNAP) group, and the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes
(ENFSI) are some of the most significant organisations to consider issues of DNA
profiling and databases in the EU.376 There is a standardisation of procedures for
DNA testing and comparison with databases within Europe.377
Currently substantial interest exits among the EU member states for establishing
national DNA databases. However, there remain some variations or differences
across the member states in forensic DNA database practices. Considerable cultural,
political diversity and variations on the criminal justice approaches (which include
common law and civil law disparities as well as differences among court systems)
exist among them, which are based on historical developments and different natural
heritages.378 Robin Williams and Paul Johnson in their report379 highlight that there
are some differences in DNA databases adopted by EU member states in terms of
technical capacity, national legislative mechanism or background for the use of DNA
in criminal investigations. There are also some differences in ethical perspectives in
374
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regards to the use of DNA databases, including in regard to privacy rights and the
confidentiality of genetic information, the nature of consent in relation to criminal
investigation, government interference or surveillance, and the proper form of
database governance.380 Nevertheless most of the EU member states successfully
utilise DNA database in support of their criminal investigations.

(b) Americas Region
The INTERPOL survey highlighted that the Americas region has also progressed
dramatically, in parallel with the European region. For instance, the Americas region
consists of 37 member countries. Among them, 35 countries (95 per cent) are
included in this survey. According to the report, 27 countries (73 per cent) use DNA
analysis in criminal case investigation and 5 countries (namely, the USA, Canada,
Panama, Colombia and Jamaica) — which is 14 per cent of the total number of
countries in the region — have a national DNA database.381
Among these the USA has the largest national DNA database —the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS) — with at least 6,702,743 profiles by 2008.382 The DNA
Identification Act of 1994383 authorised the FBI to establish the national DNA
database for law enforcement purposes. The CODIS conducts DNA analysis
involving computer technology so that the laboratories at the local, state and national
levels can share and compare DNA profiles with each other.384 The FBI uses a
standard set of 13 specific STR loci in the CODIS. The NDIS contains DNA profiles
from: convicted offenders; crime scene samples; arrested persons (subject to the
permission of state laws); unidentified human remains and from the relatives of
missing persons who have contributed profiles voluntarily. Moreover, ‘all 50 US
states have currently enacted legislation to establish DNA databases and permitted
state-to-state comparisons.’385
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(c) North Africa and Middle East Region
The North Africa and Middle East region consists of 17 INTERPOL member
countries.386 Among these, 13 countries (76 per cent — a higher percentage than for
the Americas region) are known to use DNA profiling and 9 countries (namely,
Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Jordan, Egypt,
and Morocco) (53 per cent) have national DNA databases,387 which is less than
Europe and America, but higher than other regions.

(d) Asia and South Pacific, African Region
The situation of Asia and the South Pacific, and the African regions, differs from the
other regions as these mostly comprise developing and least developed countries
compared to other regions. The most notable exception is Australia. Developing and
least developed countries are recognised for their various common issues, such as
lack

of

financial

capacity,

human

resources,

technological

development.

Nevertheless 20 countries from this region are known to use DNA analysis in their
criminal investigation process and 7 countries have national DNA databases (see
Table 1).
In this region, Australia is a developed country and, in 2001, the Australian federal
government, in co-operation with the six states and two territory governments
established the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD) system as
part of the CrimTrac initiative. CrimTrac is an executive agency of the
Commonwealth Government .388 The NCIDD is a national DNA database not solely
for the Commonwealth of Australia. The information on the NCIDD overwhelmingly
consists of profiles are placed on it by the States.389 The NCIDD became fully
operational across all Australian jurisdictions in April 2009 and it is ‘an integral part
of Australia’s resources for identifying suspects for a variety of crimes, including the
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most serious, and for serving other important social purposes such as identifying
disaster victims and tracing missing persons’.390
2.1.6.2 Evaluation
The results from this survey clearly indicate that the use of DNA profiling and
databases has increased in all regions. It should be noted that all European countries
have replied to this survey, eliminating any uncertainty in their trends,391 whereas the
opposite scenario applies in the Asia and South Pacific region. That means in this
region the highest number of countries (31 per cent) did not reply to the INTERPOL
surveys. It is further to be noted that compared to other regions, there are a
considerable number of DNA databases in the European region. From this survey the
author also identified that Africa has by far the highest number of countries (44 per
cent) which do not use this forensic technique. It is also evident that worldwide 28 of
54 countries known to have a national database have implemented DNA database
legislation.392 Although not all countries have DNA database specific legislation,
rather in many countries DNA databases are in fact regulated by existing penal laws.
In addition the author has not found any co-relation with regards to time between the
existence of DNA database and the presence of it regulatory legislation.393
There is also a lack of coherence regarding the criteria for a suspect or criminal to be
included in the database, the storage periods and the removal criteria among some of
the countries that have DNA databases. Some countries include only the convicted
offenders of serious crimes in the DNA databases, such as those convicted of sexual
crimes, crimes against life, or include also robbery, theft or blackmail.394 In others,
the criteria of entry depend on the corresponding number of years of imprisonment.
Serious crimes with a strong possibility of leaving biological material and with
eventual repetitive characteristics are some basic criteria which are usually
considered in some jurisdictions for high priority inclusion of a DNA profile on the
390
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database. The experience of some other databases also indicates that some suspects
are usually involved in minor offences before the commission of a serious crime. As
a result minor offences are also important criteria in some jurisdictions.395 All these
facts (such as serious crime, its repetitive patterns) support the importance of DNA
databases not only for the criminal investigation but also for the prevention of crime.
Not only are persons convicted and imprisoned for crimes committed, others may
also be deterred by the increased likelihood of detection, thus preventing crime.
An INTERPOL survey report further suggested that among the 54 countries which
have a national DNA database, only 21 are developing396 countries.397 This means
only 40 per cent with national DNA database are developing countries. The number
of databases is greater and the success rate is higher in developed countries in
comparison to the developing world. For instance, most of the ‘top ten’ largest DNA
databases (that is, the US, UK, France, Germany, Australia, Austria, Canada, South
Africa and Switzerland) are from the developed countries.398 On the other hand a few
DNA databases or laboratories have been established in developing countries, such
as the Malaysian DNA database, the Indian database, and the National DNA
profiling laboratory of Bangladesh.
Based on the analysis and evaluation of this survey, the research further identified
that it is the general trend that mostly the developed countries have national DNA
databases and that these are running sustainably. The developed countries have
generally progressed and advanced well in terms of the creation and operation of
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their DNA databases, and in their regulation, as well as the adoption of technological
developments as they occur, when compare to the experience of developing
countries.399 The reason is simple: developed countries are financially stable and
technologically sound. As a result developed countries can more easily afford to
adopt such technology when compared to the developing and least developed
countries. However, this is not always the case and there are some exceptions to this
general trend. Apart from economic ability or financial consideration, the
establishment and running of national DNA databases depend on a number of
various other factors, such as the perceived necessity for such a database, the purpose
and/or political will of a government, requirements for compliance with global
standards, and/ or pressure from several national (for example, NGOs, various
lobbyist groups) and international actors (such as donor agencies). Some developed
countries (for example, the Bahamas, Barbados)400 do not have a DNA database,
where as some developing countries401 do (for example, China). For what purposes
databases are created, and to what extent human rights and genetic privacy would be
preserved, are questions of fact and depend on the country concerned.
2.1.7

CONCLUSION

This chapter has briefly outlined the scientific background of DNA and DNA
profiling technology from a very general point of view. It also highlights the nature
and significance of genetic information. The discussion also provides a brief history
of the DNA profiling system, its various kinds of functions and utilities. The context
and extent of the establishment and use of DNA databases were then also addressed.
Finally it argued and concluded that in comparatively recent years there has been
widespread forensic use of DNA information. Such utilisation, however, has some
associated challenges, in particular human rights and privacy issues.
The next Chapter (that is, Chapter 3) will go on to examine human rights and privacy
violation issues in the context of forensic use of DNA information. It will also look
at or visualise the whole picture and give an overview of human rights, the right to
privacy and genetic privacy, and their justification in the international arena from the
399
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legislative point of view. Finally this chapter will highlight how individual rights can
be balanced with state security measures or social interests.
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CHAPTER 3
3. 1 FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION V HUMAN RIGHTS AND
PRIVACY
3.1.1

INTRODUCTION

The advances of science and technology have resulted in the increased use of human
DNA information in the justice delivery system in almost all jurisdictions. The many
benefits brought by knowledge of the human genome are undeniable. Among these,
the forensic use of DNA (that is, in DNA profiling) has proved to be a mechanism
with great potential to assist the law enforcement agencies in detecting real
offenders402 and identifying innocents403 with some precision. As a method it is a
rapid as well as a more precise and accurate means to facilitate safe convictions. This
is because, apart from identical twins, every person’s DNA is unique.404 It can
produce invariably accurate and individually specific information about a person and
does not change throughout a lifetime. The unique nature of a DNA sample
facilitates the detection of human identity. DNA profiling techniques (that is, DNA
analysis results of collected samples) are used in this identification process.
There is no doubt that this new technology can be used as an effective tool in the
detection of crime and the prosecution of criminals so as to accelerate the control of
crime and contribute to a better society. At the same time there is an ongoing debate
regarding misuse of DNA samples and information to violate genetic privacy and to
discriminate against people. This is because DNA samples (such as blood, semen,
bone and so on) are the prospective sources of one’s personal genetic information
(such as, gender, race, health information, predisposition to diseases and so on) and
can also reveal information relating to an individual’s identity.405 The DNA samples
that are used for forensic purposes are, similarly, potential sources of highly sensitive
402
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information about victims, suspects or criminals and their families. Utilisation of this
sensitive information presents several ethical, social and legal challenges including
but not limited to human rights and privacy violations. For instance, sometimes the
law enforcement agencies and forensic science departments carry out DNA testing
without obtaining suspects or victims’ informed consent. This can be treated as an
infringement of genetic privacy.
The claim by advocates for DNA use for various purposes is that this technique is no
more risky than the traditional fingerprint evidence. However, as privacy rights
advocates point out, fingerprints provides only limited evidence related to a person’s
identity, whereas someone’s DNA contains important health information both about
himself and his family, including collateral relatives (such as cousins) as well as
ancestors and descendants. Therefore using DNA information for forensic purposes
poses a far greater risk for privacy than using other conventional evidence like
fingerprints and photographs,406 as these (particularly fingerprints) convey
information related solely to the identification of that individual with no implications
for other persons. As a result, the issues related to human rights, and more
specifically the right to genetic privacy, are some of the biggest challenges posed by
this newly emerged technology of DNA profiling. Yet such privacy issues and other
challenges with regards to forensic use of genetic information have not been taken
seriously by many governments around the world. In addition some governments (for
example, the UK) are retaining this sensitive data indefinitely, providing great power
to the police. An additional complication is provided by the fact that ‘[a]lthough the
techniques are widely understood by scientists and criminal investigators, the public
in general does not have a deep understanding of the technology’.407 There is little
public attention and debate in this arena. These factors have increased the
vulnerability of genetic privacy. It is, therefore, argued that while using genetic
information for forensic purposes, it is necessary to protect several ethical values
such as privacy. In order to ensure a fair trial and the better delivery of justice, the
necessity for new and frequently use of DNA tools and techniques cannot be
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overlooked but at the same time, its proper use needs to be ensured so that human
rights, and particularly the right to privacy, are not compromised.
At this stage it is significant to address some basic concepts, namely those of ‘human
rights’, the ‘right to privacy’ and ‘genetic privacy.’ ‘Human rights’ has remained an
important concern for the world community and for the past few decades ‘privacy’
has also been considered as one of the major issues in the contemporary context
worldwide. The field of human genetics and use of DNA data for the administration
of justice have added a new concern —‘genetic privacy’ — to these existing issues.
The first part of the discussion will address these three ideas. The second part of this
chapter provides details about the right to privacy and genetic privacy and its existing
legislative justification in both the national and international context, and including
in case decisions. Subsequently, section 3.1.4 compares the interface of the forensic
use of DNA information and the right to privacy and genetic privacy, and then
section 3.1.5 outlines the future of the forensic use of DNA profiling. Finally, this
chapter concludes with a brief consideration of how these two mutually opposite but
inter-dependent issues could draw on one channel so that they can contribute in the
maintenance of social harmony and justice.
3.1.2

HUMAN RIGHTS, RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND GENETIC PRIVACY: AN
OVERVIEW

3.1.2.1 Human Rights and Privacy: An Overview
‘Privacy’ is an important human right and has its roots in the system of moral values
which places considerable emphasis on the protection of the rights as well as
interests of individuals. It also presupposes such social norms as respect for
individuals.408 There were obviously no such concepts as DNA or genetic privacy
before recent scientific and technological advances. Technological development has
provided means to gather and manipulate genetic information409 and a new concept
of privacy has therefore has evolved. Bris and Knoppers recognised privacy as
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‘complex concept, multifaceted, fluid and evolving’.410 In order to understand the
issues relating to this concept, and to be able to discuss as well as analyse material
supportive of the concept of genetic privacy, it is important to first explore the
meaning of ‘privacy’, and then the scope of ‘genetic privacy’.
As the authors of the Nuffield Report observed:
It is generally recognised that every one of us has a protected zone of privacy
into which neither the state nor other persons should intrude without our
permission. This can be seen as derived from a more basic right to autonomy, or
as a precondition for the exercise of autonomy, or as an independent moral
principle. ... [therefore] [t]he precise extent of this protected zone is difficult to
define.411

The term ‘privacy’ has several meanings and it has various aspects based on different
contexts. Gavison argued that with regards to the status of the term, privacy could be
a situation (state or condition of limited access to a person),412 a right, a claim, a
form of control, a value ‘to determine what information about himself may be
communicated to others’;413 and with regards to its characteristics, privacy could be
related to information, autonomy, personal identity, and physical access.414 Different
people, cultures and nations have separate viewpoints regarding what should be the
scope of ‘right to privacy’, and what should constitute a ‘violation of right to
privacy’. Generally speaking, ‘right to privacy’ means:
[A] claimed right to choose with whom to associate, as in marriage or certain
residential situations. It can refer to a right to avoid unwanted publicity, even if
accurate. It can denote a right against unwanted physical intrusion into one’s
body or one’s home, ... Finally, it can mean confidentiality — the right to insist
that information, conveyed to one party for a particular purpose, not be
retransmitted to another.415
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The scope of privacy also refers to the ability to make particular decisions without
governmental intrusion, for instance, right to an abortion416, the right of an individual
to refuse food and medical treatments and so on. The Office of the New South Wales
(NSW) Privacy Commissioner of Australia has defined the term ‘right to privacy’ in
following manner:
• the right to be left alone, or
• the right to exercise control over one’s personal information, or
• a set of conditions necessary to protect our individual dignity and
autonomy.417

Again, according to the view of Schoeman, ‘privacy’ can be seen as:
the protector of reputations and sanities, a developer of intimate and personal
relationships, and even a defender of hard-done-by individuals maltreated at the
hands of overly bureaucratic government departments.418

Moreover, according to the ALRC Privacy Report, ‘the term privacy can be used to
describe a genus of interests for which there is a strong claim of protection’.419
Privacy can also be defined as an inviolate personality, as associated with the notions
such as ‘individual dignity and integrity, personal uniqueness and persona;
autonomy’.420 Bloustein argued in favour of:
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... the principle of “inviolate personality” to posit the individual's independence,
dignity and integrity; [which] defines man’s essence as a unique and selfdetermining being.421

According to Bloustein, ‘respect for these values’ both grounds and unifies the
concept of ‘privacy’.422 The ethical principle of autonomy or individual selfgovernance is, therefore, linked to the concept of privacy because autonomy is only
possible where there is a sphere of privacy.423 Anderlik and Rothstein further argued
that the concept of ‘privacy has both intrinsic424 and instrumental425 value’.426
Prior to the wedding of Samuel Warren’s daughter in 1889, the ‘legal concept of
privacy’ did not exist.427 The legal justification for the ‘concept of privacy’ is traced
back to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890428 Harvard Law Review article
‘The Right to Privacy’, which had been prompted by personal experience. Warren
and Brandeis launched an ‘impassioned attack on invasive press practices’, where
they argued that ‘the press’s penchant for inane and intrusive gossip should be met
with aggressive new legal controls to restore civility and common decency’.429
Warren and Brandeis also argued that solitude and privacy are essential for
individuals and the individual ought to have a right of action in order to prevent
interference with their inviolate personality.430 This has contributed to the formation
of privacy jurisprudence. From the legal perspective, the concept of ‘privacy’ has
also been recognised as an important human right by various international legal
421
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instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948,431 has
recognised the concept of ‘privacy’ as one of the important human rights. Article 12
of the UDHR provides:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.

The essence of this has subsequently reflected in the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966,432 and in the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,433 more popularly known
as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The spirit of the ECHR is
exemplified in its eighth Article:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.434

In addition, decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights, the European
Courts of Human Rights, and the United Nations Human Rights Committee have
‘produced a formidable body of jurisprudence elaborating privacy as human
rights’.435 Attention has been drawn to the international as well national implications.
As early as 1980, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Council ‘recommended guidelines for the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal privacy’.436 Similarly, many other international and regional
instruments have recognised and protected the same object. In compliance with these
human rights instruments, all signatory states have enacted relevant national
legislation for privacy protection. Privacy can therefore, be claimed as a fundamental
human right which is recognised in a number of major international treaties and
431
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agreements. The concept has also been recognised in diverse regions and cultures.
Nearly every country in the world includes privacy as a right in their
Constitutions.437 Finally, a right to privacy can be articulated as ‘a right to maintain a
certain level of control over the inner spheres of personal information and it is a right
to limit public access’ to the personal information (that is, the core self) that one
never discloses to third parties other than the family members.438
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger argued that privacy is ‘a bundle of very different
underlying values’.439 Kang identified three such values — physical privacy,
decisional privacy’,440 and informational privacy.441 Scoglio has added a fourth
category, which he terms ‘formational privacy.442 Anita Allen also added another
value, that of proprietary privacy.443 Roche and Annas have commented that different
jurisdictions apply different types of privacy according to their contexts and
requirements. Thus, privacy can be categorised in a number of ways: physical
privacy, ‘informational privacy, relational privacy, decisional privacy’.444 Some
widely accepted forms are discussed below:
‘Physical privacy’ is related to human body445 and it is a right to non-interference
with a person’s body without the permission of that person.446 This right can be
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invaded by the taking of biological samples and fingerprints without someone’s
consent or by searching their bag, and in many more ways.447 Here the principle of
respect for bodily integrity comes into play. It is a basic ethical and legal principle
that a person has the right to control access to his or her own body and that
intervention in the body requires explicit consent.
‘Informational privacy’448 involves the ‘establishment of rules governing the
collection and handling of personal data such as bank information, medical and
government records. It is also known as data protection’.449 There are other types of
information privacy, for instance, medical, financial, internet privacy.
Laurie elaborates on two types of privacy, defining them as ‘spatial’ and
‘informational’ privacy. ‘Spatial privacy’ is ‘a state of separateness from others’ and
‘[s]uch a state encompasses both physical and psychological separateness’, a state
where no access is granted.450 It ‘relates to the sphere of the self — a zone of
privateness surrounding the individual that cannot and should not be invaded without
due cause’.451 On the other hand, ‘informational privacy’ according to Laurie is a
‘separateness of personal information.’452 He further argued that:
[P]ersonal information in an intimate adjunct to individual personality. Respect
for personal information is a means to demonstrate respect for the individual
herself. Informational Privacy implies the denial of access to personal (health)
information to those to whom the information does not relate, and to attribute
value to informational privacy, as we do by legal means, is to recognise the
interest of patients in maintaining information in a state of non-access and
preventing unauthorised use or disclosure of that information to others.453

The Canadian Task Force on Privacy and Computers has categorised three different
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information context’. They defined the term ‘territorial privacy’454 as a claim of
privacy in a territorial and spatial sense and historically, legally and conceptually
related to property. In this form of privacy there is a physical domain within which
nobody is allowed to enter without the owner’s permission except by legal
warrant.455 In the second sense ‘Privacy of the person’ is a claim for privacy of one
person against physical assault and unwarranted search and seizure.456 This concept
is similar to ‘physical privacy’ or the idea of ‘spatial privacy’. Finally, the third
category is ‘privacy in the information context’. The notion of privacy in this sense is
derived from the idea that all information about a person is their own and that person
can control the communication or retention of such information according to their
wish.457 This idea is similar to the Laurie’s ‘informational privacy’.
In addition, there are some other forms of privacy, such as ‘privacy of
communications’. This covers the security and privacy of mail, telephones, e-mail
and other forms of communications.458 However, this study, particularly this section,
has focused on ‘informational privacy’ interests, that is, an interest in controlling
access to and use of someone’s personal information by others. These aspects of
privacy are relevant and most commonly referred to in the discussions about ‘genetic
privacy’.459
From the above discussion it can be argued that concept of right to privacy has been
widely accepted in a number of jurisdictions across the world both theoretically and
legally. The completion of the human genome projects and developments in genetics
have presented significant challenges in the areas of privacy and confidentiality. This
is because developments in genetics and genetic technology over the past decade
have prompted a wide range of use of human genetic information in various contexts.
As ‘genetic information is connected to personal and group identity, the protection of
454
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genetic privacy is an important individual and social priority’.460 Therefore, the
concept of privacy has been extended due to the technological developments,
changed circumstances and needs of human life. The scope of privacy now extends
to cover this newly developed concept of ‘genetic privacy’. The following section
will give an overview about this newly emerged idea: ‘genetic privacy’.
3.1.2.2 Genetic Privacy: A New Conceptual Development
The concept of ‘genetic privacy’ is only a recent development. DNA scientific and
technological advances have ‘provided the means to gather and manipulate genetic
information’.461 The application of advanced technology at multiple levels has
improved and accelerated the collection, analysis, understanding, and retention of
DNA samples and profiles. In her article, Skene remarks that genetic technologies
have raised new questions about the right to privacy.462 The advances have made
genetic information an immediate and accessible source of information about the
human body. Today genetic testing has become far less expensive and various bodies
have made access to DNA analysis and different types of uses of genetic information
publicly available (for example, paternity testing). The chances of misuse due to this
kind of easy access cannot be ignored. According to Makdisi:
Because human tissues are so easily accessible, the latest tests based on newlydiscovered information can be applied to invade the genetic privacy of
unwitting and unwilling targets.463

The concept of ‘privacy’ has therefore been redefined, while another right or claim
has been raised in the name of ‘genetic privacy’. This new form of privacy has drawn
global attention.

(a) Genetic Privacy
The concept of genetic privacy is one of the important and multifaceted
contemporary scientific, philosophical, ethical, legal and human rights issues.
However, it is not easy to define precisely what it comprises. Various legislatures
and scholarly publications have outlined the idea and scope of the concept of ‘genetic
460
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privacy’ depending upon its applicability, context and necessity. In general, genetic
privacy means ‘the protection of genetic information about an individual, family, or
population group from unauthorised disclosure’.464 According to Balint’s definition
of genetic privacy or privacy of genetic information means ‘protection against
unauthorised

access

to

personal

medical

information

by

individuals

or

organisations’.465 In other words, the concept is related to the maintenance of the
privacy of one’s health information or clinical records or medical data which is
derived from the analysis of particular DNA samples.466 Labacqz has further defined
the term:
[Genetic privacy] ... does not only imply the right to keep others from accessing
and using one’s genetic information ... [it] also includes the right not to share
information with others, ... the right not to know one’s own genetic fate, as well
as the right to use information in accordance with one’s own values.467

Protection of genetic privacy therefore involves controlling the acquisition, use and
disclosure of an individual’s genetic information. The reason for its protection is the
sensitive nature of the information: genetic information is personal, often highly
sensitive as well as familial,468 and has an influence on human life, health,
employment, ability to obtain loans, marriageability, reproductive choices, adoption,
and law enforcement.469 Every individual has the right to keep their genetic
information private from outside interference, unless there is an overwhelmingly
good reason to breach it (for example, where persons refuse to supply material for
genetic analysis where circumstantial evidence points to their being a suspect in a
murder).

464
Reference.MD, Genetic Privacy (15 September 2008) Encyclopedia of Medical Concepts
<http://www.reference.md/files/D030/mD030661.html>.
465
John Balint, 'Issues of Privacy and Confidentiality in the New Genetics' (1998 –1999) 9 Albany
Law Journal of Science and Technology 27, 30.
466
Lou Anne Cummings, 'Genetic Privacy and Academic Medicine: The Oregon Experience' (2001)
76 Academic Medicine 1089, 1091.
467
Karen Labacqz ‘Genetic Privacy: No Deal for the Poor’ (1994) 33 (1) Dialog 39, 40, cited in
Margaret Everett, 'The Social Life of Genes: Privacy, Property and the New Genetics' (2003) 56
Social Science and Medicine 53, 55.
468
Skene, ‘Genetic Privacy’, above n 462, 23.
469
Ibid 23–4. See also Loane Skene, 'Legal Regulation of Genetic Testing: Balancing Privacy and
Family Interests' in Ana Smith Iltis and Sandra H Johnson (eds), Legal Perspectives in Bioethics
(Routledge, 2008) 208, 208.

96

McIlroy argued that the concept of ‘right to be left alone’470 can be interpreted with
regard to genetic privacy or protection of genetic information in three ways. Firstly,
third parties or others should not be able to use someone’s genetic information in
ways which interfere with that person’s normal way of living. Secondly, genetic
privacy is such a right that prevents others from having unauthorised access to one’s
genetic information, regardless of the uses to which it is put (a broader area is,
therefore, included). Thirdly there is the issue of consent: a person’s privacy could be
interfered with by information being given about that person’s genetic makeup
without their consent.471 That means the idea of ‘right to be left alone’ can also be
used in cases where if a person ‘does not want to know’ about their own genetic
make-up,472 nobody (including law and state mechanisms) should be able to force
that person to know about their own DNA information. Moreover individual
autonomy is a central ethical principle and owing to this ethical value every
individual has ‘the right to determine what he wants to know about his own genetic
constitution and what he does not want to know’.473
However in practice, it is often difficult to respect the principle of individual
autonomy — the ‘right not to know’ about someone’s genetic status in an absolute
sense. This is because family members have a common interest in the knowledge as
they share at least some of the same genetic information similar to that of the DNA
sample holder. Therefore it is the duty of law or state to protect the interest of the
family members, his relatives or an entire ethnic group — ‘who might also be
concerned’ — without undermining the individual’s right to self-determination.474
George Annas argued that as ‘an individual’s DNA can also reveal information about
risks and traits that are shared with genetic relatives’,475 The Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine also supports this idea, particularly protecting the patients’
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interest.476 Due to the shared interest in the genetic information, that right to privacy
does not belong to an individual only, but also to the whole family, to the immediate
members of the family as well as other relatives who have a shared interest in that
genetic information.477
One of the significant reasons for genetic privacy protection is the possible
psychological harm or stress that disclosure may have on those who may only later in
life suffer from a particular condition or whose descendants might be affected. In
order to enjoy genetic privacy, one needs to have control over one’s genetic sample
and information. In this regards, the US draft Genetic Privacy Bill 1995 provided a
definition of the term ‘private genetic information’:
[It] means any information about an identifiable individual that is derived from
the presence, absence, alteration, or mutation of a gene or genes, or the presence
or absence of a specific DNA marker or markers, and which has been obtained:
(1) from an analysis of the individual's DNA; or (2) from an analysis of the
DNA of a person to whom the individual is related.478

The Bill also provided that ‘individuals own their own DNA, and no one else can use
your DNA without your authorisation’.479 Such control or authorisation needs to
extend over the use of genetic information, including what can be done with it and by
whom and in what circumstances. It involves the right to control how information
about oneself should be used by those to whom it is disclosed. As McIlroy observed,
‘[t]his right can be described as positive since it does not just prevent others from
infringing such right but also it gives the individual additional claims on their genetic
476
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information’.480 Hustead and Goldman have provided four interrelated components
involved in protecting the privacy of genetic information:
Access: Who should have access to a person’s genetic information, under what
circumstances and for what purposes?
Use: How should those who obtain a person’s genetic information be allowed to
use it?
Disclosure: To whom should those who obtain/create/receive genetic
information be allowed to disclose it, and for what purposes?
Storage/security: What safeguards and safety precautions should be in place to
make sure that genetic information is not obtained, used or disclosed
inappropriately?481

Answers to these questions could appropriately define the zone of genetic privacy or,
in other words, the protection of genetic information. The noble concept of ‘genetic
privacy’ is proposed by Laurie in his book of ‘Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to
Medico-Legal Norms’.482 Pamela Sankar has commented that:
Many socially salient genetic features of a person, such as stature, coloring, and
“looks,” are visible and rarely categorised as sensitive information. Much
routine medical record content is genetic as well, such as family history data ... .
Genetic privacy laws in the United States, designed to demarcate sensitive
genetic information, often define genetic information as the results of DNAbased tests.483

Further according to Charles Lawson:
Genetic privacy may be defined, ..., as the confidentiality that should attach to
genetic information — the information contained in genetic materials which
exist in various forms in biological organisms. When considered at the level of
the individual this includes genotype, phenotype, mutation and sequence
information, and when considered at the level of genetic compositions it
includes individuals, communities, populations, species and so on.484

In addition, the Australian Information Privacy Principles of the Privacy Act 1998
(Cth) includes genetic information as ‘protected personal information’. Section 6 has
defined personal information as:
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Information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of
a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not,
about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained,
from the information or opinion.

Various scholars have provided a ‘zone of genetic privacy’, while others have
supplemented some parameters which can protect the genetic information, in other
words ‘genetic privacy’. However no specific legal definition or zone of genetic
privacy is provided by any national legislation or international instrument. The
possible reason could be that it is difficult to define this idea precisely due to the
changed and changing nature of genetic information in terms of both technological
advances and uses. Therefore it can be argued that genetic privacy is an ambiguous
phrase and there is no single correct definition for it. As part of an effort to protect
the privacy of genetic information, policy makers decide who should have access to a
person’s genetic information, how such information should be used and what
safeguards should be placed to prevent misuse. While taking such decisions, policy
or law makers should consider the circumstances and context of the use of such
sensitive information.
For Allen, there are
four different types of genetic privacy (in other words ‘the right to limits on
access): (i) informational privacy of personal information, (ii) physical privacy
of the body, (iii) decisional privacy in making personal choices, and (iv)
proprietary privacy and ownership interests in bodily information or body
parts.485

Krimsky and Simoncelli have added two further categories of genetic privacy: (i)
familial or relational privacy and (ii) spatial or locational privacy.486
Among them, two important forms of genetic privacy are: ‘physical genetic privacy’
and ‘informational genetic privacy’. In this regard Graeme T Laurie’s concept of
physical spatial privacy can be referred to and, according to Laurie, ‘in the context of
genetic information, … spatial privacy can be invaded by the revelation of genetic
data about an individual to that self-same individual’ and/or it can be ‘invaded by
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unsolicited disclosure of genetic information the proband or relative him - or
herself.’487 Such privacy, therefore, ensures that the ‘individual herself is in [and
retains] a state of non-access or separateness’. Such ‘physical spatial privacy is
invaded’, for example, where individuals ‘are not permitted to be alone’.488
Similarly, in the case of physical genetic privacy, third parties are not generally
allowed to seize, search or touch the body of the information holder or data subject to
collect DNA samples or genetic data unless he or she has given permission to do so
and that permission or consent has to be ‘informed consent’. In exceptional
circumstances family members or third parties can do so without the person’s
permission, for example where family necessity (such as, for treatment purposes) or
public interest is at stake (such as, for detecting criminals). As Kirby observes,
family members are usually categorised as ‘third parties’ but that ‘recent
international statements have begun to recognise the possible need ... [for] a new
sub-classification’, one that is attentive to ‘the special position of those third parties
who are family members in the same genetic group’.489
Informational genetic privacy implies that certain types of personal and sensitive
information cannot be obtained, stored or accessed without the permission of the data
subject. Moreover, the databases which store that information should not disseminate
or share with third parties except for the benefit of the information holder or in
circumstances where it is deemed necessary in the public interest. Finally it can be
argued there is no zone or forms of absolute or unconditional privacy.
Some concepts are interrelated with the concept of ‘privacy’ and ‘genetic privacy’
and it is essential that these are examined. ‘Confidentiality’, ‘informed consent’ and
‘autonomy’ or dignity’ are some essential elements of privacy, more particularly
genetic privacy. According to Gavison, there are three elements to privacy: secrecy,
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autonomy, and solitude.490 Moreover, such a concept is based on principles of human
dignity and respect for individual freedom.491 These claims require close scrutiny;
and in order to conduct this scrutiny adequately, it is necessary to consider all these
key principles, values, and factors that are of relevance to resolving the conflicting
dynamics in the genetic privacy sphere. The following section will discuss
‘confidentiality’, ‘informed consent’ and ‘autonomy’.
3.1.2.3 Confidentiality, Informed Consent and Autonomy
(a) Confidentiality
The right to privacy requires the enforcement of a right to ‘confidentiality’. It can be
considered an essential branch of privacy. Though the term ‘privacy’ is linked with
the term ‘confidentiality’, there is clear distinction between the two. The term
privacy refers to the freedom of an individual to choose or his right to control the
‘extent, timing and circumstances’ of sharing himself (physically, behaviourally, or
intellectually) and/or his information with others. On the other hand, the idea of
confidentiality is involved in many statements of professional ethics. These indicate
an explicit promise or contract is made by the professional in their fiduciary
relationships — (for example, in a doctor–patient relationship, researcher–data
subject, court-appointed defence lawyer–suspect) — not to disclose anything about
the individual concerned except under conditions agreed upon. Such an individual
has disclosed his private information in a relationship of trust and with the
expectation that it will not be divulged to others without his permission.492
‘Confidentiality’ therefore focuses on maintaining trust between two individuals,
whether this is in an intimate (for example, marriage) or a fiduciary relationship.
‘Confidentiality is a person’s claim to keep private the secrets exchanged in the
course of that relationship, enforced not simply to respect the person whose
confidences are divulged but also to underscore the importance of relationships of
trust’.493 According to Otlowski:
‘[C]onfidentiality’ refers to an obligation arising in certain relationships
whereby the recipient of personal information about another is under an
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obligation not to use that information for any purpose other than that for which
the information was given.494

Confidentiality facilitates free and open disclosure that would not otherwise occur
and sets parameters for and mediates a relationship where one party often has a
position of greater power and/or knowledge to the other in that relationship. One of
the widely accepted fiduciary (trust) relationships is the doctor–patient relationship.
Confidentiality is the duty of the health care professional and the right of the patient.
Indeed, ‘one of the most fundamental ethical principles of medical practice is the
keeping of patients’ secrets or the obligation of confidentiality’.495 If it is recognised
that, as Justice Kirby observes, that genetic information as ‘a subset of medical ...
information about an individual’, then it is ‘prima facie entitled to the same
protections for privacy and confidentiality which, from the time of Hippocratic Oath,
have bound health personnel to respect all information secured in the health care
relationship’.496 The provisions of Hippocratic Oath have governed doctor–patient
relationship since the 5th century BC. Privacy is primarily in the patient’s interest and
confidence is in the mutual interest of the contracting parties.497 This is because
patients normally approach the doctor in pain and in a vulnerable condition, but with
full confidence and trust that his or her health condition will not be disclosed to any
third parties, that is, confidentiality will be observed.
There are two types of confidentiality — ‘absolute confidentiality’ and ‘qualified
confidentiality’. ‘Absolute confidentiality’ means that information which cannot be
made public or disseminated under any circumstances to any unauthorised parties.
This kind of absolute confidentiality is difficult to apply in practice. Laurie argued
that, at least in the UK jurisdiction, ‘the duty of confidentiality is not absolute,’498
because certain exceptional circumstances and emergencies exist that bar absolute
confidentiality, and there are times where it becomes indispensible to disclose the
information to some third parties. Breach of such confidentiality is justified when it
occurs, in the interest of the patient or their family members, or even for public
494
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interest.499 ‘Qualified confidentiality’ is the type of confidentiality most widely used
one. Similar to the qualified confidentiality applicable to medical information that
may affect non-blood relatives (for example, spouse or partner where an sexually
transmitted disease detected, or in regard to threats to life where the identity of the
person at risk is disclosed to a relevant professional), qualified confidentiality may be
applicable to genetic relatives in regard to genetic information. Blood relatives
should have a highly restricted right to access to each other’s genetic records500
where, for example, their own health or that of their children is or may be
endangered (for example where a party has a carrier status for cystic fibrosis
confirmed by DNA testing) and therefore otherwise confidential genetic information
can be shared among family member or relatives under certain circumstances. It may
be considered by some family members (but not others) that the confidentiality of
that information should be restricted to the familial group.501
According to Common Law principles, the concept of confidentiality is mainly
applicable to fiduciary relationships. Nevertheless, with further interpretation, such a
concept can be applied to the forensic use of DNA data. When there is an issue
regarding the protection of sensitive information, the concepts of privacy and
confidentiality come to the fore. Moreover, the creation of large forensic DNA
databases poses problems in regard to the security of sensitive information and how
such data should be protected against unauthorised use. In the vast majority of
instances people voluntarily provide their DNA samples with assurance that their
information will be kept confidential. With regards to genetic samples, although
there is no such fiduciary relationship established between law enforcement or
forensic department and DNA sample providers, it is important to protect
confidentiality because genetic information is more susceptible and vulnerable than
any other health information and of particularly high value. In addition in the
absence of an intimate relationship, equity imposes a confidentiality obligation on
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the recipient (that is, law enforcers or forensic department. It is therefore necessary to
respect confidentiality of genetic information of suspects and/or victims.
With regards to the right to confidentiality, Leo Tsaknis argued that the duty of
confidence arises from the principle of equity and such duty is based on the broad
principle of ‘good faith’ — whereby he who has received information in good faith
shall not take unfair advantage of it.502 Furthermore Justice Megarry, in the case of
Coco v Clark, has articulated that there are three elements for determining what
should constitute a breach of confidence:
First, the information itself must have the necessary quality of confidence about
it. Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances
importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised
use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it.503

The nature of genetic information is such that it requires confidentiality, and in a
forensic context, the recipient (that is, law enforcement entities or forensic DNA
databases) is aware that the information was being given to them upon reasonable
grounds (for example, to guarantee public security) in confidence. DNA data or
genetic information presents the elements elucidated by Coco v Clark, and the
concept of confidentiality is therefore applicable to such sensitive DNA data. The
principle or right of confidentiality is therefore neither confined solely to the
existence of a fiduciary relationship nor to the existence of a contract between the
parties. The core idea is that the existing principle of confidentiality is adequate and
it should be extended to include the new context and accommodate the advances of
technology and scientific progress. Finally, it can be argued that for the sake of
public interest and benefit of humankind, there should be a higher degree of
confidentiality while handling and using human DNA samples and information.

(b) Consent and Informed Consent
The principles of ethics — which is a sub-branch of applied philosophy — determine
what is ‘the right or the wrong, the good or the bad set of behaviours in a given
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circumstance’,504 and medical ethics deals primarily with the medical practitioners
ethics in the doctor–patient relationship. The principles of bioethics (which has been
described as a ‘quasi-social science’) is at once more broad in that it can refer to
broader areas of scientific interest505 and more narrow as it as bioethics is generally
understood to offer resolutions to moral or ethical problems arising from research
involving human subjects in medical and biological science practice.506 The
Preamble to the Eubios Declaration for International Bioethics highlighted that ‘life
and medical sciences present many important educational, ethical, legal and social
issues, which need to be considered at local, national and international levels’.507
Several principles for international bioethics have therefore adopted to address such
issues and among these, ‘consent’, is considered the pivotal principle of bioethics.508
This principle requires that individuals must be provided with all of the relevant
information in the appropriate context and they should be provided enough freedom
to make their own autonomous decisions.509 Voluntary informed consent is therefore
the ‘core ethical principle of human ethics’.510 The first of the ‘Belmont principles’
(those identified by the Belmont Report)511 is ‘respect for persons’. This requires that
research subjects be given the opportunity to decide what will or will not happen to
them. This opportunity occurs in the informed consent process.512 The principle of
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informed consent is also contained in the Nuremberg Code,513 the Declaration of
Helsinki514 and in the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects, Guideline 4 of which says:
Informed consent is a decision to participate in research, taken by a competent
individual who has received the necessary information; who has adequately
understood the information; and who, after considering the information, has
arrived at a decision without having been subjected to coercion, undue influence
515
or inducement, or intimidation.

This definition embodies five elements of informed consent: (i) competence; (ii)
disclosure; (iii) understanding; (iv) voluntariness; and (v) consent.516 In the area of
medical research, ‘informed consent is mandatory before extracting or using an
individual’s biological material’.517 Informed consent in this sense ‘occurs if and
only if a patient or subject, with substantial understanding and in substantial absence
of control by others, intentionally authorises a professional to do something’.518 It is
therefore the basic ethical and legal principle that every individual has the right to
control access to his or her own health information, including DNA, and this kind of
right to control information requires prior and informed consent.
Generally the term ‘consent’ means permission to seek, store and disseminate any
information about individuals and it can be obtained in many ways. The Australian
‘National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans’519 describes
the lofty principles upon which the necessity to obtain consent rests. These principles
are that every human being has inherent value and the autonomy to determine his or
her own path in life. This means that before a person becoming involved in activities

513

US Government Printing Office Washington DC, The Nuremberg Code, Trials of War Criminals
before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10 (1949)
<http://www.ushmm.org/research/doctors/Nuremberg_Code.htm>, cl 1.
514
Declaration of Helsinki, Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects
(Adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly, Helsinki Finland) (June 1964) World Medical
Association, <http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/>, principle 9.
515
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (Prepared by
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in Collaboration With the
World Health Organization (WHO) (2002), guideline 4. See also Sigurdur Kristinsson and Árnason
Vilhjálmur, 'Informed Consent and Human Genetic Database Research ' in Matti Häyry, Vilhjálmur
Árnason and Ruth Chadwick (eds), (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 199, 200.
516
Beauchamp and Childress, above n 509, 79. Kristinsson and Vilhjálmur, above n 501, 201.
517
Kegley Jacquelyn Ann K, 'Challenges to Informed Consent' (2004) 5(9) European Molecular
Biology Organization Reports 832, 832.
518
Beauchamp and Childress, above n 509.
519
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans 1999.

107

related to either research or before providing DNA samples, the consent of an
individual is essential and such consent must be prior to the research activity being
conducted,520 and it must be voluntary, free521 and informed522 (that is, participants
must be adequately informed about what is happening and understand what will
happen to the information gained). Some EU instruments also require that the
‘consent of the data subject should be free, express and informed’ (emphasis
added).523 The addition of ‘express’ indicates an awareness and a requirement that
consent cannot be implied by simple participation but rather consent must be
definitely stated by the participant. Although specificities vary according to the
purpose for which consent is being sought, authorities generally agree that there are
three basic requirements necessary for informed consent. Firstly, the participant must
be provided with detailed and explicit information regarding the purpose, risks,
benefits and outcomes of the proposed activity or use of information derived.
Secondly, the person giving the consent should be competent to do so. And thirdly,
consent should be given voluntarily, that is free from explicit or implicit coercion.524
These rules are also applicable in the context of forensic use of DNA data; however,
they may be circumscribed by legal warrants allowing action such as DNA sampling
without the subject’s consent where matters of public interest or public safety are
involved or in relation to certain categories of persons (for example, serious
offenders).525
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Further the term ‘informed consent’ is based on an understanding of what is to be
done, why, and what will happen to the results. Offering participants the opportunity
to make such free and informed decisions through informed consent is considered as
showing respect for individual autonomy and human dignity.526 The Human Genome
Organisation (HUGO) defined the term ‘informed consent’ as ‘notification of uses
(actual or future), or opting out, or, in some cases, “blanket consent”’.527 In other
words, informed consent operates as a form of ‘legitimisation’528 of the activities
undertaken by researchers and others while giving donors or suppliers of DNA
material a certain degree of control.529 Informed consent actually ensures that the
wishes of individuals giving their DNA samples for forensic purposes or any other
research purposes are taken into account, that is, they can make decisions with regard
to the access to and use of their bodily samples and their further use. This can extend
to the use made of information derived from those samples. According to
Beauchamp and Childress, there are seven elements of informed consent: namely
‘the threshold elements (which are pre-conditions of consent) (1) ‘competence, to
understand and make decisions and (2) voluntariness in deciding; [and] the
information elements (3) disclosure of material information, (4) recommendation of
a plan, and (5) understanding of the information and the plan that is recommended;
(6) decision in favour of a plan and (7) authorisation of the chosen plan’.530
Consent can be given in many ways — ‘actual’, ‘implied’, ‘rational’ and ‘proxy’
consent. ‘Actual consent’ is the real or genuine permission of the individuals
themselves to collect, store and disseminate their DNA samples or genetic data.
‘Implied consent’ means where the data subject has not actually consented, but
where, from other circumstances or from their attitude, it can be presumed that they
have consented on a particular issue. There is another form of consent which is called
526
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‘rational consent’. It can be used in cases where there is no actual or implied consent
from the data subject, but it can be assumed that no rational person would object to
having his or her DNA data collected and stored. Finally, ‘proxy consent’531 is for
situations where the individuals themselves are temporarily incapacitated,
persistently incompetent or dead. Permission is generally obtained not from the
person concerned, but from the family members or relatives. This form of consent is
required in medical emergencies or in some cases when dealing with minors or
persons of unsound mind (irrespective of whether this is due to mental illness,
limited intellectual capacity or mental capacity otherwise affected (for example, by
ingestion of drugs or alcohol)).
To protect genetic privacy from intrusions, it is important to impose a prohibition on
the collection of genetic information without the informed consent of data subjects.
A sample donated to biobanks or other databases may be stored and used over a
number of years for a variety of purposes.532 Privacy could, therefore, be intruded
upon through the retention and further use of DNA samples and profiles. In such a
situation, a ban should be imposed on retention and dissemination of collected DNA
samples and profiles without consent of participants, at the same time, is significant.
In general, consent is required to obtain for specific purposes. So, voluntarily
provided blood samples for intimate medical information, such as information on
pregnancy, syphilis infection, and carrying an allele for sickle-cell anaemia and using
that blood sample for other purposes without specific consent may violate the right to
privacy. In the case of Norman-Bloodsaw v Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,533 the
US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit ruled that:
one of the most basic violations of one’s constitutional right to privacy is
performing unauthorised medical tests. ... when the test involves intimate
matters relating to one’s sexual and genetic history, the [US Constitution (4th, 5th
and 14th amendments)] offers even greater protection.534
531
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Informed consent is an important issue in case of DNA databases. Generally, it is
presumed that before collecting, analysing and retaining the DNA samples as well as
profiles for case investigation purposes, informed consent must be obtained (where
possible) from suspects or victims. It can also be said that free, prior and informed
consent is considered to be the pillar for protecting autonomy and privacy in every
kinds of use of human genetic data, whether it is for the medical or scientific or
forensic purposes. However, one of the vexed and complex issues with regards to
informed consent is that scientific understanding is constantly evolving and it is
impossible to know ‘what will be at the forefront of research agendas even in the not
so distant future’.535 In the light of this dilemma the concept of informed consent
needs to be reconsidered.

(c) Autonomy
Another important aspect of genetic privacy is the principle of ‘autonomy and selfdetermination’ and this is also an important aspect of bioethics (that is, ‘respect for
persons’). This notion is very much related to the informed consent. In order to
achieve respect for autonomy, one has to respect the principle of informed consent
and vice versa. Furthermore, the principle of ‘respect for integrity’ (which is related
to human dignity) lays the foundation of the principle of respect for autonomy. This
means that one ought to respect a person’s autonomy in order not to violate his or her
integrity. The two principles of respect for autonomy and integrity and the principle
of informed consent are seen as forming a triangle in biomedical ethics.536
Etymologically, the word ‘autonomy’ is derived from the old Greek word
‘autonomos’ (from the word autos meaning ’self’, and the word nomos, meaning
‘law’). Therefore the word autonomous means ‘self-rule or governance’.537
‘Autonomy’ refers to a state of moral independence. It can also be described as
‘one’s decisional power over [one’s] own personal information and the use of it’.538
States Constitution amend V; ‘... Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law’, See United States Constitution amend XlV §1.
535
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There is no single accepted definition of ‘autonomy’, although several writers have
defined it, such as, Onora O’Neill who notes that the concept is mostly based on
some notion of ‘independence and personal responsibility’.539 According to Kant,
‘autonomy’ means the distinctive human capacity for rational thought and action in
accordance with the moral law.540
The principle of respect for individual autonomy related to a person’s DNA sample
or information is fundamental to any kind of medical or forensic practices. The way
in which the source of information must be treated is also the cornerstone of many
ethical and legal requirements. Among other things, the principle requires that data
sources be consulted and their consent be sought to proceed with any kind of
intervention or treatment of data, either for medical or criminal investigative
purposes, and their wishes regarding the use of collected data be respected.
From the above discussion it can be argued that many international instruments and
organisations have recognised the value of privacy. Though sometimes there is a
dilemma in regard to the protection of the right of an individual to privacy as
opposed to state security or national interest, the value of the individual’s protected
zone of privacy cannot be ignored. While the importance of privacy (including
genetic privacy) in health care as well as in research has long been recognised, the
widespread use DNA information for justice delivery purposes has also generated
particular concerns about protecting ‘genetic privacy’ in this sphere.541
An individual’s relationship with society is determined in many ways, including by
contemporary legislation, policies and technological developments. Consequently, an
individual’s right to privacy is challenged by these newly constructed social and
legal relationships. The right to genetic privacy is no exception. Anderlik and
Rothstein point out that genetic privacy ‘has intrinsic value as a facet of autonomy,
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and respect for autonomy implies a duty to respect the genetic privacy of others’.542
They go on to argue that:
Within a legal framework, genetic privacy must be considered a fundamental
right, and individuals should be able to block or seek redress for invasions of
their genetic privacy by other people and by the government. Rules protecting
the privacy of genetic information are intended to prevent, lessen, or eliminate
negative consequences of the new genetics.543

Although the rules for this new science have not yet been decided, there are a few
steps that could be taken to address negative consequences. These actions include
dealing with any kind of privacy violation through the involvement of concerned and
interested

parties (for example,

ethicists,

social scientists,

lawyers, and

representatives of affected communities and so on). Although there are laws
protecting privacy of health information and prohibiting genetic discrimination in
most jurisdictions, there are a number of discrepancies and gaps in these laws and in
the ‘social safety net’.544 These issues need to be properly and promptly addressed.
3.1.3

RIGHT

TO

PRIVACY

AND

GENETIC

PRIVACY:

EXISTING

LEGISLATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
3.1.3.1 Significance of Genetic Privacy
The impact of genetic technology on human privacy is a significant issue. The
increasing availability and affordability of DNA testing, and the increase in the
information derived from that testing, has meant that its use is now more widespread,
and the accessible information is also more extensive, than ever before. This has led
to recent increases in the sheer volume of genetic information storage or retention in
DNA databases. The more individuals learn about their unique genetic profile
through this proliferation of information, the greater is the risk to genetic privacy.
This risk intensification necessitates greater protection of genetic privacy rights.
Without privacy protection, an individual’s right to know, their right not to know,
their social honour as well as reputation, and their right to make autonomous
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decisions about the disclosure of highly sensitive and consequential information is at
risk.545
At this stage it is important to examine the significance of genetic privacy: how
important and special this information is, and how far privacy protection of genetic
information is recognised either in principle, or law or in practice, nationally and
internationally. The following section will analyse the significance of genetic
privacy, at first in general and then in the context of forensic use:

(a) Genetic Exceptionalism: Whether Genetic Information is a Special Kind of
Information or Not?
The focus on ‘genetic privacy’ implies the notion of ‘genetic exceptionalism’, that is,
that human genetic information is distinct, presents unique problems which require
special treatment, and therefore warrants special recognition and protection.546 This
idea remains somewhat controversial. The advocates of ‘genetic exceptionalism’
emphasis that genetic tests can forecast future health problems as well as can
generate insights about current ones;547 which means that it raises particular issues
with respect to privacy and discrimination. The proponents of this view support the
notion that genetic information is exceptional or special and should be treated
differently from other information. Therefore, it is important to understand that
genetic information is different from other kinds of medical information as it is both
‘predictive’ and ‘familial nature’548 and it causes greatest concern.
Conversely, the opponents of this view assert that genetic information is not
fundamentally different from other types of health information and it is just another
form of personal health information. It should therefore, come within the existing
protection of health information. They argue against ‘genetic exceptionalism’.549
Organisation Economic Cooperation and Development in this regard argued that:
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[G]enetic information is not unique in its ability to predict an individual’s future
health. Rather it provides a range of probabilities which need to be coupled with
information on the individual’s lifestyle (eg smoker, heavy drinker etc) and
other environmental factors (eg person lives near polluted river, electrical power
lines etc) in order to obtain a clearer view of the individual’s health status.550

However, the reality cannot be ignored that genetic information does have some
distinctive characteristics and actual harm may be caused to individuals if this
information is not adequately protected. Similarly, individuals’ right to genetic
privacy and the right to control personal information (which includes the right to
limit the collection, disclosure, and use of such information) can be protected by
taking extraordinary care of their genetic information. Nevertheless, it is a significant
fact that misuses of genetic information could also take place, particularly in the field
of DNA profiling databases and criminal case investigation. While it is initially
stored and used for forensic purposes, such privacy protection is also vulnerable and
can be compromised. Because of the cumulative effects of these various
characteristics of human genetic information, it can be argued that genetic
information is exceptional and special care needs to be taken to protect the privacy of
this type of information.551

(b) Cultural, Religion and Economic Significance
DNA samples or biological materials also have some cultural or religious
significance among different communities. For example, placental tissue is
considered as having ‘spiritual life’ and it has vital cultural significance in many
communities or cultures, such as in some parts of Malaysia, and including the fishing
communities of Amarung (North Sulawesi).552 They believe it is the companion of
the newborn and should be protected and respected. Such placentas are treated like a
human life, and the same rituals are performed and same respects paid in regards to
burial and memorials that are provided.553 In some places (such as Marquesas, in
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some areas of Peru, and in Bengal both Muslim and Hindu women believe so),554
placental tissue is considered to have the ability to protect the mother and child, if
appropriate treatment is given after delivery and, similarly, it could be harmful for
them, if it is treated inappropriately.555 People from other communities want to
preserve and bury the placenta in a particular place to indicate spiritual attachment
with their land or ancestors (such as in the Tahitian community).556 In addition, some
people treated their biological materials (such as blood or semen) as materials with
super-natural properties. In other words, they are invested with aspects of an
individual’s personality or identity. Respect for these persons cultural rights as well
as their personal autonomy or ‘privacy’ rights means that the person’s right should be
upheld and they be allowed the opportunity to treat such materials as would generally
prescribed by their the particular community culture.557
Economic significance is another reason where people want to control the treatment
of their own bodily materials. For instance, the most significant judicial decision is
given by the Supreme Court of California in the case of John Moore,558 rejecting his
claim of a property right over his spleen cells, which had been violated when doctors
removed spleen cells from his body in the course of treatment and did not share
subsequent commercial gains with him. There is a big controversy: who should be
regarded as the owner of genetic material supplied and information derived: the
individual or the researchers? Apart from financial gain, some people want to control
their body (their right to choose how their biological samples should be used) as a
symbol of their ‘right to self-determination’.559
In addition, there can be some economically significant genetic information derived
from the samples by researchers for the researchers as well as for commercial
enterprises. This is because after analysing genetic information, in many cases
commercial enterprises or researchers extract unique kinds of data that may have
554
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commercial potential and thus they want to establish their exclusive rights over this
new discovery through patent protection. As a result DNA databanks or repositories
containing the DNA of sizeable populations can be termed ‘gold mines’ of genetic
information. Researchers and commercial enterprises thus have a strong interest in
getting relatively easy access to DNA samples that have been stored for medical
records or perhaps for forensic investigative purposes. There is also a ‘considerable
interest on the part of biomedical researchers, companies that market genomic data,
and the pharmaceutical industry to stake claims on these informational resources and
to exploit them for their own purposes’.560

(c) Creation of Genetic Sub-class: Genetic Discrimination and Stigmatisation
Disclosure and public access to genetic information can have some societal adverse
effects. One’s predisposition to a serious disease may create a psychological effect
both for individuals and their family members, particularly in the absence of any
effective treatments. It may also have societal negative implications for the person
concerned and may stigmatise the entire group to which the individual belongs.
Misuse of the results of genetic testing has also the potential to undermine an
individual’s self-identity and sense of self-worth. Further, if it disclosed to
institutional third parties, such as insurers and employers, it may result in
discrimination against that person. For instance, an important Australian study on
genetic discrimination has found a total of 48 cases of alleged genetic
discrimination.561 Information from a US Department of Defense Directive also
shows that ‘genetic information has been used to deny medical benefits to
retirees’.562 Another US survey of 1500 genetic counsellors and physicians ‘reported
785 cases where patients had lost jobs or insurance coverage because of a genetic
condition or test’.563 This evidence suggests that there are considerable effects of
genetic privacy on society, so much so that in the US some States have introduced
legislation regarding ‘employment legislation and genetic testing’.564 In the UK in
the same period, legislation was reportedly passed confirming insurance companies’
560
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right to refuse coverage or increase premiums on the basis of predictive genetic
testing.565 Although this merely brings the practices related to risk calculations by the
actuaries of such companies into the 21st century (as such practices had previously
been the policy in regard to the information received from the applicant regarding
their current disease status, and that of near relatives (including cause of death)),
people are increasingly fearful that tests they had thought might help them prepare
for the future may result in unforseen negative impacts on their own and their
families’ lives.
It would seem that some of these fears may now be materialising, with growing
evidence of genetic discrimination occurring in the insurance, employment as well as
the forensic arena and other contexts — on the basis of the use of DNA information.
All the above mentioned aspects have caused an anxiety that with the new genetics
revolution may emerge a new ‘genetic under-class’, a group or community who may
be in the future given fewer opportunities given their ‘abnormal’ genetic condition/s
— viewed differently by the broader society and even effectively socially segregated
(that is, made subject to a range of ‘eugenic exclusions’ (insurance, health, housing,
employment) and they and their parents made subject to a culture of ‘blame’566
It is therefore important to uphold the intrinsic value of preserving the integrity,
dignity and autonomy of individuals, and to protect genetic privacy. It is also
necessary for the state to introduce effective mechanisms against genetic
discrimination.567
3.1.3.2 Legislative Justifications: International and National Level
Everyday millions of DNA samples are collected for medical research and also for
law enforcement purposes. Very often countries are required to share DNA data for
detecting international terrorists and also for undertaking health care research (that is,
to discover effective pharmaceuticals). Advances in IT and data technologies have
contributed enormously in making such data sharing easier and faster. During the last
565
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few years, the international community has introduced a range of regulations to
safeguard individuals’ genetic privacy. The sensitivity of DNA information and the
potential ease of access to it due to technological advances must be considered when
the adequacy of current legal instruments and the standards regulating the use of
genetic information are examined.568 This section provides a review of existing
international rules and national regulations, and of a number of court decisions
regarding genetic privacy within the context of forensic use.

(a) International Norms and Standards
The principal legal basis for the protection of human rights and privacy in relation to
advances in genetic science and technology is found in the core instrument of human
rights law, which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),569
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)570 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).571 The
ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected to medical and scientific
experimentation without their free consent.572 The ICESCR contains a number of
broad principles applicable to the protection of human rights in the era of genetic
advances.573 These three human rights instruments — the UDHR, the ICCPR and the
ICESCR also emphasis the right to equal treatment, in other words respect for the
principle of non-discrimination.574 The non-discrimination principle could serve as a
powerful command for nations to prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic
predisposition or disabilities.

(b) Regional Conventions and Standards
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms
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At the regional level, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)575 has also provided adequate protection for the
right to privacy576 (including privacy protection of DNA data) and prohibits
discrimination.577 Article 8 guarantees certain rights and fundamental freedoms
including the right of respect for one’s ‘private and family life’.578
Further, according to the principle of natural justice all kinds of rights concerning
suspects or the accused should carefully be safeguarded until such persons are
proved guilty. In this regard, reference should be made to a statement by noted
English jurist Sir William Blackstone: ‘[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than
that one innocent suffer’.579 The principle of ‘presumption of innocence’580 has also
been recognised by Article 6 of the ECHR. An analysis of the essence of this classic
Anglo-American idea of ‘the presumption of innocence’ and Article 6 of the ECHR
demonstrate that everyone is entitled to fair treatment in all respects even if accused
of an offence. The presumption of innocence principle dictates that all suspects and
persons charged with a criminal offence must be treated reasonably and fairly and
their rights protected like those of an innocent person, unless or until they are proved
guilty by law. In the same way the DNA data of a suspect or an accused person
should receive some kind of protection or fair treatment (including protection privacy
of their DNA). The presumption of innocence, therefore, should apply not only to
individual but also to the treatment of their DNA data. Just as ‘everyone charged
with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent’, their DNA data should be
accorded the respect of that of an innocent person. This should apply to DNA data
from suspects as well as those arrested and charged. This provision ceases once they
are proved guilty and their DNA data — like other records, such as photos and
575
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fingerprints, the retention of which in regard to convicted persons is already deemed
necessary — may be retained and accessed in relation to criminal activities. The
DNA material and data of innocent victims or suspects excluded from investigation,
however, should not be retained and subsequently accessed. Such persons should not
suffer due to the improper retention and use of their DNA data. It is, therefore,
essential to manage, balance and protect these two mutually dependent but
sometimes conflicting interests of society (that is, the enforcement of justice as well
as protection of human rights and privacy).
The indefinite retention of the DNA samples and profiles of those who volunteer
samples simply for exclusion in mass DNA forensic sampling unfairly discriminates
against their entitlement to privacy and breaches their right to treatment equal to
those who are also innocent of any crime (by virtue of never having been charged or
arrested or a suspect). The same can be said in regard to suspects and other persons
where a charge has not proved against them. Equality of treatment is the essence of
Article 14 of the ECHR.581 As an example of where such a provision is breached, one
only has to look to UK legislation where power has been provided to law
enforcement agencies not only for the collection and retention of DNA samples and
profiles from persons found guilty of an offence but also of those who are charged
with an offence but not convicted.582 DNA samples and profiles can be retained
under current British legislation, despite the successful appeal in the ECtHR,583 as
while the Court’s rulings are to be consulted, decisions are not enforceable in the
domestic jurisdictions where the matter before the Court occurred. Legislation can
only be altered by the jurisdiction concerned. The UK legislation584 distinguishes
unfairly between suspects or charged persons (those arrested but not convicted) and
other innocent people (members of the general population who had never been
581
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arrested). This kind of unequal treatment imposes a stigma on the former and creates
a separate class in the society.

European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
Another important EU instrument is the European Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine which was passed in 1997 by the Council of Europe,585 and which
protects the right to respect for the private life of an individual in terms of their
health information.586 Although the Convention did not specifically include genetic
data as health information, it should be recognised that any reference to all kinds of
health information would include genetic data. Furthermore, Article 11 prohibited
‘genetic discrimination’.587

EU Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection
The EU Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection588 (also known as Data Protection
Directive) ‘set a milestone in the history of the protection of personal data in the
European Union’.589 The Directive enshrines two equally important basic human
rights principles — the ‘protection of fundamental rights’ and the ‘freedoms of
individuals’ and in particular the fundamental right to data protection for the EU.590
In other words, it includes strong data and privacy protection regulations for all EU
member states.
Rapid technological development and other societal changes have brought new
challenges for the protection of personal data and the European Commission has in
recent times felt the urgency of the need to reconsider the existing provisions on
sensitive data, and to examine whether genetic data and the conditions for their
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processing should be added to this category.591 In the light of the acceptance of
rapidly expanding social networking sites (such as Facebook) and the ‘cloud
computing world’ of today, the European Union began a legislative review process in
November 2010 with a Communication from the European Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘A Comprehensive Approach on
Personal Data Protection in the European Union’.592 In its 3071st meeting dated 23–
24 February 2011, the Justice and Home Affairs Council required that special
attention be given to the area of biometric and genetic data from the legislative point
of view recognising its extended use in many areas.593 Further, the Council of
European Union noted that it is ‘of the opinion the processing of genetic data should
be carried out in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality’.594
The Council also ‘considers that special provisions on aspects of cross-border
processing should be explored’ on genetic data.595

(c) Soft International Laws: Norms and Guidelines
Declarations
More general interpretation of both international and regional instruments has
provided protection for human genetic information or genetic privacy. With regards
to handling human genetic information, there are a number of important and
definitive international instruments, namely the International Declaration on Human
Genetic Data (IDHGD),596 the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights (UDHGHR)597 and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
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Human Rights (UDBHR)598 which were adopted by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
The UDBHR recognises that ethical issues created by the rapid scientific advances
and their technological applications should be examined with due respect for human
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.599 It also urges that any kind of
preventive, medical intervention and scientific research should not be carried out
without prior, free and informed consent of the data subject.600 The UDBHR also
states that the privacy and confidentiality of personal information of the person
concerned need to be respected and such information should not be used and
disclosed other than for its original purposes, and to do so would be a violation of
international human rights law.601 Moreover, there should not be any discrimination
against and stigmatisation of any individual and group in violation of human dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms.602
The UDHGHR and the IDHGD are two other significant international points of
reference in the field of bioethics, the human genome and human rights.603 These
instruments were passed in order to promote respect for human dignity irrespective
of genetic characteristics, and to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms604
as well as to protect privacy and confidentiality,605 and to legislatively ban genetic
discrimination.606 Therefore, considering privacy protection issues, these two
international instruments are currently taking up the issue of protecting genetic data
from unlawful and unethical uses. The main aims of the IDHGD are:
598
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to ensure the respect of human dignity and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the collection, processing, use and storage of human
genetic data, … and of the biological samples … in keeping with the
requirements of equality, justice and solidarity, …607

The IDHGD recognises the special status608 of human genetic data and makes
provision with regard to the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic
data for the purposes of diagnosis, health care and other scientific research.609 Article
7 also declares that effort should be made to ensure that human genetic data should
not be used to discriminate and stigmatise any individual, family, group or
communities in a way that might infringe their human rights, fundamental freedoms
or human dignity.610 The Declaration also requires that prior, free, informed and
express consent should be obtained for the collection of human genetic data or
biological samples611 and that the necessary measures be taken to ensure the
accuracy, reliability, quality and security of these data.612
Similarly, Article 5 of the UDHGHR also states almost the same principle. It
provides that research affecting an individual’s genome be undertaken only after
obtaining the prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned. Additionally,
the IDHGD has required that human genetic data or the biological samples collected
from a suspect in the course of criminal case investigation to be destroyed after the
purpose of the forensic investigation is completed and/or any relevant civil
proceedings ended, unless otherwise provided by the domestic law.613 It also
provides extensive guidelines for the international community regarding the
collection, use, processing, access and storage of human genetic data and the
promotion and implementation of the Declaration.614
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The necessity of setting universal ethical guidelines covering all issues in the field of
bioethics is felt throughout the world. Being aware of the complexity and scale of
research in genetics and also realising the urgent need for international guidelines,
UNESCO’s Director-General asked the International Bio-ethics Committee (IBC)615
to examine the possibility of drafting international instruments in the field of
bioethics, human genome and human rights. In this context and based on preliminary
feasibility studies by the IBC, UNESCO was mandated616 by its Member States to
draw up international instruments setting out fundamental principles in the field of
bioethics, human genome and human rights.617 Consequently over the years,
UNESCO has confirmed its standard-setting role in bioethics with the successful
adoption of these international instruments in bioethics.618
Resolutions
Another international approach that deals with the same issue is promoted by the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which considered
concerns related to genetic material and information at its 2001,619 2004620 and
615
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2007621 plenary meetings. In the resolutions of 2001 (2001/39)622 and 2004
(2004/9),623 states are urged to ensure that no one is subjected to discrimination
based on genetic information. Resolution 2004/9 also calls upon states to take
appropriate specific measures to prevent the misuse of genetic information leading to
discrimination against individuals, members of their families or groups in all areas of
life.624 It further calls upon states to promote the development and implementation of
standards providing appropriate protection with regard to the collection, storage,
disclosure and use of genetic information that might lead to discrimination,
stigmatisation or invasion of privacy.625 Moreover, ECOSOC decision 2008/233
urges the implementation of resolutions 2001/39 and 2004/9 and other declarations
protecting genetic privacy and non-discrimination.626
The only point of reference for the use of DNA profiling in the justice delivery
system is the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) resolution no 8 recognising
the efficiency of DNA profiling as a powerful tool for criminal investigations, a
resolution adopted by UNGA in 1998.627 Following the acceptance of the resolution
8, and in order to advance international co-operation on the use of DNA in criminal
investigations, INTERPOL established its DNA Unit. Its objective is ‘to provide
strategic and technical support to enhance member states’ DNA profiling capacity
and to promote [its] widespread use in the international law enforcement
environment’.628
This study has selected a few prominent common law jurisdictions for closer
examination, and the following section is going to examine national legislation from
these jurisdictions in regard to protecting human rights and privacy in general, and in
forensic context in particular.
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3.1.3.3 National Legislations
Several governments have framed different national legislation protecting genetic
privacy. Some of the prominent national (and other) privacy protection legislation —
including the laws of the US, the UK, and Australia — are now considered in turn.

(a) The US
Privacy is a complex concept involving different but overlapping personal interests.
There is no comprehensive federal law for protecting the privacy of medical
information generally and genetic information particularly. Instead ‘there is a
patchwork of federal and state laws that extend protections to health information
based on the type of entity that collects or creates the information.’629 Moreover, in
the US there is no single law protecting all of personal interests. The aggregate of
privacy protections are found in the US Constitution, statutes, regulations and in
common law. There are different rights and duties regarding personal information in
the US depending upon the kind of information involved. Therefore, privacy laws in
the US are fragmented because of the multiple sources of law, including the federal
government and all 50 states. In the view of Roche and Annas:
Legislative enactments are ... the result of negotiated agreements among
segments of a diverse and often polarised society, rather than of a real
consensus.630

It is also evident that the HGP ‘has created a high resolution picture of human
genome’631 and provided vast and multi-faceted opportunities for the scientists and
the researchers while also prompting questions regarding ownership, intellectual
property and privacy rights issues, among others. The HGP has thus influenced the
formation of US policy and the ethical, legal and social implications of the program
have further prompted several legislative initiatives632 in this area. Federally, a
number of initiatives have been taken to provide protection for genetic privacy.
Several laws have been enacted during the last decade seeking to regulate genetic
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privacy,633 including the Genetic Privacy Act (Bill) of 1995. The Genetic Privacy
Bill intends to protect and guarantee individual privacy634 for subjects of DNA
testing. The Bill provides for the requirement of informed consent for the collection,
analysis, and disclosure of DNA information, a requirement that DNA samples must
be destroyed when analysis has been completed.635 Anyone who holds private
genetic information in the ordinary course of business must keep such information
confidential and is prohibited from disclosing it unless the disclosure has been
authorised in writing by the sample source or sample source’s representative.636
Collection and analysis of DNA without prior authorisation is permissible only for
law enforcement identification activities and identification for dead bodies or
otherwise authorised by law such as court order.637 This said proposed Bill was one
of the comprehensive federal initiatives for genetic privacy protection; however,
finally it has not been enacted.
The legal implications of genetic information in regard to health insurance issues
were addressed by Congress in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996.638 The Act ‘is the first federal law to specifically address
discrimination and insurance issues’ relating to genetic information.639 The HIPAA
privacy regulation took effect in April 2001 and it ‘required the federal government
to implement a privacy law that covered health information created or received by
private health care providers and health plans’.640 With regards to genetic
633
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information, the HIPAA provides that ‘genetic information ... be protected by this
regulation as long as it meets the definition of protected health information’ (PHI).641
However, the definition of PHI642 does not explicitly refer or include genetic
information. To fill the gap, the US Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) included in a definition in its ‘Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information’, whereby PHI ‘includes genetic information that
otherwise meets the statutory definition’.643 This definition includes genetic tests,
services, or counselling, as well as an individual’s family medical history.644
Nevertheless there remain some gaps in the HIPAA with regards to the protection of
genetic information. One of the primary drawbacks of this regulation is its limited
scope. It does not directly regulate many key entities that obtain and use health
information, such as pharmaceutical companies, workers’ compensation insurers,
employers and many researchers. It has been observed that the Act ‘only indirectly
reaches some of the entities to which a regulated entity is permitted to disclose the
information’.645 Moreover the HIPAA privacy regulation does not protect tissue,
blood, or any other bodily source of a person’s genetic information, despite a
person’s genetic sample being relatively easy to obtain.646 In addition, web based
genetic information is vulnerable, where genetic information is collected, used and
disclosed in an unprotected way.647 Finally, it can be argued that the application of
the HIPAA for protecting genetic information depends on the fulfilment of many
criteria and conditions and it failed to provide adequate protection for genetic
privacy.
The most recent federal law protecting genetic information is the Genetic
Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 and it is a US Act of
641
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Congress648 passed in order to protect citizens against discrimination based on their
genetic information with regards to health insurance and employment.649 Title I of
the said Act prohibits group health plans and health insurers from denying coverage
to a healthy individual or charging that person higher premiums based solely on a
genetic predisposition to developing a disease in the future.650 Amending various
existing laws, it also provides limitations on genetic testing as well as prohibiting the
collection of genetic information for the purpose of health insurance coverage.651
Moreover, it protects privacy and confidentiality. Section 105 provides that health
information (that is, genetic information about an individual for underwriting
purposes under the group health plan, health insurance coverage, or Medicare
supplemental policy) shall not be a permitted use or disclosure.652 In addition, Title II
of GINA prohibits the use of genetic information in making decisions related to any
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, prohibits covered entities from
intentionally acquiring genetic information, by employers, employment agencies,
labour organisations and joint labour-management training programs.653 It also
requires confidentiality with respect to genetic information (with limited
exceptions).654 Thus Title II of GINA prohibits discrimination based on genetic
information.
Furthermore, in 2000 an Executive Order655 (namely, Executive Order 13145 of
2000)656 by President Clinton barred the federal government from discriminatory use
of genetic information in hiring and employment practices.657 The then US
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Government adopted this policy, providing strong privacy protections to any genetic
information used for medical treatment and research.
At present the majority of state legislatures658 have taken steps to safeguard genetic
information beyond the protections provided for other types of health information.
State genetic privacy laws typically restrict any or certain parties (such as insurers or
employers) from carrying out a particular action without consent. Laws in 17 states
require informed consent for a third party either to perform or require a genetic test
or to obtain genetic information. Some 27 states require consent to disclose genetic
information; while 4 states mandate individual access to personal genetic
information, and 19 states have established specific penalties — civil, criminal or
both — for violating genetic privacy laws.659 Many states have passed laws that
protect the privacy of genetic information, but, like the federal regulation, the
approach is often sector-specific.660 Moreover, ‘the definition of genetic information
in these laws also varies considerably’.661
In this regard, it can be argued that the US has not established a coherent or
comprehensive policy and/ or federal law about how US society should view or
handle their genetic information.662 US federal legislation, such as GINA 2008, has
protected only a particular segment of genetic information, such that it prohibits US
insurance companies and employers from discriminating against employees on the
basis of information derived from genetic tests. Likewise Executive Order 13145
provides privacy protections to any genetic information but only when used for
medical treatment and research, and there is no provision to protect genetic privacy
in context of forensic use of DNA data. Furthermore, states have a patchwork of
genetic-information non-discrimination laws, none of them is comprehensive. In
addition, existing state laws ‘differ in coverage, protections afforded, and
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enforcement schemes’.663 Their coverage is also confined only to medical treatment,
research and employment without protecting human rights and genetic privacy in the
context of the forensic use of DNA data.

(b) The UK
English common law ‘has. famously, never recognised a general right to privacy’,664
although it provides remedies for ‘breach of confidence’. The common law
obligation in regard to confidentiality indirectly protects a person’s right to
individual privacy.665 As a result, prior to the passing of the Human Rights Act
(HRA) 1998,666 there was ‘an incomplete scheme of privacy protection’ under the
UK law.667 The passing of the HRA, however, provides only ‘limited incorporation of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law, including the
right of privacy’.668 The major legal mechanism protecting privacy in the UK is the
EU Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection669 and the implementing national law, the
Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998.670 According to the nature of the biological
samples and/or genetic information, these should fall within the scope of EU
Directive 95/46/EC. In this regard, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
stated that ‘[t]here is no doubt that genetic information content is covered by the
definition of personal data contained in Directive 95/46/EC’.671 However the
663
Genomics.energy.gov, Genetics Privacy and Legislation (16 September 2008)
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml>. For further details see
also National Conference of State Legislatures, above n 655.
664
Keith Mathieson, 'An Overview of Laws Relating to Privacy' in Keith Mathieson (ed), Privacy Law
Handbook (Law Society, 2010) 1, 1.
665
See generally Andrew Hobson, 'Breach of Confidence' in Keith Mathieson (ed), Privacy Law
Handbook (Law Society, 2010) 17, 17–18.
666
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42 (‘HRA’).
667
Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th Ed, 2007) 23, cited in Swergold, above n
172, 193.
668
Privacy International, United Kingdom — Privacy Profile (26 January 2011) Privacy International
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/united-kingdom-privacy-profile>.
669
EU Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection [2000] OJ L 281, arts 6–12. See also Tamar Shafran,
'Data Protection' in Keith Mathieson (ed), Privacy Law Handbook (Law Society, 2010) 61, 61.
670
The Data Protection Act was adopted on 16 July 1998 to give effect to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council dated 24 October 1995, for further details see S (Eur Court
HR, Grand Chamber, Application Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008) [30]; see also
Shafran, above n 669, 61–2; Article 29 — Data Protection Working Party, 'On The Situation
Regarding the Protection of Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and Privacy
in the Community and in Third Countries ' (5066/00/EN/final WP 35, European Union, 22 December
1999) 8.
671
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Working Document on Genetic Data' (12178/03/EN,
WP 91, European Commission, 17 March 2004) 5. Note: A working party was established by Article
9 of the Data Protection Ditrective, see Shafran, above n 669, 62.

133

Working Party ‘considered that there are circumstances in which genetic information
is clearly personal data and that there are circumstances in which it is not so clear.
Context is all important’.672 Therefore to what extent, and whether or not the
definition of personal data of this directive includes genetic information is
controversial.673 Nevertheless, it is here argued that the handling of genetic samples
or information derived from those samples, which comprise inherently sensitive
personal data, should meet the standards set by the DPA principles of fairness and
lawfulness.
Although genetic information is not explicitly protected as personal data under the
UK DPA, the broader interpretation of some of its provisions provides protection for
genetic information as sensitive as well as personal data.674 Since genetic information
is unique and there is a possibility that it might reveal individual’s health data and
other factors (such as, ethnicity), such information falls under the purview of
‘sensitive personal data’.675 This applies where DNA is collected for any purpose
(including criminal case investigation) and as ‘sensitive personal data’, such material
also requires a higher degree of protection.676 The processing of personal sensitive
data should be defined under this Act to include ‘obtaining genetic data’. The Act
stipulates the conditions that must be met for the processing of sensitive data,
particularly in regard to obtaining the consent of the data subject.677 Finally it can be
argued that the UK DPA sets out eight ‘data protection principles’678 which reflect in
essence the ‘data protection principles’ of Directive 95/46/EC in regard to the
protection of personal data of any individual. Obligations are thereby imposed on
everyone who associated with the collection, processing and use of genetic
information in the UK.679
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There are some statutory protections dealing with issues of privacy and genetic
privacy at different levels. At the federal level, the most important legislation is the
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).680 The 1988 Act contains two privacy principles:
Information Privacy Principles (IPP)681 applicable for the public sector and the
National Privacy Principles (NPP)682 applicable for the private sector.683 The said
Act and principles regulate the disclosure of personal information.684 The recent
‘genetic revolution’, where huge quantities of genetic material and samples and
information derived from such samples have become available has raised various
ethical as well as legal concerns, and requires greater protection of genetic
information. However, initially neither the Privacy Act 1988 nor its related
Principles provided protection of genetic information.
Recognising the significance of genetic privacy, in 1998 then Senator Natasha Stott
Despoja introduced the Genetic Privacy and Non-Discrimination Bill to the
Australian federal parliament in a bid to afford protection to the genetic privacy of
individuals and make genetic discrimination unlawful;685 however, the Bill was not
passed by the Australian Parliament. Instead, the Australian Law Reform
Commission was later asked to conduct an inquiry.686 After an enquiry lasting two
years, the ALRC published its report in 2003 on the protection of human genetic
information addressing the issues of genetic privacy and so on.687 In this report, the
ALRC recommended a number of changes688 to the existing national legislation to
680
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protect the privacy of human genetic samples and information. In particular, it
recommended amending the definition of ‘health information and sensitive
information’ in the Privacy Act and its related Principles to include genetic
information.
Following the ALRC’s recommendation, the Commonwealth Government amended
the existing privacy legislation to extend the coverage of the privacy principles to
identifiable genetic samples.689 The definition of ‘health information’ and ‘sensitive
information’ in the Privacy Act was amended to expressly include genetic
information.690 The amendment also includes the amendment of the NPPs.691 It also
provides that disclosure of genetic information to genetic relatives must be conducted
in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the National Health and Medical
Research Council (NHMRC) and approved by the Privacy Commissioner.692 The aim
of this legislation is to prohibit disclosure of personal information without the
person’s consent. Similar principles are also contained within relevant state and
territory legislation.693
The following section will analyse relevant privacy protection legislation of
Bangladesh (representing the developing country). Bangladesh is one of the selected
case studies for this research. An analysis of the relevant national legislation will
help the author to comprehend the existing privacy protection legislative scenario in
Bangladesh.

(d) Bangladesh
The ‘right to privacy’ is a fundamental right and this right is ensured by the supreme
law of Bangladesh — the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh694 —
predictive of the health of the individual or any of his or her genetic relatives’; Recommendation 7–5
‘The Commonwealth should amend s 6 of the Privacy Act to define ‘sensitive information’ to include
human genetic test information’. All recommendations made under ‘8. Privacy of Genetic Samples’
are also relevant. For further details, see Australian Law Reform Commission, Essentially
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689
Alston, above n 557, 435.
690
Privacy Legislation Amendment Act See also section 2.1.2.4 (a) of Chapter 2.
691
Privacy Act Sch 3 — National Privacy Principle 2.1(ea), pt IX s 95AA.
692
Privacy Act s 95AA.
693
Health Records Act 2001(Vic); Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW).
694
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972 (as amended up to 2011) (‘Constitution
of Bangladesh’).

136

which provides privacy protection with regards to ‘home and correspondence’.695 But
this fundamental right is not absolute; rather this privacy right is ‘subject to some
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the security of the state,
public order, public morality or public health’.696 These considerations as outlined in
law may qualify that right to privacy.
Supplementing the Constitutional right to privacy there are some statutory laws that
provide protection for the right to privacy, such as the Information and
Communication Technology Act 2006, which bars the disclosure of information
deemed confidential and private697 with regard to electronic record, book, register,
correspondence, information, document or other material of any individual without
their consent.
The Evidence Act 1872 provides protection for confidentiality of communications
within fiduciary relationships, such as, in ‘professional communication’698 and
‘confidential communications with legal advisers’.699 These provisions are also
subject to some restrictions. This section, for instance, will not protect disclosure of
any such communication that is made in furtherance of any illegal purpose.
Similarly, the said law deals with confidentiality between client and legal adviser.700
Moreover, confidentiality between patients and doctors, what many see as
encompassing a patient’s right to privacy, has also been acknowledged by the ‘Code
of Medical Ethics’ framed under the authority of the Bangladesh Medical and Dental
Council Act.701 Guideline 4(b) of that Code prohibits disclosure of any information
collected in confidence from any patients by the medical or dental practitioners, but
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such right is exercised subject to the law in relation to state security. These laws (the
Evidence Act 1872 and the Bangladesh Medical and Dental Council Act) provide
protection particularly for confidentiality (one of the aspects of privacy)702 rather
than privacy per se.
Further, a customer’s right to privacy during telecommunication has been protected
by the Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 2001.703 Under this Act one of the
functions of the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) is
to ensure protection of privacy of the customers during telecommunication.704 Again,
the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009705 prohibits unauthorised use, disclosure
or ‘leak’ of any information which has been collected, obtained or become known to
a person or organisation or agent appointed under this Act and such prohibition exists
not only during and also after the term of service of that person or organisation or
agent. Therefore it can be argued that ‘right to privacy’ is an established,
fundamental and statutory right for all citizens of Bangladesh.
The individual’s ‘right to privacy’ is protected and ensured under Bangladeshi
constitutional and statutory laws as regards almost every kind of communication
(home,

correspondence,

electronic

records,

financial

communications,

telecommunications, confidential communication between doctors and lawyers and
their clients, and so on). However, genetic privacy has not been protected under any
of this legislation. The use of DNA information for forensic purposes began in
Bangladesh very recently (2006); however, up until the present time neither the idea
of protecting genetic information nor of a right to genetic privacy has attracted the
attention of citizens or the policy makers of Bangladesh. The lack of adequate and
effective regulation may lead to human rights and privacy violation with far reaching
consequences. The problem can be more serious when it comes to genetic violation
in the delivery justice system (like the Marper case). The examination of
Bangladeshi legislation has identified that genetic privacy is not protected
adequately, especially in the context of forensic use of DNA information. It can also
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be argued that DNA technology has advanced far and been adopted rapidly around
the world. In such circumstances, the lack of an appropriate mechanism for
protecting genetic privacy in the Bangladeshi jurisdiction is detrimental to social
harmony, justice and economic growth and also in other developing countries. The
ethical, social and economic development of Bangladesh is facing substantial
challenges.
Bangladesh is not alone in this struggle to anticipate or even keep the law abreast of
technological change, particularly in this area. The legal framework for considering
issues related to the genetic material and information lags far behind the advances in
genetic science. The rapid development of science and its technological applications,
therefore, demands urgent and profound national and international actions.
3.1.3.4 Assessing the Adequacy of Legal Protection of Human Rights and
Genetic Privacy
A number of international as well as regional instruments, resolutions and guidelines
reflect a concern for the proper use of and access to human genetic data and the need
to ensure the protection of human rights, and the individual’s right to privacy. They
also encompass recognition of the need to ensure non-discrimination on the basis of
genetic information. Although these instruments are non-binding, their value and
strength (it is argued) are in no way diminished. These initiatives demonstrate the
growing commitment of international community to introduce and respect some
basic principles regarding bioethics and human genome.
The UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR are some significant international instruments
protecting and preserving human rights. These instruments highlight respect for and
observance of human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.706 In general
these instruments provide protection for the right to privacy. However, they have
apparently failed to provide adequate privacy protection for the data subject while
collecting, retaining and accessing to his genetic samples and information by others.
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At the regional level, it is assumed that the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)707 has provided adequate
protection for the right to privacy.708 However, the idea of ‘adequacy’ is hard to
determine specially, when a member state has failed to implement regionally agreed
rules or norms within their national jurisdiction. For instance, in 2008, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that there had been a violation of Article 8 of
the ECHR through the indiscriminate retention of DNA samples and profiles.709
Nevertheless DNA samples and profiles can be retained under current British
legislation. It can be argued that although the ECtHR court ruling can be consulted,
decisions are not enforceable in the UK jurisdiction. Legislation can only be altered
by the jurisdiction concerned, in this case by the UK.
Further, EU Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection includes strong data and privacy
protection regulations for all EU member states. In this regard Graham Greenleaf
argued that because of the ‘adequacy’ mechanism, the influence of European data
privacy standards has been felt outside Europe.710 He also added that:
It is a plausible (and in my view, correct) hypothesis that the EU Directive is the most
significant overall influence on the content of data privacy laws outside Europe, and that its
influence is gradually strengthening, partly because of the desire of non‐EU countries to have
their laws recognised as ‘adequate’, but also because of the their aspiration that their laws
should be recognised as providing the highest international standard of privacy protection.711

One of the shortcomings of this Directive is that it requires EU member states to
protect the privacy of personal data;712 however, it says nothing explicitly about
medical research,713 nor is genetic data explicitly mentioned as a sensitive category
of data.714 Another dilemma is that these instruments are regionally bindings for a
particular region (for example, the EU), they have little impact for rest of the world.
Council of the European Union, in its 3071st Justice and Home Affairs Council
707
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Meeting required special attention to be given for introducing legal protection of
genetic data. However, it is not clearly mentioned by the council why genetic data
should get this special treatment. In regard to the interface of law enforcement and
judicial operations and data protection, the Council noted that:
the notion of a comprehensive approach to data protection does not necessarily
exclude specific rules for data protection for police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters within this comprehensive protection scheme ... the
Commission [is encouraged] to propose a new legal framework taking due
account of the specificities of this area ...715

The Council comments specifically on the need for harmony and balance in regard to
the competing rights of individuals and society:
[C]ertain limitations have to be set regarding the rights of individuals in the
specific context in a harmonised and balanced way, when necessary and
proportionate and taking into account the legitimate goals pursued by law
enforcement authorities in combating crime and maintaining public security.716

Further, International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (IDHGD), the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR) and the
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) - these are some
declarations which provide provision to protect genetic data. Two of these
declarations also contain provision protecting privacy and confidentiality of genetic
data. The privacy and human rights issues in the context of scientific and medical
research on the human genome or genetic information have been addressed by the
UDBHR717 and the UDHGHR. In a strict sense these declarations did not address the
ethical issues which could be raised in the context of forensic use of genetic
information; however, a general interpretation of the texts with regard to scientific
research should include an analysis of human DNA for the purpose of forensic use of
DNA profiling. On the other hand, the IDHGD expressly bars the application of its
provisions to the field of forensic medicine, civil, criminal and other legal
proceedings (that is, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences,
parentage testing). Therefore, the aim and scope of this last declaration did not
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provide provision for the protection of privacy and human rights in the context of
forensic use of DNA information.
Moreover, these declarations are not legally binding instruments but, according to a
UNESCO statement, they were chosen instead of a convention so as ‘to facilitate
consensus and allow for adaptations in a domain where the variety of situations
covered, and the complexity of the subject, is constantly evolving with new scientific
discoveries’.718 Although these declarations constitute non-binding instruments in
international law, the unanimous adoption by member states is not merely symbolic
but gives the declaration moral authority. It signals a moral commitment by members
that imposes a corresponding moral obligation upon members. In addition, these
declarations remind the international community of its duty of solidarity towards all
countries. As a result, for the first time in the history of bioethics, all signatory states
of the international community are solemnly committed to respect and implement the
basic principles of bioethics.719
Furthermore, with regard to the issue of privacy protection of forensic use of DNA
data, it can be argued that a more stringent legal instrument in the form of treaty or
convention binding the state parties is essential for guiding the use of DNA profiling
in the justice delivery system, in the same spirit as UNGA resolution 8 which clearly
recognises the power of the technology. For this reason it is justified to argue that the
legal protection for genetic privacy while conducting criminal case investigation is
inadequate.
It can also be argued that most of the international declarations, resolutions,
normative texts and statements are ‘soft’ international laws and they have limited
legal enforceability. They are inadequate in providing protection for genetic privacy
and in most cases their enforcement for compliance is very limited in national
jurisdictions. The languages in some of the instruments specify which sections are
not obligatory for the signatory states. Even if certain matters appear obligatory, it is
the force of moral pressure, not sanctions, that are the method applied to encourage
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(rather than enforce) compliance. Moreover, at present there is also no distinctive,
comprehensive and adequate international legislative instrument to guide the
collection, analysis, storage of human DNA samples and profiles in order to protect
human rights. Besides, there is no instrument that specifically protects the use and
retention of DNA samples and profiles for law enforcement purposes.
In absence of a specific international instrument, statutory frameworks regulate
collection, retention and use of bodily samples taken from individuals in the course
of criminal investigations, and prosecutions rests on national legislation,720 which
vary between jurisdictions. For instance, in case of USA, like federal regulation, the
state legislative approach protecting the privacy of genetic information is sector
specific and differs in coverage, protection and enforcement schemes. This coverage
is confined only to medical treatment, research and employment and it did not extent
to genetic privacy protection. Besides, the definition of genetic information also
varies in these laws. Further, limited incorporation of the ECHR has been provided
into UK domestic law, including the right of privacy’.721
Analysis of the initiatives taken by some developed countries (UK, USA and
Australia)722 in the previous section suggests that these countries have either enacted
new legislation or amended existing ones to protect human genetic information.
However, there is no such legislation to protect genetic privacy in Bangladesh.
Therefore it is very important to recognise ‘right to genetic privacy’ in Bangladesh,
which may be accomplished through some guidelines, national policy and/or
legislation.
From the above discussion it is evident that the precise nature of privacy protection,
more particularly genetic privacy, and necessity of protection of such type of privacy
varies considerably across the world. Consequently, access to and use of DNA
information or genetic data is regulated separately throughout the world. Moreover
there are inconsistencies in national legislations that regulate genetic privacy. These
inconsistencies are creating complexities and uncertainty. International cooperation
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faces various challenges due to these inconsistencies in national legislations. In this
regard Mark Taylor highlighted that:
Without constructing a coherent world-view, acceptable by all as representative of the correct
values in the correct measure, how might one assess the appropriateness of a legal framework
designed to protect certain preferences regarding access to, and use of, genetic data?

With regard to the assessment of the appropriateness of the legal framework, she
further suggested that:
[T]he first step towards a realistic assessment of the appropriateness of any legal framework,
intended to protect privacy, must be to consider whether it is capable of even accounting for
particular patterns and preferences. These patterns and preferences regarding access to
genetic data I call ‘norms of exclusivity’. ... Next, one might consider whether, if protection
was to be effective, the protection identified as appropriate could be delivered in practice. ...

After analysing the view of Mark Taylor, it can be argued that based on the above
mentioned test most of the international instruments and national legislations have
apparently failed to provide an appropriate definition of ‘genetic privacy’ or what is
meant by privacy of genetic information. Without adopting a globally consistent
acceptable definition of genetic privacy, it is difficult to assess the adequacy of its
legal protection. In this regard Mark Mark Taylor further pointed out that:
... [I]n many cases, the existing legal framework can be critiqued according to its inability to
take even the first step towards adequate privacy protection: the concept of ‘personal data’ is
incapable of accounting for the norms of exclusivity regarding research use of genetic data.

Finally it can be argued that the legal protections which are available worldwide are
inadequate for protecting privacy of genetic information, partly because of noncoherence between and among the international community, and partly because
countries could not agree to adopt a universally acceptable legal instrument to
address these issues.
There are countries whose protection of genetic privacy, and particularly whose
judicial analysis and decisions relating to that protection, are worth examining. The
case law of such countries provides an excellent example for legislative and judicial
principles in this field, both for health care and forensic use. The main focus of this
discussion is to assess the implications of the judicial decisions below in ensuring
genetic privacy protection, particularly in the context of forensic use of DNA data in
the investigative process.
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3.1.3.5 Case-law
(a) S and Marper v United Kingdom
The case of S and Marper v United Kingdom723 is a recent landmark decision as a
judicial recognition of human rights and privacy in the justice delivery system.
Though it is a general understanding that the use of DNA profiling for the forensic
purposes do not reveal personal health information, therefore, it does not violate
human rights and privacy. However, for the first time by this case it has been
recognised that retention of DNA samples is a substantial threat to privacy.

Facts of the Case
Both the applicants of this case, Mr S and Mr Michael Marper are British nationals.
They were born in 1989 and 1963 respectively and live in Sheffield (UK). On 19
January 2001, Mr S (the first applicant) was arrested (while aged 11) and charged
with attempted robbery. His fingerprints and DNA samples were taken by the British
police. Since his charge was not proved, he was acquitted on 14 June 2001. On 13
March 2001, Mr Michael Marper (the second applicant) was arrested and a charge
laid against him of harassment of his partner. His fingerprints and DNA samples
were also taken. On 14 June 2001, the charge against him was formally discontinued
as he and his partner had reconciled.724 As the charges had been dismissed and the
proceedings terminated, both applicants requested the destruction of their
fingerprints and DNA samples in the database, but in both cases the Chief Constable
of South Yorkshire Police refused to destroy the materials as the retention of their
DNA data for unlimited period of time is authorised by the UK domestic law.725 Both
applicants applied for a judicial review of the police decision. On 22 March 2002, the
Administrative Court of UK726 rejected their application. The Court of Appeal727
then upheld the decision of the Administrative Court on 12 September 2002 by a
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majority of two to one judges.728 Finally, the case was heard by the House of Lords
(the UK Court of final appeal) in June 2004 and their appeal was again dismissed.729

Procedure of the Court
On 16 August 2004, two applicants then lodged their applications (nos 30562/04 and
30566/04) with the ECtHR against the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
under Article 34 of the ECHR730 on the ground that the retention of their fingerprints
and cellular samples and DNA profiles by the UK police, even after being discharged
and acquitted from the criminal proceedings, was a violation of their human rights
and right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. In their complaint the applicants
also argued that the retention of their DNA data amounted to unfair discrimination
and was contrary to their entitlement to privacy under Article 14 of the same
Convention and therefore contravened their right to fair and equal treatment,731 that
is, they expected equal treatment from the government to that accorded other
innocent citizens whose DNA samples and profiles are not retained in the database.
They argued that the retention of their DNA data, despite their not being guilty of
any crime, represented a discriminatory approach of the government. Moreover,
since such an approach permits the police to retain the DNA data of persons charged
but not convicted, this approach creates a sub-group among innocent population.732
On 16 January 2007, the case was declared admissible and the Chamber to which the
case was assigned decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber on 10 July
2007.733

Decision of the Court
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In its judgment ECtHR noted that cellular samples contained much sensitive
information about an individual, including their health information. DNA
information is also contained unique genetic code, thus familial nature and it is,
therefore, of great significance both for the individuals and their relatives.734
Moreover, DNA profiles also create the possibility for drawing inferences about
ethnic origin. Because of these special characteristics of DNA data, their retention is
considered as a threat to the respect for the private life. As a result, the court
concluded that the retention of both cellular samples and DNA profiles amounted to
a violation of the appellants’ right to respect for their private life, in other words their
‘right to privacy’ under Article 8 of the ECHR. And also the indefinite retention of
DNA samples and the indefinite speculative searching of profiles taken from
individuals who were once subject to criminal charge is a proportionate breach of
their right to privacy under the same provision.735
(b) Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v State of Iceland
Again in another case, the individual’s right to genetic privacy is constitutionally and
judicially recognised by the Icelandic Supreme Court (SC). It forms a precedent
domestically for Iceland and could prove informative for other countries that have
begun to retain and use human genetic information. Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v
State of Iceland736 is, in regard to privacy and informed consent issues, a landmark
judicial decision of international importance in the arena of genetic privacy
protection.

Facts of the Case
In this case, the plaintiff, Ms Guðmundsdóttir, was born in 1985 and had two
brothers who did not object to the prosecution of this case. The plaintiff’s father,
Guðmundur Ingólfsson, died on 12 August 1991. On 16 February 2000, the plaintiff
applied through her guardian, under Article 8 of the Health Sector Database (HSD)

734

Ibid [72].
Williams and Johnson, ‘Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness’, above n 32, 548.
736
Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir V State of Iceland [2003] Supreme Court Verdict No 2003–4153,
Case No 151/2003. This decision was delivered on 27 November 2003, but its English translation was
available in April 2004, a copy of English translation is on the website of the Mannvernd — an
association formed to promote ethical standards in medical research, science and in the biotechnology
industry in Iceland.
735

147

Act,737 to the Medical Director of Health (MDH) of Iceland, requesting that
genealogical and genetic information contained in her father’s medical records not be
transferred to the HSD. On 21 February 2001, the MDH refused the plaintiff’s
application. On 30 April 2001, the plaintiff brought an action in the District Court
challenging the decision of the MDH, and the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s
claim and confirmed the decision of the MDH. The plaintiff then appealed to the
Supreme Court of Iceland on 29 April 2003 calling for a reversal of the refusal by
MDH, a refusal that would allow her father’s health information to be transferred
from his medical records to the HSD.

Procedure and Argument of the Case
According to the principles of Icelandic law, individuals’ personal rights generally
expire upon their death in so far as legislation does not provide otherwise. Article 8
of the HSD Act ‘does not provide any right for the descendants or other relatives of
deceased persons to request and act on their behalf, that information in their medical
records should be withheld from the HSD’.738 Moreover, there were no other sources
of law from which such a rule could be inferred. Therefore, it was argued that [t]he
appellant ... cannot exercise this right as her deceased father’s substitute’.739 To
prove her standing, the appellant showed that the transfer of her deceased father’s
genetic information directly implicated her right to privacy and gave her a personal
right of action.740 The Iceland SC extensively reviewed the nature and content of
information held in a patient’s medical records and, accordingly, agreed that the
appellant had a standing to bring action, since the appellant bases her legitimate
interest in the case on the fact that:
[S]he has a personal interest in preventing the transfer of data from her father’s
medical records to the Health Sector Database, as it is possible to infer, from the
data, information relating to her father’s hereditary characteristics which could
also apply to herself. ... In light of this, and with reference in other respects to
the reasoning of the District Court, the argument of the Appellant is accepted
that, for reasons of personal privacy, she may have an interest in preventing
737
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information of this sort about her father from being transferred into the
database, and therefore her right to make the claims that she is making in the
case is admitted.741

Another significant point is that extensive information about people’s health is
entered into medical records (including their medical treatment, lifestyles, social
circumstances, employment and family) and later transferred to the database, and
they contain a detailed identification of the person and information of this kind can
related to some of the most intimately private affairs of the person concerned.742
Paragraph 1 of Article 71 of the Icelandic Constitution743 applies to such kind of
information and it guarantees protection of privacy in this respect. This provision,
therefore, imposes obligations on the legislature to ensure the security and protection
of such information.
Owing to obligations imposed on the legislature by paragraph 1 of Article 71 of
the Constitution to ensure protection of privacy, … this assurance cannot be
replaced by various forms of monitoring [mechanism] … which is entrusted to
public agencies and committees ...744

There is also a lack of informed consent. Under the provisions of the HSD Act, there
is no requirement to take informed consent from the data provider, but there is a
provision for ‘presumed consent’745 (namely, that if one does not opt out in regard to
the continued presence of their information on the database, it will be presumed that
they have consented to its retention). The lack of informed consent was another point
of contention in the ongoing debate about the legitimacy of the HSD Act.746

Decision of the Court
Finally, the Icelandic SC acknowledges that Ms Guðmundsdóttir has a legal standing
in preventing of her deceased father’s information being transferred from the medical
records to the HSD, because of the Constitutional protection of ‘right to privacy’.
741
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The Court also recognises that information about Ms Guðmundsdóttir could be
inferred from data related to the hereditary characteristics of her father. After a
detailed analysis of provisions of the HSD, particularly those relating to the
protection of information in the medical records and its transfer to the HSD, the SC
of Iceland opined that the HSD did not adequately protect plaintiff’s privacy up to
the constitutionally required level. Therefore, the SC upheld the plaintiff’s right to
prevent the transfer of her father’s genealogical and genetic information into the
HSD. It shows that the court sets clear limits as to how far commercial population
genomics and biotechnology can intrude into the private lives of citizens.747

(c) John Moore v Regents of the University of California
In another most pertinent legal case — Moore v Regents of the University of
California748 — the issue of informed consent has been raised and discussed along
with other issues. It is a well-recognised principle that ‘informed consent’ is one of
the pre-conditions of ensuring privacy. In this case, although the privacy of John
Moore was not the issue, the principle and necessity of informed consent was argued
and approved judicially. The requirement for ‘informed consent’ is always vital
while protecting privacy of someone’s genetic information.

Facts and Procedures of the Case
The plaintiff and appellant of this case, Mr John Moore, had undergone treatment for
hairy cell leukaemia, a relatively rare form of blood cancer, at the Medical Center of
the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) under the supervision of Dr
David W Golde.749 After being informed that he had leukemia, Mr Moore first
visited the UCLA Medical Center on 5 October 1976. After examining Moore’s
blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily fluids, Golde confirmed his disease
and on 8 October 1976 recommended that his (Moore’s) spleen be removed in order
to slow down the progress of the disease.750 ‘Moore signed a consent form
authorising the splenectomy’751 and the subsequent disposal by the hospital. The
operation was duly performed on 20 October 1976. Golde and other defendants were
747
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already well aware of the economic value of Moore’s spleen752 and, therefore, Golde
and Quan (a researcher employed by the hospital’s Regents) had made arrangements
to obtain portions of Moore’s spleen following its removal and to take them to a
separate research unit.753 These research activities had no connection with Moore’s
medical treatment. The most significant point is that in the original consent form,
neither Golde nor Quan had informed Moore of the planned research or of the
financial value of his cells. There was no full and adequate disclosure regarding
tissue use. Yet it was on the basis of the fiduciary relationship between the physician
and the patient that Moore signed a written consent form authorising the
splenectomy, a form which did not mention the research to be performed on the cells
excised from Moore’s body.754
Later, in accordance with the advice of his doctor (Dr Golde) and based upon the
fiduciary relationship between them, Moore returned to the UCLA Medical Center
several times between November 1976 and September 1983. He was also informed
that such visits were necessary for his health.755 During these visits, Golde collected
more samples (such as, blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm)
from his body,756 and this he did (along with other defendants) while fully concealing
the fact that this collection was unrelated to his (Moore) treatment and, indeed, that
the main intention of the defendants was to conduct research using Moore’s cells and
to financially benefit from the exploitation of that research made possible only by the
continuing exploitation of the (now artificially maintained) patient-doctor
relationship between Golde and Moore.757 In September of 1983, during one of these
follow up visits, Moore was asked to sign another consent form for the use of his
‘blood and/or bone marrow’ for research purposes and to sign over any rights to any
product developed from such material. The consent form included:
752
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a portion where the individual was to circle either ‘I do’, or ‘I do not’
“voluntarily grant to the University of California any and all rights I, or my
heirs, may have in any cell-line or any other potential product which might be
developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from me”.758

He signed the consent form, but Moore claims that he circled the ‘I do not consent’
option on the consent form and this fact finally caused him to see an attorney who
commenced the investigation which led to the filing of the law suit.759 He discovered
that his physicians had earned millions of dollars from a cell-line developed from his
cells, but they refused to give him a share of the earnings.760 Accordingly, Moore
sued the physicians in the California Court.761 Moore repeatedly alleged that Golde
did not disclose him (Moore) his research and economic interest in Moore’s cells and
the research conducted on them, and failed to inform him before starting his
treatment and while later collecting his cells.762 As a result, along with his claim for
property rights, one of the main claims was that there was a breach of fiduciary duty
to disclose material facts to him as well as a failure on the part of his doctor (Dr
Golde) to obtain his (Moore’s) informed consent.763

Judgment of the Court
Finding Moore’s allegations inadequate in several respects, the trial court dismissed
the Moore’s complaint.764 On appeal, the court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court.765 The appellate Court judged that he had the right to his own body
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and should have a share in the economic gains.766 The California Supreme Court then
granted review of the case.767 The Supreme Court subsequently held that ‘the
allegations of Moore’s third amended complaint state a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent, but not conversion’.768 That means this
California SC arrived at the opposite judgment to that of the appellate court and held
that individual concerned did not retain any property interest in tissue removed
during surgery769 and, therefore, Moore had neither property rights in his discarded
cells nor he could own them in the sense of having right to profit.770 It was also held
that Californian statutes drastically limit the patient’s interest in excised cells; and
the patented cell line is ‘both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from
Moore’s body.771 However, the court concluded that a physician or a doctor must
disclose all the material facts, or any kinds of personal interests (whether research or
economic) that may affect his medical judgment, and especially which is not related
to the patient’s health and treatment. A physician’s failure to do so may give rise to a
cause of action for performing medical activities without informed consent or in
breach of fiduciary duty.772 In other words, the principle of informed consent
requires that the patient should be told of the possibility of using his or her bodily
cells by their physicians and should be given the opportunity to decide whether or
not to permit such use.773 Here Dr Golde and other defendants were under an
obligation to reveal their financial interest to him (Moore) that they had in Moore’s
cells.774 In this case, the principle of informed consent has been preserved and the
proper ‘practice of obtaining consent for the use of genetic material (such as DNA)
for diagnosis and banking has been highlighted.’775 The interest of privacy and
dignity are protected by informed consent. Therefore it can be argued that Moore’s
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interest in his bodily integrity and privacy are protected by the principle of informed
consent.776
3.1.3.6 Implication of Case-Laws in Human Rights and Genetic Privacy
Protection
From the above discussion it is evident that the Marper case is specifically
concerned with privacy issues raised by the retention of DNA samples in the
NDNAD, the UK. In this judgment, the necessity for the protection of privacy and
human rights while using DNA samples and profiles in the case investigation process
has been considered with particular attention. Through this judgment, the ECtHR has
created an example at the regional level to protect human rights and privacy in the
area of retention and use of a suspect’s DNA sample and profiles. This judicial
principle can also be a good point of reference for the courts of other jurisdictions
judging similar kinds of issues. Human rights and privacy protection in the process
of justice delivery system has been judicially recognised for the first time in the
world history. Therefore, this judgment is one of the significant points of justification
for this study.
Through the Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir case, the ‘right to genetic privacy’ is again
protected and confirmed judicially. It also recognises that the right to an individual’s
privacy can be violated by the use of his or her close relative’s genetic information.
The basic essence (that is, familial nature) of human genetic information is also
recognised in this judgment. Because of this familial or hereditary nature of DNA
information, it demands a special type of privacy protection. It can also be said that
this judgment only recognises genetic privacy in the context of the retention or
transfer of someone’s medical records in relation to a health sector database.
However, although this case did not address the issues and implications for the
forensic use of DNA data, it is possible to infer from this judgment that since the
DNA information contains someone’s heath secrets or hereditary characteristics
including his family members, such a principle is also applicable with regards to
DNA samples and profiles of suspects or accused persons. It can further be argued
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that an almost similar degree of privacy protection should be claimed for DNA data
collected and retained for forensic purposes.
The case-law analysis highlights that the idea of ‘genetic privacy’ or urge for
protection of genetic information has been recognised in legislations and judicial
decisions of a number of countries and also in various regional and international
instruments. The case law may not be directly related to genetic privacy protection in
the context of criminal case investigation but the rulings nonetheless have some
indirect application. This is particularly the findings of Guðmundsdóttir and the
Moore cases, where although no judicial principle for the protection of genetic
privacy in the context of criminal case investigation was adopted; in both cases,
however, the ‘right to genetic privacy’ was judicially recognised in the context of
medical research and or database. Further, in the case of Guðmundsdótti case the
principles of ‘genetic privacy protection’ and in the case of Moore the ‘right to
informed consent’ have been established and these principles are applicable in all
related cases where right to genetic privacy is an issue irrespective of the context.
The decision in the Marper case is another significant platform for the claimants of
privacy rights in the context of forensic use of DNA information. These judgments
are substantial points of reference for governments, judges, lawyers and policy
makers.
It has already been acknowledged that forensic use of DNA information involves two
opposite but essential interests: one is a claim for the ‘right to privacy and human
rights’, and other is the necessity to detect criminals for the sake of the national
interest or security. The following section will particularly address these essential but
opposite interests: the ‘forensic use of DNA information v the right to genetic
privacy’.
3.1.4

FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION V THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

It is well established that the forensic use of DNA (that is, DNA profiling) has
become a very powerful tool for law enforcement purposes777 and it is being
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frequently used to catch heinous criminals. Cases that were previously almost
impossible to solve can now be easily resolved with the use of DNA profiling
techniques. The dilemma, however, is that DNA does far more than simply enable a
matching of samples for identification purposes, it also reveals pre-disposition of
individuals to illness as well as other personal information that affect human rights
and privacy. The supporters of this technique in its forensic use claim that ‘DNA
testing is limited to DNA that does not reveal specific characteristics’;778 rather, it is
simply used for identification purposes. It is also claimed that the privacy (including
genetic privacy and other rights of suspects, prisoners or criminals could be
compromised for the sake of justice. In support of this view, Merryn Ekberg argued
that:
...in forensic investigations, the right of victims to justice and retribution and the
collective right of society to safety and security trumps the privacy rights of
suspects and criminals.779

On the other hand, privacy advocates have a number of concerns. They are fearful
about what may be able to found from DNA samples at some later stage,780 and
worried about the scope for storing DNA samples for extended and uncertain periods
of time, and the possibility of creating numerous copies from a single sample, and so
on.
Another big concern is that the secrets that are hidden in DNA could be revealed to
other parties if DNA samples were taken without the knowledge of the person
concerned. For instance, using residues on a glass or some other source, a ‘genome
hacker’ could obtain a comprehensive scan of that person’s genome, which may
reveal their susceptibility to a wide range of diseases. In recent years, some
companies have started to offer personal genome scans to the public over the internet
in a process that, according to Aldhous and Reilly, could lead to another person’s
DNA being ‘hacked’, that is, be subject to unsanctioned sampling by another who
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then submits and obtains the analysis and access to knowledge that they should not
rightfully possess.781 ‘Hacking’ someone’s DNA without their consent is a
significant genetic privacy issue. In terms of forensic investigation, those strongly
supportive of the rights of suspects and others to privacy (including genetic privacy)
would argue that without informed consent, the collection and analysis and use of
DNA in regard to later crimes (such as in a blanket DNA profile comparison in the
absence of any other evidence linking the crime to the person) or the unspecified use
by third parties of that DNA sample or information — particularly in regard to that of
those who have not been convicted for a criminal offence — could essentially
amount to a form of ‘hacking’.
It is, therefore, essential to protect these two mutually dependent interests of society
(that is, forensic use of DNA for enforcement of justice and the protection of human
rights and privacy). In the field of forensics, ‘[t]he collection, storage and use of
sensitive personal data ... always raise ethical social and legal issues’.782 Some vital
privacy issues include collection and retention of DNA samples and profiles for an
unknown period of time, especially those taken from the individuals without their
consent, and the extensive power and use genetic samples and information by the law
enforcing agencies.783 Williams and Johnson highlighted some vital privacy issues:
[T]he spread of forensic DNA profiling and databasing has also prompted a
wide range of concerns about problems that may arise from the storage of tissue
samples (especially those taken from individuals without consent) and the
proliferating uses of genetic information by the police. ... the threat to the bodily
integrity of citizens who are subject to the forced and non-consensual sampling
of their genetic material; the intrusion and denigration of privacy rights caused
by the storage and use of tissue samples; the potential for the future misuse of
such samples held in state and privately owned laboratories; the prospect of
long term bio-surveillance occasioned by the storage of genetic information in
police databases and biological samples in forensic laboratories; and the
possibility for the deceptive use of DNA forensic evidence in police
investigations and criminal prosecution.784
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The following section will determine the extent to which human rights and genetic
privacy are protected in existing justice delivery systems:
3.1.4.1 How Far Are Our Human Rights and Privacy Protected?
In regard to human identification issues, the freedom or liberty, secrecy, autonomy
and privacy interest of individuals are highly connected. At present, addresses,
telephone numbers, social security numbers, credit ratings, range of incomes,
demographic categories, and information on hobbies of many individuals in a
particular society are currently available from various computerised data sources.785
Even such simple information about human identity requires confidentiality to avoid
unwarranted intrusions into people’s lives (for example, advertisers cross-matching
income and purchase patterns to target prospects).
More detailed information related to identity would require additional security. Just
like fingerprint files and other personal identity related data, DNA samples and
profiles could be used to search and correlate criminal and/ or medical record
databases but such samples and profiles are far more revealing than are fingerprints.
The collection and storage of materials and profiles in the latter database is also not
usually associated with consent for such a purpose. Computer storage of DNA
information therefore increases the possibilities for further misuse, in particular the
violation of privacy.
DNA profiling, in principle, has the potential to provide personal information —
such as medical characteristics, physical traits, and consanguinity — that carries with
it risks of discrimination. For instance, the Committee on DNA Technology in
Forensic Science mentioned that the forensic restriction fragment length
polymorphism (RELP) typing markers786 are not known to be associated with
particular traits or medical conditions, but there is a possibility that they might be
DNA on Trial: Genetic Identification and Criminal Justice (Cold Spring Harbour Laboratory Press,
1992); Human Genetics Commission, Inside Information: Balancing Interests in the Use of Personal
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used in the future. The current Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) typing787 uses the
human leucocyte antigen (HLA) DQ locus (area) in a gene that controls many
important immunological functions and is associated with diseases.788
Consequently, DNA profiling has raised considerably greater issues of privacy than
does ordinary fingerprinting.789 In addition, potential privacy threats arise from the
fact that the original DNA samples are generally retained as well as the DNA profiles
held on the databases. Further information could be derived from those samples in
future, or new technologies could lead to new information. One of the most
important privacy concerns in the context of forensic use of DNA data is the
collection and retention of powerful DNA information (that is, DNA sample and
profiles) on a routine basis. In some cases, individuals are also coerced into
providing DNA samples in ‘dragnets’ or a mass screening process,790 or the relatives
of some criminals or suspects are asked to provide their samples, but after the case is
resolved, those original samples (from parties innocent in relation to the offence
being investigated) are retained for an uncertain period of time for future use.791
Privacy implications are also raised through the retention of DNA samples and
profiles.
Once there is a crime committed, or there is a suspicion that one has been committed,
law enforcement agencies require biological information from individuals for law
enforcement purposes (such as in the identification of criminals, or missing persons,
or in regard to an issue of parentage).792 Very often they do so in connection with the
investigation of a case.
Rothstein and Talbott Meagher, in their 2006 article, contrast the use of DNA testing
and the simple drug testing of blood and saliva samples (the latter attracting less
community anxiety than the former). In their example, police investigating a series of
787
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murder cases at pharmacies in a particular area find that all of the murders committed
during a series of armed robberies have another feature in common, that is, that the
thief is in the habit of taking an expensive and relatively rare drug. From this
information police speculate that the thief is dependent on a particular type of
medicine. In fact, such information could also indicate that a near family member or
other relative requires this medication. As this is the only clue, in order to identify
the actual offender, police could ask the people of that locality to undergo a blood or
saliva test to detect the presence of that drug. Rothstein and Talbott Meagher argue
that the drug test reveals more personal information (in regard to illness on the basis
of the drug taken) than any a current DNA test, but add that such drug testing lacks
the specificity of a DNA test which would be able to identify the individual involved
if there was a sample left at the SOCs. Nevertheless the samples supplied in any
mass screening (including blood or saliva for drug analysis) could be subsequently
used for DNA analysis and divulge personal health and other information about all
the individuals who have been tested. Even though they are innocent, their
information as well as their personal details might be retained for an indefinite period
on the forensic database. The test can reveal sensitive personal health information793
which is vital for both individual and his or her family. It is no wonder, therefore,
that some object (usually ineffectually) to the submission of samples for DNA
analysis.
There is also a great risk posed to society by creation of DNA database and storage
of DNA information, because the usual practices of government in relation to the
protection of individual privacy and autonomy (particularly in regard to material
collected and retained for forensic purposes) is inconsistent with the principles of
human rights and democracy. For instance, in the early thirties, when the original
Social Security Act was passed in the US, the Congress provided that the social
security number should not be used other than the purpose envisioned in this Act.
However, a considerable number of databanks have used the social security numbers
of the US citizens in the name of effectiveness and rationality. These include various
government and private entities. For example, persons will be asked to supply their
social security numbers when applying for drivers licence application, in regard to
793
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employment, and by banking and credit card companies. Such use includes providing
the government with a permanent databank about many of the activities of the US
citizens and covering every sphere of their life.794 If the DNA databases (which
contained the sensitive information) are as easily accessible and used by third parties
as social security number of US, there is enough reason to be apprehensive regarding
possible violation of human rights and privacy. It can also be argued that genetic
privacy is more sensitive than the social security information as it affects life and
health of a number of people. Consequently it demands far greater protection.
The above discussion highlights that there are a number of human right and privacy
violation issues in a number of contexts which are ongoing in the existing DNA
database practices or systems. Some notable forms of privacy violations with regard
to the forensic use of human DNA data, which are identified and considered
significant by the author, are discussed below:

(a) Retention of DNA Samples and Profiles
Cellular or DNA samples are retained for the purposes of possible later verification
of a profile, or correcting some error, for quality control purposes (as happens in case
of CODIS),795 or for resolving some subsequent disputes, and also for further
research. The justification for this retention is also based on the necessity to facilitate
any re-profiling that may become necessary ‘if the current profiling methodologies
change to include more loci or even shift more radically to new kinds of
technological platforms’ such as Single-Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP)796 (the
process most likely to replace STR analysis used in the formation of DNA
databases). However, retention of DNA samples and profiles for an unspecified
794
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period of time poses serious threats to individual or social privacy. Privacy violation
can occur in two ways. The first is by interfering with a person’s physical integrity
(physical genetic privacy) to obtain a DNA sample. The second is by accessing those
databases which contain potentially very much greater and more personal, sensitive
and detailed information797 concerning individuals (and their relatives) than other
forms of data (such as fingerprints). The latter constitutes a breach of informational
privacy. The kind of knowledge in relation to someone’s life which is possible to
gather from DNA samples has no parallel in the history of science and technology,
and it raises profound questions about the protection of human rights and privacy.798
While evaluating the privacy implications, it is necessary to evaluate the challenges
to the benefits of retention of DNA samples in databases.799 Moreover collection and
storage of large quantities of biological samples by law enforcement agencies call for
specific regulations controlling fair use and terms of retention which balance human
rights and privacy protection.

(b) Unfettered Power Exercised by Police
There is another ancillary or interconnected problem with regard to retention of DNA
samples and profiles, namely the unfettered power exercised by police. For instance,
the UK police force exercise some unfettered powers.800 Moreover, police access to
human DNA data, which can identify individuals as well as contain personal
information, has some obvious consequences in terms of a right to privacy.801 For
example, while ‘many Australian jurisdictions expressly confine the police’s use and
disclosure of information obtained from forensic procedures to investigative
purposes’,802 such police use and or disclosure of information has nevertheless been
seen as ‘encompass[ing] potentially broad intrusions into privacy’.803
797
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Australian police can lawfully obtain a person’s DNA profile without either a court
order or consent. They can do so by collecting that person’s body sample from an
item the person has touched.804 In addition, the collected DNA information — from
suspects, criminals or other innocent persons by the police — could be later used to
identify them in regard to subsequent activities where a sample is taken and found to
match the original.805
Again, as Gans observes, if the police have obtained a known person’s DNA profile
and it is compared with all other profiles derived from crime scene samples,
then the police can potentially learn of any of the person’s behaviour, criminal
or innocent, or associated, accurately or not, with any crime, actual or apparent,
at any time, past or future.806

According to such practice under the Australian legislation, all offenders and
suspects whose profile is obtained by the police, consensually or otherwise, lawfully
face loss of their privacy.807 The basis often given is the risk of recidivism among the
offender population (once so identified) or among persons who have come to the
attention of police in similar matters but not found to have been the offender in that
instance, and the relative ease of identification of suspect/s.
Furthermore, in Australia DNA profiles from volunteers and even victims can also be
used to identify suspects or offenders. Gans points out that while all Australian
statutes appear to provide for the use of samples volunteered only ‘for the “purpose”
for which the profile was volunteered’; nevertheless they may be asked not to so
limit the use of the sample. He also notes an instance where victim DNA profile was
used to assist identification of a relative for an unrelated offence.808
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It is also important to recognise that the police in England and Wales are given
extensive powers under section 64(1A) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act809 to
retain DNA samples and data derived from suspects indefinitely. The implication of
this is that the police are never required to destroy samples that they have
legitimately collected.
In addition, DNA databanking could lead to an unprecedented and extremely
powerful means of governmental intrusion into a citizen’s most private sanctuary.810
The power given to the law enforcement agencies could be misused either for
political or other reasons. For instance, when DNA samples and/or information are in
the custody of police, there is a possibility that such information could be used by the
government other than its original purposes.811 The problem can be more acute for
developing countries, where the judicial systems are not very well developed. There
is also a high chance that corrupt practices might begin in the use of DNA database
in those countries, such as manipulating innocent people, harassing the leaders of the
opposition parties, and also making transactions with some interested third parties
with regard to this highly sensitive information.

(c) Issues with Regards to Informed Consent
Another interconnected issue with regards to power of the police is — the informed
consent issue of sample providers (be they innocent volunteers, suspects or accused).
In the investigative process, the collection and use of DNA samples without consent
and/or forcibly collected from suspects also raises a question about the protection of
the privacy of that person’s interests. In this regard, it can be cited that there are two
rules exist in Australian jurisdictions. On one hand, in some jurisdictions police have
no power to compel someone to provide their DNA sample. In such circumstances,
police have to rely purely on that person’s consent to obtain their DNA.812 On the
other hand, in many Australian states police rely on consent even though they have
809
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the power to compel someone to cooperate in obtaining a sample of their DNA.
However, as police have power to compel, ‘many suspects or offenders explicitly
told that a refusal to consent may result in the use of force to carry out a subsequent
DNA sampling order’, inevitably comply with this request.813 In this situation, a
suspect’s consent is not voluntary and free from undue pressure. Similarly, under the
UK domestic legislation if an individual is arrested in connection with a ‘recordable’
offence, the police can take fingerprints and biological samples at their discretion
without the consent of the individual.814 In such circumstances, it is also debatable as
to whether informed consent from people can truly be taken freely in the police
custody during an investigation, because refusal to give a sample immediately places
a person under suspicion.815

(d) Controversy Regarding Familial Searching
Collection DNA samples from close relatives, including children, as a means of
locating a suspect creates another human rights and privacy issue. Very often for the
purpose of solving a case, ‘familial searching’816 is conducted by the law
enforcement agencies. The investigative benefits of this familial searching are
apparent, but some obvious concerns are that a perhaps unexpected genetic link
could be revealed from that searching. For example, the evidence from the ‘familial
search’ might reveal that several people on the database are related to each other and
also to the unknown suspect for the crime. In one notable US case, a familial search
identified a perpetrator as the brother of a victim who had submitted a sample in an
unrelated case.817 The genome speaks for itself. It tells the police that a particular
813
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person is the biological father or son or mother or sister of an offender or share in
some degree of consanguinity, though they may have never met.818 In other
instances, testing reveals that a relationship (for example, father-son) as putative
rather than actual, with immense personal ramifications for those involved.
In addition, there also exists a greater societal interest in maintaining and promoting
intact, healthy family units. Family integrity and privacy is cornerstone of human
rights values. Thus, implicating family members in an investigation where a relative
(genetic or social) might be involved is likely to have profound social, cultural and
physical impacts on that family.819 The investigation alone has the ‘capacity to
deepen painful rifts within strained familial bonds’.820 Family members may have
already suffered greatly as a result of the actions of a related convicted offender, such
as, incurring financial losses as a result of legal costs or thefts, or emotional losses
from incarceration, abandonment, or betrayal. Criminality can tear families apart,
and when the state conducts investigations based primarily on familial links, it does
so with the strong likelihood of inflicting further damage.821 Even in families in
which the offender’s position is reconciled, familial searching effectively turns
convicted offenders into involuntary ‘genetic informants’.822 It burdens the
relationship between innocent relatives and the convicted offender, for relatives to
find themselves suspected of a crime they did not commit by virtue of nothing other
than the biological connection.823
DNA is much greater in terms of information derived than that flowing from any
other forensic tests (such as a fingerprint) and it presents a direct challenge to basic
right to privacy.824 Though the prevention of crime is one of the fundamental duties
of a state, it is also necessary to protect and respect some basic ethical values of its
818
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citizens, for example, privacy. Sometimes a suspect (though their crime is
subsequently not proved beyond reasonable doubt) is forced to provide a DNA
sample. In the national interest, sometimes it is essential to do so. At the same time,
it is also important to obtain consent from the suspect before doing the DNA test and
to destroy the DNA sample after using it. Even if, in exceptional circumstances, its
retention is required, there should be some time limit on such retention and proper
security measures need to be maintained in relation to the sample and the profile
derived from it, because everyone has a right to privacy and a right to make an
independent decision about their life.
The power of DNA and its related technology as well as their future potentialities are
significant, but they raise profound questions that cannot be ignored. It is necessary
to consider the serious moral dilemmas surrounding the use of DNA profiling. The
societal answers require economic and legal reassessments (cost-benefit analysis) in
regard to those fundamental rights of the individual versus those of society.825
Almost all governments are required to be aware that it is simply not a matter of
what the current state of DNA profiling techniques can reveal, but what might be
able to be read from this technology in the near future. However, while state security
measures cannot cease due to the need to protect the people generally, a balanced
approach is needed. Emphasising the need to balance human rights and the
technological development in the criminal justice system, Kristina Rooker highlights
that:
Not everyone who is in prison is guilty and even if they are guilty they do not
leave their constitutional rights and protections at the prison door. Although it is
important that law enforcement officials have DNA profiles in order to solve
crimes and convict criminals, it is also important that the civil liberties and
privacy of inmates be protected. There needs to be a balance.826
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3.1.5

THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION

3.1.5.1 Balancing State Security Measures, and Human Rights and Privacy
It is therefore argued that forensic DNA databases naturally pose a privacy threat
because of the inherent nature of information contained in DNA samples. The need
for some protection of personal privacy when setting up and using DNA databases is
also fairly uncontroversial.827 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, however, argued that:
… striking the right balance between too little protection for privacy to be
preserved and too much protection for law enforcement to effectively function
is not only complex, experts also disagree on exactly how that balance can be
found.828

Since the early 1990s, governments and legislators throughout the world have been
struggling to keep a balance between two opposing but mutually significant interests:
the establishment and uses of DNA databases in their own jurisdiction as well as
concerns with regards to human rights and privacy.829 This remains a big legal and
policy concern up to the present time, and determining the balance between the
investigative benefits of DNA identification versus its privacy implications is the
subject of continuous debate for almost all developed and developing countries
across the globe. Governments, policymakers, and legislators worldwide are,
therefore, trying to strike a rational and effective balance between the possible
pitfalls or intrusiveness and the potentials or effectiveness of the use of forensic
DNA profiling and databasing.830 Such a balanced approach will foster use of the
advances in genetic technology that serve social justice and similar interests, along
with providing sufficient guarantee for the world community that such advances ‘are
subject to proper ethical scrutiny and legal control’.831
DNA profiling has undoubtedly become a useful tool in the justice delivery system,
especially in criminal investigations. Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate
between the role of DNA samples and profiles particularly in case investigation
827
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process, and the role of DNA databases in general. Searching for a DNA profile
match in order to solve a particular case from among known suspects, and
destruction of sample or profiles after resolution of that case does not require a
database. On the other hand, the retention of DNA samples and profiles is justified in
some circumstances, for example, if a case needs to be reopened, or a fresh
investigation is required, or there is a doubt about the DNA analysis result.832 The
challenge, therefore, at this point is to weigh up how to determine in which cases it is
important to retain the DNA profile or sample (and if it is so essential, how to ensure
the security of such material and the privacy of the information supplied) and also in
which cases it is not so relevant to retain the DNA sample and data. Such
estimations, of course, depend on the country’s justice system, needs and overall
situation.
Another important issue is how much access police should be given to the DNA
samples after their retention. In some cases, information about a person’s genetic
disorder or risk could potentially be used to identify suspects, for example, if police
are looking for a person with particular disease. Currently, the police are allowed to
ask for personal genetic data from an individual’s medical record, but only in
preventing, detecting or prosecuting a serious crime.833 How far such ethical
protection can be maintained by police also raises an important question. Moreover,
the lack of consistent regulatory framework and inadequate monitoring mechanism
regarding third parties (including government) access and use of human DNA
information constitute major problems.834 In addition, the costs of administering and
maintaining a big database and retaining millions of DNA samples are increasing day
by day; and so some ‘cost-benefit analysis’ should be conducted.835 Therefore,
balancing the benefits and dilemmas regarding the access and use DNA data is a
complex issue. Mark A Rothstein and Sandra Carnahan also argued about these two
opposite but essential elements:
832
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Balancing the interests in expanded forensic DNA databases is extremely
complicated. On one side are the appealing and concrete ... benefits of
preventing and solving a range of crimes. On the other side are abstract interests
in the freedom to be left alone from governmental demands for bodily
specimens.836

The current use of DNA samples and profiles in the justice delivery system is not
beyond debate. It obviously poses some uncertainties regarding the future use of this
highly promising technology (that is, human DNA sampling and data analysis) for
forensic purposes. Naturally, any initiative concerning DNA data sampling of
general citizens for investigative purposes, or initiating any advanced use of DNA
database should be supported by a thorough analysis of the scope, use and
parameters of such a database. Most importantly, it should be remembered that
“[t]here’s a difference between what one can do, scientifically or otherwise, and what
one ought to do”.837
3.1.6

CONCLUSION

It has already been established that forensic DNA profiling and databases provide
law enforcement agencies with an effective tool that may revolutionise the justice
delivery system around the world. With continuing advances in DNA technology,
such databases may become even more valuable. Application of improved
technology in analysing DNA samples ‘can yield a wealth of information about an
individual’838 and their future well being; but such activities should not compromise
human rights and privacy. The DNA databases of genetic profiles with all their
inherent potentials are to be treated with the greatest respect and careful precautions
taken in regard to privacy.
In order to support the case investigation process, the establishment of any forensic
DNA database is an ambitious venture which requires judicial endorsement and both
legislative and financial support of a government. Moreover, in order to achieve
general acceptance, such an initiative must prove that the database is comprehensive
enough to provide better quality information while protecting human rights and
836
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privacy. To be more specific, questions regarding who should be sampled and
profiled, and what information is to be generated, how will such information be used,
and how the investigators will actually benefited from such a database must first be
answered.839 In order to arrive at the answers to these questions, and to discover the
real picture as well as to weigh the balance between privacy and state security, the
author adopted two approaches. In the first phase, the author analysed the relevant
legislation, case decisions and other literature. Subsequently both qualitative (case
studies and interview) and quantitative (survey) methodologies are applied in this
research project. In the qualitative research, analysis and findings from two case
studies representing both developing and developed country are worth mentioning.
Chapter 5 will visualise, investigate and examine the first case study: the ‘National
DNA Database’ of the UK (that is England and Wales). Subsequently, Chapter 6 will
deal with the second case study, on the ‘National Forensic DNA Profiling
Laboratory’ of Bangladesh.
The next chapter (Chapter 4) will examine how these case studies are undertaken
along with other strategies adopted — that is to say, the interview and survey
methods. Chapter 4 will also highlight and discuss how these research methodologies
and designs address the two main research questions of this study.
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CHAPTER 4
4. 1 SOCIO-LEGAL METHODOLOGY: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
CASE STUDIES
4.1.1

INTRODUCTION

A ‘research methodology’ is a model which entails theoretical principles and a
framework that provides guidelines about how research is to be done in the context
of a particular paradigm840 and appropriate research designs or strategies that are
tools that help to link the research question and the chosen method. Finally such a
link determines ‘the usefulness of results or the pragmatic application of the study
findings’.841
The purpose of the present chapter (that is, Chapter 4) is to justify the multi-stage
research design and provide the rationale for choosing socio-legal research. In this
regard it is to share the earlier two chapters (that is, chapters 2 and 3), which are
devoted to discussing theoretical concepts surrounding the ‘scientific evolution of
DNA and DNA profiling’ as well as ‘human rights and privacy issues’. These first
two chapters mainly rely on the archival research method (that is, literary review). In
the subsequent chapters, a different research approach has been adopted — namely, a
socio-legal approach combining both qualitative (case studies and semi-structured
interview) and quantitative (survey) methods. Section 4.1.2 begins by explaining the
reasons for choosing socio-legal approach. This section continues the discussion
providing justification for the use of the mixed method approach, legislative as well
as literary analysis, and the rationale for the empirical analysis of the case studies
involved. Subsequently, section 4.1.3 explores the qualitative method — it includes
case studies approach, data collection (via semi-structured interviews) procedure and
ethical considerations. Sub-section 4.1.3.4 further explains the qualitatve data
analysis strategy focusing on interview data analysis method . Section 4.1.4 looks at

840

A paradigm is a set of propositions that explain how the world is perceived, it contains a world
view, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world, telling researchers and social
scientists in general ‘what is important, what is legitimate, what is reasonable: Michael Quinn Patton,
Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 1990) 37, cited in Sotirios
Saratakos, Social Research (Macmillan Education Australia, 2nd ed, 1998) 31–2.
841
Janice M Morse, 'Designing Funded Qualitative Research' in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S
Lincoln (eds), Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications, 1998) 56, 62.

172

the quantitative approach and finally section 4.1.5 provides a brief conclusion. In
brief, this chapter has been dedicated to describing and explaining issues related to
research methods, and how such methods and approaches have been applied
throughout this study.
4.1.2

SOCIO-LEGAL METHODOLOGY: A MULTI-STAGE RESEARCH
DESIGN

The main theme of this study is how a proper balance between human rights and the
right to privacy including genetic privacy and public interest or state security could
be envisioned for the ultimate protection and preservation of the forensic use of DNA
samples and information. Another objective is to examine how the UK and
Bangladesh (as developed and developing countries respectively) are encountering
and handling these issues. In order to achieve the objectives of this project and also
to answer research questions, this study has pursued the research scheme represented
schematically in Figure 2 (see below). This research scheme therefore, includes the
application of three different approaches utilising a socio-legal methodology, to
gather research materials:
1. Analysis of literature and legislation;
2. Qualitative (case-studies and semi-structured interviews with individuals
from the selected participants);
3. Quantitative (conducting survey with the same participants);

4.1.2.1 A Combined Approach: Justification for Socio-Legal Research and Mixed
Methods
(a) Socio-Legal Approach
According to David Schiff, ‘the relationship of the law to a social situation, in its
many aspects, is ... a necessary part of understanding of that situation’842 as legal
studies differ from other fields of social sciences (such as sociology, political
science, anthropology and so on) in that ‘the legal structure, because of its nature and
the social functions it serves’ and thus it ‘requires a different form of analysis from
842
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other social institutions’.843 Legal appropriateness or suitability in a given social
context or situation could properly be determined by utilising empirical research
methods that combine methods used in both law and social science. In the ‘law and
society tradition’, such an approach may be referred to variously as ‘“socio-legal
research”, “new legal realism”, “empirical legal studies”’844 or as ‘socio-legal
studies’).845 Multi-method research (that is, the combination of law and social
science methods) is, therefore, significant ‘for a better understanding of ‘the
relationship of law and the social world’846 as the use of several methodologies can
‘provide a more nuanced understanding of law, legal institutions and legal processes’
than can otherwise be provided given ‘the complex nature of the social world in
which they operate’.847 Laura Beth Nielsen also argued that the:
[M]ulti-method research is perhaps the most effective way to understand the
relationship of law and society. … [B]ecause ... the phenomenon of law itself
consists of individuals, organizational settings, institutional fields and the
interaction among them, fully understanding law demands research conducted
using multiple approaches.848

As alluded to earlier, this study used qualitative empirical methods (including case
study and semi-structured interviews) for data collection and used constant
comparative method of GT for data analysis. While commonly lawyers ‘[learn] to
understand using the law by focusing on a small number of important and relevant
precedent bearing cases’, qualitative empirical legal research goes far beyond this.
Indeed, it sets out to understand individuals’ experience of law, legal meaning, and
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Figure 2: Research Scheme
the justice system and their relationship with it’.849 By utilising different qualitative
methods, empirical legal research obtains insights into ‘people’s perception[s] of law
and justice’.850 According to this approach, analysis of law or legal issues is directly
linked to the analysis of the social situation or responses from the society to which
the law applies. This kind of methodology and analysis, which allows for such
849
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interrelated understandings, is therefore required. In this regard, Laura Beth Nielsen
argued that:
To be effective, the law must be empirically examined in the real world and
insights gleaned must inform law-makers through some sort of feedback
mechanism. Although [the] multi-method [approach] is costly, rigorous
empirical research … is always better than theoretical speculation or armchair
empiricism based on anecdote.851

Another reason for applying the socio-legal approach is that one of two case studies
of this research could not be completed only by the application of archival literature,
legislative and judicial analysis. It is relevant to note here that (as alluded to earlier) a
part of this research is conducted applying the quantitative method. The combination
of social science research methods (qualitative and quantitative) with legal analysis
was, therefore, essential to answer research questions of this study. Therefore it can
be argued that the socio-legal research methodology enables researchers to
investigate issues that ‘neither law nor sociology alone can grasp adequately’ and is
the reason why recourse to both ‘forms of knowledge’ is crucial.852

(b) Mixed Methods: Triangulation
Another aspect of and justification for the use of multiple research methods is that it
increases the validity of collected data and derived findings,853 as the ‘thoughtful use
of mixed methods can capitalise on the strengths and defuse the weaknesses of each
method’.854 Every research method has a different line of sight directed toward the
same point. Therefore, each method reveals slightly different facets of the same
reality, but a combination of multiple methods or mixed methods provides a better
picture of studied area. According to Bruce Berg:
By combining several lines of sight or methods, researchers obtain a better,
more substantive picture of reality; a richer, more complete array of symbols
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and theoretical concepts; and a means of verifying many of these elements. The
use of multiple lines of sight or methods is called ‘triangulation’.855

Triangulation or establishing reality via a mixed method approach allows a better
understanding of the research phenomenon. In this regard, Danzin and Lincoln
highlighted that such use ‘reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understating of
the phenomenon in question.’856 Denzin also outlined that triangulation has several
elements: data, investigator, theory and can comprise two types of methodological
triangulation.857 Both within-method and between-method triangulation858 has been
applied in this research. The usual justification for combining together different
research methods (that is, a multi-method approach) or mixed methods is that it
provides a greater richness of data as well as increased validity of the results.859 The
latter is largely due to the weaknesses of each single method being offset by the
other,860 as each approach has it own philosophical standpoint that guides the
research questions and the procedure to be used for data collection and analysis. In
this study both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies have also been
applied. The combination of qualitative and quantitative data sets is a good idea and
both methods are combined together to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the
research topic.861 Initially, this study assumed a qualitative (case study and semistructured interview) research approach. Then, a quantitative method (via survey)
was added to elaborate and to refine the qualitative results. A mixed method or
combined approach of qualitative (case study and interview) and quantitative
(survey) strategies were used to explore the objectives of this research, increase the
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validity of the collected data and answer all the research questions. As Kaplan and
Duchon has pointed out:
Collection different kinds of data by different methods from different sources
provide a wider range of coverage that may result in a fuller picture of the unit
under study … .862

(c) Empirical Analysis of Case study
Qualitative research involves the collection of a variety of empirical materials via
such methods as case studies, interviews and so on.863 Therefore two case studies864
have also been selected, and some data have been collected and analysed applying
this empirical form of inquiry.865 The use of the empirical method in the legal arena
is now very common and ‘draws on a range of social research methodologies
combining socio-legal research methods’.866 The empirical analysis of case studies is
one of the significant strategies for this research project. Qualitative research through
‘case studies’ has been conducted both in the National DNA Database ( hereinafter
referred to as the NDNAD) of the UK and the National Forensic DNA Profiling
Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the NFDPL) of Bangladesh and this has
enabled the researcher to better understand factors that influence issues related to this
study. It also provides up-to-date information about human rights and privacy issues
in the selected countries and the existing scenario of these countries. As part of this
process, semi-structured interviews and a survey have also been conducted with the
staff of the NFDPL, Bangladesh. In addition, while exploring the developing
countries’ context (particularly the gap between developed and developing countries
in the use of DNA data for civil and criminal case investigative processes), it seemed
that both case studies and semi-structured interviews were much better tools for
provoking discussion. This stage can be referred as ‘data collection stage’ (see Figure
2 and Figure 3).
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(d) Analysis of Literature and Legislation
An initial systematic literature review was essential for the conceptualisation of
important issues related to human rights and privacy as well as for the comparative
analysis between developed and developing countries. It is also significant in the
examination of existing thinking and established rules in this area. Therefore,
considering the value of the proper use of genetic information in the justice delivery
system, and the urgency for its legal basis, this research project has begun with
analysing legislative and judicial materials and subsequently other literature. The
drawbacks and shortcomings of existing legislation, judicial decisions and other
literature governing the forensic use of DNA information issues has been identified
and analysed with a view to striking a proper balance between two conflicting
interests (namely human rights and privacy vis a vis state security issues). This
approach also helped the author to understand the current legislative development
scenario of human rights as well as privacy (including genetc privacy), and the
ongoing debates in this area.
At first, a range of international instruments, such as conventions, declarations and
resolutions, was analysed. Then the study focused on the relevant national laws in the
UK and Bangladesh, where appropriate. The jurisdictions of the UK and Bangladesh
have been chosen for a number of reasons. Primarily, since challenges with regard to
forensic use of genetic information are global in nature, the matter needs to be
addressed globally, and an international perspective should include the concerns and
findings from both developed and developing countries. Snapshots of what is
happening in the developed and developing countries sampled have helped to
construct an overall picture that has facilitated this study to address the issues
globally. Only two jurisdictions have been selected to allow for a range of in-depth
and rigorous analysis, rather than a more superficial overview of a number of
different jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, national legislation and case law from other regulatory regimes have
also been examined. An examination of the experiences of developed countries is
very useful for developing countries. Although ideas and laws from such developed
sources are not readily applicable, they will gradually come to benefit the developing
179

countries according to their needs. It is to be noted that all of these jurisdictions are
not referred to in each of the issues of this study. Instead, they are referred to
selectively depending on their relevance. Another important source of information
are the reports created by and/or addressed to a range of governments or
organisations together with the selected countries. In the UK and Bangladesh, the
relevant organisations are the NDNAD and the NFDPL, respectively. In addition,
some other relevant literature has also been reviewed.
4.1.3

QUALITATIVE METHOD

‘The expression qualitative research,867 in its most general sense, refers to collecting
and interpreting information about some phenomena without concern for
quantities’.868 With this method, the focus is on identifying the qualitative features,
characteristics, or attributes that make the phenomenon what it is.869 Qualitative
research ‘stress[es] the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship
between the researcher and what is studied as well as the situational constraints that
shape inquiry’.870 It is one of the most established research methods in the area of
socio-legal research. Some of its common features871 are identified by Uwe Flick:
Qualitative research is intended to approach the world ‘out there’ (not in
specialised research settings such as laboratories and to understand, describe
and sometimes explain social phenomena ‘from the inside’ in a number of
different ways: (i) by analysing experiences of individuals or groups … (ii) by
analysing interactions and communications in the making … by analysing
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documents (texts, images, films or music) or similar traces of experiences or
interactions.872

Patton further argued that:
A qualitative inquiry strategy emphasises and builds on several interconnected
themes: (i) naturalistic inquiry; (ii) inductive analysis; (iii) holistic perspective;
(iv) qualitative data; (v) personal contact and insight; (vi) dynamic System;
(viii) unique case orientation; (viii) context sensitivity; (ix) empathic neutrality;
873
(x) design flexibility.

Many methods and approaches are applied in qualitative research, such as case study,
interview, personal experience, introspective, life story, participant observation,
historical, interactional, examination of artefacts (including documents) and visual
texts — all of which contribute to a description of routine and problematic moments
and meanings in individual lives.874
This method, therefore, explores attitudes, behaviour and experiences and also
attempts to get an in-depth opinion from participants.875 Consequently, the
qualitative research method provides the researcher with multiple choices and means
to explore the depth, richness, and complexity inherent in the phenomena being
studied.876 Empirical research for this project is conducted in two instances: one is
‘case study’ and another is ‘semi-structured interview’. Later interview data are
further explored and analysed applying ‘constant comparative method of grounded
theory (hereinafter referred to as the GT)’.
Next section is going to discuss about case study method:
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4.1.3.1 Case Studies
The use of case studies has become extremely widespread in small scale social
research.877 The ‘case study’ is one of the important forms of empirical inquiry878
and a most common way to undertake qualitative research.879 Stake observes that ‘[a]
case study draws attention to the question of what specially can be learned from the
single case’ and adds that it is also ‘both a process of inquiry about a case and the
product of that inquiry’.880 A case study can focus on various subjects or phenomena,
including ‘individuals, programs, institutions, or groups’.881 According to Bouma, a
case study may be of one person, group, classroom, town, or nation.882 The case
study approach is particularly appropriate for individual researchers because it gives
an opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be studied in some depth within a
limited time scale, though there are some exceptions.883 Further, the methods of
qualitative case study offer a means of ‘disciplining personal and particularised
experience’,884 while offering ‘a richness and depth of information not usually
offered by other methods’.885 According to Robert K Yin:
[C]ase studies are the preferred strategy when, “how” or “why” questions are
being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.886

Yin notes that the case study offers researchers particular advantages as ‘an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context,
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly

877

Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (Open
University Press, 1998) 30.
878
Robert K Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 1994) 13.
879
Robert E Stake, 'Case Studies' in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), Strategies of
Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 2003) 134, 134; see also Denzin and Lincoln,
‘Introduction’, above n 856, 4.
880
Stake, ‘Case Studies’, above n 879, 135–6.
881
Thomas, above n 868, 33. See also Denscombe, The Good Research Guide, above n 877, 33;
Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, above n 840, 384.
882
Gary D Bouma, The Research Process (Oxford University Press, revised ed, 1993) 89.
883
Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in Education and
Social Science (Open University Press, 2nd ed, 1993) 8.
884
Stake, ‘Case Studies’, above n 879, 443, 460.
885
Beverley Hancock, 'Trent Focus for Research and Development in Primary Health Care: An
Introduction to Qualitative Research' (Trent Focus Group, 1988) 6.
886
Yin, above n 878, 1.

182

evident.’887 Four elements typify case studies: context, boundaries, time and
intensity.888
The empirical section of this thesis reveals what happens in practice rather than in
theory. Two case studies are undertaken, each of a different human DNA service
system which are themselves selected to illustrate what occurs in developed and
developing countries — one from the UK (as a model of a developed world
approach) and another from Bangladesh (as an example of a developing country
approach). Case studies can focus on a single case as the unit of analysis or on
multiple cases that are then compared.889 A comparative case studies approach890
provides an opportunity to review two different styles regarding the forensic use of
DNA information both in the UK and Bangladesh (as developed and developing
countries respectively).

(a) Case Study 1
The first case study has been conducted in the National DNA Database of the UK
(England and Wales) (that is the NDNAD). In this case study, the main sources of
information were published books, journal articles, other published documents,
legislations, case laws and so on. Although the case study is one of the important
forms of empirical inquiry, sometimes empirical data collection, for example,
through person to person interview with human data subject requires ethics approval
and informed consent. Due to this intricate process at times this is not laudable to
conduct two case studies in one research project. Specially, if the nature of the data
to be collected is very sensitive and the project has a predefined time-limit, more
than one extensive fieldwork may become really difficult. In such circumstances,
alternatively, research outcome can be obtained from readily accessible existing data
– that is to say, the secondary data. For this reason, ‘very often case studies are
conducted depending on large volumes of readily-accessible, existing data’. There
are instances ‘where case studies focus on examples of research uses data that were
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originally collected for another purpose (secondary use of data)’.891 Moreover, Stake
(1995) and Yin (1994) identified at least six sources of evidence in case studies.
Documents and archival records are two important sources in case studies.
The UK has been selected to represent the situation of developed countries.
Moreover, the UK established the first forensic DNA database. This country has,
therefore, made significant progress in managing forensic DNA information and
database; however, there are still some inconsistencies in the current UK scenario
which must be acknowledged before the problems can be properly addressed. For
instance, very recently a significant case (the Marper case, of 2008)892 revealed
violations of human rights and privacy in the UK jurisdiction. In their judgment, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that there is a clear violation of
human rights and privacy in practices regarding the use and retention DNA samples
in the NDNAD of the UK. In addition, the UK’s current legal provisions are not
sufficiently consistent to ensure human rights and privacy in regards to the use of
DNA information for case investigation purposes.893 Still there is some scattered
evidence of the collection from and retention of DNA samples of innocent
individuals by the UK police.
This case study on the NDNAD is, therefore, significant for this thesis as it will focus
more on what happened in terms of UK policy and practice on human rights and
privacy issues after the Marper judgment. This examination of UK legislation and
policy as well as of the governance and practices of the NDNAD will increase
understanding of the government’s reaction to the Marper judgment.
(b) Case Study 2
To balance the perspective of the operations of and the challenges to DNA data
management in a developed country, the case study on Bangladesh provides a salient
contrast as it illustrates existing scenarios and challenges faced by developing
countries. The Bangladesh government has only comparatively recently established
the NFDPL and begun to collect DNA information from suspects, victims and others
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in order to detect criminals and to identify missing persons. Although the mechanism
has proved to be a very effective investigating tool for ensuring social harmony and
justice, there are nevertheless some challenges involved in utilising this system. The
NFDPL of Bangladesh lacks appropriate administrative and legislative mechanisms
to protect privacy of data subjects and others and protect persons from misuse
associated with such data. A comparison with what happens in the UK has usefully
illuminated how this issue might be more effectively dealt with. As a result it was
invaluable to compare the two different jurisdictions of the UK and Bangladesh to
determine the real gap between the approaches to the use as well as misuse (such as
human rights and privacy violations) of genetic information in both developed and
developing countries.
Moreover, the scenarios of the UK and Bangladesh offer a snapshot of the problems
and concerns which are currently encountered by various members of the world
community. In addition, in order to understand the legal, administrative and
management process as a whole, these DNA service systems are critically examined
and analysed from different perspectives, for instance, how they collect and store
DNA information, how they allow third parties to access such information and how
much power law enforcement agencies have while collecting the data. But collecting,
storing and accessing information is not the whole picture: how these systems are
running in the existing legal paradigms both in the UK and Bangladesh is a central
issue addressed by these case studies. Thus the use of this method in this research has
helped to explore ‘people’s experiences and emotions’894, and certainly underscores
why it has gained increased popularity and acceptance as a research tool.895
While conducting the second case study (that is, the case study on the NFDPL,
Bangladesh), a significant discrepancy has been detected between the theory with
regard to the forensic use of DNA information in the justice delivery system of
Bangladesh and actual practices in this regard. Since it is fairly a new practice in
Bangladesh, there is a serious shortage of archival sources of information. Therefore,
this project — particularly for this case study — relied on primary data (collected via
894
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semi structured interview). Moreover, a survey896 has been conducted with the same
participants to refine the qualitative data and to establish research arguments. As a
result, this part of this study has pursued two different approaches (namely semistructured interviews and a survey) to gather research materials and to answer the
research questions of the case study on NFDPL (Bangladesh).
4.1.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews
A case study could be conducted by applying either an ‘umbrella’ strategy that
combines a range of data (for example, interviews, documentary or historical
analysis, survey), or an individual method.897 In this research, the first approach has
been used. As a way of acquiring information, interviewing is one of the most
common and a central element to qualitative methodology898 where we try to
understand our fellow humans. With the interview, while few people generally take
part in this research process, the contact with these people tends to last a lot
longer.899 Interviewing includes a wide variety of forms and has a multiplicity of
uses. The most common form of interviewing involves individual and face to face
interchange. In this regards Marshall and Rossman argued that:
One cannot understand human actions without understanding the meaning that
participants attribute to those actions — their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, values
and assumptive words; the researcher therefore, needs to understand the deeper
perspectives captured through face-to-face interaction.900

Interviews can be structured or semi-structured or unstructured.901 In this study, the
semi-structured interviews (also known as the indepth interviews) were conducted at
the first instance. Max Travers argued that the ‘indepth interview as a social research
method, is developed from an interpretivist perspective that sees that social research
needs to address the complex ways in which people understand their lives’.902
896

For further details see section 4.1.4.1 of this Chapter.
Webley, above n 849, 939.
898
Katharyn Antle May, 'Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research: Concerns and Challenges' in
Janice M Morse (ed), Qualitative Nursing Research: A Contemporary Dialogue (Sage Publications,
revised ed, 1991) 188, 188.
899
Dawson, above n 875.
900
Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Sage Publications,
3rd ed, 1999) 57.
901
Andrea Fontana and James H Frey, 'The Interview: From Neutral Stance to Political Involvement'
in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage
Publications, 3rd ed, 2005) 695, 698.
902
Max Travers, 'Qualitative Interviewing Methods' in Maggie Walter (ed), Social Research Methods
an Australian Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2006) 83, 86.
897

186

Interviews are more formal than a ‘conversation’, and involve a set of assumptions or
presuppositions and understandings ‘which are not normally associated with a casual
conversation’.903 The topic is predetermined by the interviewer to a great extent, and
the direction of the interview and information obtained usually set by the questions
posed. Open-ended questions can elicit far greater information and at times
unexpected responses that add to the richness of the data collected and the
comprehensiveness and veracity of the scenario revealed. In other words, the
interview is seen as a potential mechanism for the exploration of research questions,
collection of relevant data and to answer those research questions. It also ‘provides
maximum opportunity for complete and accurate communication of ideas between
the researcher and the respondent’.904 Therefore, the purpose of collecting empirical
data from the NFDPL, Bangladesh (via semi-structured interviews) is to gather
necessary information on what is happening in practice apart from what exists in
theory. The data collected were supportive of the arguments of this research,
enabling the researcher to verify already established opinions and also to predict
future trends.
The interview structure used in this research is semi-structured in nature, which
involves asking a set of pre-determined questions but questions that offer a degree of
flexibility that is lacking in a totally standardised interview.905 The form lies
‘somewhere between the extremes of completely standardised and completely unstandardised interviewing structures’.906 In a semi-structured interview, the questions
asked are generally put ‘to each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order, but
the interviewers are allowed freedom to digress’.907 As Berg observes, ‘interviewers
are permitted (in fact expected) to probe far beyond the answers [provided] to their
prepared and standardised questions’.908 Therefore, the interviewees were asked
some open-ended questions and were free to elaborate on their own thoughts and
903
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digress when they deemed it necessary. In response to those digressions, the
researcher then adapted the questioning, in order to make the interviewees elaborate
more on their views and ideas.
In order to gain a deeper insight about this research topic and also to increase the
validity of the case study on NFDPL (Bangladesh), empirical data (via semistructured interviews) from the managements and operational officers (scientific or
administrative staff) of the NFDPL who deal with forensic use of DNA data were
collected in August and September 2010. Data collected via interviews illustrated
existing scenarios and challenges (including human rights and privacy issues) faced
by Bangladesh. There is also a serious dearth of secondary sources of information.
Therefore, the data collection in this study was highly significant. 9 participants were
selected among those who volunteered from among 40 employees. Although this
may appear to be a very small number from a quantitative point of view, the data
collected nonetheless has strong validity because of the depth and detail gained
through the adoption of the qualitative approach. It is argued that this number
provides ample data to illustrate the process being researched. Some of them were
very open and willing to engage in lively conversation about their perceptions and
understandings. Each interview lasted between 30 and 45 minutes and a comfortable
face to face encounter facilitated an exploration of responses on the current status of
the NFDPL. The following section of this chapter details how the research was
undertaken. Importantly, it provides descriptions of and justifications for key
decisions in relation to the methods chosen, including the sampling technique, the
structure and setting for the methods.
4.1.3.3 Data Collection Procedure and Ethical Considerations
Because the objects of inquiry in interviewing are people, extreme care must be
taken to avoid any harm to them. Traditionally ethical concerns have revolved
around the topics of informed consent, right to privacy, confidentiality and
anonymity protection from harm, and securing the data.909 Ethical considerations are
one of the important issues in research involving human beings. The following
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discussion outlines procedures and processes that were followed in the interview
methods.

(a) Participant Recruitment
The NFDPL employees were recruited for this project with permission from the
management of the NFDPL. Initially, the participants were contacted through the
management, that is, the head of the NFDPL. A letter detailing the research
objectives and significance of this project, its probable outcomes and the necessity
for the interviews were sent to the management. The letter also described how the
interview would be conducted and information used. Upon approval being obtained
from the management, participants were contacted directly to explain the research
project and given a ‘Participant’s Information Sheet’ to further explain the aims and
benefits of the study. No third parties (for example, marketing research companies)
were used. Interested participants were directed to contact the researcher in order to
undertake the interview. Participants were selected on the basis of their interest to
participate. Then the date, time and venue were fixed by the researcher according to
the convenience of the participant concerned.
Two types of interviewees have been recruited, one group being from the
management of the NFDPL (such as, the head or the senior officers) and the second
group comprising scientific officers, or other administrative staff who directly handle
collection, analysis and storage of DNA data. However, this group division is only
for personal understanding and is not identifiable in any part of this research or any
other publications. The adoption of a semi-structured interview technique with its
inherent flexibility, was less intrusive and less intimidating than a formal interview
and encouraged expansive two-way communication between interviewer and those
who are interviewed. Open ended questions were used to try to develop an open
ended discussion rather than create a more formal interview session. More scope was
thus offered to the participants to share their views freely.

Sample Selection
There are around 40 members of staff at the NFDPL of Bangladesh. At least 2
management staff and 7 operational staff (scientific officers/administrative staff)
189

were selected from among those who were volunteered for the interviews. They were
interviewed individually with no group sessions.

Why NFDPL Employees
It has been mentioned earlier that the practice of collection and use of DNA
information in solving civil and criminal cases has only very recently been adopted
in Bangladesh; however, there is not enough secondary sources of information with
regard to this service. Collected empirical data (via interviews) with the participants
(those who volunteered) has revealed the exact scenario of this newly emerging
facility. The selected groups are currently working in NFDPL, either as operational
or management staff, thus, they were able to give details about the existing situation
in the laboratory.

Outline for the Participants
At the beginning of each session, participants were given a full explanation of what
was expected during discussions. They were encouraged to freely participate in an
open but mutually respectful manner. Each interview was recorded on audio tape,
with the aim (as Cassandra Sharp so rightly observes) ‘not to capture the truth, but to
assist the conversation — that is, in order to hear better what was discussed’.910
Participants self-selected, that is, they made themselves available on a voluntary
basis. A copy of ‘Participation Information Sheet’ (PIS) was provided to them and
these PIS were translated, where requested, and explained to their satisfaction. They
were then allocated sufficient time to consult with their friends or family, where they
felt necessary, before making any decision regarding their participation.
Informed Participants911
To be willing and comfortable to participate in the research, the participants
obviously needed to be fully aware of the methods involved and of potential risks.
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The following part outlines how the participants were fully informed of these aspects
of the research.
Risk: Each interview lasted between 30 and 45 minutes; therefore; it has consumed
some of their valuable time. There was some small risk or inconvenience for them.
As some questions were related to their job and these could reveal some challenges
that currently face by this laboratory, assurances were given that the privacy and
confidentiality of all participants would be maintained and ensured all throughout
this research. However, if anyone felt uncomfortable to answer any question, they
were given opportunity to decide not to answer. Their co-workers knew that some of
their colleagues were participating in this interview process, since permission was
obtained from management beforehand; however, they did not know exactly who
was participating and who was sharing what information. Each of the participants
was interviewed separately so that their identity remained undisclosed to other
participants.
Consent: The aims and objectives of the research and how the interview information
was going to be used were adequately explained to the participants. This allowed
them to properly understand the risks, and give informed consent to the interview. A
copy of both the PIS (as referred to earlier) and a ‘Consent Form’ were provided to
them. These documents were translated and explained to their satisfaction. Finally
participants were requested to sign the consent form as part of this process.
Withdrawal of Consent: At the first meeting with participants, it was explained to
them orally that their involvement in this research project is completely voluntary,
and they were also informed that they had the right to withdraw their participation at
any time before the publication of this thesis. The PIS includes an explanation of the
participants’ freedom to discontinue participation. If discontinuation occurs, no data
from that interviewee will be retained by the author. Also, there will be no adverse
effects on participants for their withdrawal as participation is completely voluntary.
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Confidentiality:912 Among the 40 staff members of the laboratory, only 9 of them
were selected from among those who volunteered. This was to the risk of their being
identified within their laboratory and guarantee that their privacy and confidentiality
are maintained. Participants contacted the author individually when a separate date
and time were fixed for each interested participant. Their special needs and requests
(which are vital with regard to their welfare) were maintained during the interview.
Their consent form and interview questionnaire were completely de-identified so that
they can no way be related to individual participants.
Data subjects are completely de-identified in the analysis stage so that no
information can be linked with individual or group participants. Participants are cited
with code numbers. A password protected computer was used for data analysis.
Necessary measures were also taken to prevent physical (loss of hard drive) and or
logical (virus attack) threats. At the final stage, a standard encryption method (adobe)
was used to store the data. Other than the researcher and supervisor, no one has any
access to this information.
Ethical Approval: Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Human
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of Wollongong.913
4.1.3.4 Qualitative Data Analysis Strategy
According to Bogdan and Taylor, qualitative data analysis strategy ‘refers to a
process which entails an effort to identify themes and to construct hypotheses (ideas)
as they are suggested by data and an attempt to demonstrate support for those
themes and hypotheses’.914 A qualitative researcher uses inductive analysis, which
means that categories, themes, and patterns come from the data, that is, ‘[t]he
categories that emerge from field notes, documents, and interviews are not imposed
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prior to data collection’.915 The method tries to make sense of people’s experiences
in a number of ways, for instance, phenomenology, ethnography, or grounded theory,
life histories, and conversational analysis. In this study, constant comparative method
of GT has been applied to analyse and develop a theory using interview data. The
qualitative analysis of the interview data (a rich and fertile source of information)
served to reveal the functioning of this laboratory, its existing scenarios and
challenges. This collected data also helps to reveal human rights and privacy
violations, as well as to enable the author to conduct a comparative analysis between
developed and developing countries, that is, the current status of the NFDPL is
compared with the NDNAD of the UK and some anomalies have been found
between the theory and the practice within each jurisdiction and differences have
also been found between these two forensic DNA database services as they operate
in their respective justice delivery systems.
This part of the thesis, therefore, draws on and interprets this data to make some
observations about the ways in which the existing scenario and challenges of the
NFDPL has been examined, which also helps to reveal the gap between it and the
NDNAD of the UK. To this end, the next section of this chapter prefaces the analysis
with an explanation of the particular strategies used to analyse and interpret the data,
and this analysed data has been discussed and applied in chapters 6 and 7. There
were nine interview participants and these have been identified as ‘R1’, ‘R2’, ‘R3’,
‘R4’, ‘R5’, ‘R6’, ‘R7’, ‘R8’ and ‘R9’ in chapters 6 and 7. In this study the following
process has been followed:
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DATA COLLECTION
Case Study, Interview, documents etc.
DATA MANAGEMENT
Interview tape record, translation and transcription
DATA ANALYSIS
Concept Formation
Level I: Coding
Level II: Categorisation

REFINE INDEXING SYSTEM

Memo Writing

Category Linking

CATEGORY LINKING
Concept Development

Data Reduction or Data Integration
Selective Sampling of Data
GENERATING THEORY
Key Concepts or Emergence of Core Variable
Sources: Streubert and Carpenter (2003);916 John T E Richardson (1996)917

Figure 3: Grounded Theory: Constant Comparative Analysis
(a) Interview Data Analysis
Having outlined in the previous part the methods for collecting this data, this part of
the chapter seeks to outline the strategies adopted in analysing and interpreting it.
Based on qualitative research methodology, the data collected via semi structured
open-ended interviews were analysed using GT method. The GT method (that is, a
916

Dona Rinaldi Carpenter, 'Grounded Theory as Method' in Helen J Streubert Speziale and Dona R
Carpenter (eds), Qualitative Research in Nursing: Advancing the Humanistic Imperative (Lippincott
Williams and Wilkins, 3rd ed, 2003) 107, 117.
917
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(Blackwell Publishing, 1996) 86, 88.
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constant comparative method of analysis) allows the depth of investigation needed to
understand the experiences of staff members working at the NFDPL from their
individual perspectives. This investigation has identified a core problem of the
NFDPL. After constant comparative analysis of data, two core categories of problem
have emerged — (i) ‘risks of human rights and privacy violations’ and (ii) ‘challenge
of survival of the NFDPL’, that is the question of sustainably running of this
laboratory in terms of human resources, financial and technological capacities as
compared to the NDNAD of the UK (representing the discrepancy between the
developed and developing countries). Therefore the application of this method
allowed two main themes or concepts to be generated through interview data
analysis. Data analysis in a constant comparative GT method occurs at four levels:
‘coding, constant comparison for inter-changeability of indicators, theoretical
sampling (that is, data driven design) of core emergence and theoretical
saturation’.918

The Grounded Theory (GT)
The GT approach is one of the important qualitative research methodologies that use
a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived theory about a
phenomenon.919 The term ‘grounded theory’ refers to data grounded in fact and the
generation of theory from data. Data are generally gathered using field techniques.
Such a form of field research is grounded in semi-structured interviews, field work
observations, case study documentation, or other forms of textual material.920 In this
method, at no time does the investigator attempt to impose a theory from another
study onto the collected or studied data. Rather when utilising the GT method,
hypotheses are linked together so that the investigator is able to present an integrated
theory to explain the problem being studied.921 The GT method therefore is intended
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for developing theory that is ‘grounded in data which are systematically gathered and
analysed through social research’.922
American sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss923 developed GT
methodology in 1967 at the University of California‘s San Francisco School of
Nursing as the theoretical framework for a study of staff management of dying
patients. Their original GT research resulted in the publication of two classic books
on the subject, namely ‘Awareness of Dying’924

and ‘Time for Dying’.925 The

research also led to the publication of a book outlining the methodology used in this
study.926 In attempts to provide more precise and rigorous refinements on the
method, Glaser published ‘Theoretical Sensitivity’ in 1978. It was further expanded
by Strauss.927 Again with former student and colleague Juliet Corbin, Strauss
published ‘Basics of Qualitative Research’ in 1990.928 The work of grounded
theory’s originators has evolved into different versions, which are referred to by
some scholars as the Glaserian and the Straussian iterations.929 According to both
Glaser and Strauss, however, a well-constructed GT methodology use normally
meets four central criteria for judging the applicability of the theory to a
phenomenon: fit, understanding, generality and control.930

Justification for Application of GT
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The goal of GT is the discovery and or construction of theory from methodical data
generation931 that results in greater understanding of the phenomena being studied. In
other words, the purpose of GT methods is, of course, to build theory that is faithful
to and illuminates the area under study.932 According to Charmaz, ‘the power of
grounded theory lies in its tool for understanding empirical worlds.’933 Chenitz and
Swanson further stated that:
Grounded theory is a highly systematic research approach for the collection and
analysis of qualitative data for the purpose of generating explanatory theory that
furthers the understating of social ... phenomena. The objective of grounded
theory is the development of theory that explains basic patterns common in
social life. Grounded theory represents an advance in technology for handling
qualitative data gathered in the natural, every day world. It describes a method
to study fundamental patterns known as basic social-psychological processes
which account for variation in interaction around a phenomenon or problem.934

There are several reasons for applying GT method (that is constant comparative
analysis) in this study:
Firstly, GT is a widely used qualitative research methodology that aims to discover
the social problems of selected groups in society as well as to discover processes to
deal with these problems. Both problems and processes are examined coherently and
consideration is given to the context and other aspects surrounding problems and
processes. Because problems do not exist in isolation, so the conditions that co-exist
with problems must also be identified and examined. The GT method, therefore,
provides tools for analysing social problems and processes. It has the potential to
expose basic social problems and processes935 from the interview participants’
perspective, and also reveal how participants are accustomed to dealing with their
central issues of concern.
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Secondly, in this study, the application of a newly emerged technology (that is, DNA
profiling) in the society, its possible implications, and responses from a selected
group are examined. Thus, GT is one of the most suitable options for this type of
examination of data.
Thirdly, one of the major strengths of the GT method is that it provides tools that
hold much potential for studying social justice issues,936 as this area is among many
where researchers can fruitfully apply Glaser and Strauss’s GT methods.937 As
Charmaz observes, the use of ‘GT tools for studying collective and individual action
… can make social justice analysis more precise and predictive’, and ‘[b]y focusing
on data gathering, the researcher can seek information to examine questions
concerning equality, fairness, rights and legitimacy’.938 Moreover ‘social justice
research often takes into account the historical evolution of the current situation, and
a GT analysis of this evolution can yield new insights and perhaps alternative
understandings’.939 This study deals with social justice issues (human rights and
privacy violations; as well as gap between developed-developing countries while
using DNA information in Bangladeshi justice delivery system), therefore the GT
method has correctly been chosen for this study.
Finally, another main justification for applying this method is that there is a shortage
of secondary source of materials (archival information)940 in relation to the NFDPL
(Bangladesh). That indicates that there has been a lack of research on the NFDPL
and on the use of its services in the justice delivery system in Bangladesh. More
precisely, there is no adequate research or information regarding the use of DNA
data in Bangladeshi justice system, neither in terms of the extent to which it is
successful, or whether there is any challenges regarding the laboratory and so on.
According to Chenitz and Swanson, the GT method has been reported by qualitative
researchers as being appropriate and particularly useful in studying human behaviour
936
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and interaction in complex situations, especially those in which little work has been
done previously,941 GT theory again presents as the most appropriate methodology
for this section of the research.
In order to the answer research questions and also to undertake this case study, the
researcher has pursued this qualitative data analysis method (that is, constant
comparison) and the development of a substantive theory. Consequently, a part942 of
this study has been examined and analysed using the GT approach. In this regard to
theory generation, Strauss and Corbin in their book ‘Grounded Theory in Practice’
highlighted that ‘GT methodology and methods (procedures) are now being the most
influential and widely used modes of carrying out qualitative research, [especially]
when generating theory is the researcher’s principal aim.’943 Therefore, this study
meets the criteria espoused by the scholars in this field and in relation to the type of
data being obtained. Since there has been little research in the areas of forensic use of
DNA data in the Bangladeshi justice delivery system, GT method has the potential to
detect human rights and privacy issues in Bangladesh as well as the gap between UK
and Bangladesh in their use of forensic DNA data.

Grounded Theory Method: Constant Comparative Analysis
A central feature of the GT approach is its being ‘a general method of [constant]
comparative analysis’.944 The GT theorist’s ‘simultaneous involvement in data
gathering and analysis is explicitly aimed towards developing theory’.945 To do this,
a GT theorist collects verbatim transcripts of interviews and reads through a small
sample of text (usually line by line).946 Sandelowski observes that the analysis of
texts begins with proof reading the material and simply underlining key phrases
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‘because they make some as yet inchoate sense.’947 Then ‘[i]n a process called “open
coding” the investigator identifies potential themes by pulling together real examples
from the text’.948 Identifying the categories and terms used by participants
themselves is called ‘in vivo coding’.949 Then, ‘[a]s coding categories emerge, the
researcher links them together in theoretical models. One technique is to compare
and contrast themes and concepts. When, why and under what conditions do these
themes occur in the text?’950 Glaser and Strauss refer to this as the ‘constant
comparative method’.951 In other words, GT is a comparative method in which the
researcher compares data with data, data with categories, and category with
category.952 Data of a similar nature are moved into codes where they fit better, and
in this way categories and sub-categories are constructed and altered. Glaser and
Strauss nominate four stages for the constant comparative method or process:953
Comparing Incidents Applicable to Each Category:954 This stage starts with the
identifying categories955 and their properties956 from interview transcripts. Initially,
in the open coding process, data are compared in terms of incident to incident and the
process is completed by reading and comparing transcripts line by line. At this stage
the researcher moves from ‘comparing incidents with incidents’ to ‘a comparison of
incidents with properties’ and ‘in this way, incidents are compared only with the
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accumulated knowledge on a category’ in a process of constant comparison.957
Incidents are thus integrated into properties and subsequently, properties themselves
‘become integrated’.958 In essence such constant comparison could be identified as
the ‘meaning generating’ process, that is, the categories should not be merely labels
used to name different incidents but are involved in the conceptualisation of some
key features. They have to be analytical.959 Categories also have to be sensitising —
that is, they must provide a ‘meaningful picture’.960 Both analytic and sensitised
concepts ‘help the reader to see and hear vividly the people in the area under study’
and also help to ‘grasp theory developed for the area’.961
Integrating Categories and Their Properties:962 After comparing incidents (above),
in this stage ‘different categories and their properties tend to become integrated
through constant comparisons that force the analyst to make some related theoretical
sense of each comparison’.963 Researchers using this process are able to identify
under which conditions particular incidents took place and in what contexts, and
‘[t]his integrative process [is] … supposed to reflect patterns of integration in the
data itself (as generated through theoretical sampling)’ which had ‘provided the
relevant data for revealing significant similarities and differences within and between
categories’.964 This process — accompanied by memo writing and higher level
conceptualisation — allows the substantive theory to develop.
Delimiting the Theory965 or Developing Core Category: At this stage, categories tend
to collapse or integrate, and data are put back together (through constant comparison)
which enables the theory or core category to emerge. As the main objective is to
generate theory, but this is only possible ‘when an adequate theory has emerged from
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the analysis,’ a point characterised by Glaser and Strauss as ‘theoretical
saturation’,966 referring to concepts and not data, ‘and [identifying] … a point where
no further conceptualisation of data is required’.967 Dey has observed that it also
marks a point where no further sampling is deemed to be required.968 The concepts or
core categories will self-generate if the researcher adheres to this process and these
will in turn lead to the emergence of theory. This is because in this process (constant
comparison), categories become repetitive, incidents are cross coded, and categories
are eventually collapsed or integrated.
Writing the Theory:969 At the end, it is by the process of constant comparison that GT
method works to develop a theory that is suited to its intended purpose.
The application of this method culminated in the development of the major theme or
substantive theory970 which is presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
The constant comparative method of analysis was diligently applied to this study.
The first two steps (discussed above) remain important for the constant comparative
method of analysis. The phenomena are continually compared for similarities and
differences, as these may reveal a set of sub-categories of a given category, and they
are also compared to other categories,971 and this process is continually repeated until
new concepts or themes emerged. The author continually decided which category or
property the phenomena being analysed belongs to, and then named this category.
These two steps ensure the generation of categories and their properties from the
data.972 Because the author becomes close to data and is engaged in all types of
coding simultaneously, the first two steps of constant comparison are not as tedious
966
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as it may seem at first. The process involves coding, comparison and grouping or
uniting, labelling and categorising, further data collection and coding, recoding
(where indicated), and continual testing of emerging hypotheses against the data as
those hypotheses arise. In this way a structure is built up that gives order to the
relationship between categories and leads to the development of an overarching
theory.
4.1.3.5 Management of Data
This stage could be referred to as ‘data management stage’ (see Figure 2 and Figure
3). In this study, data management (coding) has been facilitated using Nvivo
software version 8 allowing data storage, manipulation and retrieval (that is, to
analyse interview data). The Nvivo program is recognised as leading ComputerAssisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS)973 developed by QSR
International974 (Melbourne, Australia), the world’s largest qualitative research
software developer. This software was designed to integrate coding with qualitative
linking, shaping and modelling.975 Doolan and Ayland have noted that one of its
main advantages of the CAQDAS is the enhanced ability to manage high volumes of
material by breaking down large quantities of field work data — such as interview
transcripts — into smaller, linked, more manageable piece of information.976
Therefore, Nvivo is a software application that can be used by researchers to manage
and analyse qualitative data977 such as interview transcripts.
CAQDAS has been used for qualitative data analysis in this project because it is
believed that it improves the efficiency and accuracy of the qualitative analysis in
comparison to manual methods. This software facilitates the location of information
973
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once it has been coded. This obviates the need to continually search back and forth
through written documents for like information’.978 It has been observed that this also
reduces human error and ‘arguably allows for a more accurate analysis of the
data’.979 However, CAQDAS could be ‘characterised as software for data
administration and archiving rather than a tool for data analysis’,980 as it is the
researcher’s ability to accurately code material in a manner relevant to the research
data and their willingness to recode or collapse categories as additional later
categories emerge, that provides the foundation of any analysis. The system enhances
research by its capacity to handle large quantities of information in a time effective
manner. It adds and integrates documents into a database, which can include
‘research project outline, records of interviews, field notes, memos, other internal
documents and link[s] to external documents … [It then can] combine and compare
data across these sets’.981 Its limitations, like those of many computer programs, can
be those of the researcher. For example, inadequate observation or comprehension of
the use of synonyms or substituted acronyms can result in inadequate initial coding
that hampers any subsequent research. Wisely used, it is a most useful tool for
research.
(a) Strategies Taken for Data Analysis: Coding Process
The process of analysing data collected in research is often referred to as ‘coding’.982
Three stages of coding or data analysis are involved in GT. These are ‘open coding’,
‘axial coding’ and ‘selective coding’.983 The ‘coding’ for this study is conducted
using Nvivo Software. In Nvivo 8.0 these three stage of coding is actually done
through free nodes and tree nodes and creating relationship among them. In constant
comparative analysis a total of four main steps are followed for coding:
Codes (tags or labels for allocating identified ideas or concepts): identifying a
passage of text in the document or transcript that exemplifies ideas or concepts;984
978
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Concepts (open coding): after coding, assigning key passages into categories which
represent ideas or concepts;985
Categories (axial coding): filtering the list of categories, deleting or merging or
integrating categories with similar concepts;
Theory (selective coding): identifying or focusing on the core categories or themes
from which the theory will emerge.
The purpose of this section is, therefore, to show how the deployment of the chosen
analytic methods would achieve the aim of this study and find answers to the
research questions. It also underpins the analysis discussed in chapters 6 and 7. In
terms of data analysis, as discussed above, following the constant comparative
approach, the four steps or coding processes are used for the systematic analysis of
data. The 4 stages involve interrogating data at progressively deeper, less abstract
levels. They are discussed in far greater detail below with the four major steps
broken down into a multitude of steps utilised in GT research in general and this
research in particular, and with reference also being made to theory. The four general
stages, however, are:
Step 1: Codes

Step 2: Concepts

Step 3: Categories

Step 4: Theory
Figure 4: Coding Process for Constant Comparative Analysis
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Step 1: Transcription and Codes
Perhaps quite obviously the step prior to the analysis of data was to have the audio
version of the discussions transcribed into written form. The author used an audio
tape recorder and listened to each tape and played interviews line by line and
transcribed each line. There were many times when tapes were repeatedly played to
allow the author to transcribe the interviews verbatim. Once this was completed, the
transcript was checked and cleaned by way of editing the manuscript for any
typographical errors and inconsistency. Although it is impossible to fully avoid the
loss of some meaning in the process of transcription, every effort was made to keep
this to a minimum. Following completion of the verbatim transcription, each
interview was printed and labelled with its own unique code. With the interviews
transcripts in hand, the QSR Nvivo 8.0 software was then used and the author
proceeded with the coding processes. Maintaining the richness of interviews data,
these individual transcripts were imported into Nvivo 8.0 for reading, analysing and
coding.
Coding the data is ‘the first major analytic phase of any research’.986 Codification is
essential procedure in qualitative analysis987 as it allows linking of different data
segments to create conceptual categories of data that have common elements. The
assigning of researcher’s observations as to categories is known as coding988 which
links the data segments to particular ideas or concepts.989 Strauss defines coding
simply as the ‘process of analysis of data.990 The first analytic step, therefore, was to
repeatedly read the transcripts in their entirety and then highlight key passages or
interesting points in the transcripts that corresponded with the initial research
questions, both primary and secondary,991 such highlighted material is also termed as
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‘critical instances’.992 Finally, coding is the pivotal link between collecting data and
developing an emergent theory to explain this data. 993

Step 2: Open Coding: Concept Formation
The second step was to ‘code’ the transcripts using particular coding994 categories
that were generated through a prolonged engagement with the data. This stage,
termed as ‘open coding’ which means to assign the quotes (responses from the
participants) or key passages (which is collected from the transcript) to categories
(see Appendix B). Strauss and Corbin defined the term:
Open coding [as] the process of breaking down, examining, comparing,
conceptualising and categorising data. [In a further clarification it is defined as]
the part of analysis that pertains specifically to the naming and categorising of
phenomena through close examination of data.995

According to Gibbs,996 open coding is used to ‘examine the text for salient categories
of information (nodes) by making comparison and asking questions.’ This is the first
basic analytic step from which everything else follows.997 In this study the author has
used Nvivo 8.0 software for ‘open coding’. Though the GT theory prefers three types
of coding (open, axial and selective coding), the application of Nvivo 8.0 actually
covers ‘open coding’ in its free nodes areas. These steps of analysis are explained
thoroughly in the following discussion. All interview transcripts are gathered or
imported into Nvivo version 8.0 as a preparatory step for open coding. All
preliminary ideas or key words were fed into Nvivo 8 as ‘free nodes’.998 Free nodes
represent unstructured, emergent ideas, an essentially non-hierarchical collection of
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nodes.999 Then the transcript of each interview was checked in order to identify the
key words or critical instances. These key words or sentences reveal the trends of the
answers to the interview questions. Subsequently, as shown in Figure 5, open coding
interpreted as free nodes, were extracted from the nine interview transcripts. Not all
questions were directly answered by the interviewees; rather their responses were
like a thorough story or discussion, so there was an ample quantity of data with a
variety of free nodes.
Data are examined and re-examined and the dialogue was broken down into lines,
and then incidents are coded depending upon what seemed to be occurring in each
incident. Open coding requires that the author identify what is happening in the data.
In that situation, the researcher had to decide how each incident would be labelled.
Later on the author asked herself ‘what category or property of a category does this
incident indicate?’1000 By asking these questions and seeking answers from the data,
open coding remained grounded and relevant concepts were emergent in the data
from the participants’ perspectives.

Figure 5: Open Coding Interpreted in Free Nodes
Following the analysis of the first transcript, the remaining eight transcripts were
dealt with in the same way. Specifically, each new piece of data was examined and
broken down into concepts. Similar concepts were coded together and in this way
999
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each piece of data was compared with data already labelled or coded. When
dissimilar data were identified, a new category was initiated accompanied by a
headline and an explanatory memo. It was also necessary to immerse oneself in the
data, to read it, think about it and try to put oneself in the position of NFDPL staff.
Eventually all incidents from all nine interview transcripts were examined, compared
and coded for both similarities and differences. In the whole process the author was
remained aware of not being biased or influenced by her own preconceived ideas.
Many categories have been identified from the first transcript and then progressively
fewer new categories from each successive transcript, as the proportion of new
information decreases. The process of assigning quotations to categories was
repeated for one transcript by a second, independent person to check the
reproducibility of assigning quotes to categories. This ensures mutual consistency
and credibility. This is a time-consuming stage which involves working through each
of the transcripts in turn to collect numerous quotes and examples of each existing
category and to identify new ones. The end point of this process is the production of
an initial list of categories. Seventy-one incidents or initial list of categories were
identified in the open coding stage.1001

Step 3: Axial or Theoretical Coding: Categories
The comparison of many coded incidents allowed the author to look for and identify
patterns. This patterning could, for example, be related to possible causes of events,
behaviours, actions, contexts, interactional strategies, or even outcomes.1002 Glaser
encourages all similar patterns to be grouped and named conceptually as a
‘category’.1003 As Strauss and Corbin observe, ‘[o]pen coding … fractures the data
and allows one to identify some categories, their properties, and dimensional
locations. Axial coding puts those data back together in new ways by making
connections between a category and its sub-categories’.1004 Therefore after open
coding, the next step was to relate the categories to one another and identify different
levels of importance; this process of analysis is called ‘axial coding’ or ‘theoretical
coding’. Though this stage was not followed by Glaser, Strauss and Corbin preferred
1001
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axial coding,1005 which they defined as ‘a set of procedures whereby data are put
back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between
categories’.1006 It involves refining the initial list of categories (which has been
developed through the process of open coding) by deleting or combining some
categories. At this stage, the initial list of categories is also cleansed by defining
properties (such as context and preconditions) and making connections between
categories. Categories have major or minor status and the linkages go across these
different levels. The GT process of constant comparison assists the author in
‘theoretical or axial coding’ and facilitates more abstract or conceptual ways of
looking at and linking the data. Like concepts are grouped together for a category,
and individual categories, like all others, contribute to the developing theory.
Although the actual management of data coding was assisted by computer software,
it was the author who had to make sense of the cumulative data and interpret what
was happening.
Interpretation or categorisation is done by extracting the tree nodes from the free
nodes and regrouping them with each other into node sets in the Nvivo 8.0. ‘Axial
and Selective coding’ are interpreted as tree nodes (see Figure 6). Tree nodes
resulted from moving free nodes into hierarchies by shifting them from a general
category at the top to more specific categories down near the bottom.1007 Categories
can be named in two ways: first, the researcher can use in vivo words (that is, the
exact words used by the participants)1008 or words that ‘have been abstracted from
the language of the research situation’.1009 In this research the author named the
category applying both ways while coding interview transcripts into free nodes and
tree nodes. The significant point is that category names were sensitising and
meaningful and provide a bridge between the theoretical thinking (of the author) and
the practical thinking of people concerned with substantive area.1010 After refining
and combing all initial categories, 14 new categories have been developed.1011
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Step 4: Selective Coding: Theory
The final stage is ‘selective coding’ and it involves the identification of a core
category or general themes from which the theory arises. Strauss and Corbin defined
Selective coding as:
[t]he process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other
categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need
further refinement and development.1012

Selective coding begins when the author moves from running the data open, to
delimiting the coding process around a core category.1013 Selective coding is the
strategy used to code for the core concept. As data chunks were being coded and
questions asked and hypotheses constructed, the author began to see linkages
between larger codes.

Figure 6: Axial and selective Coding Interpreted in Tree Nodes
For instance, the category of ‘lack of legislation or policies’ has given rise to issues
such as ‘informed consent’, ‘involvement and skill and power of police’, DNA
laboratory access by police and third parties, and equal treatment of child and adults
DNA samples. Again the ‘collection of DNA samples and personal information’ and
‘retention of DNA samples and profiles’ categories have also given rise some
societal concerns (for example, in relation to possible stigmatisation). So these
1012
1013

Strauss and Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research, above n 919, 116.
Glaser, Theoretical Sensitivity, above n 935, 56, 61.

211

categories have linkages between themselves. Each and every category individually
and jointly is contributing to violations of human rights and privacy. Finally, all these
categories are leading towards one of the core categories: ‘violation of human rights
and privacy’. In this way, in selective coding all categories were examined and links
were created to each other and finally, to the core concept. Similarly, a second core
category or concept was identified by the author, namely the ‘gap between the UK
and Bangladesh in regard to using and managing DNA facilities in their respective
justice delivery systems’.1014 In this process, memos were written to keep track of
how each code linked to other codes or related issues.
The advantage of selective coding is that the author may focus on the analysis of one
core category in detail (including consequences related to it) but still within the total
context which was developed during open coding.1015 The result of selective coding
was two core categories or themes. These two core categories are categorised in the
tree nodes that resulted from the open coding or free nodes in the previous stage.
Using Nvivo 8, selective coding was interpreted in the ‘tree nodes’ areas. It includes
human rights and privacy violations and the gap between developed-developing
countries.1016

(b) Memo
Memo writing is the intermediate step between coding and the first draft of the
completed analysis. Recording and writing memos on the researcher’s ideas is one of
the important rules of the constant comparative method and it also useful for
generating theory.1017 Moreover memo writing helps to identify properties or
characteristics of categories, look for its underlying assumptions, and show how and
when the category develops and changes. Many qualitative researchers who do not
write memos become lost in mountains of data and cannot make sense of them.1018
Throughout all phases of this study the author has maintained memos. In the GT
method, memo writing starts at the very beginning of the research process and is
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continuous throughout the study until final writing.1019 As suggested by Glaser and
Strauss, it is these memos that inform the author. For example, memos related to
coding will help recall the reasons for certain codes being constructed and others
being collapsed. Additionally, memo writing assists the researcher to justify and
clarify coding decisions. Memo construction occurred simultaneous to coding.

(c) Research Findings: Writing the Theory
When core categories are found and no new codes or concepts are able to be
developed and the author was sure the human rights and privacy issues as well as the
comparative analysis between UK and Bangladesh with regard to the use of DNA
information has been identified correctly, it was time to present the data in terms of a
substantive theory. Although much writing related to codes had occurred throughout
this study, writing the theory or details about research findings has been added in the
Chapter 6 of this thesis and it worked into the conclusion of the case study on the
Bangladeshi DNA service system. As with all qualitative studies, the author has used
verbatim quotes from the interviewees with the aim of adding richness and thickness
to the study.1020 All interviewees have been identified by code numbers.
4.1.4

QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

As Muijis observes, ‘Quantitative research is essentially about collecting numerical
data to explain a particular phenomenon’1021 and such ‘research emphasise[s] casual
relationships between variables, not processes’.1022 Moreover, in this research
approach an experimental design is established where dependable variables are
measured.1023 Carr defined the quantitative research approach as:
[A]n objective, formal, systematic process in which numerical data are used to
quantify or measure phenomena and produce findings… [this methodology]
test[s] theory deductively from existing knowledge, through developing
hypothesised relationships and proposed outcomes for study.1024
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Qualitative data is very often used as an important precursor to quantitative
studies.1025 The use of qualitative data generally develops a close personal
relationship with participants or subjects. This intimacy increases the willingness of
research participants or respondents to participate in subsequent studies involving
quantitative questions. In this regards Uwe Flick argued for ‘triangulation of
qualitative and quantitative research’:
[Where] different methodological perspectives complement each other in the
study of an issue and this is conceived as the complementary compensation of
the weaknesses and blind the spots of each single method. …. qualitative and
quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as rival
camps …1026

Ridenour and Newman identified this process as a ‘qualitative-quantitative
interactive continuum’ closing the gap between these two methods.1027 In this study,
the quantitative method has been applied in order to prove or support the findings
found from the qualitative data analysis. In other words, a survey is conducted to
support the results of the qualitative data analysis. Quantitative method also helped to
conciliate the limitations that naturally result from the use of qualitative method.
Qualitative data also provide a generalised background for interpreting later
statistical results. The statistical results are then compared with the qualitative data to
discern if there is a fit between two data sets. This method has also been applied to
elaborate and refine the qualitative analysis results. The final step of this research
was, therefore, the application of quantitative survey instruments to test the
relationship between the variables.
4.1.4.1 Survey Questionnaire
Survey methods involve gathering information about the current status of some
‘target variable’1028 within a particular ‘collectivity’,1029 then reporting a summary of
the findings in a quantitative form.1030 ‘[su]rveys are concerned with … demographic
1025
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characteristics, the social environment, the activities, or the opinions and attitudes of
some groups of people’.1031 The survey method uses ‘[i]nformation … gathered by
means of self-completed questionnaires’1032 with the aim of obtaining ‘answers to the
same questions from a large number of individuals …’.1033 This ‘enable[s] the
researcher not only to describe but also to compare, to relate one characteristic to
another and to demonstrate that certain features exist in certain categories’.1034
‘Causal relationships’, however, ‘can rarely be proved by survey methods. The main
emphasis is on fact-finding’.1035 The questionnaire1036 is one of most useful data
gathering instruments utilised in survey methods. Questionnaires are normally used
for collecting two principal types of information that respondents are equipped to
furnish — facts and opinions. Moreover, ‘the ‘questionnaire’s structure is selected in
view of the respondents’ likely knowledge of the information sought ... and also
[their] willingness to report such information in [this] form’.1037 The next step is to
specify how the data were gathered, that is the survey design and procedures:
4.1.4.2 Survey Questionnaire Design and Procedures
An important strength of questionnaires is that they enable the author to collect a
wide variety of information from respondents’, particularly if the questions are in the
form of multiple-choice, which allows people to express their opinions by merely
making one or more items in a list of options. In addition, when multiple choice
items are used, it is an easy task to classify answers and calculate their
frequencies.1038 The researcher need not be present at the time the information is
provided, and data can be collected from people in distance places. Questionnaires
can be administered by a number of methods, including by mail, personally
administered (telephone or face to face) or conducted over the internet. The selection
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of suitable methods depends on the cost, the time available, the characteristics of
participants, and the expertise of the researcher.
In this study, the face to face personally administered survey approach was
employed. Through the interview process, an intimate association was developed
between the author and the research participants. This intimate association with the
target population often results in an opportunity to achieve more reliable results
when quantitative questions are asked. Therefore, after finishing the interview
process, and when participants agreed, the questionnaire was distributed to them, and
they were then asked to fill out and return it to the author.1039 Survey questionnaires
are structured to cover mostly the same area with similar questions to those utilised
in the face to face interviews. It also helped the author to seek some more
information that is relevant for this research, but which the interviewees could not
reveal during interview process. This data helped to review the accuracy of the
interview data (whether the participants responses differ from their previous data or
not). In this process, ethics approval has also been obtained and approval from the
management of the NFDPL has also been obtained before commencing the
survey.1040 While collecting the data via a questionnaire the following steps have
been followed:

Figure 7: Data Collection Steps for Survey
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4.1.4.3 Limitation and Justification of this Approach
One of the significant limitations for applying quantitative approach is that this study
has only nine participants or variables. Among the 40 staff members of the NFDPL,
only nine were selected among those who volunteered in order to maintain their
privacy and confidentiality.1041 So, this is the maximum number of participants in the
researcher’s chosen research area. This number is very small in terms of quantity and
to prove or justify a research hypothesis applying quantitative method. Nevertheless,
this study has been chosen and mixed methods (both qualitative and quantitative
approach) applied to justify its arguments and answer the research questions. The
result of quantitative data analysis has supported and further strengthened the
findings of the qualitative data analysis of this research. In this regards, Kaplan and
Duchon acknowledged that:
Combing qualitative and quantitative methods proved especially valuable. …
Mixing methods can … lead to new insights and modes of analysis that are
unlikely to occur if one method is used alone.1042

Therefore examining the research problem using multiple research approaches has
allowed the author to develop more accurate explanations of the chosen research
phenomenon.
4.1.4.4 Quantitative Data Analysis Approach
This section provides a description of how the quantitative data analysis was actually
done. The quantitative analysis process has been given below:

Figure 8 Quantitative Data Analysis Steps
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In this study, the ‘descriptive statistics’1043 method has been used for quantitative
data analysis. Descriptive statistics provide simple summaries (what is or what the
data shows) about the sample and the measures.1044 After collecting the questionnaire
from the participants, the author organised the scores through descriptive statistics.
One of the most common procedures for organising a set of data is to place the score
in a frequency distribution.1045 This method allowed the author to see at a glance the
entire sets of scores and therefore patterns in the data sets have been seen easily.1046
This study has only nine variables, that is, a small number for quantitative data,
therefore simple statistical analysis —‘univariate statistical analysis’ (applying
frequency distribution) — was suitable for this study. More precisely, this statistical
analysis remains useful for describing the pattern of responses to discrete
questions.1047 The application of this simple statistics analysis of quantitative data
has also provided a significant social insight. In relation to question structure and
scale, multiple choice questions, Yes-No type of questions were posed to the
participants. Questionnaires were distributed to nine participants and all of them have
replied. A copy of the questionnaire has been attached as ‘Appendix D’. Frequency
distribution is depicted for this study using a table, and the table represents the
number of cases associated with each category. Frequency distributions also usually
reveal the percentage of answers found in each category. In other words, this method
provides information about the proportion of responses that fall into any one
category, thereby allowing us to see more precisely exactly what share of cases is
connected with different response options.1048 The tables which show the frequency
distributions referred to above accompany the relevant discussion issue by issue in
section 6.4 of Chapter 6. The tables mainly display frequency distributions in regard
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to the principal research questions on human rights and privacy issues, and show the
gap between developed and developing countries.
This quantitative data analysis (frequency distribution) obtained the same results as
the qualitative analysis which has been found utilising the GT, for the relevant
research area, that is, human rights and privacy violations, and also the gap between
the UK and Bangladeshi DNA facilities for their justice delivery systems. Data found
from the quantitative analysis actually help the author to draw an accurate conclusion
regarding the selected research questions of this thesis.
4.1.5

CONCLUSION

This chapter has described and justified the methodology used to test the research
questions and examine problem areas. The chapter also justified the reason for the
use of the socio-legal approach in this study. It further explained the reason for
applying a combined approach of qualitative (case study, interview) and quantitative
(face to face administered questionnaire) strategies to explore the objectives of this
research. The process of the development and validation of the application of these
methods and instruments was also provided. In order to answer research questions,
this study has chosen two case studies: one from the UK (NDNAD) and another is
from Bangladesh (NFDPL). These two case studies actually reveal the general trends
in both developed and developing countries when introducing and using a new
technology such as DNA profiling. It also helped to determine the scope of human
rights and privacy violations when such sensitive data is being collected, stored and
accessed. These case studies also revealed the gaps between developed and
developing countries. Though the problems and issues differ from country to
country, the results from these case studies at least help to get a basic idea about
some common problems which all developed and developing countries may face in
this situation.
Finally, it can be observed that case study 1 was mainly done based on the analysis
of legislative and literature, while case study 2 was conducted applying social
science research methods (quantitative and qualitative) to fill the gaps where archival
sources of information were found to be inadequate in addressing the research
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questions. The combination of the multi-disciplinary areas of study actually reduces
the basic weakness of applying single method. Also this inter-disciplinary research
approach needed to undertaken in order to cover some shortcoming the author’s
chosen area. An accurate conclusion has been drawn based on the outcomes of sociolegal approach.
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CHAPTER 5
5. 1 NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (NDNAD) OF THE UK: THE CASE
STUDY OF A DEVELOPED COUNTRY
5.1.1

INTRODUCTION

For a considerable period of time justice delivery systems across the world are
looking for various applications of science and technology to assist in detecting and
convicting criminals. It is undeniable that the ‘fight against crime’ — and ‘in
particular against organised crime and terrorism’ (one of the biggest challenges for
today’s world community) — ‘depends to a great extent on the use of modern
scientific techniques of investigation and identification’.1049 DNA technology and its
application in the forensic context are currently cited to support such a claim. The
use of this technology has marked ‘an epochal change in the dynamics of ... justice
systems throughout the world’.1050 Over the past few decades DNA profiling has
been increasingly used in forensic analysis, and is now a vital part of the case
investigation process. The introduction of DNA sample analysis to forensic
science1051 and the creation of DNA databases have brought with it an increased
scope and growing number of opportunities in the justice delivery system. For
instance, a forensic DNA database increases the possibilities of identifying a suspect
or the actual offender.1052
Very recently, continuous and successive series of technological improvements of
DNA profiling and also the innovative use of increasing quantities of DNA samples
and profiles for various civil (identifying disaster victims or missing persons) and
criminal investigative purposes have demanded the establishment and use of forensic
DNA databases. In order to meet this need, various developed and developing
countries around the world have already invested in creating, developing and
equipping their forensic laboratories and databases. The intention is to efficiently
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process and compare the DNA samples whenever necessary in order to maintain law
and order and to ensure justice.
This chapter examines the use of the National DNA Database (hereinafter referred to
as the NDNAD) in the United Kingdom (UK, that is England and Wales) — the first
case study of this research. At first it presents a general picture of the management
and use of forensic DNA databases in the context of developed countries. It mainly
examines the issues regarding human rights and the factors involved in genetic
privacy violations that may occur during this process in the context of a developed
country (that is, the UK). Section 5.1.4 highlights the constitutional history and
human rights situation in the UK; and then sub-section 5.1.5 presents the NDNAD
case study focusing on its background, nature, oversight, operation and management,
and use as well as its legislative framework. The subsequent section summarises the
NDNAD policies and operations regarding DNA sample collection, storage or
retention, access and use. Sub-section 5.1.5.9 outlines the advantages of the
NDNAD, while section 5.1.6 examines and analyses the challenges posed with
regards to the access and forensic use of the NDNAD, particularly in regard to
‘human rights and privacy violations’. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief
discussion of how to address those challenges.
5.1.2

FORENSIC USE OF DNA INFORMATION: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
CONTEXT

The establishment and maintenance of a forensic DNA laboratory or database
involves the collection and storage of samples from innocent individuals, victims,
suspects or offenders, their analysis and retention of samples while simultaneously
storing of the information derived from those samples in a numeric form on a
computerised database, sometimes together with other information about the
individuals concerned. The decision to undertake this exercise is highly influenced
by different factors, including projected outlays, anticipated benefits (often requiring
a detailed cost1053 and benefit1054 analysis, both in monetary and non-monetary
1053

‘Costs depend on a number of factors, such as methods and numbers of loci used for DNA
analysis, and types and numbers of samples that needs be analysed’: Committee on DNA Technology
in Forensic Science, above n 19, 117.
1054
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and success of finding matches at the time of investigation’: ibid.
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terms) and so on. Monetary factors or economic considerations (number of people,
categories of persons to be included, storage methods, number of samples and the
form in which they are preserved and many more issues) are some of the important
factors to be considered when establishing a DNA database.1055 Non-monetary costs
include the risk of loss of privacy as well as the misuse of genetic information.1056 By
contrast, both monetary and non-monetary benefits include the more timely, and
ultimately more cost-effective, detection of criminals and their conviction and the
prevention of future crimes, not simply due to the removal of guilty persons from the
streets but also due to the potential deterrence value of perceptions of an increased
risk of detection.1057 All these diverse elements cannot be weighed without
considering the societal values.1058 That means, before setting up a DNA laboratory
or database, several social, economic and political factors, as well as the legislative
frameworks need to be taken into consideration.1059 In addition, the attitude of
governments, political leaders, legislators and civil society is also an important factor
that cannot be ignored due to its significant impact on this process (that is, the
establishing and running of a forensic DNA database).
After considering all these above mentioned factors, many countries have established
forensic DNA laboratories and databases to facilitate forensic investigations. In this
regard, Kaye points out that ‘[a]s currently practiced in almost all jurisdictions, a
sample of blood, saliva, or other tissue or fluids is collected from a convicted
offender, a fraction is taken for analysis, and the remainder is preserved and
stored.’1060 Moreover, the 2008 INTERPOL survey report noted that DNA
technology has gained immense popularity worldwide, with about 56 countries from
different regions1061 having taken initiative for establishing forensic DNA databases,
the nature of which depends on their capabilities. However, at a national level the
projected benefits of DNA profiling have not materialised fully and equally in all
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countries.1062 The INTERPOL survey analysis also highlighted that the trend to
establish forensic DNA databases is greater in developed countries than in
developing countries.1063 In order to see the trends (that is, how far economic factors
and technological developments influence the size, quality of services (including
security mechanism and privacy protection), and to appreciate the nature of
challenges databases face, this study has undertaken two case studies: one (the UK,
here England and Wales) representing the developed countries, and the other
Bangladesh, representing the developing countries.
5.1.3

A CASE STUDY ON NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (NDNAD) OF THE
UK: A DEVELOPED COUNTRY

The UK NDNAD has been selected to represent the situation of a developed country
considering the following factors:
•

The recent judgment in the Marper case (2008) which has increased the
significance of analysing the UK NDNAD and its impact on human rights
and privacy.

•

The NDNAD is one of the successful databases of recent times. The findings
from this case study also used (together with those from the case study of the
Bangladesh National DNA Profiling Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the
NFDPL) to determine the gaps between developed and developing countries.
Of particular relevance is how far, and to what extent the databases differ. An
analysis of its successes and challenges can determine whether it is a good
model for other countries, especially for those in the developing world.

•

It is essential to note that a study with regards to the impact of forensic use of
DNA data and database in relation to human rights and privacy challenges
would not be complete if it is limited to an examination of the NDNAD only
and did not extend to an analysis of UK constitutional history and its human
rights situation (that is, the UK’s relevant historical, economic and social
factors). This is because the constitutional history and overall human rights
situation have a vital impact on and contribute to the county’s justice delivery
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system. Therefore, the next section of this chapter begins with a brief
overview of the legal and political background of the UK, and subsequently
describes and analyses the existing human rights situation of the UK.
5.1.4

ASSESSMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE STUDY ON THE
NDNAD

For the purpose of this research, nature of the case study is not similar to general type
of case studies. Though this is a socio-legal research, some of the key discussions are
focused on legal issues. Therefore analysis of various national and international
instruments, legislations and case laws form significant part of this research.
Moreover there are instances ‘where case studies focus on examples of research uses
data that were originally collected for another purpose (secondary use of data)’.1064 In
that case, case study was conducted based on secondary literature.1065 Such existing
data are often found to be extremely useful for identifying and understanding the
research questions, as well as for suggesting potential solutions’.1066
As a result, the first case study (the NDNAD, UK) mainly relies on existing UK
legislations, case laws, relevant government documents and other archival sources of
information including books, journal articles, websites and the like. Collected
information was up-to-date and adequate enough to determine the current status and
trend of the UK’s NDNAD.
5.1.5

A BRIEF IDEA ABOUT THE UK AND ITS HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION

5.1.5.1 The Legal and Political History
The UK is composed of Great Britain (England and Wales,1067 Scotland)1068 and
Northern Ireland,1069 all of which in a cultural sense are separate nations. The UK
1064

Canadian Institute of Health Research, above n 891.
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), Social Enterprise Development: Bangladesh Case Studies
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1068
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was established in 1801 with the union of Great Britain and Ireland, but only
achieved its present form in 1922 with the partition of Ireland,1070 hence its official
name the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’. The UK is a nonfederal state and a Constitutional monarchy.1071 However, the monarch (currently
Queen Elizabeth II) is politically impartial and has limited powers.1072 The power of
the monarch is, therefore, largely ceremonial and are exercised on the advice her
ministers.1073 All important formal powers are exercised by the Prime Minister, the
Cabinet and other ministers, who are accountable to the UK Parliament.1074
Parliament is, therefore, supreme, and under the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty1075 or supremacy (which is central to the UK Constitution),1076 no court
or other body in England and Wales can question the legitimacy of laws made by the
Parliament.1077 Under the British Constitution (which is not written and consists
partly of statutes and partly of common law and practices),1078 parliament exercises
legislative (that is, law-making) power.1079 ‘Much of the relationship between the
Sovereign and Parliament is conventional rather than statutory’.1080
The legislature of the UK is known as the Houses of Parliament and consists of two
houses: House of Commons and the House of Lords (the lower and upper houses,
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respectively, of this bicameral system).1081 There are two main forms of primary
legislation: Public General Acts and Local and Personal Acts. Statutory Instruments
(SIs) are regulations made under the authority of an Act of Parliament, are delegated
legislation.1082 Government functions are subdivided into municipalities, counties
and parliamentary constituencies.1083 Local authorities within the UK provide
services, and exercise some governmental functions within local areas and have a
certain degree of legal freedom and political independence. However, local
authorities obtain all their powers from Parliament and Parliament can legislate on
any subject for the whole nation.1084
The UK legal system is based on English common law principles. Since 1189,
English law has been described as a common law rather than a civil law system. The
common law is based on customs and traditions,1085 and the main feature of English
common law is that the case law is developed by judges in court (in the creation of
precedents)1086 as they make decisions in regard to particular sets of facts in cases
brought before them and in regard to applying statutes (and common sense) to cases
before them. Legislation can be amended or repealed by Parliament.
5.1.5.2 Human Rights Situation in the UK
The human rights situation of any particular country depends on many factors, such
as, the historical and legal background, political, socio-economic system, structure as
well as form of government, and what kind of state system they have, their beliefs,
state mechanism, population density, foreign policy, the country’s various capacities
as well as types of problems it faces. Consequently, which human rights and to what
extent the general people will enjoy them depends on many of these factors.
The Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right (1628) and the Bill of Rights Act
(1689) are three landmark English legal charters protecting the rights of individuals
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and civil rights.1087 These greatest Charters had also a huge influence on the
developing English common law and legal system.1088 In far more recent times, the
UK is one of the founder members of the UDHR1089 and it also joined the European
Economic Community (now the European Union) in 1973,1090 and, as a signatory to
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1091 is bound by this regional
human rights agreement.1092 This Convention enshrines fundamental civil and
political rights. Accordingly, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR are
incorporated into UK law in the Human Rights Act (HRA)1093 of 1998. This allows
for the provisions of the Convention to be applied directly by the UK courts.1094 The
HRA is about giving further effect to rights contained within the ECHR.1095 The Act
has been very widely publicised, and public authorities1096 are legally obliged to
respect fundamental human rights in the UK. Like the ECHR, this Act aims to ensure
everyone’s rights are properly respected.1097 It also ‘gives people a clear legal
statement of their basic rights and fundamental freedoms’.1098 This means giving
proper value to human rights is an important issue in the UK.
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The political and economic history of the UK reveals that the country has never been
ruled by any other country or it was never been a colony of another country.1099 By
contrast, it was itself a colonial power. During the 19th century, the British Empire
covered one-fourth of the world’s surface. The first half of the 20th century mainly
saw the UK’s strength seriously depleted in two world wars, and the latter half
‘witnessed the dismantling of the Empire and the UK rebuilding itself into a modern
and prosperous European nation’.1100 British Imperialism in Asia (particularly in the
Indian sub-continent) traces its roots back to the early 17th century.1101 Using as its
protection the UK’s dominant merchant navy and agreements with successive
governments in Britain and sometimes local princes in India, the British East India
Company (an early joint stock company) established itself first as trading body and
later as the most important political force in this region.1102 The subsequent
imposition of Imperial British rule replaced this de facto colonial (but still essentially
merchant) power — though one which even had its own troops to defend its interests
and in several locations its own coinage and that had lasted almost a century — with
a governmental one. In this regard ‘nineteenth-century formalisation of the British
Empire in Southeast Asia’ is rightly addressed as ‘British Imperialism’ by Kenneth R
Hall.1103 The East India Company had essentially colonised the Indian and South
East Asian region, governmental colonial rule was to follow.1104 In terms of socioeconomic conditions, the UK is a leading trading power, which has successfully
transformed itself into a global financial centre. It is currently the third largest in
Europe1105 and sixth-largest economy in the world.1106 Its position as a colonial
power faded rapidly in the 20th century (with India, for example, becoming
independent in 1947) but its legacy endures in its former colonies, which often have
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retained its common law system and, at least in some instances, an attachment to
parliamentary democracy.1107
The concept of democracy developed in the UK,1108 evolving its institutions into a
vestigial constitutional monarchy and a lively parliamentary system, a largely secular
state (despite having an established church), and a system that embodies the
separation of the three key powers – the legislature, the judiciary and the executive.
The notion of human rights has progressed in the UK in a different way when
compared to the countries that were ruled or were colonies of other countries. The
adoption and implementation of the HRA leads people to have more confidence in
key state bodies, encouraging more openness and participation in the democracy.
Basic human rights values enshrined in the HRA also help to promote a greater unity
and fairness in the UK society. Starting from Magna Carta, the UK society has
centuries old pro-human rights movements. Pro-human rights movements always
benefited the UK society constructively and this also includes in regards to the
protection of privacy and genetic privacy.
The enjoyment of centuries old principles of human rights principles, values that
embrace such rights, and the presence of activities related to various progressive civil
liberties make the people of the UK more aware of their human rights and privacy
violations in comparison to people in many other countries. One glorious example is
the S v Marper case where, since the UK is a member nation of the EU, an appeal
was able to be made to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which the
appellants in this case did1109 It is also appropriate to articulate that even after the
judgment in Marper case by the ECtHR (where the Court declared the retention of
DNA samples and information derived from them in the case of persons not
convicted of any crime a breach of the right to privacy), the current rule and practice
with regards to the use of DNA data by UK government is not undisputed. The
examination undertaken and the analysis conducted in the following case study of the
UK NDNAD will attempt to determine how far human rights and privacy are
1107
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protected in UK jurisdiction while using DNA data in its justice delivery system. It
will also draw on if there is any gap between NDNAD and NFDPL (that is, DNA
service system of both developed and developing countries).
5.1.6

NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (NDNAD)

One of the main features of the UK legal system (which is based on the adversarial
principle) is to convict persons of a criminal offence only when there is sufficient
evidence to reach the conclusion that a suspect is guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
Forensic science has played a key role in many trials, and DNA profiling is currently
considered the most important advance in the area. The investigation techniques (that
is, DNA profiling) adopted by modern forensic science ‘have had a profound
effect’1110 in resolving many legal cases in the UK jurisdiction. Covering England
and Wales, the NDNAD was launched on 10 April 1995 at the Forensic Science
Service (FSS) laboratory in Birmingham and ‘is the oldest and largest national DNA
intelligence database’.1111 It soon became an internationally accepted database and
nowadays its use regarded by police and forensic science personnel as ‘almost
commonplace’.1112
Williams and Johnson have argued that ‘the establishment and use of the NDNAD is
a realization of a scientific potential developed in accordance with specific state
interests’ of the UK and because of that interest, ‘has prospered and grown’.1113
Because of its successful use of DNA technology, the UK is regarded as the ‘world
leader’ in forensic DNA databasing.1114 Citing the successful experience of the UK
in April 2005, the Garda (Republic of Ireland Police) Commissioner, Noel Conroy,
claimed that ‘UK NDNAD had resulted in a 5% reduction in crime and a 50%
increase in detections’.1115 A large number of samples are constantly being added to
the NDNAD (sometimes more than 2000 samples in a week), and as a result, the
number of people whose information is stored or retained on this database is
1110
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increasing enormously.1116 Sarah Lipscombe also addressed the NDNAD as ‘the
world leader’ for being the largest DNA database1117 throughout the world.
Following the success of the UK database some developed countries have
implemented their own national DNA databases and along similar lines. These
include, for instance, New Zealand, some European countries, the USA and
Canada.1118 In 1996, New Zealand, a ‘geographically small and isolated nation with a
modest population size of less than four million’,1119 was second only to the UK in
legislating to establish a national DNA database.1120 Australia and South Africa are
among other nations also developing their own DNA databases.1121
Before analysing the potentials and pitfalls of the NDNAD, it is important to
examine its historical background, nature and composition. The following section
will concentrate on this point.
5.1.6.1 Background of the NDNAD
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of high-profile miscarriages of justice
happened in the UK. These included the Guildford Four, the Maguires, the
Tottenham Three, the Cardiff Three, the Taylor Sisters and over a dozen cases,
which is handled by the currently divided West Midlands Serious Crime Squad.1122
On 14 March 1991 and after more than sixteen years of what the Court of Appeal
had determined was wrongful imprisonment the Irishmen known as the Birmingham
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Six had their convictions quashed by the Court of Appeal.1123 On the day of their
release, the then Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker announced the Royal Commission
on Criminal Justice (also known as the ‘Runciman Commission’ after its chair,
Viscount Runciman) in March 1991.1124 The Commission can therefore be said to
have been established in response to an erosion of public confidence in the UK
criminal justice system. The Runciman Commission emphasised that:
The widely publicised miscarriages of justice which have occurred in recent
years have created a need to restore public confidence in the criminal justice
system.1125

Further, in their 1993 Report the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
recommended that:
[T]here should be clear legislative provision for the more extensive storage of
DNA samples or data both for the purpose of identifying offenders and for the
purpose of keeping a frequency database overseen by an independent body.1126

In response to the commission’s recommendation, the then Home Secretary, Michael
Howard, made an announcement and commissioned the FSS and the Metropolitan
Police Forensic Science Laboratory in 1994 to conduct a pilot study to assess the
potential of DNA technology and a DNA database.1127 Based on the outcome of this
study, the Home Office decided to form a national forensic DNA database and the
NDNAD was established in April 1995 in the UK jurisdiction for solving crime and
exonerating the innocent.1128 The UK government has provided constant financial
and legislative support since the establishment of the NDNAD.1129 As part of this
process, in 1994 the government enacted the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
19941130 (herein after referred to as the CJPOA) amending the Police and Criminal
1123
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Evidence Act 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the PACE Act) and for the first time the
said Act provided some rules in regard to the expansion of police powers regarding
DNA sample collection, particularly that from non-intimate samples (that is mouth
swabs, saliva and hair samples). There was no mention about the establishment of the
NDNAD in the CJPOA. At the same time, the Home Office issued a Circular — the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act) 16/95 on the NDNAD,1131 which provided
guidelines for the establishment, operation and use of this database.1132 The
establishment of the database is based on DNA profiles obtained from non-intimate
samples (mouth swabs or buccal scrapes and hair samples) under the PACE Act as
amended by the CJPOA and also from profiles obtained from biological material
recovered from scenes of crime.1133
When investigating serious crimes, up until 1984 the police were allowed to ask
doctors to obtain a blood sample for DNA testing with the consent of volunteers.
DNA profiling has been in use in the UK since 1985. However, forensic DNA
technology was comparatively limited in its use at that time.1134 Until the
introduction of the augmented technologies (such as the analysis of polymorphic
short tandem repeats1135) which is an adequately sensitive and rigorous system, the
actual benefit of the formation of efficient and effective DNA databases could not be
realised.1136 Due to the establishment of NDNAD, it is now recognised that DNA
databases have the potential to provide the criminal justice systems with an efficient
way to combat crimes.
1131
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5.1.6.2 Nature and Composition
At its inception in 1995, the NDNAD was initially used to store the profiles of
convicted criminals only; but the Criminal Justice and Police Act 20011137 and the
Criminal Justice Act 20031138 have empowered the UK police to collect and retain
DNA samples from those who have been arrested on suspicion for committing a
recordable offence. Under the new rules, samples could now be stored even if those
arrested person later acquitted of the charge. The changes in legislation led to a rapid
expansion of the NDNAD.1139 The forensic science service (FSS), which is the main
forensic science services provider in the UK, contributed enormously to the
formation of the NDNAD.1140 In March 2004, the FSS reported that the database
contained DNA profiles from around 2.1 million individuals and 2 15 000 crime
scenes.1141 By 2009, it contained more than 4.5 million records, representing 7.5 per
cent of the UK population.1142 The Chief Constable, Peter Neyroud, emphasised the
significance of the database thus:
The Database has revolutionised the way the police work to protect the public.
It provides forces with more than 3,500 matches each month, including some of
the most serious crimes. The majority of the active criminal population now has
its DNA recorded and police forces use DNA profiles to solve thousands of
cases every year.1143

According to the 2006–07 National DNA Database Annual Report, the use of the
NDNAD had resulted in ‘more than 41,000 matches to DNA samples taken from
crime scenes and had helped to solve some of the most serious crimes’.1144
According to the National DNA Database Annual Report of 2007–09, the NDNAD
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had rapidly become the largest forensic DNA database in the world, containing just
over 5.6 million people’s DNA profiles.1145 The INTERPOL 2008 global survey
analysis and results highlighted that ‘NDNAD is six times larger than the second
largest database (ie France) in this region and the database size is 2.3 times greater
than the other European member countries’.1146 All these statistical data show that
the NDNAD of the UK is the most extensive database in the world on a per capita
basis. Such a database is also considered to be a step forward in the fight against
crime.
The NDNAD system provides the UK crime suppression authority with a broad
range of options for the collection and use of different types of DNA samples and a
wide scope in terms of the persons from whom DNA can be collected. The
availability of a number of options can lead to a refining in the organisation of the
database. While the database has become a useful tool in criminal case investigation,
helping to resolve cases by detecting genuine offenders, the data also suggests that
the operation and management of the biggest DNA database needs proper
management and good organisation. The operation, management and ethical
oversight of the NDNAD are discussed below.
5.1.6.3 Governance, Management and Oversight
(a) Governance and Management
The overarching authority for management of the NDNAD is the National DNA
Database Strategy Board (NDNADSB). At present, the core of the governance
structure is based on tripartite arrangements — the Association of Chief Police
Officers (ACPO), the Association of Police Authorities (APA), and the Home Office
(HO) / National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) (as Custodian) (see Figure
10).1147 Each of these will be examined in turn.
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Figure 9: Governance, Management and Oversight of NDNAD
National DNA Database Strategy Board (NDNADSB)
The Crime and Security Act 2010 provides the legal basis of the NDNADSB. This
Act places the responsibility of publishing the guidance rules for the NDNADSB on
the Secretary of State,1148 who also has to make the necessary arrangements for the
Board to oversee the operation of the NDNAD.1149 Moreover the NDNADSB is
made accountable, by having to submit an annual report to the Secretary of State on
its functions.1150 The said Act also provides power to the Board regarding the
immediate destruction of DNA samples and DNA profiles (which are retained under
the PACE Act) through the issuing of guidance documents in accordance with which
the chief officer of a police force in England and Wales must act.1151 However, these
provisions have yet to be brought into effect.1152 In regards to the NDNADSB, the
Protection of Freedoms Bill 2011 recently proposed similar provisions to those of the
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Crime and Security Act 2010, through the amendments of the PACE Act (that is, by
inserting a new s 63AB in the PACE Act).1153
The three major parties of the NDNADSB are (See Figure 10):

Figure 10: Tripartite Arrangements of the NDNADSB
(a) Association of Police Authorities (APA): It ‘represents police authorities
across England and Wales’.1154
(b) Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPA): It ‘is a private limited company
that leads the development of policing best practice in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland’.1155
(c) Custodian (HO / NPIA): In order to set standards for procedures and profiling
of the NDNAD, as well as for approving and monitoring the laboratory that
supplies DNA services, there is an NDNAD ‘custodian’. The role was
initially performed by the FSS, that is, from 1995 to 2005, then, as an interim
measure, the role was transferred to the HO. Finally (after its commencement
in April 2007), the NPIA took over custodianship of the NDNAD.1156 The
NPIA is responsible for running and maintaining the database operations, as
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well as ensuring the NDNAD data integrity.1157 The NPIA therefore performs
several roles as the Custodian:
(i) It is responsible for overseeing the NDNAD services, and for accrediting
all the scientific laboratories that analyse DNA samples, and monitoring
the contract for the operation and maintenance of the database.1158
(ii) It ‘plays a key role in ensuring the ongoing quality and integrity of the
information held in the database’,1159 as it is important to ensure that the
DNA information (which is stored on police information systems) is
managed carefully and responsibly within agreed guidelines in order to
maintain public trust and confidence.
The NPIA performs all its roles and responsibilities under the set rules of
‘accountability and supervision’ provided by s 28 of the Police and Justice
Act 2006.1160 The Secretary of State may require Her Majesty’s Chief
Inspector of Constabulary to inspect, and report on, the efficiency and
effectiveness of the agency.1161 The NPIA also operates under the Data
Protection Act 1998 and Freedom of Information Act 2000.1162
In addition, membership of the NDNADSB has further been extended to include the
Forensic Science Regulator (FSR), NDNAD Ethics Group, Human Genetics
Commission (HGC) and the Information Commissioner Office (ICO) as
observers.1163 Their roles are as follows:
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Forensic Science Regulator (FSR): an important criterion of forensic science services
is high standards. In order to maintain such standards, the post of Forensic Science
Regulator (FSR) was created following the 2005 recommendations of the Science
and Technology Committee.1164 The FSR ‘is a public appointee whose function is to
ensure that the provision of forensic science services across the criminal justice
system is subject to an appropriate regime of scientific quality standards’.1165 The
FSR is ‘to provide independent advice on quality standards to the government and
the criminal justice system’.1166 Such kind of independence allows the regulator take
unbiased decisions.1167
Human Genetic Commission (HGC): This a government advisory body that focuses
on the social, ethical and legal issues with regards to developments in human
genetics and their impact on human life. The Commission is accountable to Home
Office Ministers.1168
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO): ICO is the UK’s independent authority
created to uphold information rights in the public interest, promote openness by
public bodies and data privacy for individuals. It attends the board as an independent
observer.1169 Moreover the security arrangements associated with the NDNAD are
overseen by the NDNADSB, as well as by the ICO.1170
NDNAD Ethics Group: The ethical oversight role of the National DNA Database
Ethics Group will be discussed in detail in the following section.

(b) Ethical Oversight
NDNAD Ethics Group
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Following a strong recommendation from the report of the HGC as well as from the
Select Committees on Science and Technology from both of the Houses of
Parliament,1171 the NDNAD Ethics Group was established in 2007.1172 Critics of the
lack of independent ethical oversight for the NDNAD also urged the establishment of
such an ethics group.1173 In 2007, members to the independent NDNAD Ethics
Group were appointed1174 and in the same year the ethics group held its inaugural
meeting.1175
At present the NDNAD Ethics Group is an advisory non-departmental public body of
the HO.1176 Its main vision is:
[T]o ensure that all decisions relating to the forensic use of DNA (obtaining,
storage, retrieval) are considered in the light of ethical and human rights
principles, and that individuals may only have their DNA taken for lawful
forensic purposes and at all times be treated fairly and with dignity and
respect.1177

The Ethics Group has the responsibility of providing Ministers with independent
ethical advice on the operation and practice of the NDNAD.1178
5.1.6.4 Forensic Science Service – Changing Role
The FSS is the leading forensic service provider in the UK with a role of analysing
and interpreting evidence from the crime scene. It has been at the forefront of
developing technology for DNA profiling since 1987.1179 Later it became the
executive agency of UK HO in 1991.1180 Finally it achieved a ‘scientific
breakthrough’ through the invention of chemical which enables DNA profiling in
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1995. This led directly to the establishment of the NDNAD.1181 Initially, FSS was the
sole supplier of DNA profiles for this database.1182 During 1995–2005, as outlined
above, it performed the role of Custodian for the NDNAD,1183 which role was then
transferred to the HO in 2005 and then to the NPIA, following its launch in 2007.1184
To increase its financial flexibility, the FSS was granted trading fund status in
1999.1185 This necessitated the ‘custodian’ role transfer as it was essential to retain
the oversight and management of the NDNAD within a public sector
environment.1186 The change appears destined to be short-lived, as this agency (the
NPIA) is to be ‘dissolved’ and its responsibilities dispersed as part of the massive
overhaul of UK policing decided upon by the government.1187
Subsequently, in December 2005, the FSS became FSS Ltd — a market leading
government-owned, contractor-operated (GovCo) company, a step towards ‘PublicPrivate Partnership’ (PPP). It thereby changed its status from trading fund to GovCo
Company. Then (as part of the realignment of UK policing and forensic services
alluded to above in regard to the NPIA), on 14 December 2010, the Government
announced the closure of the FSS, stating:
We have [...] decided to support the wind-down of FSS, transferring or selling
off as much of its operations as possible. [...] our firm ambition is that there will
be no continuing state interest in a forensics provider by March 2012.1188

However, critics raise serious concerns saying that a plan to close down the ‘provider
of scientific expertise [FSS] to police amounts to a risky, nationwide experiment with
the criminal justice system’.1189
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(c) Evaluation
There is good governance and management in the NDNAD. In this regard the Chair
of the Board, Gary Pugh, commented that ‘National DNA Database has the most
open and broad governance of any police database’.1190 Moreover he emphasised ‘the
importance of widening the membership of the database to provide a more
collaborative approach in the oversight and its direction’.1191 Nevertheless, despite its
reported good governance and oversight, there remain some concerns in this area.
The MPA Civil Liberties Panel noted that:
Although the Strategy Board Chair had already widened the governance
structure, we remain concerned about how independent this structure is and how
robustly it was representative of the public and reflected their concerns.1192

Moreover, the FSR, the Ethics Group and the HGC have expressed their views that
in order to increase public confidence and cooperation, more open and independent
oversight structures are required to be put in place. Furthermore, a desire was also
expressed with regards to regular publication of data reviews, an independent appeals
process for applications those who want to be removed their subject profiles and an
enhanced role for the Ethics Group.1193
Finally, it is argued that even with this robust governance and oversight system, there
remain some concerns with regards to openness, transparency and accountability
which are necessary to maintain the public confidence in the NDNAD. Analysing the
provisions of the proposed Freedom of Information Bill, it can also be argued that the
NDNADSB should report to the parliament not the Secretary of State. Moreover,
there should be some public representation on the NDNADSB.
There are also concerns that the winding up of the FSS might put at risk the forensic
services to the database.
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5.1.6.5 Technology in Use
DNA profiling processes are ‘constantly changing due to the enhancements of
methods and technology’.1194 The FSS has been a pioneer in the development of
modern, sensitive and rapid DNA data analysis, recording and matching systems for
the NDNAD. Several new and refined techniques for DNA profiling have been
invented since the inception of the NDNAD (and are summarised below).

(a) Multi-Locus Probe (MLP)
‘Multi-Locus Probe’ (MLP) was the first technique introduced and used by the FSS
for DNA profiling in 1987.1195 Sir Alec Jeffreys was the inventor of the MLP
technique and this technique relies on non-coding DNA called ‘Variable Number of
Tandem Repeats’(VNTRs) and is also known as ‘Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism’(RFLP).1196 MLP, which is known as ‘DNA fingerprinting’, is
defined by Joblings and Gill as:
[H]ypervariable loci known as mini-satellites ... were detected by hybridization
of probes to Southern blots of restriction-enzyme-digested genomic DNA.
Shared ‘core sequences’ between different minisatellite loci allowed probes to
detect many independent mini-satellites simultaneously, yielding the hypervariable multi-band patterns ...1197

Foreman et al noted that the ‘MLPs were compared visually, rather than relying on
any agreed statistical methods’ but that the process had a ‘significant disadvantage’
namely that ‘relatively large DNA samples were required to give a reliable
result’.1198

(b) Single Locus Probe (SLP)
In 1990s when there was an awareness of the limitations of the MLP technique, the
FSS and the Metropolitan Police Laboratory developed ‘Single Locus Probe’ (SLP)
and at that time it ‘was considered more suitable for forensic work.’1199 This is
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another form of RFLP.1200 The SLP is preferred because it is easier to interpret and
capable of being used to analyse mixed DNA samples. DNA analysis results could
be generated even from degraded DNA. As a result during that time (that is, 1988–
1990) the main focus of DNA profiling in the UK was the SLP testing.

(c) Second General Multiplex (SGM)
Following the year 1994, more and more cases were subjected to DNA testing and
that required even more advanced techniques than that of the SLP. The DNA
profiling techniques therefore further progressed and were refined through the
development of the Short Tandem Repeats (STRs) technique1201 as well as by the
advent of the ‘Polymerase Chain Reaction’ (PCR) technique.1202 The PCR technique
basically ‘enables STRs typing to be performed’.1203 ‘The first STRs technique that
was introduced at the FSS was the ‘quadruplex’ (quad). ‘Quad’ looks at ‘four STRs
sequence’ or loci and at that time it was used in routine casework throughout the
UK.1204
The STR-PCR technique offered some clear advantages over the SLP system, such
as DNA could be analysed using comparatively small STR loci, and a result could be
obtained even when the DNA is highly degraded. A study by Gill ‘demonstrated that
STRs could be reliably analysed from 70 year-old bones’.1205 Consequently, from
1995 to 1999, the standard profiling system that was introduced for the NDNAD was
the ‘Second Generation Multiplex (SGM)’1206 It was the original DNA profiling
system used for this database upon its introduction in 1995.1207 This technique
‘allows the simultaneous analysis of 6 non-coding STRs regions of DNA (ie 12
markers or alleles)’.1208 A gender marker was also examined.1209 Finally it produced
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a DNA profile with an average discrimination power of 1 in 50 million.1210 That
means in this technique the probability of matching of two unrelated persons is 1 in
50 million.1211 In SGM method there is a mixture of complex as well as simple STRs.

(d) SGM Plus (SGM+)
As the size of the database increases, improve techniques with more accurate
matching of profiles were introduced by the FSS than the use of the SGM
method.1212 In this regards, L A Foreman et al argued that:
As the STR profiling systems evolved, improvements were also seen in terms of
increasing forensic discriminating power; each new system would consider a
greater number of loci than the previous one.1213

In 1999, the SGM method was upgraded and replaced by SGM Plus (SGM+) to
reduce the chance of an ‘adventitious match’1214 as the size of the database
increased.1215 From 1999 onwards, this has been the DNA profiling technique used
for the NDNAD. This method is compatible with SGM, but more discriminating. In
the SGM+ analysis of 8 additional STR markers or alleles from 4 non-coding STR
regions1216 are conducted together with existing SGM (which consists of the 6
regions or loci, that is 12 markers or alleles), plus the amelogenin sex test.1217 Ten
different STRs markers or areas of DNA (that is, consisting of all six SGM loci plus
a further four STR loci) and a gender test1218 are examined in the SGM+ method.
This analysis produces 20 bits of information (using two-digit numbers). It consists
of 20 two-digit numbers because each person has two copies of each marker, one
inherited from each parent, and a sex indicator.1219 An example of an SGM+ profile
1210
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1213
Foreman, above n 274, 478.
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Lynch argued that ‘an adventitious match is a chance match between the profiles of two different
people and it gives a false positive result’, Lynch, above n 261, 145.
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Ibid 144–5.
1216
Foreman and Evett identified, ‘four STR loci, D16S539 (D16), D2S1338 (D2), D3S1358 (D3) and
D19S433 (D19)’, L A Foreman and I W Evett, 'Statistical Analyses to Support Forensic Interpretation
for a New Ten-Locus STR Profiling System' (2001) 114 International Journal of Legal Medicine 147,
147.
1217
Ibid.
1218
Foreman and Evett also highlighted that, ‘the Gender marker the Amelogenin (Amelo) is used for
the sex-indicating test’: ibid; Lipscombe, above n 1117, 5.
1219
Nuffield Council on Bioehtics, What is Bioinformation? (31 October 2011)
<http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/bioinformation/bioinformation-what-bioinformation>; see also
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would be ‘15, 18; 6, 9; 11, 13; 22, 22; 31, 32.2; 14, 17; 17, 20; 11, 12; 13, 16.3; 15,
16; X, Y’.1220
Since a DNA profile consists of 20 numbers and a gender indicator in this technique,
the chance of matching of DNA profiles of two unrelated individuals is on average
less than one in a billion.1221 Moreover, the use of a greater number of STRs
increases the discriminatory power of the test, reducing the number of ‘false’
matches.1222 People may have the same number of repeats at anyone STR marker, but
it is the information from all ten markers that gives each person their individual
profile.1223
The process of DNA profiling is changing gradually with the advance of techniques
and systems. Some new developments include, pendulum list searching (PLS) and
DNA-boost, low copy number (LCN) and single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)
techniques. Among these, PLS and DNA-boost have been developed for mixture
analysis. Low copy number (LCN) is extremely sensitive and enables DNA analysis
to obtain a DNA profile from a sample that contains only a few cells.1224
Furthermore, SNPs may be the future of DNA profiling because this method is more
efficient than STRs.1225
Though operational aspects of the NDNAD are well managed, the current legislative
scenario and practice of the UK police resulted in a number of ethical controversies,
such as those in regard to human rights and privacy violations. Moreover, the rules
regarding DNA sample collection, analysis and retention as well as the destruction of
DNA from NDNAD are covered by the UK legislation have also been subject to
criticism. In order to address these issues, the legislative development of the UK
governing all these processes (including the governance of the NDNAD) has
undergone constant change. The following section will analyse legislative
Nuffield Council on Bioehtics, Teaching Resource: The Forensic Use of Bioinformation, DNA and
Fingerprint (31 October 2011) <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/education/education-teachingresource-forensic-use-bioinformation>.
1220
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1221
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1222
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1223
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1224
Foreman, above n 274, 479.
1225
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developments or changes related to the relevant legislation with a view to
establishing whether there is any provisions that pose a risk in regard to individual
privacy.
5.1.6.6 The NDNAD Governance Regulation or Legislative Framework
As indicated earlier, the Runciman Commission made a series of recommendations
in 1993 regarding the extensive use of human DNA data. All these recommendations
were subsequently translated into legislation — the CJPOA. The Commission
therefore provided the legislative foundation for the establishment of the NDNAD. In
the same year, similar to this commission, the House of Lords Select Committee on
Science and Technology urged clear and consistent legislative provisions for the
collection, use and retention of DNA samples by the police, and its admissibility as
evidence in criminal prosecution.1226 The Committee also argued for consistent
legislative provision to support the forensic use of DNA.1227 Consequently, the UK
government has fulfilled its promise of establishing the NDNAD by making
available constant financial support and enacting pieces of legislation.1228 These Acts
of Parliament are the foundation for the NDNAD and they have provided extensive
powers for the police force to use the DNA technology during criminal case
investigation.1229 In terms of funding, recent cutbacks to the budget provision for
policing have led to a greater reliance on ‘user pays’ and a move to streamline the
force and its operations, including the eventual outsourcing of forensic services.1230
In regards to police powers and the use of DNA technology, there has been a series
of legislation from 1993 until the present. The first was the PACE Act.

(a) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)
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This Act governs the major part of police powers of investigation, including arrest,
detention, interrogation, entry and search of premises, personal search and the taking
of samples.1231 The PACE Act fulfilled the need to provide for the extensive forensic
use of DNA information in the criminal investigation. This Act also lay the grounds
for the collection of DNA samples and or profiles, as well as retention of such data
on the NDNAD. It permitted the expansion of police power of taking DNA samples
without consent, and retaining such samples as well as profiles indefinitely. A
number of features of this Act came in for criticism:
•

power of police to obtain a DNA sample without consent from those arrested
for a recordable offence;

•

indefinite retention of all samples and profiles placed on the NDNAD;

•

inclusion of minors on this database under these powers;

•

indefinite retention of volunteer samples;

•

use of DNA samples on the database ‘for research purposes.1232

A number of amendments have subsequently been made to the PACE Act in relation
to the criteria for obtaining (and the methods used) DNA samples and profiles as
well as for their use and retention. The following discussion briefly outlines the
recent legal changes in regard to ‘the way the police can collect, retain and use DNA
samples’:1233

(b) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA)
The CJPOA1234 can be identified as a direct legislative measure enabling both the
establishment of the NDNAD and the facilitation of its immediate growth. The
fundamental and most far reaching aspect of this legislation was the creation of a
new framework for DNA sample collection (which is essential for DNA profiling)
for the police administration. Part IV of the CJPOA has amended various sections1235
of the PACE Act to broaden the powers of police to collect DNA samples. DNA
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sample collection on routine basis was therefore encouraged under this law. The
following areas of the PACE Act have been amended by the CJPOA:
(i) Amendment to the Types of Offence
This amendment changed the type of offence. While originally under the PACE
Act1236 an intimate sample may be taken for the ‘serious arrestable offence’, the
CJPOA1237 amended this provision and changed the type of offence that qualified the
taking of such a sample. Under this amendment an intimate sample may be taken for
‘recordable offence’.1238
(ii) Intimate and Non-Intimate Samples
The CJPOA has amended the definition and lists of intimate1239 and non-intimate
samples.1240 This amendment has included ‘dental impression’ as ‘intimate samples’,
and ‘saliva’ samples as well as ‘mouth-swabs’ as non-intimate samples.1241
(iii) Rules regarding Collection of Intimate Samples
Under this amendment:
•

An intimate sample could be taken from an individual in police detention
with the individual’s written consent, with such collection able to be
authorised by a police officer of the rank of inspector.1242
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CJPOA ss 54 and 55.
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2000/1139) (as amended time to time); s 27(4) of the PACE Act, as amended by [61] of sch 8 to the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (‘CDA’), allows the Secretary of State to designate recordable offences,
for further details see National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations (SI 2000/1139),
preamble and reg 3.
1239
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•

While obtaining the sample, the police officer must have reasonable grounds
to believe that the individual has been involved in a recordable offence and
taking that sample can confirm or disprove his or her involvement.1243

•

If the authorisation is given by the police officer, the individual must be
informed of the grounds for the authorisation.1244

•

In the instance of the intimate sample being a dental impression, the sample
needs to be taken only by a registered dentist. Other intimate samples (other
than a sample of urine) could be taken by a registered medical practitioner or
a registered health care professional.1245

•

An intimate sample can also be taken from an individual who is not in police
detention, if two or more non-intimate samples have already been taken but
these were proved insufficient.1246

•

In case of intimate samples, an individual can decide not to consent ‘with due
cause’ and this will be respected. However, if an individual refuses to give
consent and such a refusal is deemed by police to be ‘without due cause’, the
police must warn the individual that the refusal will be taken into account if
the case goes to trial.1247

(iv) Power of Police Regarding Collection of Non-Intimate Samples
The CJPOA also changed the circumstances in which a non-intimate sample could be
taken from individuals without appropriate consent:
•

if he has been charged with a recordable offence, or he has been informed
that he will be reported for such an offence; and

•

if he has not had a non-intimate sample taken from him in the course of the
investigation of the offence by the police; or

•

if he has had a non-intimate sample taken from him, but either it was not
suitable for analysis or, though so suitable, the sample proved insufficient.1248

(v) Retention of Samples
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Originally, under s 64 of the PACE Act DNA samples had to be destroyed if a person
was not charged or was acquitted. However this section has been amended by the s
57 of the CJPOA and sub-s (3A) of s 64 provides that samples need not be destroyed
if samples ‘were taken for the purposes of the investigation of an offence of which a
person has been convicted.1249 As a result, the samples taken can be kept indefinitely.
(vi) Evaluation
Both intimate and non-intimate samples are useful for DNA extraction. The
safeguards for collecting an intimate sample from an individual are greater than for
the non-intimate samples because in case of an intimate sample, appropriate consent
is required to obtain that sample from the individual.1250 Currently non-intimate
samples are most routinely sought by the police, because non-intimate samples can
lawfully be taken from any person without consent, and also because the powers to
take non-intimate samples have been significantly expanded. This amendment also
allowed DNA samples to be kept indefinitely.
(c) Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act 19971251
The PACE Act was again amended, this time by the Criminal Evidence (Amendment)
Act 1997. This amendment extended the powers of police and the categories of
persons from whom non-intimate body samples may be taken without consent under
Part V of the PACE Act.1252
While the amendment under the CJPOA allows for non-intimate samples to be taken
without consent of the individuals convicted of a recordable offence, the Criminal
Evidence (Amendment) Act 1997 has further extended the power of police and
permitted the taking of non-intimate samples from individuals convicted of certain
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PACE Act s 64(3A), as amended by CJPOA 57.
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sexual, violent and other offences prior to 10 April 1995 (as listed in Schedule 1 of
the Act).1253
The said rule also applies to individuals detained as a result of an acquittal on the
grounds of insanity or a finding of unfitness to plead for a recordable offence.1254 The
Act of 1997 has, therefore, allowed for the retrospective application of provision of
the CJPOA.
(d) Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
The PACE Act was amended yet again in 2001 by the Criminal Justice and Police
Act 2001(hereinafter referred to as the CJPA). This is one of the most significant
amendments regarding the circumstances in which samples could be retained.1255
Initially, under s 64 of the PACE Act, police were required to destroy DNA samples
from people in the event of the person being acquitted (with such samples to be
destroyed after the conclusion of the proceedings), or in instances where the charges
were dropped or not proceeded with. (This included people found not guilty of a
matter with which they had been charged).1256 However the amendment under the
CJPA removed the obligation to destroy the DNA sample or profile even though
there was no prosecution, or acquittal of any person arrested on suspicion.1257 The
following rules were adopted under this 2001 amendment:
(i) Restriction on Use of Retained DNA Samples
•

If DNA samples are ‘taken from a person in connection with the investigation
of an offence’, such samples need not be destroyed;

•

These DNA ‘samples may be retained even after fulfilment of the purposes
for which they were taken; and

1253
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•

During such retention, those samples shall not be used by any person other
than purposes of the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an
offence or the conduct of a prosecution.1258

(ii) Restriction on Destruction of DNA Samples (Retention of Samples)
•

Samples are not required to be destroyed:

•

If they were taken for the purposes of the investigation of an offence for
which a person has been convicted; and/or

•

If they were taken for the purpose of the same investigation of an offence and
the person, from whom once such sample has been taken, has been
convicted.1259

(iii) Voluntarily Given Samples Cannot Be Withdrawn
Where a person from whom a sample has been taken with written consents for its
retention, that sample need not be destroyed and such consent once given are not
capable of being withdrawn.1260
(iv) Speculative Searches
The said Act also authorised the police to conduct speculative searches of samples
and expanded the scope of such searches to be conducted by a variety of law
enforcement bodies in the UK and also by any person whose functions correspond to
those of a police force in any country or territory outside of the UK.1261 This
provision has apparently allowed NDNAD to be participated in an international DNA
database scheme.
(v) Evaluation
The provision with regards to the retention of DNA samples was first adopted under
the CJPOA (by amending the PACE Act) but with the condition of not using them in
future investigations.1262 However, s 82 (2) of the CJPA of 2001 amended this
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provision (adopted under s 57 of the CJPOA),1263 and removed this rule and allowed
DNA samples to be retained and used for future investigations. That meant DNA
samples could be retained even where charges were dropped or not proceeded with.
Though the CJPA repealed sub-s (3A) of s 64 of the PACE Act1264 and changed the
retention rule, some rules regarding the destruction of DNA samples under s 64(3) of
the PACE Act remained unchanged. Thus samples that are taken from a person in
connection with the investigation of an offence in circumstances where that person
was not suspected of having committed the offence had to be destroyed after
fulfilling the purposes for which they were taken.1265 But the definition of an
individual who ‘is not suspected of having committed an offence’ under s 64(3) is
ambiguous. It is questionable whether this simply covered individuals whose samples
were collected by the police from the scene of crime to solve potential contamination
issues, or whether it covers individuals who volunteer in a mass DNA screening, who
could arguably considered as ‘suspects’.1266 Therefore, it is a vague and broad term
and it possibly could be misused.
Moreover this provision applied retrospectively. It authorised the ‘continued
retention of samples that should have been destroyed prior to entry into force of the
Act, but were not destroyed’.1267 The construction and expansion of the NDNAD
have proceeded through these legislative changes.1268 Finally, it can be argued that
this legislation broadened the categories of suspects from which the police can take,
retain and use samples to include those taken from innocent individuals. On this
point, Paul Johnson, Robin Williams and Paul Martin argue that:
An inherent proposition of this legislative framework was that the database will
hold the profiles of people who, in all other circumstances, are deemed to be
innocent.1269

1263

PACE Act s 64(3A), as amended by CJPOA s 57.
Section 64 of the PACE Act as first amended by s 57 of the CJPOA.
1265
PACE Act s 64(3).
1266
Privacy International, UK DNA Database Includes the Innocent and Wrongly Accused Under the
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, above n 1232.
1267
CJPA s 82(6). See also ibid.
1268
Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations
(Willan Publishing, 1st ed, 2008) 23.
1269
Johnson, Williams and Martin, ‘Genetics and Forensics’, above n 1126, 32.
1264

255

(e) Criminal Justice Act 2003
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the CJA) further amended
some of provisions of the PACE Act. The 2003 Act again widened the police power
of collection DNA samples. This amendment extended the police power by far the
most when compared to the power that was allowed by the earlier amendments. Part
1 of the CJA contained some provisions regarding the forensic investigation and
detection of crime so as to include the use of new technology in crime detection and
prevention.1270 Section 10 of the CJA amended s 63 of the PACE Act and inserted
some new provisions. The following rule was adopted by this amendment:
(i) Taking Non-Intimate Samples without Consent
The amendment allowed the police to collect non-intimate samples from a person
without the appropriate consent subject to the following two conditions:1271
•

the person is in police detention as a consequence of his arrest for a
recordable offence;1272 and

•

the sample must not be of the same type and such sample must not already
have been taken from the same part of the body in the course of the
investigation, or if it has been taken, it proved insufficient.1273

The amendment thus provided the police force with a wide range of powers to collect
and retain DNA samples taken from persons without their consent, regardless of
whether or not they had been charged with, or convicted of, a recordable offence. It
meant that samples could be taken upon ‘reasonable suspicion’ for an offence,
irrespective of whether the sample could prove guilt or whether it would be used in
the investigation, and then allowed to be kept indefinitely on the NDNAD, where it
could be later used in speculative searches. Not unsurprisingly, this resulted in ‘a
jump in the number of DNA samples taken from individuals and stored on the
NDNAD from around 800,000 in 1999–2000, to just under 4 million in the year
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and Sentencing (Waterside Press, 2004) 25.
1271
PACE Act sub-ss 63 (2A) and (2B), as amended by CJA s 10(2).
1272
PACE Act sub-ss 63 (2A) and (2B), as amended by CJA s 10(2).
1273
PACE Act s 63 (2C), as amended by the CJA s 10(2).

256

2005–2006’.1274 It gave the NDNAD the right to retain the most extensive database
of people’s DNA samples and profiles in the world. No other country’s police force
had greater freedom and power to obtain, use and store genetic information from its
citizens.1275

(f) Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
(i) Original Situation
Prior to 7 April 2005, the use of NDNAD was limited for purposes detailed under s
64 of the PACE Act. Therefore, the database could be used to help identify a victim
where death was assumed to be as a result of a crime. However, where a person had
died of a natural cause — such as a heart attack or as the result of a natural disaster
(for example, the tsunami in South East Asia at the end of 2004), the circumstances
are not covered by this legislation.1276 It meant that NDNAD was not permitted to
use to identify a deceased person’s or disaster victims and so on).
(ii) Amended Situation
On 7 April 2005, this situation was changed through the implementation s 117(7) of
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the
SOCPA), which amended s 64 of PACE Act:1277
Identification of Deceased Persons Who Have Died of Natural Causes: This
amendment enabled DNA profiles from DNA samples which have been taken from a
deceased person to be checked against the database for identification purposes,
irrespective of whether there is any suspicion of their involvement in a crime.1278 As
a result, disparity has removed in regard to the circumstances in which the databases
may be used to help identify a deceased person, as it now includes those who may
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have died of natural causes.1279 This amendment broadened the scope of uses of the
retained DNA samples and information, allowing them to be used for the
identification of deceased persons or persons from whom a body part came, whether
or not any criminal offence is suspected of being involved.
Intimate and Non-Intimate Samples: Section 119 of the SOCPA amended s 65 of the
PACE Act, providing clearer definitions of ‘intimate’1280 and ‘non-intimate
swabs’.1281 It has also further extended the scope of these types of samples adding
some more biological samples to the list. In a case of sexual assault, this may include
‘swabs of the coronal sulcus, shaft or glans of the penis’ of a male suspect and
‘[perineal] or vulval swabs and swabs from matted pubic hair from a female victim
or suspect’.1282 These types of samples had fallen outside the definition of an
intimate sample. The amendment not only increases the number and types of intimate
samples but clearly states that intimate samples require consent prior to collection
(and such consent must be in writing). This process avoids ‘any possible allegation
of assault against the police if they decide they need such a swab to be taken in the
course of an investigation and it gives added protection to the rights of the
suspect’.1283

(g) Counter-Terrorism Act 2008
In order to ‘confer further powers to gather and share information for counterterrorism and other purposes’1284 and also to provide additional power to police to
take DNA samples from person subject to a control order,1285 the Counter Terrorism
Act 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the CTA) has been passed. With regards to
collection and use of DNA sample the following amendments has been made:

1279

Ibid 52 [261], [263].
‘A swab taken from any part of a person’s genitals (including pubic hair) or from a person's body
orifice other than the mouth’: PACE Act s 65, as amended by SOCPA s 119.
1281
‘A swab taken from any part of a person’s body other than a part from which a swab taken would
be an intimate sample’, PACE Act s 65, as amended by SOCPA s 119.
1282
HM Government, Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, above n 1276, 53–4 [267]–
[268].
1283
Ibid 53–4 [267]–[268].
1284
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (UK) c 28 preamble (‘CTA’).
1285
PACE Act s 63(3D), as amended by CTA s10(2).
1280

258

(i) Extended Police Powers to Allow DNA Samples to Be Taken from Persons
Subject to Control Orders
Section 10(2) of this Act provided that ‘a non-intimate samples may be taken without
the appropriate consent of an individual subject to a control order’.1286 Control order’
has been defined as ‘an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him
for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of
terrorism’.1287 Moreover the term ‘appropriate consent’1288 is defined in s 65 of
PACE Act. In terms of the level of force able to be used to obtain a sample, the Code
of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers ‘(PACE Code D)
provides that ‘a constable can use reasonable force to ensure compliance with this
provision where the appropriate consent is withheld’.1289
(ii) Retention and Use of DNA Samples from Persons Subject to Control Order
This legislation also allows the retention and use of DNA samples collected from
individuals who are subject to control orders.1290 This Act also provides some
safeguards in ss 64(1AA) and (1AB) of PACE Act (as amended by ss 10 and 14 of
the CTA and such retention and use of DNA sample must be done subject to such
safeguards. These safeguards ensure that any such samples (which are retained)
could be used for purposes related to ‘the interests of national security, the
prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence, the conduct of a
prosecution or the identification of a deceased person or of the person from whom
the material came’.1291 These sections refer to people subject to control orders that
restrict a number of rights and impose a number of obligations on them ‘for purposes
connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism’.1292
Section 14 of the PACE Act also led to a further increase in the number of
1286
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Archives [35] <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/notes/division/5/1/2/1>.
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PACE Act sub-ss 64(1AA) and (1AB), as amended by the CTA ss 10(4) and 14.
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PACE Act sub-ss 64(1AA) and (1AB), as amended by the CTA ss 10(4) and 14; see also
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individuals on the NDNAD since it has the capacity to link the NDNAD to databases
held by the security service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6 or
SIS)1293 on the grounds of national security.1294
(iii) DNA Samples that are Held by the Law Enforcement Authority in the Course of
Surveillance
When any material (that is, DNA samples) are obtained by a law enforcement
authority in the course of surveillance1295 (which are not covered by the existing
statutory restrictions that is ss 63A and 64 of the PACE Act, for the purpose of
current discussion), such samples may be retained and used by that authority in the
interest of national security. Therefore, the CTA has extended again police powers to
allow DNA to be taken from persons subject to control orders1296 and also to be
collected from persons during any authorised secret surveillance and retained such
sample indefinitely.
5.1.6.7 Evaluation
Although the UK legal system has been subject to unprecedented legislative
developments in the field of forensic use of DNA data, there remain some problems.
For instance, the amendment of s 10 of the CJA has changed ‘the taking of nonintimate samples, but in a rather confusing way’ as it ‘seems to create two
circumstances, that are not mutually dependent on each other’.1297 Section 63 of the
original PACE Act provided that a non-intimate sample may be taken without
consent in two situations: firstly, if the individual is in police detention or is being
held in custody by the police,1298 and an officer of at least the rank of inspector has
authorised it.1299 Secondly, this officer may only give an authorisation for taking the

1293

PACE Act s 63A (1), as amended by the CTA s14 (2); see also legislation.gov.uk, CounterTerrorism Act 2008, above n 1289, [47].
1294
PACE Act sub-ss 64(1AA) and (1AB), as amended by the CTA ss 10(4) and 14.
1295
‘[O]r use of a covert human intelligence source, authorised under Part 2 of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c 23): CTA s 18(3) (a)(ii).
1296
PACE Act ss 63(3D), 63A(1) and 63A(6A), 64(1AA), as amended by the CTA s 10.
1297
Privacy International, UK DNA Database to Grow Dramatically Under the Criminal Justice Act
2003 (2006) <http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-508144>.
1298
PACE Act s 63(3)(a).
1299
PACE Act s 63(3)(b), as amended by CJPA s 81. Section 63(3) and (4) of the PACE Act provides,
‘the officer are allowed to give such authorisation if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the
person is involved in a recordable offence, and the officer also believes that the sample will confirm or
disprove his involvement’.
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sample, where he suspects the involvement of the individual in a recordable offence,
and he believes the sample will prove or disprove their involvement.1300
However, the new CJA provision1301 states that a non-intimate sample may be taken
from an individual without the appropriate consent if two new conditions are
satisfied: namely (1) the individual is in ‘police detention in consequence of his
arrest for a recordable offence’; and (2) a sample of the same type and from the same
part of the body has not already been taken, or if it has been taken, it proved
insufficient. Under the original provision non-intimate samples may be taken without
consent from a person arrested for a recordable offence, where an inspector approves
it, but under the amendment this oversight is not mandatory. It has eliminated the
requirement for the oversight of the inspector in regard to obtaining a DNA sample
without consent, yet no reason has been supplied for the change which clearly
broadens the capacity for taking such samples.
Moreover, the expansion of the DNA database to incorporate individuals merely
arrested (not charged or convicted of any offence) for recordable offences rather than
‘serious arrestable offence[s]’ has led to allegations that the UK Government is
building a National DNA Database by stealth and avoiding all open debate on such
controversial policy.1302 Subsequently, these significant legislative advances have
been challenged in the case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom where the ECtHR
decided that the retention of S and Marper’s DNA breaches human rights law.1303 In
response to that case decision, the Government has indicated an intention to amend
the law and the UK Home Office has undertaken a consultation namely, ‘Keeping
the Right People on the DNA database: Science and Public Protection’ with a view
to set out the future framework for retention, destruction and governance of DNA
data.1304 However, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis decided to continue
to apply the existing policy on the retention of DNA and fingerprints until such time
as the law was changed.
1300

PACE Act s 63(3) and (4).
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On 11 November 2009, after the consultation period had ended, the Secretary of
State made a written ministerial statement outlining a revised set of proposals. It was
decided to include these proposals in the Crime and Security Act 20101305. The Act
received the Royal Assent on 8 April 2010, but some relevant provisions1306 have not
been brought into effect. Following a change of government in May 2010, rather than
bringing this Act into force, the government announced its proposal for new
legislation designed essentially to mirror the Scottish system and finally the
Protection of Freedoms Bill 20111307 has been introduced in the House of Commons
as recently as 11 February 2011 and by November had been placed before the House
of Lords after its Third Reading in the House Of Commons (11 October 2011) and its
Second Reading in the House of Lords occurred on 8 November 2011, where it
remains.1308
In the mean time, in the case of R (on the application of GC) (FC) v the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and R (on the application of C) (FC) v the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, when the applications of both GC and C
to have their fingerprints and DNA data deleted from police records were refused by
Police Commissioner. They (both GC and C) issued proceedings for judicial review
of the retention of their data on the grounds that, in the light of the Marper case, its
retention was incompatible with their rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.1309 In the
circumstances, the Divisional Court (Moses LJ and Wyn Williams J) dismissed the
applications for judicial review1310 and granted a certificate that the cases were
appropriate for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court.1311 Two difficult issues were
raised before the Supreme Court:
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CSA.
CSA ss 14, 22 and 23.
1307
www.parliament.uk, Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010–11 (28 November 2011)
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/protectionoffreedoms.html>.
1308
www.parliament.uk, Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010–11 (12 October 2011)
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2011/october1/remaining-stages-protection-of-freedomsbill/>. Ibid.
1309
R (On the Application of GC and C [2011] UKSC 21(18 May 2011) [12].
1310
GC and C v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] EWHC 2225 (Admin) (16 July
2010) [49].
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•

Firstly, should the court issue a declaration of incompatibility under s 41312 of
the Human Rights Act 1998? This issue rested principally on whether s
64(1A)1313 of the PACE Act requires an act of this nature, or whether that
section could be interpreted so as to permit an act which was compatible with
Article 8 of the ECHR.

•

Secondly, if the Court decided that s 64(1A) could be interpreted compatibly
with Article 8 of the ECHR, should it order the ACPO to revise its
guidelines1314 or should it simply issue a declaration that the current scheme
was unlawful and leave the resolution of the matter to Parliament?

The Supreme Court, by a majority, allows the appeals (Lords Rodger and Brown
dissenting). Lord Dyson gave the lead judgment. The majority granted a declaration
that the present ACPO guidelines are unlawful because they are incompatible with
Article 8 of the ECHR.1315 Lord Dyson further argued that:
It is important that, in such an important and sensitive area as the retention of
biometric data by the police, the court reflects its decision by making a formal
order to declare what it considers to be the true legal position. But it is not
necessary to go further. Section 8(1) of the HRA gives the court a wide
discretion to grant such relief or remedy within its powers as it considers just
and appropriate. Since Parliament is already seized of the matter, it is neither
just nor appropriate to make an order requiring a change in the legislative
scheme within a specific period.1316
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S 4(2) says, ‘If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it
may make a declaration of that incompatibility.’
1313
‘By this amendment it provided and conferred on the police the power to retain biometric data on
suspects who have been acquitted or, indeed, not even prosecuted’, for further details see Mathew
Purchase Matrix, Case Comment: R (GC) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; R (C) v
The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC21 (3 June 2011) UK Supreme Court
Blog <http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-r-gc-v-the-commissioner-of-police-of-the-metropolis-r-c-vthe-commissioner-of-police-of-the-metropolis-2011-uksc21>.
1314
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidelines (which published on 16 March
2006) provides, ‘Chief Officers have the discretion to authorise the deletion of any specific data entry
on the Police National Database but this discretion should only be exercised in exceptional cases.
Exceptional cases will by definition be rare’.
1315
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Press Summary: R (on the application of GC) (FC)
(Appellant) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent) R (on the application of C)
(FC) (Appellant) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis(Respondent) [2011] UKSC 21 —
On Appeal from the High Court (Administrative Court) [2010] EWHC 2225 (Admin) (18 May 2011)
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/UKSC_2010_0173_ps.pdf>; see also R (On the Application
of GC and C [2011] UKSC 21(18 May 2011) [46].
1316
R (On the Application of GC and C [2011] UKSC 21(18 May 2011) [46].
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Therefore, the court granted no other relief1317 and left the matter to be decided by
the government and parliament. At present, the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2011,
which mirrors the Scottish system, has undergone its Third Reading in the House of
Commons and is before the House of Lords.1318 It is thus argued that current
legislative mechanisms have provided extensive power to UK police, so much so that
the above legislation was introduced to define and protect freedoms in the UK and
provide greater certainty.
Further, because of the various Acts and their amendments over time, it is difficult to
protect human rights and privacy with regards to someone’s DNA data judicially. As
a result, even after the Marper judgment, cases like those of GC and C were
prosecuted in the UK domestic court even though they dealt an issue similar to that
of the Marper case. No new rule or precedent protecting human rights and individual
privacy was announced because of the disputed legislative provisions. After
discussing the legislative bases for the DNA database management (sample
collection, storage and retention) as a whole, the following section will examine the
DNA sample and profile collection, storage and retention policy as well as
mechanism.
5.1.6.8 NDNAD DNA Sample-Profile: Collection, Storage and Retention
Implementing a forensic DNA database involves a number of steps, such as DNA
sample collection, storage and retention. The whole process is strongly influenced by
different factors, such as the legal system of the respective country in which it is
situated, and the nature of their DNA laboratory, both of which vary between
countries. It also depends on the political, economic, social and cultural background
of the country implementing the database. All these factors affect the possibility of
obtaining DNA samples from suspects, the storage and period of retention of DNA
samples and profiles for the purpose of case investigation. There are, for example,
significant differences between and among the European countries regarding the
criteria used to enter a person onto the database. For instance, profiles of suspects are
entered in five countries, namely, Germany, Austria, Finland, Denmark, and
1317

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Press Summary , above n 1315. See also R (On the
Application of GC and C [2011] UKSC 21(18 May 2011) [52].
1318
www.parliament.uk, Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010–11 (12 October 2011), above n 1307.
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Switzerland, whereas a separate court order is required in order to obtain a sample
(even from convicted offenders) in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Norway.1319 There are also differences in relation to the destruction rule or removal
criteria, and retention policy in the continental EU countries.1320
For instance in some EU member states (for example, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Hungary, Luxemburg, Scotland, Slovakia and the Netherlands), the
records have to be destroyed after acquittal or when the charges have been dropped
against suspects. In case of Austria, it requires suspects to submit a written request
for sample destruction after they are acquitted.1321 Some member states pursue the
policy of immediate destruction of all samples (for example, Germany, Lithuania,
Sweden and Belgium).1322 Regarding the DNA data of convicted offenders, some
member states (for example, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary,
Luxemburg, Scotland, Slovakia and the Netherlands) allow for their retention for a
substantial period of time.1323 In France, the profiles are retained either for 40 years
after the sentence has been passed or until the convicted offender reaches the age of
80 years.1324 Another group of member states retains the DNA samples of both
suspects and convicted offenders for a certain period of time. In the case of
Denmark, for instance, DNA profiles of convicted offenders and crime suspects must
be retained in the database until two years after the passing away of that person
concerned, or it must be retained until when the person concerned reaches the age of
80 years).1325 The UK, on the other hand allows indefinite retention of DNA samples
and profiles.
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Peter M Schneider and Peter D Martin, 'Criminal DNA Databases: The European Situation' (2001)
119 Forensic Science International 232, 233–4.
1320
Ibid 233.
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N Van Camp and K Dierickx, 'The Retention of Forensic DNA Samples: A Socio-Ethical
Evaluation of Current Practices in the EU' (2008) 34(8) Journal of Medical Ethics 606, 608. Van
Camp and Dierickx, ‘National Forensic DNA Databases’, above n 308, 97.
1322
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Camp and Dierickx, ‘National Forensic DNA Databases’, above n 308, 97; Schneider and Martin,
‘Criminal DNA Databases’, above n 1319, 233.
1323
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1324
Van Camp and Dierickx, ‘National Forensic DNA Databases’, above n 308, 94, 96.
1325
Ibid 42–3; see also Schneider and Martin, ‘Criminal DNA Databases’, above n 1319, 233.

265

As can be seen from the above, the national legislation and policies regarding
practices of sample collection, retention periods, and data entry and removal criteria
for regulating forensic DNA databases of EU countries, in some cases, differ
significantly from those of the UK.1326 (It should also be noted that there are some
differences between the legislation of England/Wales and Scotland, which have
separate parliaments.) The UK (England and Wales) is the only country which has
pursued a policy of indefinite retention of DNA samples and profiles; and, therefore,
the NDNAD is only the database which follows this unique policy.
The following section will analyse the NDNAD’s collection, storage and retention
mechanisms which differs from other countries in many respects.
(a) Collection
The successful collection of DNA material depends upon the search methods and
also state of the crime scene/s.1327 DNA samples for the NDNAD are collected from
different sources, such as:
Criminal Justice (CJ) Sample1328 or Subject Profile
When biological or DNA samples are collected from suspects ‘following arrest for a
recordable offence,1329 they are referred to as ‘criminal justice (CJ) samples’. The
police first check the Police National Computers (PNC) to see whether the
individual’s DNA profile is already on the NDNAD, and also ensure that a fresh
sample is not collected if an existing profile is confirmed. The police keep their own
record of ‘arrested persons who have given a sample on the PNC database’ with
‘[e]ach police record ... given an Arrestee Summons Number (ASN)’.1330 The profile
that derives from CJ samples (that is, those taken from suspects following arrest for a
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Kris Dierickx, 'A Belgian Perspective' (2008) 3 BioSocieties 97, 98.
Goodwin, Linacre and Hadi, above n 207, 20.
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Select Committee on Science and Technology House of Lords, 'Human Genetic Databases:
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Swab to Database: A Guide to the DNA Profiling Process’ (The Forensic Science Service, London,
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recordable offence) is called a ‘Subject Profile’. As at 31 March 2009, some 5 617
604 subject profiles had been retained on the NDNAD.1331
Scene of Crime (SOC) Sample and Profile1332
While investigating a case, the police collect a range of samples (such as, hair, blood,
semen, urine, and saliva) from the scenes of crime (SOC) with the expectation of
obtaining a DNA profile for the offenders. These samples are analysed in the
forensic laboratory in order to create such profiles. SOC samples go through the
same set of steps as CJ samples in order to be placed in the database. The NDNAD
2007–2009 annual report noted that since 1995, 5 56 794 crime scene profiles had
been placed on the NDNAD,1333, and that ‘as at 31 March 2009 350,033 crime scene
profiles were retained on the database’, some 53 000 having been removed at the
request of police during 2007–2009 following a conviction for an offence or a
decision that the matter will not be pursued further.1334

Volunteer Samples and Profiles
The term ‘volunteer’ has been defined by the Willis and Willmott. It includes ‘those
who offer a sample for elimination purposes in an intelligence-led investigation’.1335
Generally when DNA samples are provided voluntarily by individuals in a police
investigation for inserting their profile in the database for comparison purposes, their
entries are known as ‘volunteer profiles’. There are various sources of volunteer
samples; however, most volunteer samples are obtained from victims, innocent third
parties in the process of mass screening, or persons who have voluntarily come
forward to donate their samples.1336 As at 31 March 2009, the total number of
volunteer samples was 36 093.1337

Samples from Child Offenders
According to the provisions of the PACE Act 1984, DNA profiles from children
under the age of 10 years could be added to the NDNAD but only with the consent of
1331

NPIA, ‘National DNA Database Annual Report’, above n 1145, 10.
Ibid 22–5.
1333
NPIA, ‘National DNA Database Annual Report’, above n 1145, 22.
1334
Ibid 25.
1335
Willis and Willmott, above n 1232, [1.3].
1336
NPIA, ‘National DNA Database Annual Report’, above n 1145, 13.
1337
Ibid.
1332

267

their parent or guardian.1338 On 16 December 2008, however, the Home Secretary
announced that DNA profiles of all children under 10 years of age were to be
removed from the NDNAD. Following the Home Secretary’s announcement, the
profiles from all the children under 10 years1339 were removed and deleted from the
NDNAD. The final profile taken from a child under 10 years was removed from the
NDNAD on 5 March 2009. As at March 2009, 11.7 per cent of those on the database
were aged between 10 and 15 years old, and 9.0 per cent between 16 and 17 years of
age at time of loading were on the NDNAD. As at 31 March 2009, in terms of their
current age 2.3 per cent of those on the database are between 10 and 15 years of age,
and 3.7 per cent are from 16 to 17 years of age.1340
Methods of collecting DNA samples, therefore, vary depending on the types of
sample (SOC sample, CJ sample or volunteer’s sample). Most often a sample is
obtained via a buccal swab or where a large cotton wool bud is rubbed inside the
suspect’s cheek to loosen and collect skin cells. Alternatively, ten hairs with roots
bulbs attached ‘can be removed from the head’.1341 The police force is authorised
under the PACE Act to collect DNA samples. The amendments and the additional
new legislation (that is, the CJPOA, the CJPA, the CJA) have expanded various
powers of police — defining the classes of people from whom samples and profiles
can be collected and also what types of samples can be collected and the method of
collection.1342

(b) Storage and Analysis
The storage of DNA sample and/or profile is another important issue; it is possible to
choose either the storage of only the DNA profiles or the samples,1343 or both. The
exact conditions for storage of the samples depend on the nature of the samples and
the environment. Generally samples collected for DNA analysis are stored at low
temperature and humidity in order to avoid or slow its rate of degradation or
1338
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contamination as a cool, dry environment limits the action of bacteria and fungi.1344
The storage process of DNA sample on the NDNAD usually begins at a police
station when an officer takes a tissue sample from a newly arrested person. If an
individual’s DNA profile is not on the NDNAD, the police start the following
storage process and the process is repeated so that there are two samples for each
suspect:
•

The police keep their own record and each police record is given an Arrest
Summons Number (ASN). The ASN allows information on the NDNAD to
be linked with information on the Police National Computer (PNC).1345

•

Sample tubes are labelled with a unique barcode sticker, then placed into a
special tamper-proof, clear plastic bag, together with card with the same
barcode label and other details1346 related to this sample.

•

The bag is then sealed and the samples are sent to an accredited DNA
profiling laboratory for processing, where staff check the integrity of the
tamper-proof bag and the card details, entering the information on a computer
system.1347 There are currently five approved laboratories1348 or organisations
that are authorised to supply DNA profiles to the NDNAD.

•

Staff from the laboratory’s sample reception unit checks the integrity of the
tamper-proof bag and, before opening it, they also check whether all the
required details have been entered the accompanying card. A scanner ‘is used
to record the details of each sample onto the computer system’.1349

•

One of the two samples submitted from each individual is kept frozen by the
laboratory that undertakes the analysis. This ‘back up’ sample is kept ‘until
the person would have reached the age of 100 if no further information is
obtained about them’. If the person’s death is confirmed, however, that
person’s sample is only kept for a further 12 months before it is destroyed.1350
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•

‘The other sample is processed for analysis in order to obtain a DNA profile.
The DNA is first extracted from the tissue. It is then amplified in a heating
and cooling process that creates millions of copies of the original DNA —
like a biological photocopier’.1351 This process is known as the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR).1352 The PCR technique ‘produces a string of numbers
which is the DNA profile and such profile is sent to load onto the
NDNAD’.1353

Forensic organisations then store samples on completion of the DNA analysis, and
‘retain a record of the derived profiles for use in the specific case or related
investigations’.1354 Legislation gives police the authority to collect DNA samples,
which are then given to the FSS for the construction of reference profiles that are
deposited in the NDNAD’.1355
(c) Retention and Removal
Another important but related issue is for what period individuals’ DNA profiles and
other personal information should be retained on databases? Most countries with
DNA databases keep the DNA profiles of people who have committed serious crimes
(such as rape and murder) on the database for defined period, but there are a wide
variety of criteria for entering and removing people who are convicted of less serious
crimes (as discussed above).
When NDNAD was first created, DNA profiles, samples and police computer
records were legally required to be deleted and destroyed when someone was
acquitted or where charges against them were dropped. However, the amendment to,
and the insertion of ss 64(1A) and (1B) into, the PACE Act1356 allowed samples to be
retained indefinitely, even if an individual were acquitted or released from
prosecution. Section 64(1A) of the PACE Act does not specify any timeframe for the
retention of the data or any procedure to regulate its destruction. Such provision
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appears intended to introduce a database with a power to indefinitely retain DNA
samples and profiles.
(d) Access
It seems a reasonable requirement that only ‘authorised persons’ should be allowed
to access the database or the information; however, in practice there are various
different possibilities regarding who should have the right to access such material,
and almost every country has framed its own database access policy due to a number
of different factors. Each policy has its own merits, depending on the overall legal
and judicial system of that country, but it is generally accepted that the chances of
abuse of DNA information, particularly the violation of privacy, increases in
proportion to the number of persons who are allowed to access.1357
In the case of the NDNAD, access to the information in the database has been strictly
limited to a small number of people authorised by the NDNAD custodian.1358 This
comprises a small number of employees of the NDNAD Delivery Unit and the FSS
(approximately 30 staff in total), all of whom have the necessary security clearance.
The PACE Act has made it clear that DNA data stored on the NDNAD can only be
used for purposes related to preventing, detecting, and prosecuting crime, or
‘identifying deceased persons or body part’.1359 In addition, the forensic science
organisations have been issued with strict guidelines relating to the handling of
samples and profiles in their possession; however, if a forensic science organisation
wishes to consider making use of the samples or DNA profiles for any other
purposes, such as research, they first must submit a proposal to the NDNAD Strategy
Board1360 for consideration. The NDNAD Strategy Board then assesses each
proposal ‘on its merits’ and seeks ‘further independent advice ... from the Ethics
Group’.1361 Strict control is to be maintained at all times in regard to the release of
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any information.1362 In the period from the NDNAD’s establishment in 1995 to 31
March 2009, 46 requests for access to samples or data for research and development
purposes have been made. The release of samples or data as a result of such request
is considered on a case by case basis. Of those requests, 26 have been approved, 18
have been rejected and two were still being considered at that date.1363 This access
policy (that is, for use of DNA samples and profiles in the NDNAD) is, therefore,
subject to some relevant legal and ethical constraints.1364
Further, under the NDNAD policy, members of the police force are not allowed to
directly access the NDNAD. Any kind of information about the profile matching is
provided by the NDNAD Delivery Unit. The UK police force can, if there is no
match on the NDNAD, seek to access samples from existing collections held by
other parties (for example, health and research related collections) by virtue of an
access order issued by the court.1365 The sample provider in these instances has no
role in determining whether such use eventuates.1366
5.1.6.9 Uses and Benefits of the NDNAD
In terms of value for crime detection and prevention, ‘[o]ne of the most salient
aspects of the NDNAD is its capacity to enact an automated and continuous series of
searches of all new database entries against SOC and CJ profiles already on the
database’.1367 The size of the NDNAD is increasing day by day with samples from
innocent people (such as those supplying samples at mass suspect elimination
screenings) as well as from convicted criminals. It was estimated that as at 31 March
2009, a DNA profiles of some 4 859 934 individuals were held on the NDNAD,
representing an 11 per cent increase on the previous year.1368 Although the
administration of the database requires a huge investment both in terms of staff and
equipment, it is useful in many respects, including as a cost effective measure that
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accurately identifies offenders and saves investigative time.1369 Highlighting the
benefits of NDNAD, the Home Office noted:
The National DNA Database is a key police intelligence tool that helps to
quickly identify offenders, make earlier arrests, secure more convictions and
provide critical investigative leads for police investigations.1370

Since its inception in 1995, NDNAD has successfully detected a number of
offenders, enabling them to appear before the court. It has been instrumental in
securing their conviction and, ultimately, their punishment. There are several realistic
benefits of the NDNAD, some of which are going to be discussed below.
(a) An Enhanced Tool for the Proper Administration of Justice
Advantages of the NDNAD include minimising risk of innocents being subject to
police investigation,1371 its use where no eye witness is available, and its low error
rate.1372 Further, a guilty plea induced by the existence of DNA evidence will avoid
the trauma of court appearance for witnesses and victims and diminish the scope for
witness intimidation.1373 Retention of samples and profiles on the database is not
only helpful in quality assurance programmes, it can allow ‘future challenges to
errors in the original DNA profiling; and ... allow re-profiling in the event of
scientific advances’.1374
(b) Familial Searching
One of the important aspects of NDNAD is ‘familial searching’. Familial searches
allow the police to identify a suspect who left a crime scene sample and whose
details are not on the NDNAD, but who can, nevertheless, be traced through the
profiles of family members whose details are already on the database. This can occur
by looking for partial matches between SOC profiles and the NDNAD profiles.1375
1369
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Even if an individual has not provided a sample on the NDNAD, the database can
become a means of identifying those who are relatives (whose samples are on the
database) of a person whom the police is seeking in regard to a criminal offence due
to the shared, inherited nature of DNA and through that information attempt to locate
the suspect. This is possible due to the fact that close blood relatives share much of
the same DNA coding.1376 Investigators are using this method for solving criminal
cases in the UK and it is now an established practice in regard to the NDNAD. Bob
Hepple in his article identified that that there were 78 familial searches alone in 2005
in the UK.1377
(c) Cold Cases1378
The advent of PCR-based techniques have made it possible to obtain DNA profiles
from old case samples and it will be helpful to resolve ‘cold cases’, that is, cases that
have previously been closed. The application of low copy number (LCN) PCR has
further increased the chance of obtaining DNA profiles from highly degraded
material. Cases that could not be resolved and have remained open from dates prior
to the introduction of DNA typing can now be re-examined using either standard
DNA testing or LCN in combination with the NDNAD. The use of the new
technology ‘has allowed numerous cases to result in a conviction and therefore
closure’.1379
(d) Speculative Searching
Wallace, 'Prejudice, Stigma and DNA Databases', above n 12, [1], [3]; Patrick Hennessy and Ben
Leapman, 'Ministers Plan "Big Brother" Police Powers', The Daily Telegraph (online) 4 February
2007 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1541513/Ministers-plan-Big-Brother-policepowers.html>.
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A ‘speculative search’1380 is ‘a search that is carried out when DNA samples are
submitted to the DNA database laboratory and they are compared against all other
samples held’.1381 There is wide legislative provision covering this area. Generally,
in case of some unsolved crimes, speculative searches are conducted using the
NDNAD. People voluntarily provide their DNA samples and also give consent to
have their sample stored permanently. Accordingly, their profiles are loaded onto the
NDNAD and then it is used in speculative searches for the indefinite future.1382 The
speculative searches are carried out either in case of convicted person’s sample (also
known as CJ sample) which is received for the first time and then it is compared
against all other samples held on the database, or in case of undetected crime scenes,
when DNA sample (also known as database sample) are compared against the person
in the database, to identify matches. Database samples are also compared against
other detected crimes on the database, to identify linked offences.1383

(e) Fight against Terrorism
The use of DNA is also significant in the ‘fight against terrorism’. The Prüm Treaty
was signed on 27 May 2005 by seven EU countries1384 who agreed to collaborate in
precisely identifying personal information by facilitating the rapid and efficient
exchange of DNA data among national law enforcement officers to combat terrorism
as well cross-border crimes (such as illegal immigration).1385 The new ‘fast track’
data-sharing powers are very supportive for effective data sharing by removing
barriers and allowing the police forces of their countries to compare and exchange
1380
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data more easily. The Treaty has been adopted by the EU and included in the EU
legal framework.1386 Use of DNA data as an investigative tool to fight against
terrorism thus opened a new horizon.
5.1.7

RISKS OR CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NDNAD

New technologies always bring with them ethical and societal impacts. The forensic
use of DNA technology and the establishment of NDNAD is no exception. Apart
from its contribution to the detection and prosecution of crime, the database has also
raised some risks or challenges. After analysing the overall nature, functions,
management and governance of the NDNAD as a whole, a few leading concerns or
challenges with regard to the use and access of the NDNAD have been identified,
which can be divided under two categories: (1) management and governance; and (2)
human rights and genetic privacy issues.
5.1.7.1 Risks Regarding Management and Governance of the NDNAD
(a) Concerns about Extensive Power of Police Regarding the Use of DNA
Power Regarding Specific Investigation
Generally, through exercise of their power, the police force has gained public trust
and confidence (for enforcing law and order situation), regardless of how far, or
whether or not, coercive measures are actually used. It can be argued that the use of
DNA evidence (and the procedures required to secure such evidence) has received
broad support from the general people and society. As Kaye observes, ‘It is difficult
to argue against such procedures’ especially when they are effective and ‘when there
is strong support for measures that seek to prevent and solve crime’.1387 Critics,
however, say that the outlay required is disproportionate to the number of cases
actually solved with the assistance of DNA technology. This is a view that is
expressed in the recommendations of ‘the Home Affairs Committee – Eighth Report’
on the ‘National DNA Database’. The Report noted that:
It is currently impossible to say with certainty how many crimes are detected,
let alone how many result in convictions, due at least in part to the matching of
crime scene DNA to a personal profile already on the database, but it appears
that it may be as little as 0.3%—and we note that the reason for retaining
1386
1387
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personal profiles on a database is so that the person can be linked to crimes
he/she commits later. (Paragraph 6).1388

The existing power of the police in the UK to take DNA is wider than those in any
other country.1389 Their power is unparalleled internationally in regard to (i) the
taking a DNA sample without the consent of any individual who is arrested for a
recordable offence but not convicted; and (ii) the fact that after such collection the
DNA profile is able to be stored on the NDNAD indefinitely.1390
This extensive power can be seen as threatening an individual’s privacy rights.
Concerns are also raised in regards to what appears to be a bias in the sampling.
Some groups, such as young males and black ethnic minorities,1391 are
disproportionately represented on the NDNAD.

Intelligence-Led DNA Mass Screening or DNA Dragnets
Law enforcement agencies exercise another important power with regards to the
collection, analysis, and retention of DNA samples through large-scale intelligenceled mass screenings1392 (also known as DNA Dragnets).1393 In this process, police
generally ask people to give their DNA samples as a part of case investigations.
People normally volunteer their DNA samples either to eliminate themselves from
the investigation (for example, the partner of a raped woman), or to help a police
investigation (for example, to narrow down the list of suspects in the case of a mass
screening).1394 Once these samples are obtained they compared them with the
samples collected from the crime scene in order to detect a match.
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Very often these individuals are approached not as suspects, but rather as
‘volunteers’ whose cooperation is sought due to their physical similarity to a
description provided of a perpetrator (based on information from witnesses); or
sometimes on the basis that their usual place of residence or work place near a crime
scene.1395 In reality, these individuals have little choice — if they refuse to
‘volunteer’, greater suspicion will attach to them. If the police get search warrants,
they are bound to provide a sample. For instance,
[I]n 1998 in an attempt to catch the perpetrators of 84 sexual offences and of
burglary against elderly women, the Metropolitan Police initiated one of the
largest voluntary DNA screenings which was aimed at black males in South
London. However, individuals who did not “volunteer” to submit DNA samples
were sent “threatening letters” from Scotland Yard, alleging that their actions
were hampering investigations’.1396

Since the establishment of the NDNAD, police forces throughout the UK have
increasingly started asking certain classes of individuals, including those with no
criminal records) to submit their DNA samples to the police in order to assist with
investigations. Statistics released in the UK Parliament in December 2005 revealed
that at that time the NDNAD contained the DNA information of more than 15 116
individuals who gave their samples voluntarily to assist an investigation.1397 In this
way, the names (and DNA) of innocent persons are included on the police databases;
much to the horror of their relatives, friends, neighbours, and employers, and
themselves. They find themselves not merely connected during the investigation in
connection with various horrendous crimes,1398 but then, in the UK, their DNA
sample may remain on the database indefinitely. The need to ensure ‘true
voluntariness’ for those providing DNA samples is one of the concerns raised;
another is the nature of consent in regard to its retention.

Risks Associated with Speculative Searching
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Standard (online) 27 September 2004 <http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/1044>.
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The use of the speculative searches method is associated with some risk. As in the
DNA mass screening process, the individual who has consented to participate in a
speculative search for one case are not allowed to withdraw their consent for the use
of their DNA for matching purposes in later searches, and their sample are kept
indefinitely for other searches unrelated to the original case. In this way someone’s
human rights and right to privacy is under threat.

(b) Concerns about Informed Consent Issue
Another significant concern with regards to the use of DNA data is the ‘informed
consent issue’. Generally two types of consents from donors are obtained by police
in this process:
•

Their sample to be used for comparison with crime scene sample;

•

Their sample to be retained indefinitely and according to law consent with
regard to retention of sample is non-revocable.1399

Legal Justifications for Informed Consent
The Home Office ‘Proposals for Revising Legislative Measures on Fingerprints,
Footprints and DNA Samples (1999)’ reflected the idea that voluntary samples
should be obtained with consent1400 and once consent is given for retention of such
sample it would be irrevocable.1401 The amendment of the PACE Act by the CJPA
has provided the legislative basis for the indefinite retention of DNA samples
collected from volunteers who has participated in a mass screening process. It is,
however, subject to the condition that they had given their sample voluntarily or with
free consent.1402 Moreover, the FSS has developed a ‘volunteer kit’ with a view to
ensuring that a volunteer sample would not be loaded onto the NDNAD without the
donor’s full consent.1403 There have been various mass requests for volunteer DNA
samples in regard to a number of serious crimes in the UK before and after
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introduction of volunteer kit.1404 However it is unclear how effective the use of the
volunteer kit is in ensuring fully informed consent.1405

Refusal to Supply Sample Raises Suspicion
It rarely happens that people refuse to supply their DNA sample, because such a
refusal immediately raises suspicions regarding that person. It is, therefore, dubious
whether people can truly and freely give their consent in these circumstances when
refusal to give a sample immediately places a person under suspicion.1406 In this
regard, Barabara Prainsack argued that:
Even if a person states that s/he is providing a DNA sample voluntarily, an
element or suggestion of coercion can be present, for example when the
volunteer knows that s/he would be treated as a suspect if s/he did not volunteer
DNA …1407

Controversy about Whether Volunteers Sufficiently Informed
There are also some doubts about whether volunteers are provided with sufficient
information about what they are agreeing to1408 (that is, consent for comparison, and
consent for indefinite retention with no right to withdraw their consent). Volunteers
consent to give their sample in order to assist police in an investigation and exonerate
themselves, but without realising that the DNA profile created from their DNA
sample will be kept on the NDNAD indefinitely.1409

Consent with Regards to Retention is Non-Revocable
In the UK, according to the legal requirement, separate consent forms (for consent to
submit a sample, and consent to retention on the NDNAD) are used. The consent
with regard to retention made the situation more difficult for volunteers or ‘donors’,

1404

Ibid.
Ibid.
1406
Staley, above n 275, 41; see also Human Genetics Commission, 'Whose Hands On Your Genes?:
A Discussion Document On the Storage, Protection and Use of Personal Genetic Information' (2001)
46 [10.19].
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as such consent is non-revocable.1410 Consequently, sample providers can not apply
for destruction.1411 This approach differs from practices in Scotland and many
European countries, where consent can later be withdrawn. It is also contrary to
many standard practices in medical research.

Giving Consent under Conditions of Pressure
Sometime police use undue coercion or force to induce people to provide their
samples ostensibly ‘with consent’.1412 There is a lack of clarity as to whether the
consent obtained by the police from volunteers can always be regarded as genuine or
free consent, as it is often given under distress, pressurised condition or sometimes in
the absence of appropriate advice. A refusal to participate in the police investigation
process also raises suspicion against them and makes the concept of the free consent
quite hollow in such circumstances. A reasonable person can assume that an
individual has little choice but to consent to the police request for his or her DNA
sample, for although such giving is claimed as ‘voluntary’,1413 actually they are
giving their consent under pressure.

(c) Concerns Regarding Retention of DNA Samples and Profiles
Insertion and retention of DNA data on the NDNAD has become another sensitive
issue. Section 82 of the CJPA1414 allows samples to be retained indefinitely, even
where an individual is acquitted or the prosecution not proceeded with. Such
indefinite retention of the DNA data of innocent people could associate the stigma of
criminality with them, even if their inclusion on the database only signifies that they
have provided such data or sample voluntarily or in a mass screening. Because of the
lack of universality of DNA sampling, a stigma of criminality could attach to the
mere fact that an individual’s DNA sample and/or profile is on the NDNAD. The
extent of this database is undeniably seen as broadly intended to represent the actual
or likely criminal community. Therefore, it is not irrational to raise an objection
1410
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regarding the retention of DNA samples and profiles of innocent people on this
database. Since they have never committed a criminal act in their whole life, and
little likelihood of such commission in future1415 (or, rather, no more likelihood than
any others whose material is not on the NDNAD), their inclusion can be seen as
discriminatory.
The Nuffield Council Working Group has expressed its concerns on this issue as
thus:
[T]he Database has proved to be an excellent tool in the crime-solving process.
However, the need for a debate of the ethical issues raised by police powers to
take, store and analyse the DNA of suspects, witnesses and victims remains.1416

Retention of DNA samples and/or profiles from unconvicted or innocent persons has
been greatly criticised. Currently a large number of people (about one million as at
May 2009) are represented in the NDNAD who are the unconvicted or innocent
people.1417 The Information Commissioner for Scotland points out that:
[T]he indefinite retention of DNA profiles of individuals who are arrested but
are not convicted of any offense is an intrusion into their private lives.1418

In the ‘Consultation Response’, the ‘Wellcome Trust’ also expressed its concern over
the question of which individuals are included on the NDNAD, and in regard to the
extent to which emerging capacities (though still as yet extremely limited in
reliability) to infer phenotypical information (that is, appearance) from DNA data
should be incorporated into the scope of the NDNAD.1419 Both it described as
‘highly contentious’ issues. The potential for such inferences is currently extremely
limited, but is being explored in research (for example, in relation to eye colour, skin
pigmentation and even face shape).1420 Again, this has implications for privacy
rights.
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(d) Representativeness and Discrimination
In the forensic contexts, there are some concerns about racial or ethnic bias in that
bias that is already evident may be reproduced in the use of DNA matching capacity
and even be further intensified by it. Already while investigating a case (without
recourse to DNA analysis), investigators may only look for people of a particular
racial background1421 or ethnicity (that is, racial profiling).1422 As a result,
investigators may sometimes incorrectly include a person who falls under a particular
description and in the same way exclude a suspect who does not match that
background. Racial profiling reinforces racial stereotyping and does not
acknowledge the reality of differences within communities and similarities across
diverse communities.1423 An identified racial group may form a minority in the
community, and, reflecting existing preconceptions, investigations that use racial
profiling could disproportionately focus on such communities.1424 Moreover, racial
profiling should not be an acceptable as a tool for police investigation because its use
is often ‘an unjustified expression of racism’.1425
The 2007 Report on ethical issues associated with the forensic use of DNA that was
issued by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics revealed that black ethnic minorities are
disproportionately over-represented on the NDNAD and noted that this is a matter of
considerable concern.1426 Questions are inevitably raised as to the reasons for such
unequal representation, such as variations in access to legal representation, detection
1421
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rates and types of crime represented. Undermining the ‘principle of the presumption
of innocence’, such representation inevitably appears to incriminate individuals ‘by
association’. This also ‘raises concern of an institutionalized ethnic bias in the
criminal justice system’.1427 In terms of policing, the use of racial profiling can skew
results by targeting particular visibly identifiable groups, further fuelling not only
stereotypical perceptions but supplying highly suspect evidence for their
perpetuation. For instance, if one targets a particular ethnic minority for DUI testing
or searches for drug possession and so forth1428 on the basis of racial profiling, then
any result will necessarily serve to contribute to a higher conviction rate for that
group. The failure to test members of other groups will, conversely, lower their
representation in overall results. Hence, profiling with its distorting ‘impacts on
surveillance, search, investigation, arrest and incarceration for the racialized
communities [that have been] singled out for its destructive attentions’1429 can
produce a self-perpetuating picture and pattern of offender behaviours.
Some have questioned the extent to which the NDNAD complies with the first
principle of the Data Protection Act, that is, that personal data must be processed
fairly.1430 In addition, the popularity of racial analysis tests for genealogical purposes
has already raised concerns that it will reinforce racial stereotypes or bias by
emphasising the differences between populations of different backgrounds.1431 Even
assuming the utility of racial categorisation in interpreting DNA results, it could be
argued that overtly racialising biological evidence in the criminal justice system
embarks upon a dangerous path that biologises and pathologises crime along racial
grounds.1432 In this regard, Erin Murphy argued that:
[T]his widespread acceptance of racial and ethnic categorisation as a means of
quantifying DNA results (say, allelic frequencies) opens the door to a kind of
twenty-first century racial eugenics ...1433
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The NDNAD itself notes that research is underway ‘[u]sing anonymous data on
ethnic appearance (as perceived by the police)’ regarding the development of an
‘ethnic inference database for predicting the likelihood of an undetected offender
having one ethnic appearance as opposed to another’.1434 However, research on
‘ethnic-inferencing’ remains highly controversial.1435

(e) Lack of Transparency and Checks and Balances
The 2002 Report of the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) highlights public
concerns about the collection of DNA samples for trivial offences, the duration of
their retention in the database, and also in regard to research related to forensic DNA
as well as use of genetic information to predict characteristics of a person (which
may in the future extend to behavioural traits).1436 In this regard, the HGC also noted
that ‘some people and organisations have expressed concerns about certain aspects of
the present arrangements’ regarding the forensic use of DNA information and that
this ‘could affect public confidence’ about the NDNAD.1437 In other words HGC
expressed concerns that the present arrangement of the NDNAD has some impacts
on privacy. A consistent concern has been expressed by the HGC in relation to public
discussions about the NDNAD that apparently there had been ‘no discernible
systematic attempt … to evaluate the utility of this database’ on the basis of public
consultation.1438 A 2009 report by Bob Hepple indicated that in the then 14 years of
its existence, there had been a lack of public debate, transparency as well as checks
and balance regarding the governance and use of the NDNAD. There was also lack
of data about public attitudes towards the issues related to the use of NDNAD which
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have been highlighted by the 2005 House of Commons Select Committee on Science
and Technology.1439
Therefore, there have been calls for a full public debate on the collection and use of
bio-information by the police, particularly on the uses of the NDNAD.1440 Moreover,
the Runnymede Trust in their 2009 report recommended that the government should
take measures to ‘correct this state of affairs with a wide-ranging consultation’.1441
Finally, the HGC called for a review of the database and new laws to be passed to
govern the use of DNA database.1442 The UK’s ‘genetics watchdog’ argued that:
Britain has built the world’s biggest DNA database without proper political
debate and police routinely arrest people just to get their DNA profiles onto the
system.1443

All these reports and data indicates a lack of proper checks and balances in the
NDNAD and this is one of the biggest challenges for proper functioning of a DNA
Database like NDNAD. Therefore, it is important that the government take some
initiatives to fill this lacuna.
(f) Risks Associated with Familial Searching
‘Familial searching’ seems to be very useful; however, it clearly represents a major
intrusion into family life, in other words into ‘family privacy’. It could reveal, for
example, that there is no genetic relation between the parties who have long believed
such relationship existed, which might also affect family relationships.1444 Both the
individuals involved and their relatives’ may face some social stigma. Again, the
practice of familial searching has some negative impacts, such as, samples or profiles
of innocent persons (those who have no criminal records) are retained in the database
1439
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and their samples could be subsequently used as a part of an investigative process.
Very often the outcome of such investigations leads to a potential relative of the
person who has left biological material at a crime scene. In this way, a large number
of innocent people may unwittingly become suspects.1445

(g) Risk with Inclusion of Child Offenders in the NDNAD
Under the UK legal system a child aged between 10 to 14 years was presumed to be
‘doli incapax’ (that is, they are lack of sufficient maturity to be guilty of a crime)
until 1998. However, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 removed that
presumption.1446 Under the current provision of this Act, any child aged 10 or
over1447 in the UK can be arrested on suspicion of a criminal offence.1448 It has been
a common understanding for many years that early exposure to the criminal justice
system is harmful and counter-productive for children. It is for this reason the system
of reprimands and final warnings was developed with the idea behind that children
would only be taken to court for the most serious offences or where opportunities to
change their behaviour had failed. However, the abolition of the presumption of ‘doli
incapax’ has allowed even relatively young children to be held criminally
responsible for minor offences (such as misjudgements for testing boundaries, for
behaviour that would once have been described as ‘being naughty’).
Moreover, Sue Penna and Stuart Kirby noted that s 10(2) of the CJA 2003 provides:
[E]xtensive police powers in England and Wales to routinely obtain DNA
samples without consent from anyone aged ten or above in police detention who
has been arrested in connection with any recordable offence, regardless of
whether the person is subsequently charged with an offence.1449

Retention of the DNA samples and profiles of children and young teenagers is
therefore an added additional concern. The NDNAD policy in this matter is unique.
‘No other country in Europe criminalises children at such a young age; and [also] no
1445
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other country in the world has such an extensive DNA database’.1450 The Nuffield
Council on Bioethics argued that:
[t]he policy of permanently retaining the bioinformation of minors is
particularly sensitive in the [UK], where the age of criminal responsibility is
low (at age ten years in England and Wales and eight in Scotland) compared
with many other countries. It may be argued that retaining bioinformation from
young people is contrary to Article 40 of the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child1451, in that the Convention requires special attention to be given to the
treatment of children by legal systems, to protect them from stigma, and that if
they have offended, opportunities for rehabilitation should be maximised. The
destruction of relevant criminal justice records and accompanying body samples
could become one element in such a rehabilitative process.1452

In response to the Marper case, on 16 December 2008, the Home Secretary, Jacqui
Smith, set out the government response in the following words, ‘the DNA of children
under 10 — the age of criminal responsibility — should no longer be held on the
database’.1453 She also added, such data ‘held on the database has already been
removed and will not be retained in future either’.1454 Following the Home
Secretary’s announcement, the profiles from all the children under 10 years were
removed and deleted from the NDNAD.1455 Nevertheless, ‘currently more than 3 00
000 children aged 10–17 have profiles on NDNAD, and around a quarter of the 5
million DNA profiles were added when the person was under 18’.1456 The CJPA and
the CJA have made possible to obtain DNA samples from juvenile offenders upon
arrest and retain them indefinitely.1457 It is always possible that children can reinvent
themselves upon reaching adulthood, leaving their mistakes behind; but with regards
to the current practice of retaining children’s DNA, Dowty and Wallace draw
attention to a situation:
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[W]hereby the imposition of targets on police forces “has created a climate in
which children are now highly vulnerable to arrest for trivial misdemeanours”
and together with “the current policy of retaining children’s DNA on arrest”
increases the risk that they are locked into the criminal justice system for the
rest of their lives.1458

But the incoming coalition government has promised to change the system by
copying the Scottish model for DNA retention.1459 Considering the special nature of
children’s DNA data and relevant implications, it is to be desired that the
government will soon take appropriate measures to protect the interest of child or
youth offenders and suspects.
5.1.7.2 Human Rights and Privacy Violations
Along with these challenges, another concern with the use of NDNAD is the
potential for ‘human rights and privacy violations’. Because DNA data has the
potential to reveal a great deal of personal information and it can be used to violate
genetic privacy. Theoretically, a physical description of the source (or sample
provider) of crime scene sample could be determined through a further and more
multifaceted examination of such DNA SOC samples.1460 The analysis of a DNA
sample to determine the physical traits of the source is an option currently limited by
the available technology. However, as more reliable analysis methods emerge, this
approach would provide descriptive information to identify suspects.1461 The
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) has articulated
their agonies about the collection of DNA data as it constitutes a physical intrusion
into a person’s privacy and can be extremely sensitive.1462 Moreover collection of
someone’s DNA sample without their informed consent is significant privacy issue.
In addition, DNA tests based on racial background (that is, racial profiling1463) are
provoking greater controversies.1464 Moreover, extensive power and practice of UK
1458
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police regarding the use of NDNAD raises legitimate fears about individual privacy
and autonomy in the face of state power.1465 With the continuous expansion and
current practice of the NDNAD, the government is approaching the risk of creating a
“suspect society”. The recent ruling of Marper case has also referred to this
eventuality.1466 This important aspect of the growth of the NDNAD and forensic
DNA sampling demands greater attention.

(a) Debate between Individuals’ Right to Privacy and Public Interest: Analysis
of the Marper Case (2008)
In the Marper case, ‘the legality of the retention of DNA samples and profiles from
those individuals who are not subsequently charged or convicted of any criminal
offence after their arrest’ was reviewed by the UK House of Lords.1467 The 2001
amendment to the PACE Act had removed the obligation to destroy the DNA sample
or profile even though there is no subsequent prosecution, or where there is an
acquittal of any person arrested on suspicion. It opened the door for indefinite
retention of DNA data.1468 This amendment was subject to legal challenge in
Marper. The House of Lords considered that the retention of DNA from individuals
who had not been convicted of a crime was not a breach of their right and not
discriminatory and their right to privacy.1469 Such violation is seen as being
proportionate, as the ‘samples could only be used for the purpose of “prevention or
detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution”’
under s 64(1A) of the PACE Act (as amended by s 82 of the CJPA).1470 The said
provision, therefore, did not contravene Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. Supporting
this proposition, Lord Woolf CJ stated that though it was an interference with the
privacy rights under Article 8, this was justified because of the statutory provisions
which aimed to promote the public interest. According to Lord Woolf CJ:
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I draw attention to the statutory provisions to which I have referred because
they make clear that we are dealing with a situation where Parliament has drawn
up a code carefully designed to prescribe that circumstances in which the steps
referred to can and cannot be taken.1471

However, on 4 December 2008 the ECtHR ruled that there had been a violation of
Article 81472 of the Convention through the indiscriminate retention of their (S and
Marper) DNA samples and profiles1473 in the NDNAD. Whether the retention of
cellular samples and DNA profiles may in general be regarded as justified under the
ECHR was not the issue considered by the court. The only issue which is considered
by the Court is whether the retention of the DNA data of the applicants, as persons
who had been suspected, but not convicted, of certain criminal offences, was justified
or not under Article 8(2) of the Convention. The Court observes that:
[T]he protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention would be unacceptably
weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-justice
system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential
benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life
interests.1474

In conclusion, the Court finds that:
[T]the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the
fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not
convicted of offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, fails to
strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that
the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in
this regard. Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and cannot be
regarded as necessary in a democratic society.1475
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The judgment in S and Marper1476 held that the practice of retaining of the DNA
samples and profiles on the NDNAD of those arrested — but where guilt was not
subsequently established or admitted — should be discontinued. Moreover, presently
retained DNA profiles should be removed from the DNA database as well as all
samples should be destroyed. In what has been described as a ‘landmark decision’,
the Court set ‘limits to the growth of national DNA databases’.1477 This judgment
also ‘sends out a clear message to other countries’— there should be a limit to
retaining intimate body samples and DNA profiles in forensic databases.1478
Again, in the case of R (on the application of GC) (FC) (appellant) v the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent) and R (on the application of
C) (FC) (Appellant) v the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent),
By a majority of 5 to 2, the Supreme Court held that:
S 64(1A) could be interpreted compatibly with Article 8 and that, accordingly,
no declaration of incompatibility should be made. However, because this matter
was already being considered by Parliament and because it involved sensitive
and difficult questions, it would not be appropriate for the Court to make
decisions about the facts of the individual cases or to make a specific order
requiring ACPO to reconsider the guidelines. The Matter should be left to
Parliament to resolve.1479

This judgment again reflected that individual privacy had been violated and would
continue to be violated until the UK Parliament actually enacted some protective
legislation. In addition, some recent government activities represented reluctant
response by the UK to the ECtHR ruling in 2008. For instance, at the end of 2008,
the number of profiles being included on the NDNAD was rising at the rate of 6 000
per week. The UK is believed to hold the DNA of at least 4 million people (more
than 5 million profiles) on its database. There have also been individual cases about
illegally retained DNA samples.1480 In addition more than 90 000 innocent people’s
DNA has been added to the NDNAD as it keeps indefinitely the profiles of
1476
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unconvicted suspects. According to the Liberal Democrats Research (based on
Parliamentary answers) a further 4 33 752 profiles were added to the DNA database
in the less than 12 month period after the human rights court decision on December
2008.1481
The above discussion articulates and argues that there are some instances of human
rights and privacy violations exist in the UK. The main objection raised by the
Marper case is the ‘blanket and indiscriminate’ retention of DNA information. The
mere retention of personal data have direct impact on the private-life of an individual
concerned, irrespective of whether subsequent use is made of the data or not.
Furthermore, the retention of the unconvicted persons’ data may be especially
harmful in the case of minors (the first applicant of the Marper Case), given their
special situation1482 and the importance of their development and integration in
society.1483 These are some relevant concerns that could be raised in similar kinds of
situation. After analysing the Marper case, it can be alleged that state security
measures (such as, the use of NDNAD in the justice delivery system of UK) cannot
be compromised as it is necessary to maintain law and order as well as to protect
public safety. Similarly, curtailing or restricting individual freedoms does not make it
easier to keep the peace. Therefore, crucial ethical and legal issues relating to human
rights, privacy, informed consent and discrimination raised by the use of NDNAD
cannot be ignored.
According to William Copper, ‘the moral “dividing line” is between integrity and
cynicism’.1484 In order to balance the two competing forces, it can be recommended
that rather than establish a population-wide database, strict criteria for retention need
to be maintained (limiting the retention period, types of sample, and setting
conditions of access for set personnel). Further adequate safeguards for all sample
providers (including convicted, unconvicted individuals and/or innocent people)
should be used to improve public confidence. The argument is about whose DNA
1481
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profiles should or should not be on the database and also whether after a certain time
convicted criminals should also have the right to have their profiles removed.1485 It is
a general rule that it is the right of a person who has been arrested but not convicted
for a minor offence not to share his or her DNA with the state. In this way, a perfect
balance will be kept between human rights and public safety or national interest. In
this regard the current UK government plan for adopting Scottish System enacting
the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2011 is one of the recent initiatives in response to the
ECHR ruling in 2008 that is worthy of appreciation. However, uncertainties will
loom until such rules are implemented and used in practice.
5.1.8

CONCLUSION

The application of genetic technologies to forensic science has been of great benefit
in solving crime and in the elimination of suspects.1486 Thus, forensic identification
technologies (with the use of DNA data) are supporting and encouraging a pathway
of reform in the justice delivery system around the world. The NDNAD is no
exception, and plays a vital role in this reform process of the UK legal system.
This chapter has analysed the case of the NDNAD (that is, some factors for the
establishment and better functioning of the NDNAD). Such discussion particularly
included legislative developments, governance as well as management of the
database, its well equipped mechanisms and modern technology with regard to DNA
sample collection, analysis, and retention of DNA samples and profiles, and diverse
sample sources for the purpose of criminal case investigations. The discussion and
analysis of this case study has revealed that the UK has developed a good database
compared to other countries that have almost the same political, economic, social and
cultural background. There are also significance differences between the UK and
other countries regarding the practices and criteria of entering the DNA profiles in
the database as well as in regard to their removal.
However, this case study also reveals that the growth of the NDNAD and its
extensive use clearly has some adverse effects in terms of human rights and privacy.
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There is both excitement about the potential of NDNAD and fear regarding its use.
Each and every step of the expansion process of the NDNAD as well as its uses has
created some concerns about the human rights and privacy violations (the Marper
case; the SC judgment in the case of GC and C). The other findings from this case
study signify that there is controversy regarding the extensive legislative provisions
which have enabled the expansion of the database through sampling the DNA from
various sources (including innocent people, child offenders and so on) and its
indefinite retention policy as well as practice. The increased uses of DNA sampling
and resulting profiles by the police have raised some other ethical concerns (for
instance, how informed is the consent in sample collection) and such practices have
some definite human rights and privacy impacts.
In regard to the concerns which have been raised by the controversial provisions of
the UK legislation (and their permitted practices), the author of this thesis hopes that
some policy limitations would be able to mitigate some of those concerns and
practices.
The next chapter (that is, Chapter 6) will examine the second case study, that on the
National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory (NFDPL) of Bangladesh. This case
study will also concentrate in the same areas as the study on the UK’s NDNAD, and
will include legislative developments, governance and management of the laboratory,
technological development and capabilities with regard to DNA sample collection,
analysis and retention of DNA samples and profiles, diversity in sample sources for
the purpose of criminal case investigations (that have been highlighted and argued in
the first case study conducted on the NDNAD). Chapter 6 will also analyse how the
same type of DNA database or laboratory function in the different political,
economic, social and cultural background, and how much these factors contribute to
the proper management of a DNA laboratory.
Subsequently, the chapter will explore the issues with regards to human rights and
privacy challenges in the context of the forensic use of DNA or genetic information,
and, while using such information in criminal or civil case investigations, how these
issues could be balanced with public interest or state security measures of
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Bangladesh. The data that have been collected while conducting the case study on
the NFDPL (Bangladesh) will illustrate existing scenarios and challenges faced by
this laboratory. Then further discussions will identify gaps between developed and
developing countries regarding DNA data analysis and their forensic use; that is to
say, comparative analysis between the findings from the NDNAD and the NFDPL
will be conducted and researcher will see how those gaps could be minimised.
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CHAPTER 6
6. 1 NATIONAL FORENSIC DNA PROFILING LABORATORY (NFDPL)
OF BANGLADESH: A CASE STUDY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
6.1.1

INTRODUCTION

It has already been identified that revolution in DNA technology has a number of
impacts for the world community, whether that economy is in a developed or
developing country. However, the nature of the challenges facing the developed
countries is somewhat different from that of those facing the developing countries.
For instance, in reality most forensic DNA services or databases are located in the
industrialised world and it is these countries that mostly benefit from these facilities.
The situation of the developing countries is far different. Most understandably lag
behind as they do not have access to sufficient funds, nor possess the technological
capacity and human resources for establishing forensic DNA services or databases
for assisting in their justice delivery system. Moreover, the ‘right to privacy’—
including the ‘concept of genetic privacy’ — and the overall human rights situation
are very different in developed and developing countries. For instance, the UK and
Bangladeshi legal-political and socio-economic systems are derived from two
completely different backgrounds. Therefore, the situation regarding human rights
generally as well as the right to privacy is different in these countries.
After analysing the forensic DNA context of a developed country (that is, the UK
NDNAD) in the previous chapter, it is appropriate to examine the implications of
these advances in a developing country. The specific intention of this chapter is to
determine and evaluate the challenges faced by the developing nations, as well as
scrutinise how well-designed mechanisms could control misuse (in terms of human
rights and privacy violations) of this kind of knowledge. The main focus of this
chapter is, therefore, to examine the current situation of the forensic use of DNA
information in the justice delivery system of Bangladesh.
The National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the
NFDPL) is the sole forensic DNA laboratory in Bangladesh and assists both the civil
297

and criminal case investigation processes of Bangladesh. The NFDPL of Bangladesh
has been chosen for conducting case study to representing the scenario of a
developing country. Some international benchmarks or organisations have
determined that Bangladesh is a low income economy1487, or a least developed
country (LDC),1488 while others identify it as the developing country.1489 It is worth
to mention here that with regards to the issue of using DNA technology, the
challenges and risks for developing and least developed countries (LDCs) are almost
identical. Although in terms of its economy, Bangladesh represents a low-income
economy or LDCs; nevertheless for the purpose of present thesis, the situation of
Bangladesh is examined as representative of the context of a developing country. The
author believes that the issues identified by this case study are the same and that the
research outcomes would be useful for other countries with similar problem,
regardless of whether they are developing or LDCs.
This case study is dedicated to answering the two main research areas of this study:
(i) whether there is any scope for the violation of human rights and privacy while
using forensic DNA laboratory in Bangladeshi justice delivery system; and (ii) an
evaluation of the gaps between developed-developing countries with regards to such
use of DNA data. The discussion is divided into a number of sections and subsections. First, section 6.1.2 draws a general picture of the use of traditional forensic
investigation mechanisms in Bangladesh. Then the discussion points to the
justification for this case study. Sub-section 6.1.3. highlights the socio-political and
human rights situation of the Bangladeshi people. Subsequently, section 6.1.4
presents the case study of the NFDPL focusing on its background, nature and
composition, objectives, oversight, operation and management. Its existing practices
(that is, the process of DNA sample collection, analysis, storage and retention) as
well as uses are examined. It is worth mentioning that section 6.1.4.3 has examined
1487

‘Economies are divided according to 2010 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, calculated
using the World Bank Atlas Method. The groups are: low income – USD 1005 or less; lower middle
income – USD 1006–USD 3975; upper middle income, USD 3976–USD12,275; and high income –
USD 12,276 or more’: World Bank, How We Classify Countries—Country and Lending Groups,
above n 397.
1488
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'The Least Developed Countries Report
2009: State and Development Governance' (UNCTAD/LDC/2009, 2009) xii.
1489
Developing 8: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (15 November 2011)
<http://www.developing8.org/about-d-8/brief-history/>; see also Australian Government The
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), List of Developing Countries (15
November 2011) <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/devel_list.cfm>.
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and critically analysed the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2010 (draft) of
Bangladesh (‘draft DNA Act’).1490 Furthermore, section 6.1.5 identifies the basic
risks or challenges associated with the NFDPL through an analysis of both
qualitative (semi-structured interviews) and quantitative (survey) data. This section
examines and analyses the NFDPL services, particularly looking at ‘human rights
and privacy violations’ and the ‘financial-technological-administrative challenges’
the NFDPL faces. Finally, this chapter provides a brief summary of those challenges.
6.1.2

A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESHI DNA LABORATORY: A
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT

Very recently the practice of collection and use of genetic information to solve
criminal cases has begun in Bangladesh. Previously, the case investigation system,
production of evidence and judicial trials were conducted and managed in
Bangladesh relying on and applying mostly the traditional forensic investigation
mechanisms1491 (such as using fingerprints, documentary as well as oral evidence,
expert opinion, and evidence based on other items found at a crime scene). However,
the traditional investigation system contains some problems, such as fingerprinting,
oral and documentary evidence which are not error-free. Evidence can also be
forged. In addition, very often law enforcement agencies discover some remnants of
a human body or discomposed human bodies either with skull, some teeth, some ribs
and bare bones, clothing which are stained with blood, saliva, semen, hair, at the
crime scene. Mostly with these items it is hard to detect accurately whether the
skeleton was of a human being or not; and, if it is a human being, who that person

1490

Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2010 (draft). For further details see Multi-Sectoral Programme
on Violence Against Women, DNA Act 2010: Final Draft (7 November 2011)
<http://www.mspvaw.org.bd/news_details.php?nid=5>.
1491
Forensic investigation helps to detect factual evidences and there are many subdivisions of
forensic investigations. Investigators specialising in ‘entomology’ conduct investigative examinations
of insects in any legal proceedings. But today, the term most closely associated with the investigation
of untimely human death. ‘Forensic Odontology’ mainly involves the identification of human remains
by use of dental records. Other subdivisions include ‘forensic pathology’, ‘forensic psychiatry’,
‘forensic radiology’, ‘forensic anthropology’, ‘forensic geology’, and ‘forensic toxicology’.
Investigators in all of these divisions carry out exact techniques to collect sufficient data that will be
used to prove or disprove accusations of criminals. For further details see, Michael Fitting Karagiozis
and Richard Sgaglio, Forensic Investigation Handbook: An Introduction to the Collection,
Preservation, Analysis, and Presentation of Evidence (Charles C Thomas Publisher, 2005) 7–13; see
also
WiseGeek,
What
is
a
Forensic
Investigation?
(5
November
2011)
<http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-forensic-investigation.htm>.
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is.1492 Moreover, paternity disputes, proof of relationship, rape and murder cases are
also some other issues which usually arise before the investigation department. In
Bangladesh, cases remain unresolved year after year due to the lack of proper and
effective investigation methods. The application of DNA testing for the case
investigation process has opened a new opportunity for identifying criminals in
Bangladesh.1493
The NFDPL has been chosen for this case study for a number of reasons:
First, the NFDPL is the only DNA profiling laboratory established in Bangladesh
(established in 2006). No research has yet been done regarding the effectiveness of,
and challenges to, this laboratory and its operations — that is to say, the issues with
regard to violation human rights and privacy, as well as any gap between the NFDPL
and other countries DNA laboratories or databases are yet to be examined.
Secondly, an examination of this laboratory is important to determine the existing
scenario of the practice of developing countries regarding DNA data production, its
use, and how a developing country with limited resources, technological capacity and
technical personnel like Bangladesh use this mechanism in its justice delivery
system.
Thirdly, the NFDPL has proved to be very useful until now; however, there is no
legal basis (that is, no legislation or policy) to control and manage the proper use of
such advanced technology and sensitive DNA data. A legal basis is necessary
because, without any legal justification, all laboratory activities, case investigation
process, and judicial trials are subject to legal challenges. Further, use of the NFDPL
in the investigation process is an ongoing process; all existing and future activities
related to this laboratory require legal validation.

1492

Razzak Raza, 'Need of A DNA Lab for Bangladesh Police', Blitz: Comprehensive Tabloid Weekly
(online) 24 December 2009 <http://www.weeklyblitz.net/366/need-of-a-dna-lab-for-bangladeshpolice>.
1493
Staff Correspondent, 'First DNA Lab Starts: A New Horizon in Solving Criminal Cases Opens
Up', The Daily Star (online) 10 May 2011
<http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/01/24/d6012401097.htm>.
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Finally, it would be useful to compare the use of the NFDPL with the NDNAD of the
UK to determine the differences between these DNA service systems in their
dealings with sensitive DNA data. A comparison with the DNA profiling system or
forensic use of DNA data from both developed and developing countries will
usefully illuminate how this issue could be more effectively dealt with by the
government and the parties concerned. Moreover, the scenarios of the UK and
Bangladesh will offer a snapshot of the problems and concerns which are currently
encountered by the world community.
The research and investigation into the use of the NFDPL in the justice system of
Bangladesh and its related effects is highly significant at this stage. The case study of
the NFDPL in Bangladesh has been selected due to the factors above.
Before examining the practice of the NFDPL and the scope of human rights and
privacy violations in this practice, it is essential to discuss the legal and political
background of Bangladesh. It is also important to analyse the overall human rights
situation in Bangladesh which reflects the legal-political and socio-economic systems
of the country. The basic human rights situation has also influenced the whole
process of justice delivery system, from investigative tools to ensuring justice.
Therefore, the next section will examine the socio-political context of Bangladesh
and its current human rights situation.
6.1.3

SOCIO-POLITICAL

AND

HUMAN

RIGHTS

SITUATIONS

IN

BANGLADESH
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is a geographically small but densely
populated South Asian nation. The country lies in the north-east corner of Indian
subcontinent1494 and has an area of 56 977 square miles or 1 47 570 km1495 and a
population of 124.35 million in 20011496 which some 10 years later had climbed to

1494

Kenneth Robert Redden and Linda L Schlueter, Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia: Asia (William
S Hein, 1990) vol 9, 9.30.7. See also Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2008 Statistical
Yearbook of Bangladesh: Bangladesh — An Overview (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 28th
ed, 28th ed, March 2009) xviii; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook: Bangladesh
(21October 2011) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html>.
1495
BSS, 2008 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, above n 1494.
1496
Ibid xix.
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142.32 million (at 15 March 2011).1497 The capital is Dhaka and the country is
divided into six divisions and 64 districts.
6.1.3.1 Political and Legal History
Bangladesh has a long political and legal history. From ancient times, the territory
has been known as ‘Bengal’1498 and most of its people are popularly known as
‘Bengalis’.1499 From 1757, the British — in various forms — ruled the country for
200 years. Firstly, the British East India Company (a private, that is to say
commercial entity) became established as a substantial trader in the region in the 17th
century, accumulating ever greater power until it essentially ‘ruled’ this region and
parts of what is now India from 1757 to 1857 AD.1500 More formal British rule
followed after the rebellion by the Indian army against the British authorities in
1857.1501 The transfer of power to the population began with the Government of
India Act in 1935.
The Government of India Act 1935 operated as a pre-independence Constitution. It
recognised Bangladesh as a part of the ‘Province of Bengal’.1502 Like many other
areas, the Province was affected by the British government’s attempt in 1947 to
divide the subcontinent into two separate states — Indian and Pakistan — under the
Indian Independence Act 1947.1503 The partition was hurriedly undertaken using
1497

Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) Statistics Division, 'Population and Housing Census 2011:
Preliminary Results' (July 2011) 3.
1498
See generally Aksadul Alam, History (6 December 2011) Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of
Bangladesh <http://www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/H_0136.HTM>.
1499
Countries and Their Cultures, Bengalis (6 December 2011)
<http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Afghanistan-to-Bosnia-Herzegovina/Bengalis.html>. In ancient
times the areas now known as Bangladesh was sometimes divided into tiny kingdoms and at other
times was part of various sub-continental empires that stretched across what is now Pakistan and
northern India and Bangladesh and even beyond. Bengalis themselves established colonies in what is
now Sri Lanka and Thailand. In more recent centuries (the last two millennia) it was regulated first by
Buddhist, Hindu, and then Mughal (16th – 18th centuries CE) administrations, punctuated by periods of
various degrees of independence for various kingdoms or states within what is now Bangladesh. See
also M Shah Alam, 'Bangladesh' in Herbert M Kritzer (ed), Legal Systems of the World: A Political,
Social, and Cultural Encyclopaedia (ABC-CLIO, 2002) vol 1: A-D, 116.
1500
Alam, ‘Bangladesh’, above n 1499,116–9; see also Mark Brown, 'Crime, Governance and The
Company Raj: The Discovery of Thuggee' (2002) 42(1) British Journal of Criminology 77, 77; Peter
Edidin, '1947: The End of the Raj' (2006) 138(9) New York Times Upfront 16, 16, 19.
1501
Peter Marshall, British India and the 'Great Rebellion' (17 February 2011) BBC
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/indian_rebellion_01.shtml>.
1502
Government of India Act 1935 s 46.
1503
Indian Independence Act 1947, preamble, s 2. Indian Independence Act, 1947 passed on 18 July of
the same year which was enacted by the British Parliament to make provisions for setting up in India
of two independent dominions: Union of India and Pakistan, for further details see, V P Menon,
Transfer of Power in India (Orient Longman, 1957) 516.
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largely out-dated maps and the most recent census materials by a Commission
headed by a British lawyer (Cyril Radcliffe) with ‘little knowledge’ of the region’s
history and a little over a month to complete this monumental task.1504 That partition
caused the Province of Bengal1505 to be divided into two new Provinces — East
Bengal (that is, present Bangladesh) (which, as East Pakistan, became part of
Pakistan)1506 and West Bengal (which remained in India).1507 While both are
predominantly Muslim areas, the simple division (with the capital situated in West
Pakistan) failed to recognise the distinctly historical, social, linguistic and cultural
differences. After Partition, the then wealthier and more powerful but less populous
West Pakistan (now Pakistan) politically, economically1508 and culturally suppressed
and began a policy that amounted neo-colonialism in relation to the East
Pakistanis1509 (that is, people of Bangladesh) from 1948 to 1971.1510 The continued
economic exploitation (and resulting hardships) together with the existing cultural
disparity led the Bengalis to resist Pakistani dominion.1511 As a result, Bangladesh
became an independent and sovereign state on the 16 December 1971 after a war of
liberation that left over a million dead.1512 The historic war for national independence
fought against a (West) Pakistan military dictatorship fulfilled the legitimate ‘right to
self determination’ of the people of Bangladesh.1513

1504

Crispin Bates, History: The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies (3 March 2011) British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml>.
1505
Province of Bengal was constituted under the Government of India Act 1935.
1506
Indian Independence Act s 2(2)(a).
1507
Indian Independence Act ss 2(1), 3(1), 3(3)(b).
1508
Mohammad Niaz Asadullah, Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947–71: Was
East Pakistan Discriminated Against? (Number 63, Discussion Papers in Economic and Social
History, Oxford University, 2006)5, 7–10.
1509
At the time of 1970 elections the people of East Pakistan represented over 56% of the total
population of Pakistan: J Castellino, 'The Secession of Bangladesh in International Law: Setting New
Standards' in Ko Swan Sik and Surya Subedi (eds), Asian Yearbook of International Law (Kluwer
Law International, 1997) 83, 87.
1510
Salahuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present (APH Publishing, 2004) 305–6. See also
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs US Department of State, Background Note: Bangladesh
(24 May 2010) <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm>.
1511
Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present, above n 1510, 306–7; Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, Background Note, above n 1510.
1512
S M Masum Billah, Of Independence: Rhetoric and Reality (5 November 2011) Mukto-Mona
<http://www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/masum_billah/rhetoric_and_reality.pdf> 2, 6–7, 7 n 13; see
also Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present, above n 1510, 23; BSS, 2008 Statistical Yearbook of
Bangladesh, above n 1494.
1513
Billah, above n 1512, 2; see also Castellino, above n 1509, 84; Mijarul Quayes, 'Opportunity
Bangladesh — Our Freedom Struggle: An Aesthetic Celebration' (Bangladesh High Commission in
Singapore, 2010) 16.
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The pace of this historical development can be divided into five periods — Hindu
period, Muslim Period, British period, Pakistani period, and of the period of an
independent Bangladesh.1514 Thus legal system of Bangladesh ‘passed through
various stages and gradually it developed as a continuous historical process’.1515 The
process of evolution has been partly indigenous and partly foreign, and the legal
system of the present day stems from a ‘mixed’ system.1516 Although the legal
principles and concepts have been modelled on both Indo-Mughal and English
law,1517 the main structure and legal principles of the Bangladeshi legal system is
derived from the English common law system. Gradually the country inherited the
judicial system and court structure created by the British and adopted them into its
own judicial system with some modifications.
The Constitution of Bangladesh is the supreme law of the Republic.1518 Before the
Constitution came into force, Bangladesh was governed by a de facto1519 government
from 16 December 1971, under three constitutional documents, the Proclamation of
Independence,1520 the Laws Continuance Enforcement Order 19711521 and the
Provisional Constitution Bangladesh Order 1972.1522 The Constitution came into
force on 16 December 1972 and the de jure1523 government was formed for this
country. The entire legislative, executive and judicial activities of the state are now
guided and regulated by this Constitution.1524

1514

For a good overview of these five periods, see generally Pranab Kumar Panday and Md Awal
Hossain Mollah, 'The Judicial System of Bangladesh: An Overview from Historical Viewpoint' (2011)
53(1) International Journal of Law and Management 6, 6–31.
1515
Ibid 6.
1516
Ibid.
1517
Azizul Hoque, The Legal System of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Institute of Law and International
Affairs (BILIA), 1980) 1.
1518
Constitution of Bangladesh art 7.
1519
‘De facto’ government is a that which has taken the place of another regular government and
‘exercises sovereignty over a nation’: Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (West
Publishing, 8th ed, 2004) 716; for further details see Herbert W Briggs, 'De Facto and De Jure
Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi' (1939) 33 American Journal of International Law 689, 689.
1520
Constitution of Bangladesh art 150, sch 4. See also Justice Mustafa Kamal, Bangladesh
Constitution: Trends and Issues (University of Dhaka, 2001) v–vi.
1521
Now it has been repealed. For further details, see Constitution of Bangladesh art 151. See also
Kamal, above n 1519.
1522
Ibid.
1523
‘“De Jure” government is a functioning government that is legally established’: Black, above n
1497; see also Briggs, above n 1497.
1524
Kamal, above n 1519.
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The present legal system owes much to the British colonial administration,1525 and is
based on English common law,1526 which belongs to the common law family.1527 In
the judicial structure of Bangladesh, the Supreme Court is the highest judicial
institution.1528 This highest judicial institution comprises two divisions,1529 the
Appellate Division (AD)1530 and the High Court Division (HCD).1531 Apart from
these, there are some subordinate courts,1532 which are structured at district level.
They are called the ‘lower judiciary’. The justice delivery system at the district level
can be divided in two parts:1533 namely the civil1534 and criminal justice delivery
systems.1535 The government of Bangladesh, since its independence, has been trying
to give a good shape to court management and administration so as to ensure justice
and eliminate crime and corruption. The sources of law consist of the Constitution,
legislation, case law or precedent, Sharia (as the personal law for Muslims), and
Hindu customs and tradition for Hindu community, and various other customs, which
have been practised from ancient times, expert opinion, and juristic writings.1536
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the overall human rights situation is
not the same around the world. It varies from country to country. What types of
human rights a state or government is able to provide for its citizen as well as foreign
nationals, and to what extent those rights are able to be provided, depends on a
1525

Panday and Mollah, above n 1514, 6.
Ibid 14.
1527
René David and John E C Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to
the Comparative Study of Law (Stevens and Sons, 3rd ed, 1985) 24.
1528
Constitution of Bangladesh art 94; see also Panday and Mollah, above n 1514, 15.
1529
Constitution of Bangladesh art 94(1).
1530
The AD hears and determines appeals from judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the HCD.
It has also power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it. It also has advisory
jurisdiction. For further details, see Constitution of Bangladesh arts 103, 105–6; see also Panday and
Mollah, above n 1514, 15–16, 18–20.
1531
The HCD has both original and appellate jurisdiction and it also has both the civil and the criminal
jurisdictions comprising different benches. For further detail see Constitution of Bangladesh arts 101–
2; see also Panday and Mollah, above n 1514, 16–18.
1532
Constitution of Bangladesh art 114; see also Panday and Mollah, above n 1514, 20.
1533
Kazi Habibul Awal, 'Court System in Bangladesh' in Wali-ur Rahman and Mohammad
Shahabuddin (eds), Judicial Training in the New Millennium: An Anatomy of BILIA Judicial Training
with Difference (University Press Limited, 1st ed, 2005) 96, 96; see also Omar Sial, A Research Guide
to the Legal System of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh (October 2008) Globalex [7.3]
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Bangladesh.htm>.
1534
Sial, above n 1533, [7.4]; see generally Civil Court Act, 1887; see also Panday and Mollah, above
n 1514, 20–2.
1535
Sial, above n 1533, [7.5]; see generally Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; see also Panday and
Mollah, above n 1514, 22–4.
1536
See generally V D Kulshreshtha, Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History (Eastern
Book Company, 7th ed, 1995) 379–93.
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number of factors. Some countries may provide most of the globally accepted human
rights but others are able to provide only a few of them. For example, when many
countries have already banned death penalty or are in the process of banning it,
China, ‘continues to make extensive use of the death penalty, including for nonviolent crimes’. There ‘[t]he death sentence continues to be imposed after unfair
trials’ and the country’s statistics on the imposition of death sentences and their
execution remain ‘classified as state secrets’.1537 All of which is, of course, a major
example of human rights violation. In the case of Australia, the death penalty was
last used in 1967 with the execution by hanging of Ronald Ryan, who had been
convicted shooting and killing a prison officer’. More recently, in what has been
termed a ‘largely symbolic’1538 gesture — given the that the state by state abolition
that was completed by 1984 — the Commonwealth passed legislation amending the
Penalty (Abolition) Act 1973 (Cth), and prohibited capital punishment in all states
and territories of Australia ensuring it could not be reinstated in any state or
territory.1539
The following section will discuss and analyse how far the Bangladeshi government
has been able to provide and ensure basic human rights for its citizens. First, it will
investigate the basic human rights situation in general. Subsequently, it will examine
the enjoyment of genetic privacy rights by Bangladeshi people in particular. Finally,
the Chapter will analyse the extent to which human rights and privacy are ensured or
violated in the process of forensic use of DNA data in Bangladesh. The investigation
of the overall human rights situation will also highlight the country’s economic and
technological capacity, including social and cultural responses in this country in
regard to adapting to new technology (in this instance, DNA testing and analysis).
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Amnesty International, China — Amnesty International Report 2010 (14 November 2010)
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china/report-2010>.
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(online)12 March 2010 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/death-penalty-dead-and-buriedas-parliasment-bans-it-for-good/story-e6frf7l6-1225839834244>, quoting Senator George Brandis.
More than two-thirds of Australians oppose the death penalty: see Death Penalty Information Center,
International Polls and Studies (6 December 2011) <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/internationalpolls-and-studies> where a 2007 nationwide Morgan Gallup Poll is cited.
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Crimes Legislation Amendment (Torture Prohibition and Death Penalty Abolition) Act 2010 (No
37, 2010) sch 2; 'Death Penalty Officially Abolished in Australia ', The Daily Telegraph (online) 12
March
2010
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6.1.3.2 Human Rights Situation in Bangladesh
The signing of the Charter of the United Nations in 19451540 was indeed a landmark
in the annals of internationalisation of human rights.1541 Bangladesh has been a
member of United Nations (UN) since its independence. It became the 136th member
of the UN on 17 September 1974.1542 Bangladesh is party to ‘the seven core human
rights treaties ‘which set legal standards for states parties for the promotion and
protection of human rights’.1543 The International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) is considered the most influential human rights mechanism of the
UN for the recognition and protection of civil and political rights. Through the
ratification of this Covenant, Bangladesh has undertaken to respect and to ensure all
individuals’ civil and political rights in areas that comprise its territory and those
subject to its jurisdiction.1544 Moreover, the country has a constitutional obligation to
recognise and protect all fundamental rights of its citizens.1545 Therefore Bangladesh
is under an obligation to guarantee all kinds of human rights (including the right to
privacy) both nationally1546 and internationally.1547 Although Bangladesh is under an
1540
Charter of the United Nations signed 26 June 1945 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 October
1945).
1541
Borhan Uddin Khan highlighted that:
By Article 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations member states pledged themselves
to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United Nations to achieve respect
for human rights.
Borhan Uddin Khan, Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Institutional
Development of Human Rights in Bangladesh (IDHRB) Project, 1998) 1.
1542
GA Res 3203 (XXIX), 29th sess, 2233rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/3203 (17 September. 1974).
For further details see, Year Book of the United Nations, vol 28 (1974) 297.
1543
Human Rights Library University of Minnesota, 'Concept Paper on the High Commissioner's
Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body' (UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/CRP1, 14 March 2006) [3].
The seven core instruments (and the dates of Bangladesh’s adherence) are: The conventions and the
dates of its adherence are: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) is 11 June 1979, the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 6 November 1984, the Convention for the Rights of the
Children (CRC) 3 August 1990, both the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) as well as the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 5 October 1998, the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) 6 September 2000. The country has only signed the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW) (7 October
1998): Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Bangladesh
International Treaties Adherence (6 December 2011) Geneva Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC) <http://www.adhgeneve.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=22>; see also Borhan Uddin Khan and
Muhammad Mahbubur Rahman, 'Human and Minority Rights in Bangladesh' in Rainer Hofmann and
Ugo Caruso (eds), Minority Rights in South Asia (Peter Lang, 2011) 85, 86.
1544
Abul Kabir and Hasnat Manjurul, 'The Politics of Bangladesh: Constitutional Trends and Legal
Issues' (2004) 5(1) Bangladesh Journal of National and Foreign Affairs 51, 51–4.
1545
Constitution of Bangladesh arts 26–44.
1546
For further details see section 3.1.3.3 of Chapter 3.
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obligation to ensure a number of human rights for its citizens, the country does not
and cannot readily enforce those rights for its citizens. Enjoyment of human rights by
Bangladeshi people mainly depends on factors including the country’s constitutional
history, government structure, political stability, and socio-economic conditions.
Moreover, though Bangladesh has become party to some core human rights
conventions or treaties, their impact has not materialised or been felt yet within the
Bangladeshi jurisdiction.
Before as well as after the nation’s independence, the people of Bangladesh were
continually the victims of breaches of civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights. An analysis of the constitutional history of Bangladesh reveals that the
country can be characterised as a ‘twice-born nation’.1548 This is because at first it
was suppressed and oppressed under the British colonial rule and gained
independence in 1947.1549 The British partitioned this region mainly based on
religion just prior to independence being granted to what had been previously known
as India, such that the ostensibly Muslim-majority areas that were located in the
northwest and northeast of British India1550 became West and East Pakistan,
respectively. The main differences of the two parts of Pakistan were that East
Pakistan was separated by nearly 1 600 km (1 000 ml) of Indian Territory from West
Pakistan and they also had a different language, culture, and traditions that reflected
their different ethnicity.1551 The only thing in common was their religion. In the years
following Partition, West Pakistan suppressed and dominated economically,
culturally and politically the East Pakistan (what is now known as Bangladesh).
Gradually, continued suppression sharpened an awareness of these differences
among many East Pakistanis and fuelled Bengali nationalism and demands for
greater autonomy.1552 The successful war of liberation against Pakistani troops
1547
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1548
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History (Wadsworth-Cengage Learning, 2nd ed, Vol C: Since 1750, 2011) 900.
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Encyclopedia of the Nations, above n 1550; Mohammad Bari, A Brief History of the Bangla Language
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(referred to earlier) signalled the second birth of this nation and this time Bangladesh
born as an independent and sovereign state.
While many nations (including to some extent Bangladesh) languished under
military dictatorships subsequent to independence from colonial rule, ‘[t]he history
of political experience of Bangladesh indicates that people of Bangladesh want
democracy, political freedom and rights, as well as development’.1553 During the
colonial regimes of the British (1757–1947) and Pakistan (1948–1971), the people of
Bangladesh could not exercise or enjoy democracy, political freedom, basic human
rights, and development. Such deprivation continued even after independence.
Democracy was not established readily; rather, the ‘search for political democracy
[by the masses] has suffered from interruption’.1554 The country experienced a
considerable period of military rule, both before and after independence. Under the
control of (West) Pakistan’s ruling military elite as part of Pakistan from 1958-62
and again from 1969 to independence,1555 it was then governed for nearly 15 of the
first 20 years of its existence by the two military rulers.1556 Martial law was declared
after the assassination of the ‘Father of Nation’, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 and
the army emerged as a powerful political force, continuing in power until 1981.1557
The second period of martial law was imposed by H M Ershad in 1982 and his
dictatorship continued until 1990.1558 For these two periods, the parliament was
dissolved, the Constitution suspended and all political activities banned.1559 All the
fundamental rights were suspended during these two military government regimes.
Democracy was restored only after the Revolution of 19901560 and people of
Movement (1998) Virtual Bangladesh: History of Ekushe February
<http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/history/ekushe.html>; Virtual Bangladesh, Economic
Exploitation: 1948–1971 (1 May 2005) <http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/history/econexp.html>.
1553
M Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (University Press, 1979), cited in
Nurul Islam, 'Reflections of Democracy and Development in Bangladesh' (1999) 1 Journal of
Bangladesh Studies(JBS) 1, 2.
1554
Islam, above n 1553.
1555
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background Note, above n 1510.
1556
Islam, above n 1553; see also BBC News, Bangladesh Profile: Overview (8 April 2011)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12650940>; Moudod Ahmed, Democracy and the
Challenge of Development: A study of Politics and Military Interventions in Bangladesh (Vicas
Publication House, 1995) 350.
1557
Md Abdul Halim, Constitution, Constitutional Law and Politics: Bangladesh Perspective: A
Comparative Study of Problems of Constitutionalism in Bangladesh (CCB Foundation, 3rd ed, 2006)
461. See also Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background Note, above n 1510.
1558
BBC News, Bangladesh Profile, above n 1533.
1559
Halim, above n 1534, 461.
1560
BBC News, Bangladesh Profile, above n 1533.
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Bangladesh started to feel the essence of democracy. The Bangladeshi people,
therefore, had long been denied basic human rights. Their inability to enjoy such
rights stretched from within the British period until the late 20th century (that is, to
1990). Yet the rights to self-determination, expression, language, representation,
food and shelter — that is, human rights — remained at the heart of the people’s
aspirations. It was the curtailment of such rights that led to revolution, and
ultimately, a democratic Bangladesh where once again people sought to enjoy and
exercise their human rights.
Such rights are attempted within a difficult context. Apart from its stormy political
history, the country ‘is one of the world’s most densely populated … Poverty is deep
and widespread; almost half of the population lives on less than one dollar a day’.1561
The basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, health care and education) are not
guaranteed for all Bangladeshis. That’s why these basic needs become the part of
‘fundamental principles of state policy’1562 rather than fundamental rights1563 under
the supreme law of this country — the Constitution. In addition, corruption is another
critical issue for Bangladesh. It is also another contributing factor to the violation of
human rights. It can be successfully argued that there is a strong link between the
two.1564 These factors (poverty and corruption) also exacerbated the human rights
violations in Bangladesh. Basic human rights (civil-political, economic-socialcultural rights) cannot be guaranteed for Bangladeshi citizens, even to the present
time.
In the judicial system, in order to ensure a fair trial and justice, the use of DNA data
and DNA facilities has begun in Bangladesh as in other countries. With the
introduction of this technology, new dimensions of human rights violations (that is,
genetic privacy) – and new concerns in that regard have emerged in the Bangladeshi
jurisdiction. The concept of ‘right to genetic privacy’ is very new for many countries
1561

Ibid.
See generally Constitution of Bangladesh arts 8, 15.
1563
See generally ibid arts 26–44.
1564
See generally International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International,
'Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection' (2009) 5–10, 23–62; see also Lucy Koechlin
and Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, 'Corruption and Human Rights: Exploring the Connection' in
Robert I Rotberg (ed), Corruption, Global Security, and World Order (Brookings Institution Press,
2009) 310, 310; Zia Haider Rahman, 'Corruption and Human Rights' in Ain O Salish Kendro (ASK)
(ed), Human Rights Bangladesh 2001 (Ain O Salish Kendro (ASK), 1st ed, 2002) 34–5.
1562
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(including Bangladesh). Privacy protection with regard to the use of DNA samples
and profiling is seen, therefore, to be a significant problem for Bangladeshi society.
After discussing human rights situation, it can be argued that the basic human rights
scenario of Bangladesh is not satisfactory. The concept of ‘right to genetic privacy’
has not as yet received any factual or legal recognition. Section 6.1.4 will examine
the NFDPL from different perspectives (its nature, composition, functions, scope of
its services, challenges, as well as problems). It will also investigate and determine
whether and to what extent and in what manner the usual practice of the NFDPL, use
of DNA sample and profile in administering justice poses a risk to privacy. It will
then analyse whether there is any gap between developed and developing countries,
to be more precise, whether the Bangladeshi DNA Laboratory is facing any
challenges in financial and technological terms compared to the NDNAD of the UK.
6.1.4

NATIONAL FORENSIC DNA PROFILING LABORATORY (NFDPL)

6.1.4.1 Background, Nature, Operation and Use of the NFDPL
Aim of this section is to discuss the background, nature, and the forensic use of DNA
data in Bangladesh. It will also examine issues and challenges faced by the NFDPL.
Apart from case study, as has been mentioned earlier data analysis is conducted on
the basis of the qualitative method (that is, responses to interviews conducted with 9
participants from the NFDPL, comprising

two management staff, and seven

scientific and technical staff), as well as the quantitative method (that is, a survey
conducted with the same participants). In order to ensure the anonymity of all
interview respondents’, the respondents’ are identified by an alpha-numerical code
(with the abbreviation ‘R’ standing for respondent and an assigned participant
number for each respondent). Interview respondents are referred to as R1, R2, R3,
R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, and R9 respectively. Pinpoint references to a particular page of
the interview transcript are represented by an additional number. For example, the
comment/quotation taken from the second page of the transcript of the interview with
respondent R1 would be referenced as R1.2. Additionally, within any quote or
extract from a transcript, the use of italics indicates emphasis, and ellipsis (…)
indicates that material has been omitted to aid readability.
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The case study and other data collection methods are mainly focused on the overall
management and administration of the NFDPL (which includes sample collection
and retention, use of DNA data for justice delivery purposes, legislative mechanism,
laboratory access rule, and the rights of the parties). Finally, the collected and
analysed data have determined the outcome of the case study, in regard to issues
about ‘human rights and privacy violations’ as well as the ‘gap between developeddeveloping countries’ (that is, between the UK and Bangladesh).
(a) Background
The forensic medical service of Bangladesh includes clinical forensic medicine and
forensic pathology. The service is provided by the Bangladesh government through
the Ministry of Health.1565 Forensic science involves a network of many laboratories,
scientists and experts from different fields.1566 The DNA laboratory is a part of this
very intricate scientific network.1567 Under Bangladeshi law, all unnatural deaths
(including serious criminal cases such as rape, and murder) that are reported to the
police are subject to forensic investigation.1568 Similar to the law of many other
countries, the criminal law of Bangladesh defines the offences and prescribes
punishments, as well as the procedure for investigation of crime. In Bangladesh, the
legal basis for these forensic investigations is the Code of Criminal Procedure
18981569 and the Evidence Act 18721570.
Owing to the revolutionary potential of the use of DNA techniques in identifying
offenders as opposed to the methods of traditional investigation, Bangladesh — like
many other countries — started to use this new technology.1571 The Multi-Sectoral
Programme on Violence against Women (MSP-VAW) is one of the significant
initiatives for the introduction of DNA technology in Bangladesh. As a part of this
1565

KGM Rahman, MK Osman and S Mahmud, 'Forensic Medicine: Bangladesh Perspective' (2010)
19(1) Journal of Dhaka Medical College 61, 62.
1566
Karagiozis and Sgaglio, above n 1491; see also WiseGeek, What is a Forensic Investigation?,
above n above n 1491.
1567
Dyuti Monishita, 'Indelible Fingerprints', New Age Xtra (online) 9 May 2008
<http://www.newagebd.com/2008/may/09/may09/xtra.html>.
1568
For further details about the forensic investigation process in Bangladesh, see Rahman, Osman
and Mahmud, above n 1565, 61–2. See also Muhammad Nurul Islam and Mohammed Nasimul Islam,
'Forensic Medicine in Bangladesh' (2003) 5 Legal Medicine S357, S357.
1569
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act No V of 1898) ss 154–75, 509–10.
1570
Evidence Act ss 45–51.
1571
Raza, above n 1492.
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programme, the NFDPL was set up on 23 January 20061572 at the forensic medicine
department of the Dhaka Medical College.1573 The MSP-VAW is the joint initiative
of the governments of Bangladesh and Denmark under the Ministry of Women and
Children Affairs. It is being implemented through bilateral agreement between two
countries.1574 Denmark’s governmental aid agency, Danida,1575 provides financial
and technical assistance all over the world, including Bangladesh, under the theme of
‘human rights and good governance’, which includes ‘access to justice’. Under the
‘access to justice’ theme, Danida has established the MSP-VAW project. The pilot
and first phase of the project took place from May 2000 to December 2003 with an
extension from January 2004 to June 2008. The project is now in its 2nd phase, which
began in July 2008 and continues until June 2011.1576 The Danish government has
expressed its willingness to support the 3rd phase (July 2011–June 2016) of the MSPVAW under Human Rights and Good Governance III sectoral programme.1577
The NFDPL was, therefore, initially established under the MSP-VAW project with
financial and technical support from the Danida,1578 and physical facilities, logistics
for establishing the laboratory having been provided by the government of
Bangladesh.1579 This is the only DNA laboratory that has been established in
Bangladesh for assisting the country’s investigation process and judicial system.

(b) Objective
The main objective of this laboratory is to assist and serve the justice delivery system
of Bangladesh. Initially the lab had been established in order to provide legal support

1572

National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, above n 90, 6; see also Raza, above n 1492.
Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women, National Forensic DNA Profiling
Laboratory (NFDPL) (7 November 2011) Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, Government of
People’s Republic of Bangladesh <http://www.mspvaw.org.bd/dna.php>.
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Forward' (October 2010) 4(4) Newsletter of the Multispectral Programme on Violence Against
Women (2nd Phase) 1 <http://www.mspvaw.org.bd/newsletters.php>.
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Danida is the entity (parallel to AusAid in Australia) that implements Danish international
development cooperation conducted under Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for further details
see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, DANIDA: Activities (6 December 2011)
<http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/>.
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Hossain, above n 1574.
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Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women, NFDPL, above n 1573; see also Durdana
Ghias, 'Tapping a New Horizon in Criminal Investigation: Use of DNA Test Limps for Lack of Laws,
Funds', The Daily Star (online) 4 July 2010 <http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=17966>.
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for female victims of various offences, particularly sexual assaults.1580 This was the
case because one of the main shortcomings of the criminal justice system in
Bangladesh was a lack of evidence to prove sexual assaults. ‘Many sexual offences
occurred1581 daily but those cases could not be proved due to a lack of evidence’.1582
The NFDPL is a major step in ensuring a speedy and fair trial for those who
perpetrated violence against women.1583 Gradually, because of its significant
contribution in detecting criminals with accuracy,1584 the scope of its service has
been expanded. At present, various other civil and criminal cases have been resolved
using this laboratory.1585
(c) Nature and Composition
The NFDPL is divided into three sections:1586
•

Screening Lab: The function of the screening lab is to check for the presence
of biological evidence — such as, blood stain, semen, saliva or other bodily
substances — which is recovered or collected from crime scene or victim.
Apart from the NFDPL, there are five other divisional screening labs across
the country.1587

•

Extraction Lab: After screening, collected evidence or samples are sent to the
NFDPL for further examination. When the source of DNA is detected, the
samples are sent to the extraction lab for DNA extraction.1588

1580
Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women et al, National Forensic DNA Profiling
Laboratory (5 November 2011) <http://www.mspvaw.org.bd/files/wsdl.pdf>; see also R 1.1, R 2.6.
1581
‘A symposium was organised on February 17 by four divisions of BRAC at the BRAC Centre Inn
on the theme “Celebrating Development, Celebrating Women.” It was held to commemorate 100
years of Inter-national Women’s Day and 35 years of the ratification of CEDAW (Convention on
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women). The results of research by BRAC on
3000 human rights violations between 2006-2009 showed that the most frequent crime was rape
(31%), followed by murder (25%), acid throwing (15%), suicide (12%), physical torture (8%) and
attempts to rape (7%). Half of the rape victims were below 15 years of age. DS 18.02.10’:Hotline
(HRs) Bangladesh, Teenagers Most Sexually Harassed (6 December 2011)
<http://hotlinebd.org/?p=230>.
1582
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1584
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1585
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•

Analysis Lab: After extraction, the extracted DNA is sent to the analysis lab
for PCR amplification and further downstream application that yields the
ultimate DNA profile.1589

Currently, the NFDPL is headed by the National Technical Advisor, Dr Sharif
Akhtaruzzaman, who carries the overall responsibility for operations. He is
supported by scientific officers, laboratory technicians and other staff with
appropriate training and background. As has been mentioned earlier, in order to
extend the service of this DNA laboratory across the country and also to make this
service more widely available for the population, there are five divisional DNA
screening laboratories, each of which has been established in a divisional medical
college hospital.1590 These laboratories accept cases from remote areas and conduct
the preliminary screening. They subsequently send the samples collected to the
NFDPL for DNA analysis.1591 The final opinion always comes from the NFDPL,
which is the main laboratory (in Dhaka). Six one stop crisis centres (OCCs) have
been established, one at each of six divisional public hospitals, in order to assist the
victim from the grass roots level and from the remote areas.1592 These OCCs provide
medical treatment, security, and counselling services to the victims of various sexual
and physical assaults.1593
The laboratory provides services to law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to
help solve various violent crimes, such as, murder or rape. DNA analysis can also
help solve disputes arising over issues like paternity, maternity, immigration or
inheritance, and determining the identity of missing children, disaster victims or
mutilated bodies. The laboratory is well equipped to provide all kinds of DNA
testing services related to civil and criminal case investigation.1594 More than 50 per
cent of tests undertaken are in relation to paternity cases and the rest are related to
1589
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College Hospital, Sylhet, Sher-E-Bangla Medical College Hospital, Barisal, and Khulna Medical
College Hospital. For further details, see Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women,
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murder, rape, identification of corpses, sibling testing, immigration disputes and so
on. It takes around one month to do the analysis. Up until November 2011, the
NFDPL has completed DNA analysis for 1516 cases, consisting of 5702 DNA
samples.1595
Table 2: Categories of DNA Test up to November 20111596
Serial

Description

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Total

20

72

105

146

100

135

578

2

Paternity
Test
Murder

2

8

20

25

20

24

99

3

Rape

3

90

154

223

162

166

798

4

Identity

2

2

1

3

3

1

12

5

Immigration

0

3

3

5

8

2

21

6

Burglary

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

7

Sibling

0

0

1

2

2

2

7

Total

28

175

284

404

295

330

1516

Number
1

The NFDPL does not accept private cases or request from private individuals. It only
accepts cases referred by law enforcement agencies or courts for DNA analysis.
After completion of the DNA analysis, the report is submitted to the forwarding
authority in a sealed cover.
(d) Oversight, Operation and Management
Operations and Management
Along with its small number of staff, the organisational hierarchy for the NFDPL has
been framed as follows: at the top there is a laboratory head; below that, there are
posts for scientific officers; and under those positions, there are laboratory
technicians; and then there are also other staff (for example, computer operators,
clerical positions, and cleaners)1597 at the bottom of that hierarchy. The staff are
appointed by the government under this project (these positions are currently only
temporary in conformity with the policy of the project). Their organisational
structures are given below:
1595

Ibid.
For further details see ibid.
1597
R 1.1.
1596
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Head of the Lab

Scientific Officers

Lab Technicians

Computer operator

Other staff

Figure 11: Organisational Structure of the NFDPL
Apart from that, there is a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) to initiate and facilitate
the renovation, construction and equipment of OCCs, and DNA laboratories. As
there is no approved permanent, organisational hierarchy, laboratory staff are assured
of their job only during the lifetime of the project.

Ethical Oversight or the Supervisory Body
The supervisory body for the NFDPL is called ‘DNA Executive Board’ (DEB),
which consists of a chairman1598 and 6 other members.1599 The Board is charged with
the responsibility of supervising overall activities of the NFDPL. The DEB convenes
a meeting to review activities of the NFDPL twice a month.1600 In this regards R2
observed:
There is a supervisory body for the NFDPL … the DNA Executive Board
(DEB). How the lab works, how samples are collected and what the DNA
database looks like, the accountability of the lab etc are monitored by this
Board. That means all functions of the lab are monitored by the DEB. Every
activity of the lab is required to be reported to the Board. When there is any new
activity of the lab, the Board calls a meeting. [However] [r]eports of regular day
to day activities are not required to be submitted to the Board.1601

1598

Principal, Dhaka Medical College, see National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, above n 90,

5.

1599

Representatives from the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, the Ministry of Home
Affairs, the Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine, the National Technical Advisor (NFDPL)
and the Project Director of the MSP-VAW: ibid.
1600
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1601
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Technical Teaching Team (TTT)
In terms of skilling personnel for the tasks associated with the new technology, there
is:
[a] three member team … responsible for training on national forensic DNA
Profiling. The members of the team are: (1) National Technical Advisor of the
NFDPL (2) Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine, Dhaka Medical
College (3) Director of the Centre for Medical Education.1602

There is one more committee for the divisional DNA Screening Laboratories.1603
(e) Technology in Use
In order to analyse the DNA, the NFDPL mainly uses PCR1604 based STR marker
technology. DNA profiling via PCR method is a quick way of identifying people by
comparing sequences of STR regions. Paternity dispute cases are investigated in
Bangladesh using 10 autosomal STR loci.1605 In order to do the PCR test, different
kits are used, for example, ‘Identity filer’, ‘y filer’, ‘X-plex’, ‘SGM+’. Among these,
‘identity filer’ is the latest method and most frequently used one.1606 R5 has
highlighted that:
If there is any confusion about a particular method used and also to draw an
accurate conclusion, generally, we use more than one method. We also use
another kit, depending on the type of case.1607

(f) Uses and Benefits of the NFDPL
The NFDPL helps Bangladeshi police investigators to prove the guilt of a suspect or
exclude the innocent in regard to a criminal charge. It may also assist courts by
providing them with conclusive evidence of the suspects’ involvement in the offence
or at least their presence at the scene. Therefore, it minimises doubt as well as
preventing errors of judgment in criminal cases. In this regard, North South
University, Bangladesh, Foundation Chairman, M A Kashem, said at a 2010 seminar
1602
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on ‘DNA Technology in Criminal Investigation’ ‘DNA profiling has the potential to
revolutionise the country’s crime investigation scenario’.1608
DNA testing also minimises the scope for corrupt police officers to execute random
arrests in a criminal case that lacks clues. The DNA lab works as a shield against the
misuse of police powers which will ultimately result in building positive image of
police department as an investigating authority.1609 All interviewees agree that the
NFDPL is very important for the justice delivery system. The service and use of this
laboratory has also expedited the activities of the judiciary, and people are getting
justice smoothly as well as fairly. It has also reduced case related costs.1610 Most
notably, R2 underlines that ‘this remarkable technology provides exclusion as well as
positive identification with virtually 100 per cent accuracy’.1611
At present, the NFDPL is providing services in resolving disputes over paternity1612,
identification of rapists and or murderers1613, disaster victims and or missing
persons1614, to prove innocence1615, to determine sibling disputes,1616 immigration
disputes1617 and so on.1618 According to Prof Sharif Akhteruzzaman:
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Staff Correspondent, 'DNA Profiling Can Revolutionise Crime Investigation Scenario', The Daily
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DNA profiling is being increasingly used to identify criminal suspects as well
as in many other fields throughout the world. Apart from criminal
investigations, DNA profiling is used in paternity tests, immigration disputes,
establishing family links, inheritance disputes and identifying nameless victims
from accidents and disasters.1619

In addition, the NFDPL assists in identifying stolen property through DNA testing,
as ‘DNA can be used to make property [safer] and aid [its] recovery from
thieves’.1620 In civil cases, the DNA test result also helps in determining chastity.1621
The NFDPL is therefore supporting the civil courts ‘to dispose of thousands of
pending cases where inheritance, paternity, and chastity’ are in dispute.1622
Furthermore, there is a plan to establish a database for convicted offenders under the
NFDPL management. Any future criminal activities can then be compared (matched)
with the stored profiles. This will help dispose of criminal cases quickly, thereby
saving time, money and other resources of the government.1623
The following section will scrutinise current practices of the NFDPL (such as DNA
sample collection, DNA analysis, storage and or removal, and, finally, right to
1615

Trans: Niyamul Kabir Shajol, ‘The Young Girl Filed a Rape Case after Delivering the Baby: A
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access). Then it will examine the legal basis for this practice and the services
provided by this laboratory in the justice delivery system.
6.1.4.2 Existing Practices: Governance of the NFDPL
(a) Sample Collection
Detailed information has been provided by interview respondents regarding the
sample collection process in the NFDPL. Almost all scientific officers and laboratory
technicians have been working there for more than one year.1624 Some of them have
been working there since the establishment of the laboratory.1625 There are two
groups of people who are involved in the DNA sample collection, analysis, storage
or removal, and submission of the final report:
•

Scientific officers: their job is to supervise technicians in the whole process
of sample collection, DNA extraction, and analysis.1626 Some of these officers
conduct the correspondence with outside organisations or bodies.1627

•

Laboratory technicians: their function is to assist the scientific officers in the
process, for instance, in collecting sample, completing the forms, and
extracting DNA.1628

In general, scientific officers and laboratory technicians are assigned the duties of
handling cases related to DNA testing and profiling. For every case, one scientific
officer and one laboratory technician are assigned. There are two ways of collecting
DNA sample:1629
i.

DNA samples are collected from the crime scene by the police. The sample is
then passed on to the laboratory staff, and after receiving SOC bodily
substance, depending on nature of the crime, they (laboratory staff) complete
the prescribed forms. After completing the required paperwork, scientific
officers (with assistance of laboratory technicians) undertake the DNA
analysis.

1624

R 3.10, R 4.16, R 5.21, R 8.35, R 9.39.
R 3.10, R 5.21, R.7.31.
1626
R 4.16.
1627
R 5.21.
1628
R 8.35.
1629
R 1.1–2, R 3.10, R 4.16, R 5.21, R 6.26, R 7.31, R 8.35, R 9.39.
1625
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ii.

Bodily substances (for example, blood, semen, saliva) can also be collected
from body of the suspect or victim by laboratory staff in the presence of
police. In this regard R3 reports:
We are only authorised to collect DNA samples from the bodies of victims or
suspects inside the lab. We do not collect samples from the crime scene. DNA
samples from the crime scene are only collected by the police.1630

Despite some differences in patterns of response by the interviewees, there were
similarities of opinion; for instance, all interviewees are agreed on the DNA sample
collection process. Further, a survey conducted in August 2011 with the same nine
participants (including management and operational staff) from the NFDPL
(hereinafter referred as the ‘survey’). In this survey, 100 per cent respondents are
also agreed on this point.
After collecting the DNA sample, the next stage is to start the process of DNA
analysis. When the DNA sample is collected, a separate identification number is
given for every sample or case. A separate file is maintained for each case and every
detail is taken so that each file can be identified separately. After opening the file, the
laboratory head assigns each case or file to a team that comprises one scientific
officer and one laboratory technician. The team then undertake DNA analysis and
they try to complete the analysis and obtain a result within a month. However, if
there is any urgency they try to complete it earlier than that. Subsequently, this result
is cross checked by the same test being done by another scientific officer. After cross
checking, the report is submitted to the laboratory head and once it is approved, the
final report is signed by the laboratory head, and assigned scientific officer and is
then counter signed by the forensic department head. Once the DNA analysis results
are ready for publication, one copy is directly sent to the court. Another copy is given
to investigating officer (IO) on his or her request.1631
The NFDPL procedure of sample collection differs from case to case. In case of
parentage testing, blood samples of the mother, child and the alleged father are
required. If the collection of blood samples is done outside the laboratory, strict
1630
1631

R 3.10.
All interviewees have a similar view and opinion in this issue.
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procedures regarding collection, preservation and transportation of the samples are
undertaken by the laboratory staff and by the police departmental officers, separately
or together as the case may be.1632 If the blood collection cannot be taken or is not
possible or unsuccessful for any reason, a buccal (cheek) swab is provided for
sample collection.1633 A buccal swabs are normally done for DNA testing. A
specimen is collected by gently rubbing inside the cheeks with long swabs.1634
In case of a rape or murder, forensic exhibits (for example, clothes worn by the
victim, under-garments, bed-sheets, internal vaginal swabs, slides of microscopic
examinations along with blood samples of the victim and accused) are collected. In
murder cases, forensic exhibits that might be left by the suspects at the scene of
crime, together with tissue samples taken from the victim and blood samples from
the suspects, are required.1635 All samples are required to be accompanied by a
forwarding note (Form 1)1636 and an identification form (Form 2)1637 for each person,
duly filed and signed by the donor in the presence of a witness (magistrate or public
representative or medical officer). No samples are received by the NFDPL without
these documents.1638

(b) Storage and Retention
After DNA sample collection, the next step is storage and retention, including
removal and destruction of some of the samples when required. Most biological
evidence is preserved and stored in a dry and cold place. Dry samples are kept at
room temperature (out of direct sunlight) or are to be refrigerated at 4 degrees
Celsius or frozen at -20 degrees Celsius.1639 Undried samples (for example, tissue,
bones) are kept frozen at -20 degrees Celsius. Liquid blood is kept refrigerated.

1632

‘All packages containing DNA analysis report are marked with a case number, police station or
court, item number and date. Packages are initialled across the security seal and all samples are sent
through police courier’: See National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, above n 90, 17; for further
details see Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women et al, National Forensic DNA
Profiling Laboratory (NFDPL): Procedure for Collection, Preservation and Transportation of Sample
for Sample Analysis (7 November 2011) 1–6 <http://www.mspvaw.org.bd/files/scp.pdf>.
1633
National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, above n 90, 14.
1634
Ibid.
1635
Ibid 13–14.
1636
See Appendix E.
1637
See Appendix F.
1638
National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory, above n 90, 13–14.
1639
Ibid 16.
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Garments with blood stain or semen stain are air dried and stored at room
temperature or refrigerated.1640
Results of the DNA analysis or profiling are stored both in the electronic and hard
copy versions. Files containing DNA analysis or profiling reports are stored and kept
in the personal custody of the laboratory head. Other than scientific officers, no
person can access these files. There are six computers for six scientific officers and
these computers are protected by password. Electronic copies of the DNA profiling
reports are stored in the PCs of the laboratory head and scientific officers.1641
Regarding the retention of DNA samples and profiles, the interview respondents
were asked:
Do you retain DNA sample and profile, If yes, what is the maximum period of data/sample
retention at the NFDPL?

The following information is shared by interviewees1642:
R1, R2, R7, R8: Yes, we retain both DNA samples and profiles. We retain DNA
samples for 1 year and DNA profiles for an indefinite period of
time.
R3:

Yes, our lab retains DNA samples for 1 year and DNA profiles for
an indefinite period of time. DNA analysis results are retained both
in the computer and paper based files.

R4:

We retain blood samples for 2 years and DNA samples extracted
from other bodily substances or biological fluid are retained for
1year. After completion of 2 years, we destroy those samples.
DNA profiles are retained indefinitely.

R5:

Blood samples are retained for 1 year. DNA sample extracted from
other bodily substances or biological fluid is retained for 2 years or
more than that, it depends on the capacity of our lab. Once the
capacity is full then we destroy DNA samples which are 2 years
old. We retain DNA profiles for unlimited period of time for
convicted offenders.

R6:

We retain DNA profiles for an unlimited time and DNA samples
for 2 years.

R9:

We retain other type of samples for 1 year, blood samples for 2
years and DNA profiles for unlimited period of time.

1640

Ibid 17.
R 3.12, R 4.18, R 5.23, R 6.28, R 7.32, R 8.36, R 9.40.
1642
See Appendix A.
1641
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The above mentioned responses have highlighted that interview respondents have
differences of opinions regarding DNA sample retention period. This argument is
also supported by the following survey results:
Table 3: Frequency Distribution of Maximum Period of Retention of DNA Samples
Maximum Period of
Retention of DNA Samples
(in years)
0–1

Frequency

Per cent

1

11.11

1–2

5

55.56

2–3

3

33.33

Unlimited

0

00.00

Total

9

100.00

After observing the collection and retention of process of the NFDPL, it can be
argued that is there is no uniform data retention rule or policy for this laboratory. Its
staff members have developed a practice or process for DNA collection and retention
(how long a sample ought to be retained, and when it has to be destroyed and so on);
however, the practice is not consistent over time nor universally adopted. The lack of
a standardised policy and practice with regards to the collection process and sample
retention period is causing some uncertainty around the sensitive material which is
human DNA contained in those samples. If such uncertainty continues, DNA
samples, and therefore data able to be derived from such samples, would be able to
be exploited or misused more frequently, violating human rights and privacy.
Involvement of police in the sample collection process without any accountability is
also great threat for privacy. Section 6.1.5 of this chapter will examine all these
issues related to the scope for violation of human rights and privacy while collecting
and retaining DNA data in the NFDPL in detail.
(c) Access to Data
After retaining DNA analysis results in the NFDPL, the question arises regarding
who should or should not access the DNA data retained in this laboratory. According
to current practice of the NFDPL, only the laboratory head can access all data and
files related to DNA samples and profiles stored in the laboratory. Where an urgent
matter arises and the laboratory head is not available, scientific officers alone are
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able to access data and files but only with permission from the laboratory head.1643
However, the laboratory does not have any formal access rule or policy to cover such
a practice. The NFDPL management and staff simply hope that their practice will be
covered by legislation once the draft DNA Act is enacted. They expect that their
access practice and guidelines will be bit different after its enactment, such that:
[D]uring DNA analysis, all scientific officers and the lab head will have access
to all data. But after the analysis is completed and the report submitted, only the
lab head will have access to all data related to DNA profiling stored inside the
lab.1644

However, the proposed draft DNA Act is silent on this issue. Section 40 of the
proposed Act only provides that during criminal case investigation process, tissue
samples, bodily substances or DNA data shall not be disclosed to anybody other than
a person authorised by the law enforcement agencies government. Section 49
provides sanctions for illegal access to the database. The provision provided in s 40
will keep the door open for the police and government to exercise their power with
regards to someone’s sensitive DNA data. The proposed section does not clarify the
role of government or persons authorised by government in this process. The need
for court access for justice is clear but it is unclear what purpose ‘government’
authorised access would serve, particularly in light of the fact that the term
‘government’ is not defined in the definitions section of the proposed legislation, nor
are the roles of authorised persons.
Under existing practice, only laboratory staff members are permitted to access DNA
data retained after the trial is concluded. Third parties — particularly law
enforcement agencies — are not allowed to access the laboratory, and so cannot
access retained data. They can seek a DNA analysis report; and, if law enforcement
agencies feel it necessary in the interest of a later case investigation, then they can
seek more data under the supervision of laboratory staff. One respondent opines that:
Until now the law enforcing agencies have not expressed much interest in
accessing the lab. Apart from that, we have not established the DNA database
yet. Once the database is established, then the authority will decide who should
have right to access it and who should not.1645
1643

R 3.12, R 4.18, R 6.28, R 7.32, R 8.37, R 9.41.
R 5.23.
1645
R 1.4.
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Under the existing practice, there is little or no scope for violation of privacy, as most
of the third parties (for example, insurance companies, employers) are not very
aware of the DNA analysis and its potential uses, and also they do not have right to
access the database. Once people know more about this laboratory, then possible
implications will arise in regard to possible access by third parties and perhaps in
regard to intimidation of staff and/or their families where parties wish to ensure a
result pleasing to police or to the accused party. Moreover, when the DNA database
is formally created and legislation is framed to guide who should have and who
should not have a right to access, then the implications in regard to third party access
should also be evaluated. Also a possible offence in relation to intimidation of staff,
interfering with due process, corruption etc could also be considered for inclusion in
the proposed legislation.
6.1.4.3 The NFDPL Governing Regulation
There is as yet no legal basis for the NFDPL and the regulation of its activities. This
is another most significant issue which has been found through the case study of the
NFDPL and other data collection. In order to justify the activities of the NFDPL and
in relation to the possibility of other related legal challenges, at present s 451646 of the
Evidence Act 1872 and s 5101647 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are
applied. However, these provisions are not a comprehensive legal basis for this
newly emerged technology. There are so many issues which could not be answered
by the application of these provisions, such as: what should be the rights of the
sample providers; how is informed consent to be obtained; what are the rules
regarding the sample collection process and retention period; and who should have
right to access DNA database; what are the rules regarding the treatment of a minor’s
DNA data; what are the privacy and security policies applying to samples and data;
and, most importantly, what are the overall guidelines for how to properly manage
1646

Opinions of Experts: s 45. When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or
of science, or art, or as to identity of hand writing or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point
of persons especially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of
handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts, Evidence Act s
45.
1647
Report of Chemical Examiner, serologist, etc: s 510. Any document purporting to be a report
under the hand of any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government or any
serologist, handwriting expert, finger print expert or fire-arm expert appointed by the Government,
upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of
any proceeding under this Code, may, without calling him as a witness, be used as evidence in any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code: Code of Criminal Procedure s 510.
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and run the NFDPL. Another issue is that police investigators have been using DNA
tests in order to solve criminal cases since 2006, but until now the plaintiffs have had
to depend on ‘the judges’ discretionary power in accepting DNA test in the
investigation process as there is no law making the DNA test mandatory for the
accused’.1648
The above discussion has demonstrated that there is no comprehensive legislation
regulating or governing the NFDPL and its operations and its forensic use for the
purpose of criminal case investigation in Bangladesh. Therefore, it is urgent that
comprehensive legislation be enacted to cover and regulate this new area. In
addition, in the absence of specific laws the fruits of DNA technology could not be
reached on the broadest possible level of application across the jurisdiction.
Considering the necessity of a comprehensive law on the use of DNA information in
the justice delivery system in Bangladesh, a draft DNA Act has been proposed to the
government in April 2010 by the MSP-VAW project office and the NFDPL
authority.1649 The draft has been prepared by joint initiative of the NFDPL and the
MSP-VAW project office. A copy of the draft law has been published in the
website1650 of the MSP-VAW Project for general viewing and in order to obtain
comments. Accordingly, a national consultation and an inter-ministerial meeting on
the draft law have been held. The proposed law covers many areas of this newly
emerged technology. If this law can be passed, much uncertainty and many
anomalies will be removed. At present, the proposed law is under consideration by
the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs and process of enactment.1651 The
following discussion will analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
legislation.

1648

Ghias, above n 1578.
All interview respondents (R 1.2, R 2.7, R 3.14, R 4.19, R 5.24, R 6.29, R 7.34, R 8.38, R 9.42)
are agreed on this issue.
1650
Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women, DNA Act 2010: Final Draft, above n
1490.
1651
R 2.7 (as at September 2010).
1649
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(a) Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2010 (Draft):1652 The Proposed Legislative
Framework for the NFDPL
Although the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2010 (draft)1653 (draft DNA Act) is
not enacted yet, it will be interesting to review and examine its main features. This
discussion will also add greater value in relation to the research questions and it may
support the arguments of the author.
Objectives: The main objectives of this draft DNA Act1654 are to:
•

provide for the DNA analysis of bodily substance or tissue samples;

•

provide for the evidentiary value of the DNA analysis report;1655

•

provide for the use of DNA testing to determine parentage, matters related to
criminal and civil proceedings and other related matters;

•

authorise the collection, storage and removal for DNA analysis of bodily
substances1656 obtained from the SOC and from anyone convicted of a
designated offence for the purpose of creating a National DNA Database.

(i) Bodily Substance Collection with Written Consent: the draft DNA Act authorises
the police to collect a bodily substance or tissue sample with the written consent of
the victim of an offence, a suspect, the accused or any other person associated with
commission of an offence, in a prescribed form. Written consent to collect a DNA
sample is required to be supplied in the presence of both police and a witness.1657
(ii) Right to Consult a Lawyer: This draft Act also gives the person a right to consult
with and have the presence of a lawyer of his or her choice in case of adult1658 or, in
the case of minors, the presence of his or her guardian,1659 before consenting to the
taking of any bodily substance.
1652

Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women, DNA Act 2010: Final Draft, above n
1490.
1653
The draft is prepared and available in the Bengali language; this is translated in to English by the
Author. All the provisions referred, described and analysed in English here are taken from Bengali
text [Trans of: wWAw·ivB‡evwbDwK¬K GwmW (wWGbG) AvBb, 2010 (Lmov)]
1654
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2010 (draft) preamble.
1655
Draft DNA Act s 54.
1656
Draft DNA Act ss 17–29.
1657
Draft DNA Act ss 4, 7.
1658
Draft DNA Act s 9.
1659
Draft DNA Act s 4, 13.
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(iii) Right to Know about the Use of Bodily Substance: Before collecting a bodily
substance from a person detained for, or arrested or charged with an offence, a police
officer will be required to inform the person that such sample might be used as
evidence in a case investigation process or prosecution.1660
(iv) Right to Refuse to Give Bodily Substance:1661 A police officer cannot use force to
collect a bodily substance from a suspect, victim or arrested or convicted person;
however, a police officer may use reasonable force to prevent a person from
destroying or contaminating any evidence.1662
(v) Power of the Court Regarding Collection of s Bodily Substance: In cases where a
person refuses to give consent for the collection of a bodily sample, a court may, on
application, grant an order directing that a bodily sample shall be taken without
consent.1663 Before granting such order, there should be reasonable ground for the
court to believe that the person against whom the order is sought is associated with
commission of, or has committed, an offence, and such collection is likely to prove
or disprove a person’s involvement in a crime.1664 If any person refuses to give his or
her bodily sample declining court order, the court may issue a warrant for their arrest
and detention until the sample is taken from them in accordance with the order.1665
(vi) Establishment of National DNA Database: The proposed Act also provides
provision for establishment of the ‘National DNA Database’.1666 The DNA profiles
added into the database can only be used for law enforcement purposes. Such
database will consist of a ‘crime scene index’1667 and a ‘convicted offender
index’.1668 The envisaged DNA database will assist the law enforcement agencies in
solving crimes by:
•

Linking crimes together where there is no suspect found;

•

Helping to identify suspects;

1660

Draft DNA Act s 10.
Draft DNA Act s 8.
1662
Draft DNA Act s 6.
1663
Draft DNA Act ss 12, 15.
1664
Draft DNA Act s 14.
1665
Draft DNA Act s 16.
1666
Draft DNA Act s 38.
1667
Draft DNA Act s 41.
1668
Draft DNA Act s 42.
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•

Eliminating suspects where there is no match between crime scene DNA and
DNA Profile in the National DNA database; and

•

Determining whether a serial offender is involved.

•

The proposed DNA database will be, therefore, a most useful revolutionary
tool for assisting the justice system of Bangladesh. The proposed Act also
provides procedures for taking bodily substance or tissue sample both inside
and outside the NFDPL laboratory.1669

(b) Evaluation
Both the highly significant ‘right to consultation’ and ‘right to informed consent’
could be addressed in legislative provisions to protect the human rights and privacy
of sample providers. As victims or suspects have the right to consult before giving
their bodily substances, this will provide them with an opportunity to know and
decide whether they want to give their bodily substance or not. This provision will
cover all the required features of the principle of informed consent. Another
important point that should be noted here is that the lawyer or consultant concerned
should have a clear idea about DNA technology, its potential area of uses and
misuses. It means that they must have some scientific knowledge and background
about DNA in addition to legal knowledge. Only then would the respective
consultant or lawyer be able to give appropriate advice to their clients. However, the
proposed Act remains silent on this point (that is, on the qualification of the lawyer
or other consultant of the victims or suspects). The proposed s 10 on the right to
know about the use of a person’s bodily substance also protects the right of sample
providers. This type of right will keep the party concerned aware and, in that way,
they would be able to take appropriate decisions about their sensitive personal data
such as that of their DNA.
Moreover this draft Act also allows the requested person’s right to refuse to give his
or her bodily substance (s 8). Since there is a right to refuse, the suspects ostensibly
cannot be forced to do a DNA test, and it could be argued that the law enforcement
agencies cannot use force against a person while collecting DNA samples; however,
when collection of bodily samples is crucial, and the victim or suspects refuse to give
1669

Draft DNA Act s 5.
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their consent, a case sample can be obtained with a court order.1670 As a result, the
court would play a supervisory role. This could be important, for example, in two
scenarios in relation to DNA sample collection. First, police may have to obtain a
court order in order to obtain DNA samples from a reluctant suspect. Secondly, in
instances where a victim may be reluctant to supply samples due to intimidation by
other parties, again a court order would ensure such collection. Collection would be
in accordance with the law. A court order would also ensure collection by an officer,
who might otherwise succumb to bribery or intimidation. This provision is very
significant because it will minimise misuse due to corruption, bribery, political
manipulation, and unnecessarily forceful collection of DNA data by police exercising
their power, or collection in the absence of a court order. Without that provision, the
proposed Act could be misused.
The ‘right to refuse’ is a basic right of sample providers, but for the interest of public
and the national security, some sample collection without consent is indispensable.
The Court’s involvement through this provision creates a good balance in situations
where sample providers are refusing to give samples, without causing any harm to, or
misuse of, their samples and their rights. That’s why the supervisory role and power
of the court is required here. Otherwise the fruit of the technology could not be
realised.
From the language of the Draft DNA Act, it seems both crime scene profiles as well
convicted offender profiles will be allowed to be retained in the proposed DNA
database. Under this draft Act, DNA samples could not be retained, though the
language of this draft law is not very clear on this issue. Moreover it has not provided
any guideline as to what would happen to the 5702 DNA samples from various
sources (for example, innocent people, children, suspects) that have been stored
(until November) in the NFDPL, a practice that continues.1671 The proposed law has
also failed to provide any guidelines as to how long DNA profiles should be retained
and what should be the security mechanism (both physical and IT-related) to protect
the sensitive information that is contained on this database. Moreover, there is one
1670

Draft DNA Act ss 12, 15.
For further detail, see Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women, NFDPL, above n
1551.

1671
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inconsistent provision in the draft Act. In s 29 it provides that after the release of the
accused or after the final decision (including appeal, revision and review) by the
superior court, all the information related to the accused person’s DNA analysis has
to be removed from the database. Yet s 41 provides that profiles (which can contain
material of both innocent and convicted parties) obtained from the crime scene can
be retained in the crime scene index in the proposed national DNA database.
Convicted offender profiles and SOC profiles could be retained under this draft Act.
In addition, other information that is related to convicted offender profiles as well as
SOC profiles, such as, investigation related information which are connected to the
bodily substance or DNA sample (from which the profile has been constructed),
details about the crime concerned, photo ID and fingerprint of that person would be
retained in the database (s 43). Such other information could possibly be misused,
since some of these may carry sensitive data.
The draft law seems a comprehensive one with all its proposed features; however,
there are some important issues which are not addressed. These include the need for
a clear distinction between DNA samples and profiles, manner of treatment of these
two types of DNA data, and their storage period, particularly the retention period for
DNA profiles, rules regarding the treatment of a minor’s DNA data, and, if people
give their DNA samples, whether permission is required to be sought from them in
regard to the subsequent use of their DNA data. The provisions regarding the privacy
and security of DNA data are incomprehensive and vague. Finally, it is also
uncertain whether all the proposed provisions will be approved by government
without any modifications or amendments at the time of enactment.
Undoubtedly this draft DNA Act is an important mechanism for the DNA lab or
database of a developing country like Bangladesh. It is very important to enact this
proposed law; otherwise the entire DNA laboratory system, as well as the
establishment of a national DNA database, will face uncertainty. Moreover, since the
nature of crime is changing rapidly, especially in regards to international terrorism
and organised crimes, it is highly necessary to build a comprehensive national DNA
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database and enact comprehensive legislation regulating the entire forensic DNA
system.
The above discussion has provided a general picture of the current scenario of the
NFDPL, including its legislative and administrative mechanisms. It is important to
mention here that the case study, reports and other materials about the NFDPL have
actually assisted in determining such a picture. However, the case study and some
archival materials were not sufficient to prove the hypothesis and answer research
questions (that is, to reveal the human rights and privacy issues, as well as gap
between UK and Bangladeshi DNA facilities in their respective justice systems). In
order to fill this gap, both qualitative (semi-structured interview) and quantitative
data (survey) methods were applied. Analyses of both quantitative and qualitative
data have provided a clear picture and helped the author to draw the conclusion by
answering these research questions. In the next section, the author shall embark on
analysing the challenges of the DNA laboratory in the Bangladeshi context based on
both qualitative and quantitative data.
6.1.5

ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA: RISKS OR CHALLENGES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE NFDPL

Chapter 4 describes the strategy taken for data collection and analysis. The following
section is going to present the results of this analysis. First, qualitative data were
analysed applying a ‘constant comparative method’. In this analysis process linkages
were created among collected data to develop core concept. Thirteen different
categories have been identified after coding and analysing the responses.1672 Some
issues of this part of discussion have also been argued with the support of
quantitative data. The reason for the application constant comparative method as well
as mixed methods has been thoroughly discussed in Chapter 11673 and Chapter 41674
of this study.
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For further details, see Appendix B.
See sections 1.1.6 of Chapter 1.
1674
See sections 4.1.2.1 (b) and 4.1.3.4 of Chapter 4.
1673
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6.1.5.1 Data Interpretation and Bringing it All Together: Core Categories
In the constant comparative analysis method of grounded theory, the ‘core category’
is allowed to emerge from the data. In this study, almost every piece of data is
connected to the core category and consequently, two main core categories —
‘human rights and privacy issues’ and ‘some gap between UK and Bangladesh in
using DNA data for case investigation purposes’ — were allowed to emerge from the
interview data. Codes and categories were examined and re-examined, and the author
identified that there are some types of ‘human rights and privacy violations’ as well
as a ‘gap between UK and Bangladeshi DNA facilities’. These two core categories
are also supported by the analysis results of quantitative data. The following subsections provide a presentation about and brief discussion of these key ideas and
findings:
6.1.5.2 Human Rights and Privacy Violations
Analysis of the interview data has revealed that the overall system is working in such
a manner that there is huge scope for human rights and privacy violations. Using the
constant comparative method of analysis, the following seven categories (see Figure
13)1675 have been identified. These categories are:
a) issues with regards to informed consent;
b) lack of trust and awareness among public;
c) concerns with regards to involvement, skill and extensive power of police in
collection and use of DNA data;
d) lack of legislation and policies;
e) societal concerns and stigma;
f) concerns regarding collection and retention of DNA samples and profiles;
g) risks associated with equal treatment of adults and children’s DNA data.
All these issues and factors (seven categories), individually and jointly, contribute to,
or lead towards, human rights and privacy violations (see Figure 13). One additional
category was found in this analysis that is — ‘lab access’ (see and Appendix B) but

1675

See Appendix B.
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this was not found to be a potential risk of human rights and privacy violations
currently. Therefore, it has been omitted from the main categories list.
After further analysis of these seven categories, the core category or theory —
‘human rights and privacy violations’ — has been developed. Analysis of interview
data and the use of the constant comparative method have assisted in the
identification of this concept. The Nvivo software version 8.0 has been used to
develop this model of ‘human rights and genetic privacy issues’ (see Figure 13). The
following sub-sections will discuss these seven categories and also how they are
related to each other and contribute to ‘human rights and genetic privacy violations’
(see Figure 13 and Appendix B).

(a) Issues with Regard to Informed Consent
At the time of collecting DNA sample, one of the important requirements is to obtain
‘informed consent’. The NFDPL practice is that once a victim or suspect arrives at
the laboratory for DNA testing, the laboratory staff members provide an
identification form and obtain the person’s signature on that form. Neither before nor
during the collection of DNA sample is there a practice of explaining the collection
method. Moreover, the laboratory staff members presume that the victim or suspect
has given their consent freely to the police for the whole process. Simply signing the
form, however, does not indicate that the sample providers understand what is
happening or what the implications are of their signing the consent form. Moreover
there is no legislation guiding how to obtain informed consent from the DNA sample
providers.
Interview respondents were asked:
Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If not, why not?

Regarding informed consent collection, all interview respondents share almost same
opinion, although there are little differences of opinions among them on some points.
The assumption of prior consent was almost universal. R6 stated that when a matter
is referred to the laboratory by the Court or police, the person involved (whether
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suspect or victim) arrives at the laboratory with the appropriate court order
authorising sample collection. He noted:
We presume that victim or suspect has given his or her consent freely to the
police or their lawyer before arriving to the lab.1676

Further explanation is, therefore, deemed superfluous. As R4 said:
When a suspect or victim arrives in the lab to have their DNA test conducted,
[as] we presume that they already know everything, … we do not inform them
the whole DNA collection, storage, use and its related concerns and benefits.1677

The consent form signed in the laboratory does not appear to prompt further
explanation. R7 added:
By filling and signing the form, they provide their consent. We do not ask for
their consent, [and] normally we do not explain the whole process of sample
collection to them.1678

Finally almost all recounted that, as a part of the collection process, the victim or
suspect fills and signs the identification form.1679 Some interviewees stated that they
explain to the victim or suspect about sample collection process and its subsequent
use, but there is no unanimous standard for that. R8 shared that, while collecting
DNA sample, an opportunity was given to object to the procedure and its purpose:
[W]e ask the victim or suspect if they have any objection regarding this sample
collection procedure and its purpose of collection.1680

R5 further added that:
We also inform [them] that after the DNA sample collected and its analysis will
be used in order to prove the allegation against him or her. A link will be
established with the crime and it might prove [the person] guilty or innocent.1681

A survey has also been conducted with similar nine participants (see Table 4) and
33.33 per cent of respondents think that they explain and inform the sample
1676
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providers about the consent collection procedure, while, 66.67 per cent responded
that they only obtain signature in a form and presume that victim or suspects are
adequately informed. It can, therefore, be argued that there are some anomalies or
problems with informed consent in the collection process.
Table 4: Frequency Distribution about the Method of Obtaining Informed Consent
Method of Obtaining Informed Consent

Frequency

Per cent

Explaining the whole process to sample
providers
Obtaining signature in a form and
presuming that victims/suspects are
adequately informed about the whole
process
Total

3

33.33

6

66.67

9

100.00

Based on the collected data, it can also be argued that informed consent for the
collection process in the NFDPL is neither uniform nor consistent. Moreover, the
collection method is inadequate; therefore, it can be argued that participants are not
informed in any real sense. In general, sample providers (that is, the mass of the
people) are not conscious about the value of proper use of their right to informed
consent. In addition, as the current system does not allow the person the right to
consult with their chosen lawyer or other party before giving their sample, the whole
process is in fact poses a risk to human rights and privacy violation.

(b) Lack of Trust and Awareness
There is lack of awareness among general public. Almost 90 per cent of people in
Bangladesh are not aware of the recently developed DNA technology and they do not
have a proper knowledge of what DNA or DNA testing is, or how it works. Even
members of law enforcement agencies, lawyers and magistrates have little
knowledge about DNA profiling and its use. Moreover, judges were conservative in
accepting DNA evidence presented before their court. Experts claim that for the
DNA laboratory to be properly utilised, there has to be far greater awareness about
DNA profiling itself and of the potential it holds. Moreover, there is some doubt
about the technology among the general public. At the very beginning, even the legal
experts and law enforcement agencies had no clue whatsoever about DNA testing
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and analysis and were very sceptical. In relation to public understanding and
sentiments, R1 stated:
The first challenge is public feelings and opinion about this new technology, for
instance the general public is suspicious about the quality of DNA testing.
There is also much corruption in Bangladesh, consequently, the general public
1682
have a lack of trust in the state bodies involved with the new technology.

Ignorance or a lack of knowledge of among ordinary people who find themselves
involved in cases (for example, innocents, victims, suspects) and service providers
(for example, police, judges, lawyers, magistrates) could pose a risk in terms of
violations of human rights, including the right to privacy. Ignorance threatens the
integrity of the justice system as a whole by unequal access by victims to the service
provided by this laboratory. Due to their lack of awareness or ignorance, many poor
victims would not even know about the government funds that are available for
conducting their DNA testing. R2 shared his view in this regard, ‘[t]here is a
government fund for the poor victim. But most of the ordinary people do not know
about the fund’.1683 Some other respondents supported the view of R2, stating that
most of the poor victims even do not know how to access these funds.1684 Thus the
human right to equality before the law is stymied, as access to needed laboratory
services is denied.

(c) Concerns with Regards to Involvement, Skill and Extensive Power of Police
in Collection and Use of DNA Data
Under the current Bangladeshi legal system and the practice of the NFDPL, the
victims or suspects are identified by police. Personal information of sample providers
(for example, name, parents name, address, age, gender, and case details) is also
obtained along with their bodily substances as a part of this process. Samples or
bodily substances are also collected by police from crime scenes. In the whole
process no personnel are involved apart from those of law enforcement agencies. As
a result, the potential risk is that the preliminary identification of victim and or
suspect, and/or collection of tissue samples are conducted mostly by a generally
unskilled police force. The use of DNA testing and profiles being a recent innovation
1682
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in Bangladesh, so law enforcement personnel lack adequate knowledge about not
only the technology but also the processes involved, including DNA collection (for
example, how to obtain DNA sample without degradation, how to maintain privacy,
and also to protect the sensitive personal data like DNA).
Most police are not aware about the potential and sensitivity of DNA data. There is
possibility of contamination while collecting DNA sample and also violations of
privacy. Moreover, the police of Bangladesh are often subject to political
influence,1685 and there is also scope for exercising various corrupt practices, such as
bribery.1686 As a result, while collecting and using DNA data there is a high
possibility of corrupt practices or political manipulation occurring. It could also be
argued that identification of victims or suspects, and/ or collection of samples from
crime scene is the most important stage. If it is not done properly, and there remain
mistakes or misuse, the fate of a particular case is at risk, and the parties involved
will not obtain justice.
In this regard, the constant comparative method of analysis has developed the
following category: ‘concerns with regards to involvement, skill and extensive power
of police in collection and use of DNA data’. The Nvivo model has illustrated the
analysis of results in Figure 12. There is a link between and among each category
and concept. Each and every category, individually and jointly, highlight the various
ways in which law enforcement agencies are involved in this process. It should be
noted that such involvement makes them extremely powerful in dealing with
sensitive DNA data, both in terms of sample collection and in terms of subsequent
access to profiles. Extensive powers for police increases the likelihood of the
misusing DNA data. In regard to sample collection, DNA can be intentionally
1685

Abu Syed M Shahjahan, 'Police Reforms in Bangladesh: From the ADB Regional Workshop in
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<http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=57212>.
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contaminated, even substituted, rendering the whole subsequent analysis process
misleading, perhaps even result in a false conviction or exoneration. In regard to
database access, manipulation and substitution or deletion (data loss) at this highly
technological level is only possible among more highly educated individuals; but
access to information could facilitate other forms of corruption (bribery, extortion).
As can be seen, police integrity is essential to the maximisation of the potential of
DNA in the service of justice. Individual and family privacy are in danger and it can
therefore be detrimental in terms of human rights and privacy violations.

Figure 12: Nvivo Model Developed Based on Some Interview Responses1687

(d) Lack of Legislation and Policies
Another main challenge is that the legislative framework for the management and
use of the NFDPL is still in its infancy. There is no legislation regarding the use of
DNA technology, nor in relation to the admissibility of DNA evidence in court. The
interpretation of some existing legislation (that is, s 45 of the Evidence Act 1872)
allows the courts to entertain new scientific evidence, but many experts feel that a
comprehensive law should be enacted to cover uses of DNA and all issues related to
it. In this regards, the views of R1 and R2 can be referred to, ‘[a]t present DNA tests

1687
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are accepted in court as “scientific evidence” under the Evidence Act of 1872’1688 but
‘the court cannot force any person to do the test because of a lack of legal basis’.1689
In the current state of legal ambiguity, the legitimacy, authenticity and admissibility
of DNA evidence in Bangladeshi courts can be easily challenged, even though it is
accepted in courts of law across the world.1690 Moreover, in most cases due to the
lack of legislation, police cannot produce suspects at the laboratory because they
refuse to participate in DNA testing. Without the test, it is difficult to reach any
conclusion and, finally, victims do not get justice. This is a very frustrating situation.
Similarly, rape cases are hard to solve as suspects mostly do not agree to do DNA
tests. Often rape cases are unsuccessful. Supreme Court lawyer Khan Saifur Rahman
said:
If a suspect refuses to do DNA test then there is nothing court can do.
Therefore, new laws are needed to force suspects to do the test.1691

In this regard, the case of seven children of the former deputy inspector general of
police, Anisur Rahman, can be cited. Initially this case remained unsolved for some
time after the DIG refused to do a DNA test to prove his paternity.1692 Lack of
legislation and policy for this area is causing many uncertainties with regards to the
functioning of the DNA laboratory and its use for the delivery of justice. Considering
the significance of the need for appropriate legislation, NFDPL staff and MSP-VAW
project officers have prepared a draft DNA Act and currently draft DNA Act is in the
process of enactment (as discussed earlier). The government appears a little
reluctant; therefore, the proposed law is taking longer time than expected to be
enacted, and situation remains hap-hazard until it comes into force.
In addition, there is also no privacy policy in place to protect sensitive DNA data.
The replies of most of the interviewees1693 have indicated that a lack of legislation
and privacy policy are widening the path to violations of individual and family
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But later it was possible because of the petition for the order of DNA testing was filed before the
High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh by two prominent local NGOs. For further
details, see section 6.1.4.1(f) of this Chapter.
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privacy. The following survey results support interview responses. That means 100
per cent respondents unanimously highlighted the similar fact:

Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Opinion about Privacy Policy
Opinion about privacy policy

Frequency

Per cent

Yes

0

0

No

9

100.00

Total

9

100.00

On the other hand, one respondent believed that laboratory data are protected, even
though there is no privacy policy, because according to their laboratory practice,
DNA data are not shared with third parties, except the requesting body.1694 A view of
R5 is rather contradictory of other respondents. R5 stated:
[I]n our laboratory system there is no scope for violation of privacy. ... If any
case arrives related to family or friends, then somebody from that family or
friend wants to know about DNA test results, because of proximity of
relationship we normally inform them about the test result. Though we do not
tell them who [that is which scientific officer] is handling the case in the
laboratory.1695

The above interviewee clearly believes that this is not a violation of privacy, nor that
the privacy of DNA data are un-protected. No legislation exists currently that covers
this situation. Yet, in reality, this kind of sharing with parties other than the sample
providers (or without the sample provider’s consent) could be termed as violation of
privacy. The lack of both legislation and privacy policy issues are interconnected.
Without a privacy policy or legislation containing provision/s protecting privacy of
laboratory data, the practice of privacy protection is not universally applied. This is
harmful for sensitive data like DNA which are stored on the NFDPL.
(e) Societal Concerns and Stigma
In the existing justice delivery system of Bangladesh and the practice of the NFDPL,
all cases for DNA testing must go through the court or the law enforcement agencies
1694
1695
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(that is the police). There is no scope for entertaining private requests or cases. This
practice is meant to limit the misuses of DNA test. According to the view of R1:
If we are allowed to entertain private cases, it might corrupt the whole system,
1696
and there will be no transparency as well as a lack of checks and balances.

R2 further added that:
Such practice allows us to maintain good checks and balances in our system.
Besides, if there were an undue number of cases, it would be difficult for us to
handle and provide accurate DNA results.1697

On the other hand, the concerns is that in many circumstances, the parties do not
want to disclose their personal matters before public entities or bodies, and if they are
forced to go through that prescribed methods (police or courts) then there is no room
for privacy. Therefore, it can be argued that without the scope for private cases, lots
of cases could not see the light of day (or justice). This is because many innocent
people from respectable families do not want their private family matters to be
disclosed before the society. It is seen as threatening their right to privacy. Moreover,
it raises main societal concerns, such as, if police and court are involved in any case,
a stigma will be associated with that person and his or her family. If the matter,
ultimately, is seen as affecting the reputation of a family not just the individual
involved, a complaint and thus a case may not be brought. A noted example in this
regard is the instance of rape. Being a rape victim causes stigmatisation of the girl
(clearly undeserved) and is also seen as affecting family reputation.
(f) Concerns regarding Collection and Retention of DNA Samples and Profiles
It has already been identified and highlighted that the NFDPL does not have any
uniform set of data retention rules or policies. Interviewees have differences of
opinions regarding policy in relation to DNA sample and profile retention.1698
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Figure 13: Nvivo Model for Human Rights and Privacy Violations
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The survey results also reflect that the existence of some anomalies with regards to
the DNA data retention period in the NFDPL. The majority of interviewees and a
majority of survey respondents (55.56 per cent) believed that DNA samples are
retained for from one to two years in the NFDPL. All of them, however, agreed that
DNA profiles are retained indefinitely. Although this is the established practice of
the NFDPL, a data retention policy or rule, containing a direction in regard to how
long a DNA sample should be retained or when it could be destroyed, is essential for
this laboratory. Moreover, the NFDPL lacks security standards and has no policy in
relation to computer data safety. It also lacks appropriately trained IT security
personnel. Yet in the absence of proper security measures, the laboratory retains
sensitive DNA data. R5’s experience reflected a scenario where there is a partial
adoption of IT security:
In order to encounter logical [IT] threat, we use antiviral software and our
computers are password protected. Other than scientific officers, nobody is
allowed to use these computers. But sometime we share our computer and data
with each other (between and among scientific officers only) even though it is
1699
password protected.

The security system is not sufficiently standardised to protect sensitive data, like
DNA samples and profiles. There is a practice of sharing data among scientific
officers and, therefore, password protection is meaningless. It cannot be identified as
secure system.

(g) Risk with Equal Treatment of Adults and Children’s DNA Data
The NFDPL receives samples from children (that is, those below 18 years of age). In
cases of paternity testing, samples are even collected from the body of a newborn. In
rape and murder cases, the laboratory also gets samples from the juvenile offenders
(14–16 year olds).1700 There are regular cases for DNA testing and profiling of
innocent child as well as child offenders, although the number is very low compared
to the number of adult profiles. In this regard R8 provided his opinion that:
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There is no accurate data on the number of cases related to juvenile offenders
but, on an average about 25–30% of the cases sent to our lab for DNA profiling
are of the juvenile offenders.1701

After resolving the case, the DNA sample of juvenile offenders are stored and
retained just as are the samples of adult offenders. Children should not be compared
to habitual offenders, or those convicted of serious crimes, so neither should their
samples and profiles be accorded the same treatment as that of such offenders. It
increases the likelihood of violations of the human rights and privacy, and, in this
instance, child rights. It could even jeopardise the bright future of a child, should
sensitive data be shared with relatives or others.
After analysing data gathered from interviewees, survey results and other materials,
it can be argued that although many administrative, technical and legislative
measures have already taken to improve the NFDPL facilities for the Bangladeshi
justice delivery system, there still remain some problems in the whole system. The
seven above mentioned categories are some significant ones which have been
identified by this study. It further can be argued that all these issues are interconnected. One problem contributes to another. For instance, if informed consent is
not properly obtained, the contributing factors are is lack of awareness and lack of
legislation. In other words, there is no stringent rule for collection of informed
consent. Other issues — concerns with regards to power of police, concerns
regarding collection and retention of DNA samples and profiles, risks posed by equal
treatment of both adults and children’s DNA data — also exist because of a lack of
legislation and policies.
Again, because of lack of awareness people are not concerned about the
consequences of insecure retention of their DNA data, the value of their informed
consent, or the possible misuse of children’s DNA data if it treated equally with
adults DNA profiles. Since there are no legal or policy mechanisms, then people are
not sufficiently aware of their rights, and so the police force then has greater
opportunity to manipulate the system. Because of lack of awareness and knowledge,
the parties involved are not putting pressure on the government for comprehensive
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legislation. Moreover, as there are no legal guidelines, the laboratory does not have
any consistent DNA sample and profile retention periods. All these issues are
individually and jointly contributing to the violation of human rights and privacy.
The seven categories identified through the use of the constant comparative method
of analysis concentrate towards the main problem or core category, namely
‘violations of human rights and privacy’. The Nvivo model for human rights and
privacy violations (see Figure 13) is a good example of interconnectedness among
these issues. Though the case like Marper has not been prosecuted yet in the
Bangladeshi jurisdiction, if the system continues as it is there is a distinct probability
that cases similar to the Marper case and its judgment will emerge in near future.
6.1.5.3 Gap between Developed and Developing Countries
The constant comparative method of analysis has also identified another six
categories and these new six categories refers to financial, technical and
administrative challenges (including some social and cultural issues) faced by the
NFDPL. This challenge actually refers to gaps between developed and developing
countries. These six categories have developed and are concentrated towards the core
problem or category: ‘gap between developed and developing countries’. As has
already been discussed, the Nvivo model for ‘gap between developed-developing
countries’ (Figure 15) has been developed by applying the constant comparative
method. All these issues are actually repetitive responses from all interviewees which
has been coded applying Nvivo 8 software. This model refers to the practical
situation of the NFDPL. These challenges which are identified by the qualitative data
analysis are discussed below (Figure 151702):

(a) Job Discrimination and Uncertainties
Among the concerns raised by the employees at the NFDPL was the issue of
discrimination between and among the NFDPL staff in terms of employment and job
security. Some of the staff are appointed directly under the MSP-VAW project and
they are paid according to the project document. Other staff of this laboratory are
appointed by a third party vendor organisation and their terms and conditions, and

1702
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payments are regulated by this third party organisation.1703 Although they are
working under the project, nevertheless, their employment is not secured under the
project. The issue of job discrimination has been identified by some of the interview
respondents. R7 and R9 respectively argued that ‘there are lots of problems... we
have salary and job discrimination’1704 and ‘we do not have any job security’.1705 R8
added that:
[I]nitially, we were appointed under the MSP-VAW project but now our status
has been changed. At present, we are appointed under a different company.
Under the current recruitment rule, we do not have any pay scale, nor is our
salary regularly paid or bonuses allocated.1706

Some of them have complained that:
We do not have any clear and set organisational hierarchy [in the lab].
Moreover we have not got any promotion since our appointment. Some of us
have already left this job and have joined another organisation.1707

The following quantitative data also support the findings of the qualitative data (that
is, the interview responses):
Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Concern about Job Security of the NFDPL
Employees
Concerns about employment status
Frequency
Per cent
and job security
Strongly agree

7

77.78

Agree

0

00.00

Neutral

0

00.00

Disagree

2

22.22

Strongly Disagree

0

100.00

Total

9

100.00
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Such discrimination is causing dissatisfaction and uncertainty in their minds. It may
threaten the retention of skilled personnel. In addition, to ensure uninterrupted
service on the part of all laboratory staff, their jobs need to be brought under a single
governmental revenue budget. This will integrate them into the public service;
otherwise a lack of job security might possibly force them to seek jobs elsewhere,
resulting in a loss of skilled labour, which could impact on the services provided.

(b) Lack of Knowledge and Co-operation and Co-ordination
As DNA analysis and profiling is a new technology for Bangladesh, judges, lawyers
and magistrates are not familiar with it. Moreover, some judges are conservative and
somewhat reluctant to accept this new technology. In this regard, R2 argued that:
Lack of cooperation and co-ordination on the part of the service providers
(police, courts and lawyers) is one of the biggest challenges. The success of
DNA testing and the lab depend on the co-operation of the police, the court and
the lawyers. If judges are positive about this new technology, then the success
rate would be very high. They can even motivate ordinary people, because
ordinary people have a huge faith in the judiciary. But if the sitting judge thinks
that he will not consider the evidence, then it is useless. Besides, disputing
parties and their lawyers need to feel that DNAtesting is necessary to obtain
justice, and they then need to convince the court and seek permission for the
DNA test in the particular case. If lawyers are reluctant because they do not
understand this new technology, then the whole purpose will be frustrated.1708

In addition police, judges, lawyers and magistrates ‘do not have any scientific
background’.1709 Many of them have no expertise or proper knowledge of DNA
technology and its use in the justice delivery system of Bangladesh. Often a scientific
officer of the NFDPL has to go to the court to interpret the test results. There is no
suitably qualified legal expert to verify the authenticity of such test results or DNA
data. The interviewees, however, noted that there is now provision for regular
training for service providers, such as judges, lawyers, police, magistrates, and
forensic doctors.1710 How extensively that training is conducted across Bangladesh
has not been determined.1711

1708

R.2.9.
R 2.9.
1710
R 2.9, R 3.13, R 5.25.
1711
If the training of laboratory staff themselves is to be an indicator, training of others could be
somewhat lacking in frequency, see R 7.32.
1709

350

(c) Shortage of Technical Hands
The number of scientific officers and laboratory technicians currently employed at
the NFDPL is very low and they are always overloaded with their work. Such a small
number is not sufficient to serve the needs of the population of Bangladesh. Further,
this inadequate number of staff would not be able to provide quality service,
especially in cases of great urgency. In addition, although the laboratory is assisting
the law enforcement agencies, it is not staffed to meet the growing demands of the
police investigators.1712
The NFDPL’s lack of skilled technicians and the laboratory has prompted hiring
expertise from abroad (generally India) to train local staff. R3 states that:
When new technology or methods arrive, there is an arrangement with an Indian
lab for providing training — we hire a technician from that lab, he installs the
technology and trains the lab scientific officers and lab technicians. … There is
a lack of technician equal to his standard in Bangladesh.1713

Again this highlights the lack of sufficiently trained personnel in adequate numbers
to cope with the increasing demands of the new technology and a forensic workload
that can be anticipated to continue to increase. It should perhaps be noted that the
presence of highly trained, well paid personnel reduces the risk of corruption in any
workplace and therefore helps assure data integrity in an institution such as the
NFDPL.
(d) Lack of Development Co-operation
At present other than Danida funding, there is no collaboration and cooperation of
the NFDPL with other international bodies or DNA laboratory or databases of other
countries. Not only does the NFDPL have rely on hiring foreign technician for
training purposes as technology changes, it has been noted that the laboratory does
not reach in that standard where it could share data for detecting some international
terrorists. Again, R3 opines that:
[E]conomic and technological shortcomings are the main challenges on the path
to the future sustainability of the NFDPL. I believe this is one of the main gaps
between developed and developing countries.1714
1712
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In order to develop the laboratory to an international standard, more development
cooperation with the outside world is required. Access to technical and financial
training or sharing of knowledge is really important in this regard.
(e) Other Challenges
There are some other challenges, such as, the very high operating and maintenance
costs of the NFDPL, in a context where Danida funding will expire in June 2016. Its
operating cost runs to around BDT (Bangladesh Taka) 1 crore (which is equivalent to
USD 1 29 870 (approx)) per year. In terms of capital costs, a DNA analyser (which is
the main appliance of a DNA laboratory) cost BDT 1.5 crore (which is equivalent to
USD 1 94 805 (approx)) to purchase initially, apart from the cost of computers and
other equipment.1715 For a developing country like Bangladesh, acquiring and then
maintaining such a laboratory with its costly technology is a big challenge.
Moreover, DNA tests are very expensive for the general public. Either the defendant
or the plaintiff has to pay the charge. If they are unable to pay, the charge has to be
borne by the police but in many cases police do not have enough funds to pay these
costs. All respondents identified following segments where laboratory is facing
challenges or supports need to be increased (see Table 7).
Table 7: Segments Where Laboratory are Facing Challenges or Support Need to be
Increased from All Sources
In order of priority
1

Segment where support needs to be increased from
all sources
Financial and logistics support

2

Training

3

Back up facilities are poor (both IT and physical)

4

Lack of public awareness and information;
lack of knowledge;
lack of dissemination information in electronic media
Expensive or costly test

5

1715

Ghias, above n 1578.

352

In addition, some other challenges include that the laboratory has only small space
and there is not an adequate back up facility. There is also no scope for regular
training for the laboratory staff. R7 notes, ‘[a]fter joining this lab, I once got some
training. I have not got any further training’.1716
(f) Question of Sustainability: Future of the NFDPL
At present, although its operating costs are very high, the NFDPL services are
contributing positively to the justice delivery system of Bangladesh. According to the
view of some respondents, in order to investigate crime, there is no better technology
in Bangladesh than DNA profiling. The general populace are obtaining better justice.
This is more important when comparing such progress to the high cost of DNA
testing. People also consider that they are getting correct judgments.1717
The laboratory has the potential to contribute to the justice delivery system of
Bangladesh, if some associated challenges with its future sustainability can be
removed. For instance, after running out of funding from Danida, performance and
achievements of NFDPL will depend mostly on whether the government will take up
the responsibility for funding and maintaining the laboratory. The laboratory is
currently running under a project and so is not even in the revenue budget.
Uncertainty also looms as to whether this highly sophisticated technology can be
brought to the masses in a country where basic forensic services like viscera reports
take months to deliver. Shahdeen Malik, Advocate of the Supreme Court highlighted
that:
We are yet to implement basic forensic technologies like collecting fingerprints
in the investigation process at the mass level. At this stage it is hard to say how
far this highly sophisticated DNA technology can be brought to the mass
people.1718

Future or sustainability of this laboratory depends on many issues at this stage (see
Figure 15).1719 The laboratory has proven to be a reliable investigative tool, and there
are also funds for poor victims. Public reliance on the technology is increasing day
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by day. The state and the public should realise the importance of the laboratory in
trying to achieve justice and accurately identifying individuals.
The above discussion has highlighted that there are some challenging areas where
financial, technological and administrative support is essential for this laboratory. If
national and international assistance or development cooperation are not provided, it
will certainly adversely affect the future sustainability of this laboratory. Three
categories — ‘lack of development cooperation’, ‘other challenges’ and ‘question of
sustainability: future of the NFDPL’ — are interconnected. It can therefore be argued
that financially and technologically Bangladeshi laboratory is far behind compare to
the NDNAD of the UK and there are some gaps between NFDPL of Bangladesh and
NDNAD of the UK.

Fig
ure 14: Nvivo Model about Future of NFDPL
Future or sustainability of this laboratory depends on many issues at this stage, such
as, the effective role of judges and the existence of appropriate back-up facilities.
Issues of its sustainability and longer term prospects have been illustrated in Figure
14.1720 The laboratory has proven to be a reliable investigative tool, and there are also
funds for poor victims. Public reliance on the technology is increasing day by day.
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The state and the public should realise the importance of the laboratory in trying to
achieve justice and accurately identifying individuals.
The above discussion has highlighted that there are some challenging areas where
financial, technological and administrative support is essential for this laboratory. If
national and international assistance or development cooperation are not provided, it
will certainly affect the future sustainability of this laboratory. Three categories —
‘lack of development cooperation’, ‘other challenges’ and ‘question of sustainability:
future of the NFDPL’ — are interconnected. It can therefore be argued that
financially and technologically Bangladeshi laboratory is far behind compare to the
NDNAD of the UK and there are some gaps between NFDPL of Bangladesh and
NDNAD of the UK.
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Figure 15: Nvivo Model for Gap between Developed-Developing Countries
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6.1.6

CONCLUSION

DNA technology contributes significantly in proving a suspect guilty or not beyond
all reasonable doubt on the balance of probability, by convincingly linking a suspect
with a victim or SOC, it contributes significantly to the cause of justice. It brings
comprehensiveness to trial proceedings and investigations, but also can enforce
greater accountability of the experts, but strict penalties against tampering with
evidence must be maintained as this is the key to the integrity of the entire process.
This Chapter has examined the case study on the NFDPL of Bangladesh and its
related qualitative data (interview responses) and quantitative data (survey results).
The discussion of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of factors in the
establishment, gradual development and functioning of the NFDPL. The discussion
also includes how DNA samples are collected from various sources, stored and
analysed in order to identify victim or suspect, in other words to serve the justice
delivery system of Bangladesh. The case study, interview and survey data have also
revealed that there are some risks and threats associated with this laboratory and the
overall justice delivery system in Bangladesh. Two significant challenges has been
identified from constant comparative method of analysis one is ‘human rights and
privacy violations’, and the other is the disadvantaged suffered by Bangladesh in
maintaining the NFDPL compared to other developed countries database like the
NDNAD of the UK, in other words, ‘gap between developed-developing countries’.
These findings have been supported by simple frequency distribution of simple
univariate statistical analysis (quantitative data analysis method).
Some human rights and privacy issues include, the process of collecting informed
consent for obtaining DNA samples from victims and suspects is not quite ‘free’ nor
is it necessarily ‘informed’, with a lack of recourse to advice from reliable third
parties. The integrity of law enforcement personnel is crucial. While the very
reliability of DNA evidence may assist in encouraging a new police culture by
ostensibly taking the matter out of the hands of individual officers, there remains the
possibility in the existing culture of political manipulation and corrupt practices for
which Bangladesh is notorious, that DNA evidence can be tampered with, including
by sample substitution (at point of collection by law enforcement personnel) or loss,
357

especially where political interests are involved. Where witnesses are also required to
ensure a conviction, these can continue to be intimidated or eliminated, undermining
the value of the DNA evidence presented. Intimidation of victims of crime either
directly or through their families can also result in cases not proceeding despite DNA
evidence, as can the elimination of a crime victim where their testimony is required.
Staff of laboratories, too, must also be made less vulnerable to corruption and
intimidation. This is not to imply that any current staff members are in any way
corrupt, but to simply point out the possibility for such corruption at some future
date, particularly if the system becomes significantly underfunded and lower paid,
less skilled staff are then employed.
Moreover, most ordinary people are not aware of their privacy rights. The biggest
problem facing this laboratory is that there is no legislation for guiding and
regulating its activities (for example, in relation to sample collection, retention,
privacy policy, security mechanisms.). After applying the constant comparative
analysis method of GT, some of these aspects of human rights and privacy violations
have been detected under existing system of NFDPL. It is also found that there are
some interconnections between and among the various issues. All these issues either
individually or jointly are contributing to increasing the possibility of human rights
and privacy violations.
With regards to financial and technological issues — that is the second research
question — it is identified that the NFDPL is operating currently under a project
funded by the Danida for a specified period of time. Such funding is for limited time
only (until June 2016). Although the time is very limited, the government of
Bangladesh has not taken any initiative to place this laboratory within its revenue
budget, nor shown any indication or intention of doing so. Uncertainty, therefore,
looms large about future sustainability of the laboratory because there are huge
administrative and technological costs involved with this laboratory every year. With
regards to other issues, it can be shown that laboratory staff members are dissatisfied
with their job prospects and, as a result, skilled personnel might leave and the
laboratory lose important technical expertise. Further, there is also lack of legal
expertise in the interpretation of DNA evidence in the court and clarify it in terms of
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evidential value. There is also a lack of knowledge among judges, lawyers and
police, as well as a failure to develop international co-operation that would facilitate
a better service. This is further complicated by a poor monitoring and oversight
system, and a lack of co-operation or co-ordination between service providers
(police) and the laboratory. All of these lacunae further weaken the NFDPL
operation and services.
Constant comparative analysis has further identified that there is no scope for regular
training of laboratory staff and poor back up facilities. These raise the question of the
sustainability of the NFDPL. These challenges also have drawn a picture of a gap
between developed-developing countries. It is important to remove all financial,
technological and human resources gaps in order to prevent or minimise human
rights and privacy violations in Bangladesh. Finally another main category: the ‘gap
between developed-developing countries’ has been developed through the
application of the constant comparative method. The second core concept is
illustrated in the Nvivo model 2 (see Figure 15). Such a concept is also supported in
many instances by the results of the quantitative data.
It is just five years since the establishment of the NFDPL. At the very beginning,
both the users and service providers did not accept the use of DNA technology. In its
first year of operation (2006), there were only 28 cases (see Table 2), but up until
November 2011, the laboratory has assisted in resolving 1516 cases (consisting of
5702 samples). The technology is slowly gaining recognition and is contributing to
various civil and criminal case investigation processes. According to R1:
The use of DNA profiling is spreading. The progressive-minded legal
professionals and law enforcement agencies are willing to explore this field and
the unlimited possibilities it holds.1721

This data analysis identifies some weaknesses regarding the usual practices of the
NFDPL; however, there are also some good practices which will help to sustain the
laboratory and contribute in the justice delivery system of Bangladesh. In resolving
the conflicting pressures of these issues, the collected data helps to reach the
expected outcome of this research project.
1721

R 1.5.

359

If a developing country like Bangladesh, a DNA service system is not to be left
behind in this extraordinary period of technological development. It is vital that the
laboratory should have the necessary facilities and technical and professional
expertise. Because the field is moving so rapidly, even many developed countries
have a major shortage of scientists and technicians in this field. Without appropriate
personnel and technological supports, it will be impossible for this country to
develop and use this technology properly. A start can and should be made in
establishing development co-operation (which includes technician development and,
technical support) between developed and developing countries so that the DNA
technology can be introduced and used equally by all countries. In this regard, the
former Director General of WHO, Gro Harlem Brundtland, noted his foreword to the
world community:
[I]nternational partnerships and co-operation strategies [is necessary] to
ensure that fruits of the genomic revolution are equitably shared by all.
Strong international leadership is required to achieve these laudable
aims.1722
Although this remark by the former WHO director general is directed towards the
health benefits, this statement is equally true in regard to the field of the forensic use
of DNA information. In the same way as genomic revolution poses some social,
ethical concerns, so too does the forensic use of DNA, and developing countries need
international support and co-operation as well as partnership in this area.
Foundations are also required to be built on which any kind of new technological
development in this area can be introduced for the benefit of developing countries.
Building foundational relationships between developed and developing countries and
building independent institution and enacting relevant legislation are some important
steps. At present, the NFDPL should be an independent institution, so that
bureaucratic intricacies can be broken down and such institution can be operated as a
logistic and technical backup for the people, and for forensic professional, legal
experts and law enforcement agencies. In addition, societies need to be better
prepared for this new area of case investigation techniques and their related
consequences. Public education, understanding and trust are some basic pre-requisite
1722
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on these key issues. In addition, enactment of the proposed DNA Act of 2010 can be
a way to ensure the legitimacy and authenticity of DNA technology in the
Bangladeshi jurisdiction. Moreover, it can work as good guide for proper
investigations (including the collection and use of DNA data) and fair trials. This
legislation could also open doors to look for better strategies to ensure human rights,
privacy and preventing misuse related to this sensitive data. This is because a
legislative approach has some enforcement mechanisms rather than a mere guideline.
It will convey a clear message for the DNA data users, law enforcers, forensic
experts, judges and lawyers that proper use forensic DNA data will bring fairness
and justice for all, at the same time it recognises and imposes severe sanctions in
relation to its misuse which could otherwise be seriously detrimental to social
harmony, peace and the integrity of the justice delivery system.
The following chapter (Chapter 7) will undertake a comparative analysis of the
findings from the case studies of the NFDPL of Bangladesh and the NDNAD of the
UK. The comparative analysis will focus on and be confined to the main issues
raised and discussed in these two case studies and their related findings. It will
particularly compare and contrast these two case studies in terms of their database
management practices and regulations, and their impacts on human rights and
privacy (including genetic privacy). In an attempt to do this, this chapter will take
into consideration the technological, political, economic and cultural differences
between these countries. It will conclude by providing some recommendations based
on the findings of these case studies.
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CHAPTER 7
7. 1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE WAY FORWARD
7.1.1

INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the core problems of the forensic use
of DNA in developed and developing countries, the former represented by the UK,
and the latter by Bangladesh. It will mainly compare the issues that have been
identified in case studies of the major forensic DNA databases or system in those
countries. Chapter 5 presents the first case study — the forensic use of DNA
information in the developed country context, in other words the use of the National
DNA Database (hereinafter referred to as the NDNAD) in the UK justice delivery
system. In contrast, Chapter 6 highlights the second case study — the use of DNA
information in the justice delivery system of a developing country, that is, the use of
the National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as the
NFDPL) in Bangladesh. Both chapters examined the scope of human rights and
privacy violations, and then continued the discussion and analysis to reveal the gaps
between these countries in the provision of their forensic DNA services.
There are many similarities and even more differences in regard to the services
provided by the NDNAD and the NFDPL. The nature of the challenges faced is
similar to some extent; however, some issues where there are differences have also
been identified in the last two preceding chapters. Before conducting the comparative
analysis of the NDNAD and the NFDPL, it is important to compare the legalpolitical background and overall human rights situation of the UK and Bangladesh.
Although the UK and Bangladesh represent two distinct scenarios in terms of
political, legal, economic and social backgrounds, they are similar in many respects.
These differences or disparities have a big impact on the basic human rights
situations of these countries. The comparative analysis will thus discover how these
different social, economic standards are contributing to human rights and privacy
(including genetic privacy) violations in respective countries. Therefore, in the first
part of this chapter (that is, section 7.1.2) the legal-political and social-economic
background of the UK and Bangladesh as derived from the analysis of the case
studies will be compared and contrasted.
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Subsequently the second part of the discussion (which begins with section 7.1.3) will
provide a comparative analysis between the NDNAD and the NFDPL. It will first
address the issues concerning human rights and privacy violations, and then identify
the gaps between UK and Bangladesh with regards to forensic DNA facilities in their
justice systems. Subsequently, section 7.1.4 will conclude by offering some options
or recommendations based on the findings from the comparative analysis. Section
7.1.5 — the final part of this chapter — will argue whether there is any avenue and
scope for further research in this area, and then section 7.1.6 will provide the
concluding remarks for the entire research project.
7.1.2

COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE UK AND BANGLADESH

The analysis of the political and legal history of the UK and Bangladesh reveals that
both the UK and Bangladesh are based on common law legal systems. Bangladesh
was under substantial British influence for two hundred years since 1757 AD. Whilst
control by the British East India Company marked the first century, direct British
rule extended across much of the Indian sub-continent in the second century, with the
Bangladesh of today forming a major part of the Province of Bengal. As a result,
particularly of this latter period, the legal systems of the UK and Bangladesh are very
similar in many respects.
Despite this similarity, significant differences exist. The UK was an important
colonial power whilst Bangladesh was the colony. The following two sub-sections
will first outline the experiences of the UK and then those of the Bangladesh.
7.1.2.1 United Kingdom
It has been estimated that during the nineteenth century, the British Empire covered
one quarter of the world’s surface.1723 In terms of socio-economic conditions, the UK
‘is a leading trading power, financial centre, and is the third largest economy in
Europe’.1724 Due to its strong economy, the country was able to adopt a solid social
1723
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security system in the course of the twentieth century.1725 In addition, the UK ‘has
historically played a leading role in developing parliamentary democracy.’1726 It has
long been a democratic country. The Magna Carta of 1215 limited monarchical
power, instituted the rule of law, and guaranteed certain rights; some 50 years later
came the inception of the country’s first elected parliament.1727 Democracy in its now
commonly recognised form, however, only came into being far later, with the
franchise extended to non-landowners in the nineteenth century, and women in the
twentieth — the very period when British power was at its height on the Indian subcontinent.
The rights and freedoms of the people in the UK have been further strengthened by
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which led to the adoption of
the Human Rights Act in 1998.1728 The enforcement of this Act and utilisation of
access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has introduced an additional
level of appeal and a new force in regards to human rights issues.1729 In terms of
specific legislation regarding data privacy and protection, the UK implemented the
EU Directive 95/46/EC1730 in the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 (which entered
into force on 1 March 2000). This Act has enshrined eight data protection
principles.1731 Because of these developments, the concept of human rights is well
developed and the human rights situation in the UK is well organised compared to
that of many other countries, including Bangladesh. All the above factors have
1725
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contributed substantially to the introduction of new dimensions in human rights, such
as privacy generally and genetic privacy more particularly. DNA profiling, the
methods of DNA sample collection and storage, are part of this new dimension, as
are informed consent and other rights of data subjects, the ensuring of their rights, as
well as keeping or making data subject aware of their rights. As a result, there is a
better scope for considering and enforcing human rights and the right to privacy in
the application of DNA information in the justice delivery system in the UK
jurisdiction than in countries elsewhere.
However, it is of course a matter of debate as to how far UK intends to protect the
right to privacy (including genetic privacy) in the context of the forensic use of DNA
data, and as to what extent it has provided such privacy protection. Despite the UK
parliament having approved the DPA and this Act having enshrined eight data
protection principles,1732 in 2004 the European Commission ‘expressed concerns
about the UK’s insufficient implementation of Directive 95/46/EC in a number of
areas’ in a formal ‘letter of notice’ to the British government.1733 In addition to
concerns regarding right of access to personal data, international data transfer and the
Commissioner’s lack of investigative powers, and a lack of sanctions, confusion
persisted for some time ‘about what constitute[d] “personal data” under UK data
protection rules’.1734 In 2010 the European Commission again criticised the UK
regime in a reasoned opinion that recommended that the UK DPA ‘be amended to
better implement Directive 95/46/EC …, including … the monitoring and
enforcement powers of the Information Commissioner’s Office’, with changes to
include ‘random checks on those using or processing personal data’ and subsequent
enforcement of sanctions.1735 It has been said, moreover, that ‘the English common
law has historically never embraced the idea of a right to privacy’,1736 while a
‘prominent jurist’ has stated that ‘[i]t is well-known that in English law there is no
right to privacy.’1737 Indeed, before the implementation of the HRA in 1998, British
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law offered a largely ‘incomplete scheme of privacy protection’.1738 The UK has
been a party to the ECHR since its foundation, which has entailed its ‘limited
incorporation … into domestic law, including the right of privacy’.1739 Nevertheless,
Britain’s legislative response has been described as ‘limited’ and its judicial
interpretation as ‘cautious’.1740 Judgments by the ECtHR have also led to criticism
regarding the degree to which the UK has surrendered jurisdiction to the European
Court,1741 with a call by the Lord Chief Justice himself for greater debate.1742
Whatever might be the government’s intention or policy human rights generally or
privacy protection in particular, the people of the UK are more aware about their
human rights and privacy violations. A notable example is provided by the S and
Marper case and the relevant issues regarding this debate have been raised and
discussed in previous chapters,1743 has and will be further addressed in the later
discussion of this chapter.
7.1.2.2 Bangladesh
In contrast to Britain’s colonial role as ‘coloniser’; for much of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries Bangladesh was ‘the colonised’, a colony ruled by the British
government.1744 This rule has provided the basic administrative and legal foundation
for the Indian sub-continent.1745 Most of its cultural, economic, social values have
1738
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been mediated by the two hundred years of colonial rule.1746 The disputed subsequent
division of the Indian sub-continent by the British government in the Partition that
preceded independence did not totally erase that heritage, nor did the emergence of
Bangladesh as an independent state after years of domination by West Pakistan.1747
However, in terms of resources Bangladesh (currently ranked the 94th smallest1748 yet
7th most populated1749 country in the world) is also ranked as among the ‘low-income
economies’ by the World Bank.1750 The whole process of colonialism — both by the
British as well as in terms of Pakistani suppression — followed by a further two
terms military regimes negatively impacted the overall socio-economic development
and basic human rights situation of Bangladesh. Thus basic human rights could not
be guaranteed for Bangladeshi citizens for a considerable period of time. Moreover,
even though the country has signed a number of important human rights treaties,1751
its human rights situation is not consistent enough both in terms of law and in
practice.1752 This is reflected in the incomplete nature of its legislation and provision
of guidelines for the use of DNA technology generally and for forensic purposes in
particular, as well as in other areas.
7.1.2.3 Comparative Evaluation: Gaps between the UK and Bangladesh
From a comparative analytical point of view, it can be argued that the there are some
basic disparities or gaps between the UK and Bangladesh in terms of their respective
legal-political, socio-economic, and human rights situations. These gaps have
influenced the overall legal system and mode of justice delivery in these two
countries. Bangladesh and the UK originated in two largely different historical
contexts and, therefore, differ fundamentally in their legal-political and socioeconomic development at a number of points. Nevertheless, both share the same
perception of the role of technology and intend to make use of DNA technology in
their justice systems. The forensic use of DNA profiling has contributed much to the
1746
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justice delivery systems of both the UK and Bangladesh. It will be interesting to see
if the two countries that so differ in their socio-economic background and human
rights situation can achieve the same objective in using this technology. It is
therefore critical to compare the situation in these two countries with regards to the
use of the DNA technology in their respective justice systems and the implications of
these uses in terms of individual privacy and the human rights situation. The next
section will compare and analyse the two forensic DNA facilities: the NDNAD of the
UK and the NFDPL of Bangladesh.
7.1.3

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE NDNAD AND THE
NFDPL

The NDNAD plays a vital role in the case investigation and justice delivery process
of the UK legal system. It ‘currently holds the DNA of all people who have had their
DNA taken after being arrested for a recordable offence’.1753 In 2009 when it
contained the DNA profiles of 7.39 per cent of the UK population, the NDNAD was
considered to be the most extensive database in the world on a per capita basis,1754
and also the largest database in Europe,1755 and second only in size to that of the
USA.1756 On the other hand, the NFDPL was set up on 23 January 20061757 in
Bangladesh under the MSP-VAW project funded by the Danida in order to assist in
prevention of violence against women as well as to ensure speedy and smooth
trial.1758 The NFDPL is not a police database, and currently it is in the process of
transformation into a fully-fledged national DNA database for Bangladesh. These
two case studies (NDNAD and NFDPL) address the following two main research
questions of this study:
1. Is there any scope for human rights and privacy violations in the context of
forensic use of DNA data, and how can these issues be balanced with public
interest or state security measures?
1753
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2. Is there any gap between developed and developing countries concerning the
forensic use of DNA data in the justice delivery system, and how can this gap
be addressed and/or minimised?
7.1.3.1 Comparative Analysis
After analysing findings from two case studies (in chapters 5 and 6), some significant
problems have been identified. Those problems are common to both the UK and
Bangladeshi systems. The key issues comprise concerns about
a)

the extensive power of police regarding collection and use of DNA data,

b) informed consent,
c)

retention of DNA samples and profiles,

d) risks regarding the inclusion of child offenders, and
e)

access and use of DNA data.

These issues or problems mainly fall under this study’s first research question —
‘human rights and privacy violations’.

(a) Concerns about Extensive Power of Police regarding Collection and Use of
DNA Data
The analysis of the two forensic DNA systems has revealed that there are some
similarities as well as differences on the issue of police power in regards to collection
and the use of DNA data both in the UK and Bangladesh. Among the similarities is
the fact that neither database has been established by a specific Act of parliament.
Among the differences are the scope of powers accorded law enforcement personnel,
their skill levels, and the availability of training. In the case of the NDNAD, the UK
law enforcement agencies are highly skilled and well-trained. The UK legislation
also provides extensive police powers for taking and retaining DNA samples and
profiles.1759 In 2003, the relevant legislation was ‘further amended … to permit
requests for samples in any arrest, no matter how minor or dubious the crime’.1760
Therefore, the UK police exercise unfettered power while collecting and retaining
DNA samples. The extent of this power has been widely criticised. Anthony Mark
Cutter observed that the UK had ‘seen a gradual expansion of police powers relating
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to the collection, retention and use of DNA and related samples’,1761 a process that
has been facilitated by a relaxation of the rules applying to such procedures and a
lowering of threshold values for collection, use and retention.1762 This, as well as the
resulting broadening of the scope of database and its growth, has been criticised as
providing greater opportunity for misuse.
In this regard, the main concern is that the exercise of such power increases the
possibility of violation of the human rights and privacy. Concerns have also arisen
regarding the powers of police in regard to sample selection. Accusations of skewed
selection or bias in regard to sampling have been made.1763 Initial findings of a
higher representation among a particular population (perhaps in regard to a particular
crime) may simply be the result of existing bias affecting policing or be a genuine
statistical observation; however, subsequent targeting of that population inevitably
‘confirms’ and intensifies the skewing of the statistics by reducing the representation
of other groups in the sample group. Such sampling can result in a ‘self-fulfilling
prophecy’ where targeting the specific group results in a greater detection and
conviction rate per head of population for particular offences than for the less tested
group.
Specific groups (such as young males and black ethnic minorities)1764 are
disproportionately represented on the NDNAD. Such unequal representation
highlights the fact that collection and sharing of DNA information is not equally
distributed amongst all citizens. Undermining the ‘principle of presumption of
innocence’, such representation inevitably incriminates them. Supporting this view,
GeneWatch suggested that:

1761

Anthony Mark Cutter, 'To Clear or To Convict? The Role of Genomics in Criminal Justice' (2006)
2(1) Genomics, Society and Policy 1, 8
<http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/journals/gsp/docs/vol2no1/AMCGSPVol2No12006.pdf>.
1762
Ibid 4.
1763
See, eg, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Young Black people and the Criminal
Justice System: Second Report of Session 2006-07’, vol 1 (Stationary Office, 2007) 5, 11–15, 18, 26,
44–50, 53.
1764
For further details see section 5.1.6.1(d) of Chapter 5.

370

… The three main areas of concern about the NDNAD are: its impacts on
people’s privacy; the potential for misuse by governments; and whether it
discriminates against certain groups of people.1765

Similarly, all other things being equal, researchers have observed differences in
relation to rates of conviction, remand, and imprisonment, as well as in terms of
sentence length, parole application success rates and so forth.1766 This may be seen as
evidence of a societal wide problem, from which policing, and particularly DNA
sampling and data collection and use, would not be immune.
In contrast, in Bangladesh there is no such legislation providing police any power in
regard to DNA sample collection and its use. With the interpretation of other relevant
existing laws, this gap is being addressed by the country’s legal system. As a result,
police power in Bangladesh is not as wide as in the UK. Moreover, in Bangladesh
DNA sample collection and identification of victim and/or suspect are conducted
mostly by members of the police force that lack skill and training in this field.1767
Because, forensic DNA profiling and the NFDPL is a recent phenomenon in
Bangladesh, the police force of Bangladesh does not have adequate knowledge about
DNA technology, neither do they have adequate training on how to obtain DNA
samples without contaminating them, nor have they guidance in regard to the
protection of the privacy of this sensitive data.1768 Since the concept of right in
privacy, particularly ‘genetic privacy’, is not well established in this country, in most
instances the Bangladeshi police do not even sense the value of individual and family
privacy and, thus, the need to protect it. In the same way, the police of Bangladesh
are not as skilled as those of the UK. On the other hand, racial discrimination is not
the issue in Bangladesh that it is in the UK; therefore there is generally no prejudice
practice towards any specific groups or ethnic minorities in Bangladesh.1769 Whilst
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there have been allegations of unequal treatment in regards to certain minorities in
Bangladesh (notably the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts),1770 and
examples of inter-community violence even in recent times as well as individual
instances of racially1771 or religiously motivated violence,1772 there has been no
apparent systematic skewing of policing activity in any way similar to that reported
in the UK.
However, the existing bureaucratic, administrative and even judicial systems in
Bangladesh are widely acknowledged as those of the most corrupt country in the
world.1773 It is, therefore, no surprise that the law enforcement agencies are subject to
political manipulation and corrupt practices. A 2007 survey by Transparency
International Bangladesh, for example, revealed that ‘96.6% among the surveyed
households experienced harassment and corruption during interacting with or
receiving services from law enforcing agencies’.1774 The Survey notes that
‘corruption and harassments among the law enforcing agencies are so
institutionalized that incidence of corruption and harassments are almost equal in
both rural and urban areas’.1775 The key offence reported was bribery (41.6 per cent
of surveyed households), while misbehaviour figured in 21 per cent of reported
irregularities, the threat of torture in almost 11 per cent, and arrest without warrant in
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8 per cent. Also reported were the filing of false charges (almost 7 per cent) and
negligence in filing cases (4.3 per cent).1776 Given the above, the highly
sophisticated, sensitive, and mostly useful DNA technology could possibly be
misused in the justice delivery system of Bangladesh, particularly with regards to
human rights and privacy violations.
In both systems, police play a crucial role in the collection of DNA samples. The UK
NDNAD is a police database and British legislation provides extensive police powers
for taking and retaining DNA samples and profiles. In case of the NFDPL of
Bangladesh, victims or suspects are also identified by the Bangladeshi police force at
the first instance.1777 Personal information (such as name, age, gender, parents’
names, addresses and so forth) is collected by them. The interesting point to be noted
here is that although the mode, nature and way of application of police powers are
different in these two jurisdictions, nevertheless there is a wide scope for violation of
human rights and privacy — through the use of this police power and their practices
— both in case of the NDNAD and the NFDPL.

(b) Informed Consent Issues
Informed consent is another important issue. In case of the NDNAD, the UK police
are legally authorised to obtain a DNA sample without consent of any individual who
is arrested for a recordable offence (conviction is not a prerequisite).1778 This is a
clear violation of individual privacy, autonomy and dignity. Moreover in cases where
samples are obtained and retained with consent, once such consent is given by any
volunteer (either victims, witnesses or others who are supporting the law
enforcement mechanism), their decision is irrevocable, that is they have no right to
withdraw their consent.1779 There is also a lack of clarity as to whether the consent
obtained by the police from volunteers can always be regarded as genuine or free
consent, as it is often given under pressure.
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In contrast, the current practice of the NFDPL is to obtain consent from the victim or
suspect (that is, the sample providers) by collecting their signature on the
‘identification form’. Sample providers are not, however, given a separate briefing
and or explanation about DNA sample collection (for example, the sample collection
process, storage period, subsequent use, and consequences if data derived from it is
‘leaked’ to interested third parties, and any related impacts). The sample providers
are ‘informed’ as part of the process, but arguably the information and the process
are not adequate in terms of the international standards.1780 It can therefore be alleged
that they are not informed that their consent is supposed to be free, informed, free
from other pressure or any duress, nor are they advised that they can withdraw their
consent any time. Hence, the existing system and practice of the NFDPL fails to
meet the basic standard or norms of ‘informed consent’. As the general population is
neither well informed nor sufficiently aware of their rights, they are generally willing
to supply their DNA samples and are not generally aware of the possibility of
subsequent use. If sample providers do not give their consent freely, or are not being
properly informed, or are unaware of their right to withdraw consent, then the
collection and use of their DNA samples in the justice delivery system is nothing but
a violation of human rights and privacy (including genetic privacy) of the person
concerned.
After analysing the existing rule and or practice of the NDNAD and the NFDPL, it
can be argued that in both systems the ‘issue with regards to informed consent’
exists, although the specific nature of the issue differs. Police are involved in the
process of obtaining informed consent in both the systems. A striking difference,
however, is that UK legislation has accorded UK police unfettered power to collect
DNA sample without consent from almost anyone, including minors above 10 years
of age (but below 18 years of age).1781 Due to this parliamentary provision, the UK
domestic courts do not even interfere in this issue. However, there is no such
1780
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legislation nor any policy or guidelines to guide the NFDPL regarding how to obtain
informed consent from the sample providers. There is only a draft DNA Act 2010
which has not yet been enacted. Problems exist in Bangladesh mainly because of the
practices of the NFDPL, not because of the law (which is the case in the UK).
Although there are differences in both of these systems (that is, the NDNAD and
NFDPL), nevertheless the ultimate result is same — human rights and privacy
violations.
(c) Concerns regarding Retention of DNA Samples and Profiles
Under the current arrangements of the NFDPL, various kinds of DNA samples are
retained for almost two years and DNA profiles are retained indefinitely. The
individuals’ DNA profiles and personal information are retained both in the
electronic and hard copies at the NFDPL. Paper files or hard copies containing DNA
analysis results are kept in the personal custody of the laboratory head. No person
other than scientific officers can access these files. Electronic or computerised DNA
profiles are retained in the computers of the laboratory head and those of the
scientific officers.1782 As in the case of other operations of the NFDPL, it is merely
practice that guides sample and data retention at the NFDPL. This is not guided by
any legislation, nor by any data retention rule or policy. Furthermore, there is no
security policy and mechanism for this laboratory. The provision of a proper backup
facility for data retention is also very poor at the NFDPL. Consequently, the storage
and retention of DNA samples (for two years) and profiles combined with a poor
security system seem to pose a significant threat to human rights and privacy.
In the UK, the situation has been very different. Before the 2001 amendment to the
PACE Act, DNA was only collected by the UK police when a person was charged
with an offence and was destroyed if the person was acquitted. The scope widened
with the enactment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (hereinafter referred
to as the CJPA), which amended the PACE Act to allow DNA samples to be kept
indefinitely. Since then, ‘the issue of retention of innocent individuals’ DNA has
become central to debates regarding the proportionality and balance of police uses of
the NDNAD’.1783 Moreover, ‘[a] number of judges1784 and senior police officers have
1782
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called for the expansion of the database to cover the entire population’.1785 This
would be a significant increase from the current level of 7 per cent of the population
who are now on the database.1786 In addition, while ‘successive Acts of Parliament
have expanded the grounds allowing for retention of DNA (samples and profiles), the
law has been silent on the creation of a framework for deletion’.1787 The policy of
indefinite retention of the DNA of anyone arrested means that a large number of
innocent people, including thousands of children, have had their DNA data
permanently retained.1788 The reason why they should be categorised as innocent is
because many such persons have been arrested — but not subsequently been proved
guilty of a crime. In S and Marper v the UK, the applicants moreover claimed that
the retention of DNA data ‘casts suspicion on unconvicted persons implying that
they were not “wholly innocent”’.1789 Furthermore, retention of the DNA profiles of
a large number of innocent people ‘who have never been convicted of any crime’ in
the NDNAD ‘compromise[es] the long-standing tradition of presumption of
innocence1790 in the UK courts and the principle of equal treatment before the
law’.1791 Liz Campbell further argued that:
Non-conviction DNA databases embody the state’s suspicion of the risk of (re-)
offending on the part of certain people, thereby distinguishing them from
“truly” innocent people who have never come to the attention of the police. In
1784
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broad terms, this may compromise the precept that everyone should be
presumed innocent, by keeping the DNA of legally innocent individuals on a
database which is otherwise populated by convicted persons. 1792

It creates a division of persons into a ‘risky’ population and others who had not come
to the attention of the police (however innocently), which is prejudicial to equality
before the law. Certainly the current position embodied in the CJPA 2001 and
Criminal Justice Act 2003 particularly is incompatible with the principles of human
rights and privacy. In this respect, the ECtHR in the case of S and Marper v UK held
that the ‘blanket and indiscriminate’ retention of DNA in the NDNAD violated the
right to a private and family life.1793 The ECtHR ‘decision [also] rejected the UK’s
DNA retention policy in strong terms, stating that it was “entirely improper and
prejudicial” for samples to be retained where there was no “reasonable relationship
of proportionality to the purported aim of crime prevention”’.1794 The Court
concluded that ‘the proper balance was not met given the failure of British authorities
to consider, inter alia, the nature of the crime, the age of the suspect, and the
indefiniteness of sample retention’.1795 The blanket retention of innocent people’s
DNA in the NDNAD in this way remains disproportionate, discriminatory and is also
a breach of right to privacy according to the HRA. The question must also be raised
as to why (controversially) the UK government permits the NDNAD to retain the
DNA records of innocent people and yet has failed to retain the DNA data of persons
convicted of serious offences. For instance, Home Office has admitted that thousands
of convicted prisoners (among others) do not have their DNA profiles logged on the
NDNAD although their details are held by the national police computer; yet the
DNA data of innocent peoples are collected and logged onto this database. A
conservative parliamentarian highlighted that:
The Home Office admitted almost two years ago [2008] that there were 2.3
million people who had been convicted, cautioned or warned and had a record
on the police national computer but did not have their DNA profile logged on
the database. This contrasts sharply with the number of innocent people —
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more than 975,000 at the last count —who have been arrested but never charged
or convicted of an offence yet whose DNA has been collected and logged.1796

The then Opposition member further argued that the government seemed ‘more
concerned with collecting the data of innocent people than convicted criminals’.1797
He expressed shock that the government was unaware that many ‘dangerous
criminals do not have their DNA on the database’.1798 He argued that the database
‘should help the police’ in case investigation; however, it should not contain the data
of the ‘innocent majority’, but rather ensure that the data of ‘anyone convicted of a
serious crime’ is on the database.1799 Helen Wallace of GeneWatch argues that ‘the
retention of DNA profiles ... from an individual on [the] database ... [will also] allow
a form of biological tagging or “biosurveillance”’, that involves not only the
individual concerned but their relatives.1800
A comparison with the NFDPL reveals a number of differences with regards to the
nature of the database itself, the criteria for retention, and the retention period. The
NDNAD is a police database, whereas in case of the NFDPL, it is not police database
but a database used in the police investigation process. In terms of the retention
criteria, samples and resulting profiles of the innocent (witnesses, victims, nonconvicted suspects and so forth) are retained on the NDNAD as outlined above,
while the NFDPL has yet to set any criteria. Under the draft DNA Act 2010,
however, two types of profiles will be kept on the database: namely, convicted
offender profiles and SOC profiles. In terms of the retention period, the NDNAD
retains DNA samples indefinitely, whereas DNA samples are retained for 2 years of
the NFDPL under its current policy. Both retain the resulting profiles indefinitely.
Another difference is that the NDNAD — unlike the NFDPL — seems to have
adequate back up facilities and security mechanisms in regard to samples and
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profiles. There is as yet no controversy regarding the practice or law on the part of
the Bangladesh government in terms of the retention of the DNA data of innocent
persons. This reason has earlier supplied is that the use of DNA technology is quite
new for the country’s legal and judicial systems; therefore, various issues and
concerns with regards to the retention of DNA samples and profiles — which has
been identified through the analysis of the UK legislations and from the practice of
the NDNAD — are absent in the case of the NFDPL.1801 Nevertheless, in both
systems ultimate results are same — indefinite retention of DNA data can lead an
increased risk of human rights and privacy violations.
A number of legal proceedings have already taken place in the UK in regard to the
human rights and privacy violations in this context. This has occurred mainly due to
the legislative provision for the indefinite retention of DNA data. Similar violations
of privacy could also take place in regard to the NFDPL due to the legislative
vacuum in this area, and also due to the ignorance and/or lack of awareness of people
generally about the potential misuse of sensitive DNA data and the inadequate data
storage facilities in the NFDPL of such data.
(d) Risk Posed by the Inclusion of Child Offenders and Other Minors
Under the current Bangladeshi investigation system, there is as yet no process of
mass screening, speculative searching and/or familial searching for detecting
criminals. Samples are, however, collected from victims, and even from innocent
children,1802 and the resulting profiles are currently stored on the NFDPL. There are
regular instances of DNA testing and profiling of innocent children or child
offenders in the NFDPL. The ages range from new born up to less than 18 years old.
Samples are normally collected from new-borns for paternity testing and sibling
matching, while samples are also collected from children in the 14–16 age group in
rape and murder cases.
By way of contrast, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 any child aged 10 or
over1803 in the UK (England and Wales) can be arrested on suspicion of a criminal
offence, and thus be subject to DNA testing and their profile retained on the
1801
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NDNAD. The retention of DNA samples and profiles of children and young
teenagers on the NDNAD is, therefore, an additional concern. The retention of DNA
can be ‘particularly detrimental to children’ as was pointed out in the case of S1804 in
the Marper case. Sometimes vulnerable individuals, such as children or ill persons,
can find having their DNA taken and their records kept particularly disturbing and
some individuals have even become suicidal as a result.1805 In response to the
Marper case, the UK government decided that DNA profiles from the children under
the ten years of age should be removed from the NDNAD. However, the profiles
from other child offenders (that is, children above 10 years but below 18 years1806 of
age) are still on the database.
Although the age range and nature of the offence for which child or juvenile
offenders DNA data are collected and retained are different in the NDNAD and the
NFDPL; the issue is similar in both systems, namely the ‘inclusion of the DNA data
of child offenders together with that of adult offenders’. Whilst both the NFDPL and
NDNAD treated all samples and data derived alike, the data of children is more
sensitive. The ‘equal treatment’ increases the likelihood of violating a child’s rights.
Moreover, the current policy of retaining children’s DNA on arrest confers the risk
of locking them into the criminal justice system for the rest of their lives.1807 Given
that many subjects are actually not guilty of any crime or enter the system with a
minor ‘one-off’1808 offence, the resulting impact of the process can be
counterproductive, in terms not only of the individual but also in terms of overall
confidence in policing. In particular, it has been argued that ‘[s]tigmatising children
and young people for minor crimes or on the basis of false accusations can also be
counterproductive’ and there is even ‘some evidence [to suggest] … that this may
make them more likely to commit offences in the future’.1809
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(e) Real Life Examples
Despite the existence of several legislative, ethical and administrative safety
mechanisms, nonetheless there are practical examples of human rights and privacy
violations in the UK jurisdiction. For instance, in the precedent-setting case of S and
Marper v UK, the ECtHR held that the ‘blanket and indiscriminate’ policy of
permanent retention violated the right to privacy of the appellants. Even after the
Marper judgment, a violation of individual privacy was again before the UK
courts.1810 In this instance, the outcome was similar to that of the Marper case.
Several government and legislative initiatives have been taken in the UK in response
to the Marper case; however, to date the changes being undertaken to comply with
the Marper judgment have not yet been finalised.
In contrast, the NFDPL is a recent development for Bangladesh. There are no
instances or case judgments or precedent — like that provided by the Marper case —
about privacy violations arising in the Bangladeshi jurisdiction in the course of the
investigation of a case or the use of DNA data in its justice delivery system. All
emerging or related issues with regard to this new technology (including the concept
of genetic privacy and its violation) are new to the Bangladeshi people. The people
need first to be aware of the potential for such issues in order to address matters that
might emerge in Bangladesh in cases like that of S and Marper v UK. Though
genetic privacy issue is not contested in Bangladeshi court, nevertheless the Marper
case could provide a good example for many countries, including Bangladesh, as to
the matters that need to be taken into consideration in terms of human rights in the
construction and maintenance of DNA data systems.

7.1.3.2 Human Rights and Privacy Violations
It is evident from the existing practices of both the NDNAD and the NFDPL that
there is scope for violations of human rights and privacy. In the case of the NDNAD,
several legislative amendments1811 have been made one after another. Instead of
improving the human rights situation of sample providers, however, most — if not
all — of these changes have instead provided ever more extensive police powers
1810
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UKSC 21(18 May 2011).
1811
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regarding the collection, storage, analysis, retention, access and use of the DNA data.
In the case of the NDNAD, problems related to these (as well as the issue of
informed consent) are individually and/or jointly responsible for violations of human
right and privacy.
It may be argued that the challenges that the NDNAD currently faces are unilateral
or one dimensional — that is, they are a reflection of current UK government policy
and are mainly based on legislation. Through the series of legislative changes
mentioned above, the government has indicated that at this moment the control of
crime is their priority, rather than the preservation of individual privacy. In
Bangladesh, however, the problem is two-dimensional. First, there is a legislative
vacuum and lots of controversial NFDPL practices continue mainly because of this
vacuum; and second, the NFDPL lacks resources. Although some of those problems
are independent social issues, many of them are directly related to the absence of
legislation.
The introduction of relevant legislation will not solve all these issues entirely;
nevertheless, law is necessary for this newly emerged technology in Bangladesh, as
legislation — unlike a policy or guideline — has the capacity to be enforced, and
normally does. Thus any new provision (mechanism, and so forth) introduced may
have greater impact as it has the force of law, with accompanying sanctions for
breaches. Moreover, the framing and enactment of legislation provides an
opportunity for the community to become familiar with, or seriously think about, any
proposed new system. If there is any law involved, people will be more aware about
its application and related issues. The ignorance or lack of knowledge about forensic
use of DNA among the masses is, therefore, somewhat due to the lack of legislation.
In addition, any prospect of a greater role for the NFDPL in the justice delivery
system of Bangladesh necessitates such an examination of legal parameters for its
operation as well as of potential issues that may arise. However, the laboratory is
already facing some challenges in regards to human rights and privacy violations.
These could be addressed generally by appropriate legislation, as well as by
increasing people’s awareness.
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In the case of the NDNAD, the problems are created by controversial legislative
provisions, and if these provisions could be changed or new provisions could be
enacted overriding these provisions — which is the current plan of the UK
government — then it could reduce the human rights and privacy violations risks in
that country. On the other hand, in the case of the NFDPL, the opportunity or scope
for human rights or privacy violations may occur due to a lack of legislation as well
as some other inadequacies related to the NFDPL, such as the lack of people’s
awareness of the issues and insufficient resources. Sometime both a lack of law and
the presence of controversial law can be equally problematic.
Finally, it can be argued that there are human rights and privacy risks associated with
the forensic use of human DNA data, if such data are not handled properly (that
means from the initial collection stage, through analysis, storage, use, and to the
indefinite retention stage). In this regard, reference can be made1812 to Ricoeur’s
distinction between idem (same) and ipse (self) identity.1813Ipse refers to ‘who the
self is’ and it is close to our individuality, while idem refers to ‘what the self consists
of’ — a more external possibility of identifying the self.1814 According to this
distinction, ‘DNA samples contain privacy-sensitive, ipse [self] related information,
while DNA profiles contain much less, and largely idem [same] related,
information’.1815 From the scope of extensive police power, lack of adequate
informed consent, lack of protective measure for children’s’ DNA data, unlimited
access and use as well as indefinite retention of DNA sample and other personal
information, there is an apprehension regarding the ‘leaking of personal details’ of
sample or data providers including much sensitive information ‘such as ethnicity or
medical status’.1816

1812

See also Koops and Goodwin, above n 1477.
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7.1.3.3 Gaps between Developed and Developing Countries
In addition to human rights and privacy violations, there are some other challenges
(or problems) with regards to the sustainability of the databases and involve
financial, technological and administrative issues. Different political, economic,
social and cultural backgrounds of the UK and Bangladesh are reflected in the
economic, administrative and technological gaps between the NDNAD and the
NFDPL. The NFDPL is far behind the NDNAD in these areas.
Economic and technological gaps or differences between the NDNAD (UK) and the
NFDPL (Bangladesh) are identified mainly from the case studies as well as by data
analysis applying both qualitative and quantitative methods. These findings reflect
the gaps between the NDNAD and the NFDPL (in terms of financial, human
resources, technological and administrative matters). All of these issues are mainly
(and understandably) a problem for the developing countries’ DNA systems (as
typified by the NFDPL) as compared to those of the developed countries (as typified
by the NDNAD of the UK). The following section of this chapter will compare the
NDNAD and the NFDPL, more particularly to address the second research question:
Is there any gap between developed and developing countries concerning forensic
use of DNA data in the justice delivery system, and how can this gap be addressed
and/or minimised?
All the following issues will reflect the gaps between NDNAD and NFDPL (that is,
between developed and developing countries):
(a) Supervisory and Transparency Issues
The NDNAD is subject to adequate supervision.1817 There is also an ethics group
overseeing its operations. Management and administration by these supervisory
bodies and ethical monitoring seem to be of a very high quality. Nevertheless,
objections have been raised about the overall governance as well as oversight of the
NDNAD. For instance, it is argued that the monitoring systems do not work
adequately because the original decision about the inclusion of DNA data on the
NDNAD is ‘purely a police matter’.1818 In addition, there are some complaints about
1817
1818

For further details see section 5.1.5.3 of Chapter 5.
Campbell, ‘Non-Conviction" DNA Databases and Criminal Justice’, above n 1767, 68–9.
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the extent of transparency of the NDNAD. These include that there is a lack of public
debate and/or a lack of continuing consultation with relevant stakeholders.1819 Public
confidence in its operation and governance and also public acceptance of the
government approach are always of central importance. In response to a government
consultation held in the wake of the Marper case,1820 the Human Genetics
Commission (HGC) commented that while it appreciated the UK government having
taken the initiative in undertaking this consultation and sought a broad range of
public views on the NDNAD, it was quite unfortunate that such consultation could
not have been undertaken before the Strasbourg court judgment had taken the
initiative away from the government and resulted in debate being necessarily limited
to measures needed to implement a ‘timely response’ to the decision rather than the
desired broader discussion.1821 Another concern consistently expressed by the HGC
in relation to public discussion about the NDNAD is in relation to the quality of
debate.
Consultation and public debate need to be based on evidence and reasoned
argument and the Government has a special responsibility to provide accurate,
complete and balanced information. It is unfortunate that the debate has, at
times, been clouded by rhetoric and skewed by anecdote, and that no discernible
systematic attempt has been made to evaluate the utility of the database on the
basis of robust and complete evidence.1822

On the other hand, in the case of the NFDPL, while there is also a supervisory body
for the NFDPL, namely the DNA executive board; its monitoring and oversight
mechanism of is not as dynamic as that of the NDNAD. The NFDPL supervisory
body is more a supervising body in name only rather than in action. However, the
function of the board will be more transparent when the national DNA database for
this country starts to work, as well as when people become more concerned and
aware of their human rights and of privacy and human rights issues related to the
forensic use of DNA data. Therefore at this stage supervisory issue is not big concern
for the NFDPL. However, the nature and degree of supervision, transparency in
relation to such matters and/or the existence or otherwise of a system of checks and
balances could become a significant problem if the situation continues as it is. In
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order to ensure more adequate supervision, greater transparency and an efficient
system of checks and balances requires more funds, skilled personnel, and a growth
of public awareness. Yet, transparency is also an important ethical issue for the
NDNAD. Its transparency problems, however, are not due to a shortage of funds or a
lack of human resources, and/or weak administration, rather the system reflects the
government intention or policy. The problem could be solved by changing the policy
or the government’s view.

(b) Lack of Knowledge and Expertise
Since DNA profiling is a technology new to Bangladesh, most judges and lawyers in
the country are unfamiliar with it. Furthermore, there is also a lack of knowledge
among law enforcement agencies even as to how to collect DNA sample without
losing its evidentiary value.1823 In addition, there is shortage of human resources or
skilled personnel in Bangladesh for DNA sample collection and analysis, as well as
for the interpretation of the DNA analysis results before the court. Again, with its
limited resources and manpower, the NFDLP finds it difficult to make people
understand this technology, its various uses and related challenges. Experts claim
that for the NFDPL to be properly utilised, there has to be far greater awareness
about DNA profiling and its potential use among legal and judicial service providers
(for example, law enforcement agencies, lawyers, judges and magistrates) as well as
consumers (for example, victims, their family members, and people generally)
regarding DNA data. Nationally, government can provide some training to judges,
lawyers and magistrates. Internationally, governmental and commercial entities
could step forward to assist developing nation’s databases. Such bodies could include
the Forensic Science Service (FSS) (which could provide assistance with regards to
technological training to the forensic scientists, or INTERPOL, which could provide
training to the police.
Yet the FSS, one of the leading forensic service providers to police forces in the UK
is currently in the process of being wound up.1824 There is no such lack of knowledge
and expertise among forensic scientists, judges, lawyers, and police forces of the UK
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For further detail see section 6.1.5.3 (b) of Chapter 6.
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in the use and interpretation of DNA data. However, this is a substantial financial,
human resource and technological issue for the NFDPL.
(c) Uncertain Staff Appointment and Job Discrimination
The NFDPL consists of a small number of staff members who are appointed
temporarily by the government on a time-limited project basis. In addition, there is
what amounts to job discrimination in terms of this NFDPL staffing as some are
appointed directly under the project and are paid under the rule of the project
document, whilst others are appointed by a third party (that is, their appointment is
outsourced to a human resource company, rather than being handled by the
laboratory or project office). On the other hand, there is no such problem with regard
to staff appointment for the NDNAD.
The problem exists because of the different economic structure and capacity of the
two countries. It can, therefore, be argued that while the NDNAD has the capacity to
retain its human resources, the NFDPL has no such capacity, and this is reflected in
the gaps between the NDNAD and the NFDPL. In addition, varying employment
conditions amounting to discrimination and uncertainty of employment are among
the sensitive issues with regards to privacy protection, because dissatisfied or
underpaid staff may leave and thus reduce the number of skilled personnel, which
may compromise service quality, or if they stay their service quality be negatively
affected by their level of dissatisfaction. Worse still, dissatisfied underpaid staff may
be more open to corruption. There is the possibility that staff who handle sensitive
DNA data may compromise data privacy as well as service quality for this reason. In
addition, there is a possibility that they may not securely store this data.1825 This
problem can be solved with the proper initiatives and measures taken by the
government.

(d) Other Challenges and the Question of Sustainability
With regards to the issue of sustainability of the NFDPL, there are some significant
problems facing the laboratory. In regard to the management of the NFDPL, these
problems include the lack of an adequate training facility, insufficient laboratory
capacity, a shortage of expertise, and inadequate physical security systems. These
1825
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challenges are creating basic impediments to the sustainability of the NFDPL.
Uncertainty looms as the Government of Bangladesh has not yet included the
laboratory in its budget, and there is no such plan or timeline in existence that
indicates when the government will do so. As a result, the future of the NFDPL
depends mostly on whether the Bangladesh government will accept the responsibility
for funding and maintaining this laboratory, when the Danida funding runs out.
Moreover, maintenance and use of such sophisticated technology in its justice
delivery system is fairly ambitious project for the Bangladesh government without
appropriate regional and/or international supports. In order to build the sustainable
capacity of this laboratory, regular co-operation, greater collaboration, technology
transfers, the sharing of knowledge, provision of training program on the part of
other counties or international organisations (such as INTERPOL, UN and its
agencies) will be needed.
On the other hand, despite some controversial practices and provisions, the NDNAD
has run successfully for almost 16 years from its inception. It can, therefore, be
argued that the NDNAD is sustainable. This means the country is capable —
financially and technologically — of managing a forensic DNA database, unlike
many low-income countries (for example, Bangladesh). In many cases, high
maintenance costs are not a problem for the NDNAD. It can further be argued that
the NDNAD and the NFDPL are established in two different legal-political, socioeconomic situations, and so there are, in fact, some gaps between these two systems.
Though there are some discrepancies, the objectives of the two databases and their
respective governments are the same — that is, to maintain forensic DNA database
services offering quality service and protecting privacy where they view it as
necessary in their respective jurisdictions. Some collaboration and changes of policy
can reduce the level of discrepancies and achieve this objective.
7.1.4

OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having analysed the DNA facilities in the two countries as case studies and having
compared the findings from chapters 5 and 6 with regards to human rights and
privacy violations; and the gaps between the NDNAD and the NFDPL, the following
recommendations are able to be proposed. In general, these options and
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recommendations will provide guideline to ensure proper forensic use of DNA
information in the justice delivery systems of both these countries:
7.1.4.1 Safeguards for Human Rights and Privacy Protections
Different legal, ethical, technical and administrative standards are set and followed
by DNA databases in different countries. These principles and standards provide
mechanisms designed to meet basic criteria to protect human rights and individual
privacy. These safeguards also ensure the proper use, handling and managing of
DNA data and of the databases in the case investigation process. As in other such
systems, in the NDNAD and NFDPL there are various stages — collection and
analysis, retention, as well as access and use of DNA samples and profiles — where
human rights, particularly the right to privacy, can be violated. In order to monitor
the whole system, there is also a mechanism of governance and oversight. Privacy
could be violated if such a mechanism is not sufficiently robust. Therefore several
safeguards need to be provided at each and every stage.
(a) Collection and Analysis of DNA Samples
There is a wide range of views in different jurisdictions, and there are also several
opinions among various human rights organisations about DNA sample collection
and analysis, especially when and how DNA should be collected by the police. There
are some basic standards or parameters which are accepted by most countries, and
such standards could or should be applied by the country concerned where deemed
appropriate. The following parameters need to be taken into consideration:
•

Under what circumstances should law enforcement agencies (that is, the
police) be allowed to collect and store DNA samples and profiles?

•

How DNA data should be included in the database (with consent or without
consent)?

•

Whether collection of DNA is directly relevant to the crime for which an
individual has been arrested? Or can DNA be taken to detect an individual’s
DNA profile against stored DNA profiles from other crimes?

•

What other factors need to be taken into consideration while collecting DNA,
such as the seriousness of the alleged offence, whether the individual has
been charged or merely arrested, or their age or other circumstances?
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•

Should there be any independent oversight for these decisions, or should they
be left to the discretion of the police?

•

Whether additional safeguards are needed for people who give their DNA to
the police on a voluntary basis during the course of an investigation (such as,
a requirement that their consent be fully informed and freely given, without
coercion from the police or others, and that they have a right to withdraw
their consent)?

•

Are quality assurance procedures being followed in the laboratories during
DNA analysis?

In both systems (that is, those involving the NDNAD and the NFDPL), DNA
samples are collected with the involvement of police, generally without adequate
consent. An important safeguard against such practices could be legislation with
specific provisions regarding collection without consent and penalties where samples
are collected in breach of those provisions. This would be far preferable to a
‘guideline’ or ‘policy’, which is barely adequate in this regard as it lacks an
enforcement mechanism. Such legislation should allow DNA collection by police
without consent from adult persons where such collection is necessary to assisting in
the solution of heinous crimes,1826 even if such DNA sample collection breaches a
person’s right to privacy. DNA may serve to link certain persons to particular crime
scenes, although conviction for the crime itself may require further evidence.1827
Despite popular confidence in the convicting power of DNA evidence and the
generation of unrealistic expectations (even in political circles), the words of the
‘architect of DNA fingerprinting’, Sir Alec Jeffreys, should perhaps be recalled in
this regard:
[I]t does not solve crimes. It establishes whether sample X comes from person
Y, it is up to the court to interpret that in the context of other evidence in a
criminal case.1828
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For example, where two brothers are suspected of raping and then murdering a young woman, or
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At the same time, legislation should be in place to ensure that ‘the interference with a
person’s rights is not disproportionate to any benefit that might be achieved’ from
that collection.1829 Such a principle of proportionality may require further definition
(perhaps in terms of sentence length for conviction and/or by the nature of the crime
committed). Due to the particular vulnerability of children to the possibility of
stigmatisation and unintended later impacts due to inclusion on forensic database, if a
child’s DNA needs to be obtained for case investigation purposes, it — along with
any profile derived from it (see further below) — should be destroyed (or deleted)
once the case is decided.
Moreover, where sufficient evidence exists regarding a crime suspect, police should
have a right to take samples without consent. However, such non-consensual
collection should not be applied in case of innocent individuals (such as in regard to
witnesses, victims, or for mass screening purposes) nor in relation to those arrested
for minor offences. It should be recalled that only collection is here being referred to
and therefore the guilt or innocence of accused persons is not yet established; so
again a decision regarding sample collection is made on the basis of the principles of
proportionality (relevance, propensity, gravity). Where the use of force is inevitable,
a transparent and clear witness based procedure must be applied so that people do not
feel that there is an abuse of process. If someone refuses to give their DNA sample in
circumstances where collection has been made possible by a court order having been
obtained, they should be given a warning that such collection is compulsory.
However, for the whole collection and analysis process, sample providers should be
provided with an information pack containing relevant and sufficiently detailed
information (for example, how and why a sample will be collected, its subsequent
use, and in regard to the analysis process). In addition, the legislation should provide
and safeguard the right of sample providers to withdraw of consent, similar to that
provided in Scotland and many European countries as well as in many standard
medical research practice guidelines where withdrawal of consent exists.
During DNA data analysis, laboratory quality assurance procedures need to be
ensured. Otherwise people’s DNA samples might be mixed up and result in false
data that may be used in evidence. Moreover procedures to interpret very small
1829
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samples of DNA, or mixed DNA samples also need careful and independent
evaluation. Furthermore, adequate data security and privacy policies are critical to
ensuring that sensitive private information is not revealed to unauthorised persons
during the analysis or processing of such data. Such safety measures should also be
applied to the transport of DNA analysis reports to the court or police. Reporting
procedures to the police and to the courts need to ensure both privacy and reliability
of that report. The scientific officers or analysts concerned also need to understand
the limitations of DNA technology, including how and why it can be misinterpreted,
and have a clear idea about the DNA profiling system, and how complete a DNA
profile needs to be before it can be uploaded onto the database.
(b) Retention of DNA Samples and Profiles
The general perception is that ‘the significant value of DNA retention as an
intelligence and evidence tool must be balanced against the incredibly intimate
nature of material that reveals so much more than the identity of the person
profiled’.1830 It should also be noted that the larger the number of entries of DNA
samples and or profiles, the greater the risk of error and abuse. In addition, the
retention of DNA ‘in terms of State’s stigmatisation of an innocent person without
due process, is anathema to liberalist principles’.1831 A modest respect for the
principle of ‘presumption of innocence’ is also required. Therefore, while
considering the issue of the retention of DNA samples and profiles the following
benchmarks or parameters need to be considered:
•

the period for which the profiles/samples should be retained (limited or
indefinite);

•

the purpose for which the profiles/samples are to be used: for case
investigation purposes only or for other purposes, such as medical research
and/or for commercial purposes;

•

the circumstances in which profiles/samples are to be retained (after arrest,
charge or conviction);

•

the circumstances in which DNA samples and profiles are to be destroyed
when the purpose for which they have been collected has been served;
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•

the necessity for security mechanisms or safeguards for DNA data storage
and retention; and

•

whether such a mechanism or safeguard is to be included in legislation, or
only in a policy or guidelines that could be more easily changed.

In regard to establishing such benchmarks, it can be argued that if a person whose
DNA has been loaded onto the database is found to be innocent or is released, the
DNA sample must be destroyed and the profile should be removed from the database
after a set period of time. ‘Liberty’ (the National Council for Civil Liberties), one of
the UK’s leading civil liberties and human rights organisations, believes that a limit
on DNA retention period can be set through the application of the human rights
‘principles of necessity and proportionality’. There are three principles of
proportionality with regards to retention of DNA:
•

The relevance or probative value of DNA to the type of crime in question;

•

The potential propensity of the trigger offender to future crime of a relevant
nature;

•

The gravity of both trigger offence and the type of crime feared in the
future.1832

In no circumstances should DNA samples or profiles be retained indefinitely. The
period of DNA data retention should, therefore, be proportionate to the gravity or
severity of the crime, relevance of DNA evidence collected, and propensity of the
criminal concerned to reoffend. Moreover, the premise of the current retention policy
— that is, one of ‘just in case’ a person may commit a crime at a future date’1833 —
must be avoided. Also, ‘[t]he length of retention period should be based on the best
available evidence, and such evidence should be actively sought and regularly
reviewed’.1834
Generally, the standard practices of many DNA databases dictate that the DNA
sample and/ or profile of a person accused but not convicted of specified violent or
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sexual offences could be retained for a limited period of time. For instance, under
Scottish law police have since 2007 ‘been able to retain DNA samples for up to three
years where allegations of serious violence or sexual offence have been made’.1835
Such law also allowed ‘for an extension beyond three years if it is felt necessary’.1836
Similarly, because of the impact of DNA samples on privacy and human rights, some
countries, such as Germany, Lithuania, and Belgium have pursued a ‘policy of
immediate destruction of DNA samples’ following the creation of DNA profile,
while in the case of Sweden, samples have to be destroyed ‘as soon as possible’.1837
This policy aims to protect privacy by preventing the samples from being kept, used
or re-analysed, to obtain personal health information. Again, the principle of
proportionality should decide whether a DNA sample or profile is to be retained and
the duration of such retention.
There are some other factors that need to be considered with regards to retention,
such as the sample providers requiring knowledge of how their samples and profiles
will be stored and used prior to sample collection; the period for which the sample
and profile will be retained; and how they can request the destruction of the sample
and the deletion of the profile. By way of contrast, in most cases both DNA sample
and profile should be retained after conviction, unless there are exceptional
circumstances. Any kind of further use of the DNA sample or profile should be
restricted to the prevention and detection of crime. Safeguards also need to be
designed to ensure that people who have given their DNA voluntarily during an
investigation, do not have their DNA data indefinitely entered into databases and/or
retained against their will. If for some reason, their DNA samples or profiles need to
be retained, this should only be for a certain period of time, and with proper security
mechanisms in place, with such mechanism needing to be included in legislation, not
simply in a policy or guidelines. The reason is that policy or guidelines lack an
enforcement mechanism and also that can easily be changed (as discussed earlier). In
addition where police are empowered to make decisions about DNA retention, such
decisions ‘should be amenable to judicial review by an independent body’.1838
1835
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In regard to the retention of DNA data, another point is that a separate regime for the
taking and retention of DNA from children should be followed. That means states
must treat DNA samples of minors separately from those of the adults, given special
needs of minors in the criminal justice system. This is not to say that DNA samples
or profiles of minor offenders cannot be retained in forensic databases, in cases
where children are repeat offenders or commit serious offences (for example violent
crimes and sex offences), for then their DNA profile could be retained. The
legislation must pay specific attention to the particularities of minor offenders, for
example by creating a different database for minors, or by establishing shorter
retention periods or by destroying their data after completion of its purpose. In cases
where it is important for it to be retained, in no way it should be retained in the same
database as the DNA data of adults.
(c) Access and Use of Stored DNA Data
Access to DNA samples and or profiles as well as the use of a DNA database must
be restricted to a small number of authorised persons. In other words, the access of
unauthorised people (including person who wants to infiltrate the system) should be
prohibited. Normally, no other third parties should be allowed to access stored DNA
samples or data. In this respect, legislation should be passed to define who can access
databases containing sensitive DNA data. Such legislation should contain provisions
defining and/or restricting the purpose of access and use. In cases of great urgency
(such as for crime detection), only police could be allowed to access such material
and such access should only be permitted in regard to seeking matches for a profile
from a crime scene or for supporting defence or prosecution cases, and subject to the
appropriate monitoring mechanism. The idea of forming an independent commission
for auditing and testing the robustness of security and access control is highly
important. Therefore, while considering the issue of access and use of DNA samples
and profiles in any DNA systems or database, the following benchmark or
parameters need to be taken into consideration:
•

Who should be allowed to access DNA data and profiles (only authorised
people or third parties or both)?

•

Can the DNA samples and/or database be used for additional purposes (for
example, research, commercial) other than case investigation?
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Considering the value of the second parameter, normally a forensic DNA database
should not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was originally
established (that is, crime prevention and detection). Any additional use should only
for research purposes, and safeguards would need to be provided for accessing stored
data. In this regard, the key issue which needs to be kept in mind is that research on
people’s genetic characteristics should not take place without their consent, and any
such research ‘should only take place with the express consent of the donors ..., or
with completely anonymous ... samples or data along with research ethics committee
approval’.1839
(d) Governance and Oversight
With regards to the governance and oversight issue, the important parameter that
should be considered is that:
•

Is there any independent monitoring and oversight of how the DNA lab or
database operates?

An independent oversight as well as the regular publication of public information
about the size, costs and effectiveness of the database in helping to solve crimes is
always significant for any DNA database. An independent body or commission
should be composed of representatives of various bodies or groups: the government,
police, scientists, the general public, human rights organisations and an ethics
group.1840 It has been recommended that:
Membership of such body or commission must be defined by law and should
include people from all walks of life. It must oversee that the database is run
satisfactorily. All safeguards regarding the database should be rigorous and
assessed by this independent body.1841

In the case of the NDNAD, the National DNA Database Ethics Group should play a
more prominent role and have more influence in the legislative process governing
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database development.1842 For the DNA systems of other jurisdictions, this type of
ethics group or an independent body needs to be formed.
Moreover, legislation should contain provision that any kind of decisions regarding
collection, retention, access and use of DNA data should be monitored and jointly
taken by an independent body rather than being left solely to the discretion of the
police. A further oversight issue is closely associated with the retention issue. In
circumstances where the retention of DNA is inevitable, neutral supervision and
monitoring of DNA systems is thus required. For instance, in the case of Krurslin v
France1843 the recording of an applicant’s telephone conversations on the part of the
public authority was an issue and in deciding this case the ECtHR found that where
there is state surveillance of an individual, the supervisory control ideally should
come from judicial officers.1844 Though retention of DNA data and individual
surveillance are not similar on the face of it, nevertheless the retention of DNA data
could sometimes considered similar to as a means of surveillance, and at times even
‘mass surveillance’ where screening of numbers of persons in relation to an offence
is to be undertaken. In order to safeguard the sensitive DNA data as well as to control
such surveillance and protect privacy, adequate supervision is required either through
judicial involvement or that of independent bodies. As Campbell observes:
Retaining personal biological material may not be conceptually equivalent to
the State monitoring one’s phone calls, given the greater direct intrusion of the
latter; nevertheless, the degree and depth of personal and familial information
contained in DNA indicates that judicial or other independent oversight is
warranted to safeguard an individual’s privacy.1845

Careful consideration and adoption of those recommended monitoring principles will
ensure human rights and privacy protection. These mechanisms should be applied to
both the NFDPL and the NDNAD. The impacts of the use of DNA data and
databases on privacy, human rights and justice will always depend on the context in
which it operates, that is, on the integrity of the criminal justice system in the country
as a whole. Given the resource constraints of developing countries, the introduction
of such standards could not be instituted in full ‘overnight’. Implementation would
1842
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be more gradual than could be the case with the NDNAD, and would need to also be
accompanied in both cases with suitable training and so forth. Their introduction and
enforcement would depend to a large extent on the capacity and resources of the
country concerned. In a developing country context, implementation would need to
be progressed as rapidly as is possible to maximise effectiveness and ensure greater
international cooperation.
7.1.4.2 Sustainable Capacity Building for Developing Countries
The second issue is the technological, human resource and socio-economic
discrepancies that exist between developed and developing countries (for example,
between the UK and Bangladesh). The selected case studies have highlighted some
potential gaps, which could be common to some other jurisdictions of a similar
nature (that is, countries that have same socio-economic and legal-political
background). For example, in their study, Ungaria and José ‘draw attention to the
struggle of some countries to afford centralised DNA databases’.1846 In their
discussion, they ‘contrasted the costs of the establishment of a centralised forensic
DNA database in the Philippines, with the costs of pressing societal needs —
including basic ones such as shelter, food and access to clean water’.1847 That means
that the ‘question of the proportionality between the possible benefits of the forensic
DNA database and its economic costs in a developing country’1848 is a ‘crucial and
particularly challenging for the governance of forensic DNA databasing’1849 in the
developing and least-developed countries. Given that the Philippines is now
considered a ‘newly industrialised country’,1850 the challenge must be even greater
for those countries at a lesser stage of their development.
Section 7.1.3.3 of this chapter has highlighted some of the significant challenges
facing the NFDPL, though such challenges are not vital issues for the NDNAD.
However it is incumbent upon Bangladesh to take measures to ensure sustainable
1846
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capacity building of the NFDPL in particular, and for the country as a whole.
Currently, the Bangladesh government is in the process of creating its own national
DNA database that will contain the DNA sequence of convicted criminals along with
their criminal records as well as the records of samples found at crime scenes.
Though this laboratory is currently funded by the Danida, the process of managing
this laboratory on a sustainable basis should start now as international funding is
anticipated to end as soon as 2016, and the future of a national DNA database can
only be ensured by its being included in the government’s budget. The NDNAD can
be a good model for the NFDPL, despite their being from two different socioeconomic, legal-political backgrounds, and representing two different situations. In
many instances, the NDNAD maintain good practices and can be identified as a
sustainable forensic DNA database. The NFDPL can learn and adopt gradually some
good practices from the NDNAD. At the same time, the country should be aware of
some practices of the UK government that are subject to much criticism (such as the
indefinite retention of DNA of persons who have not been convicted of any crime).
In regard to the recommendations below, the recommendations could be particularly
useful for the Bangladesh DNA system, whilst others could be useful for both the
systems — the NDNAD and NFDPL. In general, forensic DNA databases in all
countries could benefit from the following recommendations.
(a) Education and Training
In the case of the NFDPL, it is highly important that all stakeholders including the
government, all service providers (for example, police, lawyers, judges, magistrates),
and the general public well understand the role of and the necessity for DNA
technology.1851 As part of this process, service providers should be trained and
educated about DNA technology, its use/misuse, and the possible threats to human
rights and privacy that this technology poses in the context of the justice delivery
system. Particularly ‘police officers, as part of the initial training, should be
extensively trained and educated on policies’1852 concerning forensic DNA systems
and a future national DNA database in Bangladesh. Police forces also need more
1851
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education about human rights and privacy issues. There should also be ‘an
independent agency to regulate and monitor the procedures of collecting DNA’1853
which procedures in regards to crime scene collection should only be conducted by
‘specially trained police officers’.1854 Once people are aware of this technology, the
proper forensic use of DNA information in the justice delivery system of a
developing country like Bangladesh will be ensured
(b) Awareness Building
As Murtuja, Adris and Ahmed observe in their 2008 citizens inquiry into the
NDNAD, a ‘nationwide public awareness campaign’ is much needed, one that is
comprised of ‘just the facts‘ and having ‘no bias’,1855 and focusing on a number of
key areas, including the nature and use of DNA samples and profiles, the broader
implications of DNA, an accurate knowledge of the legal criteria for being subject to
sample collection, legal provisions for sample use, for prevailing retention policies,
as well as the actual logistics and procedures involved. It will help the public to take
‘informed decision’.1856 Despite differences in their systems, it is imperative that
such public education and awareness programs are conducted both for the UK and
Bangladesh DNA systems. Moreover, ‘scientists should be much more involved in
[such] education’1857 and their involvement and the education programme will help
people to ‘understand more about DNA and … raise public awareness’ more
generally.1858 The concept of genetic privacy in the collection and use of DNA
information is new for Bangladeshi society. There needs to be a forum that will allow
voices to be raised in regard to the protection of genetic privacy. Some people are
already started to think about issues related to genetic privacy and these people have
begun some research as well as started to communicate their thoughts in different
national as well as international media and fora. Extensive research and media
campaigns are essential to build a greater common awareness. Joint efforts by
government, civil society and members of the general public will facilitate human
rights and privacy protection. In general, as Hindmarsh and Prainsack have observed,
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‘one of the biggest challenges will be building and maintaining public trust’.1859
Accurate communication of a person’s rights and responsibilities in circumstances
where DNA sampling is required can help maintain the necessary public confidence.
Strict maintenance of the integrity of the system and its administration in both
developed and developing contexts is also clearly required. Washington has also
urged ‘better public education and awareness concerning DNA forensics, which is a
necessary prelude to a wider public policy debate’ of the issues involved.1860
(c) International Collaboration and Cooperation
The concept of ‘development co-operation’ means and includes but not limited to:


financial assistance



technology transfer



infrastructures building



developing expertise



framing national legislation.

There is some collaboration and interaction between the NFDPL and DNA systems
of a few neighbouring countries, such as the Philippines, India, and Malaysia.1861
Nevertheless some international collaboration and cooperation with regard to DNA
technology between Bangladesh and countries or international bodies, other than
Danida, is significant.
A lack of development co-operation, co-ordination and data-sharing between
developed countries and Bangladesh would hamper the progress of the NFDPL
system. Moreover, if all DNA facilities or service systems are not of an equal
standard to those around the world, it would not be possible to build a common
standardised forensic DNA database and to share data in order to detect international
terrorists and heinous criminals. The NFDPL has international significance and this
laboratory plans to establish a National DNA database and also to establish a link
with the international criminal police organisation (INTERPOL). Regarding this
issue, one of the interviewees highlighted that there is no development agreement
1859
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between Bangladesh and other developed countries or international bodies for a
DNA database of a standard equal to those in developed nations (who might later
wish to access its data, for example in relation to transnational criminals).1862
However ‘there is regular association with an Indian laboratory, namely the Centre
for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics (CDFD)’.1863 R1 is hopeful that:
Once our database is established then we have a plan to build relations with
FBI, INTERPOL. The pioneer organisation in this field is the Forensic Science
Service (FSS) of the UK. We also have a plan to contact the FSS.1864

The role of Bangladesh Police in the arrest of a number of notorious international
criminals is recognised. A DNA database will assist this process. For example, there
are some ‘extremists [who] stay in disguise in different countries’, and the NFDPL
has the potential ‘to identify them quickly’.1865 If there is a good co-operation and a
data sharing relationship with other countries, then DNA samples or DNA profiles
stored in the database could easily be checked against that of persons arrested,
perhaps on suspicion of illegal activities. In this regard, section 45 of the proposed
‘Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Act 2010 (draft)’ of Bangladesh provides that, with
the approval of the government, the proposed national DNA database of Bangladesh
will supply the necessary co-operation, co-ordination and data-sharing with the
international law enforcement agencies (such as INTERPOL).1866 Therefore, the
NFDPL or the proposed national DNA database of Bangladesh ‘is essential to expose
[it to] the international standards of similar bodies.1867 Once the database builds links
with other countries and/organisations, then its scope of activities will also be
increased. All these facts lead to a recommendation that the national DNA database
should start to work for the Bangladeshi justice system without delay. In order to
fulfil this objective, a high quality and coherent development co-operation program
is required to facilitate the necessary sharing of data and knowledge.
Moreover, observations should be made of the type of regional co-operation that
already exists and how that operates. Within the EU, for instance, regional
1862
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cooperation already exists for which ‘the EU itself provides funds [including] for the
Standardisation of DNA Profiling in the European Union (STADNAP) to ascertain
best practices capable of facilitating increased data sharing across criminal
jurisdictions’.1868 The UK government is also committed to the ‘“technological
harmonisation” of forensic DNA databasing across the EU’.1869 The European DNA
Profiling Group (EDNAP) has also supported the ‘need for harmonisation of [the]
technical and legal issues at the European level’, although there are ‘considerable
heterogeneities’ among the European countries with regards to the ‘cultural, political
and legal’ matters’.1870 This kind of regional co-operation needs to begin in other
parts of the world and could be a primary step on the way to building a common
DNA database standard for all.
Currently no international regulatory framework exists to create common standards
for the content and use of forensic DNA databases so as to provide respect for human
rights and privacy, as well as ensuring national security. Hindmarsh and Prainsack
raised their concerns that:
In the next decades, the use of forensic DNA databases will increase in breadth
and scope at national, transnational and international levels. Moreover, the
importance and use of DNA profiling and databasing will increase and broaden
with the rise of security, biometrics and anti-terrorist issues on public and
political agendas. Parallel to such expansion, which is also occurring in
developing countries, will be an increasing need to balance the benefits of the
new genetic technologies of identification, surveillance and security against
civic concerns, informed by criminal, genealogical and, potentially, medical and
health histories, and new shifting definitions and identities and stakes pertaining
to the criminal and the suspect.1871

An international effort is therefore vital to ensure that some relaxed country practices
or national standards for DNA databases should not become the international norm.
Rather where there should be an international DNA database agreement that should
be signed between countries which provides clauses on safeguards, security and how
the database and related information should be used.1872
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7.1.5

THE WAY FORWARD

The journey of this study that began with the research questions which have been
addressed and argued in all chapters of this thesis are now resolved. This is not the
end, because there are not ever really any beginnings, nor any ends. At the end of this
research journey, some new issues have been discovered which generate enough
scope to pursue other avenues of investigation, and such issues actually laid a
foundation for other research in this area — the use of forensic DNA databases for
law enforcement purposes are expanding at an alarming rate worldwide. According
to the report of the Council for Responsible Genetics, at present some ‘56 countries
operate national DNA databases from Asia to Europe and the Americas’.1873 Over
time this number will increase gradually. Among them ‘some are still in their
infancy, while others (eg those are in the US and the UK) are large, highly
sophisticated and have been established for at least fifteen years’.1874 Another factor
which leads to the rapid growth of these forensic DNA databases is that ‘in a post 9–
11 world, law enforcement and national leaders have become increasingly
concerned’ about international terrorist activities and other kinds of global crimes
(such as, illegal immigration).1875 As Hindmarsh and Prainsack have observed,
‘[T]he current trend towards an expansion of the scope and uses of DNA databases
for police and forensic purposes is now attracting increasing discussion and can meet
different levels of public concern in different countries’.1876 These authors also noted
that:
There is great variety in the ways in which forensic DNA databases are set up,
managed and monitored … there is also considerable variety among countries in
the public and regulatory discourses that preceded and accompanied the
establishment of national forensic DNA databases — a process that is still
ongoing in some countries — or the discourses that relate to new
development.1877

Countries, therefore, do feel the urgency for sharing data regarding criminal records
(including DNA data) across their borders, which has led for instance, to regional
data-sharing agreements (such as the Prüm Treaty which has been established in the
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European Union.1878 A range of organisations are currently involved in developing
and promoting DNA databasing across the EU, including
EDNAP, [which] has existed since 1988 with the aim of establishing systematic
procedures for data-sharing across the European community; the STADNAP
group [which] exists to promote co-operation across the EU in order to utilise
DNA profiling to detect “mobile serial offenders”; and the ENFSI [which] has
similar ambitions to standardise forensic practices in support of policing across
the whole of the EU.1879

Furthermore the International Centre of the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) of the
USA promotes ‘international access to information about transnational crime’.1880 In
addition, INTERPOL’s DNA database now contains profiles shared by 54
countries.1881 Although technological harmonisation has increased the scope of data
sharing, it has also raised concerns regarding the misuse of transnational DNA data.
DNA data is shared across borders with little oversight. This is also a big threat for
the national security for the countries concerned. These kinds of data sharing
practices, especially with regards to sensitive information like human DNA, pose
additional threats to human rights, privacy and democracy worldwide. These threats
are further ‘heightened by the growing effort to link all these databases into one
international database’.1882
As Bautista observes,
There is always a fragile balance between obeying international law and
maintaining sovereign autonomy. Especially from a political standpoint, the
leaders of a country are not always keen to lose face with their fellowmen for
acts that may be interpreted domestically as treasonous or un-nationalistic even
when such policy shifts mean bringing the country’s policies into line with
international norms.1883

National leaders tend to sign conventions and treaties in a way that suits their
domestic situation. Thus a country may enter reservations for a convention to ensure
1878
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that it is compliant with social mores or religious belief and/or practice. They do so,
sometimes not to lose their political positions inside the country, or sometimes just to
direct national regulation in a particular way. Countries do not readily want to enter a
regional and/or international regulatory framework that may involve onerous
compliance obligations and extensive change on their part (for instance, initially the
UK1884 did not want to join the Prüm Treaty).1885 Therefore, at least in some cases,
countries do not readily accept the treaty or convention; rather they enter one or more
reservations when they become signatories to that instrument.1886 Even when a
country is a signatory to a relevant convention, ensuring compliance may be fraught
with problems, not the least a lack of enforceable sanctions. It is always a big
challenge to make countries uniformly observe any regional and/or international
incurred.
In order to adopt a common DNA database standard for all countries and to regulate
international DNA data sharing practices across the borders, several efforts are
currently underway. Most notably, the CRG report1887 represents a first step toward
addressing and tackling the issues related to international DNA data sharing
practices. It actually signifies the existing scenario regarding the global growth of
DNA databases and human rights issues. This report mainly focused on each
country’s practice regarding DNA databases (covering its law on a number of points,
including sample collection, entry criteria, removal criteria, sample retention, and
database access). However, the way in which countries around the world will equally
implement international DNA data sharing practice and rule in their national
jurisdiction still remains unclear. Moreover, information resources are also a
1884
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potential site for abuse as well as for reform.1888 This report did not confine its scope
to those countries where DNA technological facilities are common, but also tried to
focus on the developing world ‘where policy and practice are un-fixed’1889 and in
some cases inconsistent as well.
International data sharing practice, undoubtedly, is a wonderful mechanism to detect
heinous criminals as well as a tool to lessen international terrorism; however, that
mechanism needs to be applied in such a manner that it will ensure the proper use of
DNA data sharing across borders. It is now important to conduct some research on
whether the proper use of DNA data sharing could be ensured through an
international regulatory framework and, if so, what should be the nature and scope of
that framework; and, to what extent, could countries be made equally obliged to
abide by such a regulatory framework. This is because countries do not have a
common standpoint regarding the sharing of DNA data across the borders.
Furthermore, many developing and least developed countries do not have equal
footing and capacity to fulfil any international convention or treaty to the same extent
as developed countries that have a greater capacity to apply such advanced
technology. If international regulation is proved not to provide a better solution, then
further research could be undertaken to look for alternative mechanisms for ensuring
the proper use, access and sharing of DNA data across borders. Such an alternative
mechanism may or may not be a substitute for that international regulatory
framework. I believe that solutions to such issues need to be researched for the
above-mentioned reasons.
7.1.6

CONCLUSION

Developments in the DNA field continue apace. It has been acknowledged that in
this regard, ‘[s]cience and technology have certainly come a long way … standard
turn around times — from crime scene exhibit to DNA profile — have gone down
from three months to three weeks to three days’ in the period from 2001.1890 Forensic
scientists are also ‘currently working on developing a portable kit the police could
use to get a rough profile (with a one in a million chance of a match) at the crime
1888
For example, DNA of a person targeted for political reasons could be shared as if that DNA were
that of a ‘criminal’.
1889
Thibedeau, above n 26, 18.
1890
Jones, above n 1485.

407

scene within an hour. It has also become possible to generate profiles from ever
smaller or more degraded DNA samples’.1891 DNA technology has much potential —
Hindmarsh and Prainsack identified this technology as ‘a new language of truth’ and
also argued that ‘forensic DNA profiling and databasing provide simple solutions to
complex problems’.1892 It is a crime prevention tool that was originally intended only
to identify the most dangerous convicted felons on a case by case basis. However,
DNA collection and analysis are also conducted in regard to innocent people and
there is a widespread practice of retaining such data for a considerable period of
time.
In addition, DNA data is now routinely being used for a multiplicity of purposes that
pose significant human rights and privacy concerns for every citizen and their
families. DNA differs greatly ‘from other methods of identification such as
fingerprinting; it is a window into an individual’s medical history and that of their
entire family’.1893 DNA records are routinely linked to other computer records, such
as records of arrest, which can be used to refuse someone a visa or a job or otherwise
discriminate against them. A ‘very serious threat’ to human rights and privacy in a
democratic society is posed by the permanent retention of DNA samples, whether
these are from ‘individuals who have never been convicted of a crime’ or from those
caught up in ‘DNA “dragnets” devoid of individualized suspicion’ when the storage
and use of such information is combined with ‘weak safeguards’.1894 Essential
safeguards — including legal restrictions on the circumstances in which DNA and
associated information can be collected and retained — need to be in place.
Global governance of forensic DNA profiling and DNA databasing was examined by
a number of authors in a 2001 volume edited by Hindmarsh and Prainsack. It
undertook ‘[a]n investigation of the emergence, implications and governance of
forensic DNA profiling and databasing’,1895 with a view to exploring the
scientific, technical, legislative, crime management related and social and
cultural contexts of forensic DNA profiling and database governance in
1891
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countries that display different stages of development of forensic DNA
databases … rang[ing] from the highly developed practices of the UK … to the
emergent ones.1896

Similarly, this thesis will more specifically consider the developed/developing
country context of forensic DNA databases, and with this view two case studies (of
the UK and Bangladesh) have been conducted. This chapter contains the findings
from these case studies and the subsequent comparative analysis of those findings.
Both the NFDPL and the NDNAD are significant police investigative tools for their
respective countries. However, at present both these DNA facilities pose some risks
and challenges, some of which differ in nature or extent, while others are common to
both. For ensuring human rights and privacy protection, some mechanisms have been
suggested by section 7.1.4 of this chapter. The application of these benchmarks is
required at different levels in the NDNAD and the NFDPL depending upon their
priorities and capacity. In order to reduce gaps between developed and developing
countries, the sustainable capacity of Bangladesh (a developing country) for
smoothly running the NFDPL needs to be increased. At the same time, some
development co-operation should be provided by the developed countries (including
the UK) to improve the NFDPL and its operations. This way the NFDPL will meet
the necessary requirements to achieve an internationally accepted level, which will
ultimately enable it to contribute to international DNA data sharing to combat
international terrorism and global crime.
S and Marper is a landmark decision for protecting human rights and privacy while
using DNA information in the justice system of all countries that run DNA services,
including UK and Bangladesh. This is because it provides a necessary reminder that
privacy is a fundamental right that sets limits to what states can do in the area of
combating crime. The guiding principle decided by this case should not be used to
unnecessarily obstruct law enforcement. Sufficient scope is always kept for states to
pursue important interests of national security and public safety, and the prevention
of disorder as well as crime. However, state legislation should be more finely
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‘nuanced, and … not give blanket powers to investigation authorities that affect
many more citizens [particularly their individual right to privacy] than necessary in a
democratic society’.1897 There should be a proper balance between individual human
rights and state security measures.
To conclude it can be said that in light of the discussion provided, data collected,
analysis performed and argument presented in this thesis, there is scope for the
consideration of human rights and privacy violations in the forensic use of DNA
information. Such privacy interest, however, needs to be protected while keeping a
balance between human rights, individual privacy and the public safety and state
security measures. It can be argued, similarly to the view of Michael Boylan:
[P]olicy parameters [should] balance the police’s legitimate interest in using the
latest technology to solve crimes while protecting the rights of the innocent, the
presumed innocent, and the guilty. Such protections are necessary because
efficiency is not the only goal in criminal investigation. We must never forget
that all social institutions should exist within the context of justice.1898

Moreover, there should be greater development co-operation between and among
countries around the world; this could be in terms of financial and/or technological
assistance or sharing of DNA data or knowledge. It is anticipated that the
recommendations provided in this research will be instructive in advancing human
rights and genetic privacy protection both for the NDNAD and the NFDPL and, if
adopted, contribute to a lessening of the discrepancy between developed-developing
countries. These recommendations could work at the level of national jurisdiction at
first instance as well as globally, as this crisis is not only a matter of international
affairs but also primarily a matter of the domestic realm. It is also expected that the
research methodology adopted and findings will provide a useful model and insight
into further research analysis in this area. Finally beyond the scope of this thesis, it is
to be hoped that the analysis presented in this thesis will play a role in facilitating
future exploration of issues relating to international DNA data sharing, national
sovereignty and a country’s international obligations.
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APPENDIX A
R1, Management level staff, NFDPL, Interview Date 26/08/2010, 10:30 am
1. What is the organisational structure of this laboratory? Please provide me
information about staff hierarchy.
The Lab head is the top position in the National Forensic DNA Profiling Laboratory
(NFDPL) and all other staff members (that is scientific officers, lab technicians and
others) work under his or her direction. Under the position of the lab head, there are some
posts for the scientific officers. Below that position, there are some posts for the lab
technicians. At the bottom of that hierarchy there are some posts for the computer
operators, receptionist, cleaner and other staff. Though there is a hierarchy, we all work in
this lab as a team. We are appointed by the Bangladesh government under the multisectoral programmne on violence against women (MSP-VAW) project. Our appointment
is temporary (that is for the project period). After the completion of each phase of this
project, our appointment is renewed along with the renewal policy of the project.
2. What kinds of service do you provide?
This lab provides various kinds of services, such as, paternity testing, relationship proof,
dead body and/ or disaster victim identification, immigration disputes, identification of
rapists and murderers and so on. That means our lab provide services for all kinds of
.disputes where the identity is an issue.
3. What are the objectives of this lab?
The main objective of this lab is to assist the Bangladesh justice delivery system. Many
sexual offences occur daily but those cases cannot be proved due to a lack of evidence.
Now with the help of DNA testing, it is possible to detect the actual offenders. Initially it
provides services for the rape victims; at present the scope of its services has been
expanded.
4. Which level of staff is responsible for collecting DNA sample?
Each and every case is assigned and handled by a team comprising one scientific officer
and one lab technician and they are supervised by the NFDPL head. There are two
1

methods of sample collection, firstly, samples are collected directly from the body of
sample providers (victim or suspect) who come in the lab with the IO, and secondly,
samples are also collected from the crime scenes. Such collection is mainly conducted by
the police. There are five divisional DNA screening labs and police collect samples from
the crime scene of peripheral regions and send these collected samples to the nearest
DNA screening lab. In order to cover the whole Bangladesh such kind of divisional
service system has been established. The lab staff do not collect sample from the crime
scenes.
5. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
Our lab does not have any policy as such. But there is a working manual for guiding our
activities (including sample collection procedure)
6. Do you retain DNA samples?
Yes. We retain both DNA samples and profiles.
7. Do you retain DNA data?
We retain DNA analysis results or profiles both in the paper based files as well as in the
computer.
8. If yes, what is the maximum period of data/sample retention at the NFDPL?
We retain DNA samples for one year and DNA profiles for an indefinite period of time.
9. Is there any legislation or approved policy framework to govern this lab?
The proposed draft DNA Act 2010 is under review. At present DNA tests are accepted in
court as ‘scientific evidence’ under the Evidence Act of 1872. Therefore until now court
is using DNA evidence with the interpretation of some existing legal provisions, for
instance, s 45 of Evidence Act and s 510 of Code of Criminal Procedure. These
provisions are not, however, the direct basis for accepting DNA evidence in the court.
They are only widely interpreted to include DNA evidence in the judicial process so that
any future dispute with regard to the use of DNA evidence can legally be justified.

2

10. Do you have privacy policy for this Laboratory?
At present this lab does not have any privacy policy. Once the proposed DNA Act will be
enacted, then government will formulate related policies and rules under this umbrella
law gradually and on need basis.

11. Is there any supervisory body for this lab?
There is a supervisory body for the NFDPL and this is called DNA Executive Board. The
Board supervises all activities of the NFDPL. The Board also convenes a meeting to
review activities of the NFDPL twice a month.

12. What kinds of assistance do you receive from funding body (Danida),
financial/technical/training and development/other?
Danish International Development Agency (Danida) provides all financial and
technological support, equipments, training and all other costs for successful running of
this lab. Though Danida is funding this lab, there is a substantial involvement on the part
of the Bangladesh government. Other physical supports (such as office space, and other
logistics supports etc) are provided by Bangladesh Government.
Depending on the necessity, there is scope for the training of the lab staff. Moreover,
regular training session and workshops are organised for the judges, public prosecutors,
lawyers, police officers, magistrates, forensic doctors and those who are related to the
service of DNA technology. Training costs are mainly borne by the Danida.
13. Who are the primary customers of your services?
At this moment judiciary, law enforcing agencies, embassies are main consumers.
Sometimes some agencies of the government in case of urgency sent request to us
(normally via court or law enforcement agencies) for DNA testing. For instance, in case
of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) insurgency or revolution, BDR officials seek help to the
NFDPL to identify the dead bodies of some of the missing army officers. This request
came to our lab as a special case. Generally no private request is entertained in our lab. If
we are allowed to entertain private cases, it might corrupt the whole system and there will
be no transparency as well as a lack of checks and balances.
3

14. Can any government authority or funding body access your lab?
Government departments or funding bodies cannot access the lab. Only the court or the
police can seek the DNA analysis report. In the interest of a case investigation or justice,
if law enforcing agencies feel necessity then they can visit the lab and can collect some
more information related to the case, but they need to come with proper channel and with
just cause. This access must be supervised by our lab staff.
Until now the law enforcing agencies have not expressed much interest in accessing the
lab. Apart from that, we have not established the DNA database yet. Once the database is
established, then the authority will decide who should have right to access it and who
should not.
15. How important do you consider this laboratory in justice delivery system of
Bangladesh?
It is very important for the justice delivery system, before establishment of this lab; it was
difficult to detect the actual criminal. It is actually assisting victims of different heinous
crimes (such as rape, murder etc) in order to get justice.
16. Is there any development co-operation between Bangladesh and other developed
countries for better management and functioning of this lab?
At present the Danida is providing their financial assistance. Moreover there is regular
association with an Indian laboratory, namely the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and
Diagnostics (CDFD). Other than this cooperation and assistance, this lab does not have
any development co-operation or relationship with any international body or country.
Once our database is established then we have a plan to build relations with FBI,
INTERPOL. The pioneer organisation in this field is the Forensic Science Service (FSS)
of the UK. We also have a plan to contact the FSS.

17. What are the key challenges NFDPL facing at this moment?
The first challenge is public feelings and opinion about this new technology, for instance
the general public is suspicious about the quality of DNA testing. There is also much
corruption in Bangladesh, consequently, the general public have a lack of trust in the state
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bodies involved with the new technology. Some people also think if the DNA testing is
conducted within Bangladesh, then the quality of the test would be poor. They prefer to
send the sample to do analysis in any foreign country’s laboratory. There is also lack of
awareness among them.

Judiciary and most of the judges are not familiar with this new technology. Some of the
judges are rigid to accept this new technology. There is also lack of skilled personnel in
Bangladesh. It is a big challenge on the way of creating awareness among general people
about DNA technology as well as it use with small number skilled personnel. It will take
time. At present there is also lack of knowledge among the law enforcement agencies
how to collect DNA samples without losing its evidentiary value. But situation is
gradually changing. The use of DNA profiling is spreading. The progressive-minded
legal professionals and law enforcement agencies are willing to explore this field and the
unlimited possibilities it holds.
18. What is the Future of this lab?
After finishing the current phase of the MSP-VAW project, there are two options, either it
will be come under Bangladesh government revenue budget, or the Danida might renew it
for another phase. Under the current arrangement with Danida, the project is going to
extend for another three years which means it will enter in its fourth phase until 2013.
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R2, Management level staff, NFDPL, Interview Date 28/08/2010, 9:30
am
1. What is the organisational structure of this laboratory? Please provide me
information about staff hierarchy.
Under the current set up, the laboratory head is the highest position. After that post, there
are some posts for the scientific officers. In order to assist these scientific officers there
are some post of the lab technicians. Apart from that there are some posts for computer
operator, cleaner, front desk officer or receptionist.
2. What kinds of service do you provide?
This lab provides services for identification of rapists and murders, paternity testing,
sibling testing, dead body identification and/ or disaster victim identification,
immigration disputes or any other cases where identity of someone is an issue.
3. What are the objectives of this lab?
On 23 January 2006 the NFDPL was established under the MSP-VAW project, which has
been funded by the Danida. The Danida provides financial and technical assistance all
over the world under a component of ‘human rights and good governance’ and there is a
sub-component namely, ‘access to justice’ and the MSP-VAW is under this subcomponent. The NFDPL is established with an objective to assist and to provide legal
support to women victim for various offences, especially sexual assaults. Later scope of
its service has been extended. Now the services of this laboratory are not confined only to
get justice for victimised women for various offences. At present it is supporting the
whole legal system of Bangladesh.
4. Which level staff members are responsible for collecting DNA sample?
Scientific officers and lab technicians are mainly involved in the collection process.
However, all their activities need the approval from the lab head.
5. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
There is a project document or project proforma. At present however, there is no policy
governing the DNA sample collection.
6. Do you retain DNA data?
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Yes. We do.
7. Do you retain DNA samples?
Yes. We do.
8. If yes, what is the maximum period of data/sample retention at the NFDPL?
We retain both DNA samples and DNA profiles. We retain DNA samples for one year
and DNA profiles for indefinite period of time.
DNA data or analysis results are retained both in the paper based files as well as in the
computers as electronic version. DNA Samples are retained for 6 months. Now our lab
has limited capacity, once its capacity will be increased, then we will consider about the
exact duration of sample retention.
9. Is there any legislation or approved policy framework to govern this lab?
At present there is no particular legal basis as such. Therefore the court cannot force any
person to undergo the test because of a lack of legal basis. Currently DNA tests are
accepted in court on the basis of the Evidence Act and Code of Criminal Procedure.
Sometimes legal opinion from the ministry of law, justice and parliamentary affairs, of
the government of Bangladesh is also taken. The necessity for the comprehensive law has
already been felt, and an inter-ministerial meeting and a national consultation was held on
the draft law. Now the final draft – the ‘DNA Act 2010’ is under review in the Ministry
of Women and Children Affairs.
10. Do you have any privacy policy?
There is no written privacy policy for governing this lab. However through practice it is
maintained that DNA data should not shared with anybody except the investigating
officers or the court.
11. Is there any supervisory body for this lab?
There is a supervisory body for the NFDPL and it is called the DNA Executive Board
(DEB). How the lab works, how samples are collected and what the DNA database looks
like, the accountability of the lab etc are monitored by this Board. That means all
functions of the lab are monitored by the DEB. Every activity of the lab has to be
reported to the Board. When there is any new activity of the lab, the Board calls a
7

meeting. Reports of regular day to day activities are not required to be submitted to the
Board.
12. What kinds of assistance do you receive from funding body (Danida),
financial/technical/training and development/other?
The Danida provides its assistance with regards to financial and technological matters.
13. Who are the primary customers of your services?
At present mainly court, police and some embassies are the main users of this lab. If any
government or non-governmental department or its authorised person wants to request for
DNA testing, such body is required to apply via court. We do not allow private request.
Such practice allows us to maintain good checks and balances in our system. Besides, if
there were an undue number of cases, it would be difficult for us to handle and provide
accurate DNA results.
14. Can any government authority or funding body access your lab?
No other third party including government body can access DNA data stored in this lab.
Only the lab head and scientific officers are allowed to do that.
15. How important do you consider this laboratory in justice delivery system of
Bangladesh?
With the assistance of this technology, cost of appeal, review or revision, and
unnecessary costs for the disputant parties have minimised dramatically. That means it
helps to reduce the case related cost of the government as well as for the parties.
Moreover this remarkable technology provides exclusion as well as positive identification
with virtually 100 per cent accuracy.
16. Is there any development co-operation between Bangladesh and other developed
countries for better management and functioning of this lab?
There is no development agreement between Bangladesh and other developed countries
or international bodies (such as the INTERPOL) for an equal standardised DNA
database. But some kind of data sharing or cooperation with some international bodies or
developed countries is important, as it will expedite the regional and inter-country DNA
data sharing relationships in order to detect some international terrorists or transnational
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criminals However, there is some connection of the NFDPL with the DNA systems of a
few neighbouring countries, such as the Philippines, India, and Malaysia.
17. What are the key challenges NFDPL facing at this moment?
Lack of cooperation and co-ordination on the part of the service providers (police, courts
and lawyers) is one of the biggest challenges. The success of DNA testing and the lab
depend on the co-operation of the police, the court and the lawyers. If judges are positive
about this new technology, then the success rate would be very high. They can even
motivate ordinary people, because ordinary people have a huge faith in the judiciary. But
if the sitting judge thinks that he will not consider the evidence, then it is useless.
Besides, disputing parties and their lawyers need to feel that DNA testing is necessary to
obtain justice, and they then need to convince the court and seek permission for the DNA
test in the particular case. If lawyers are reluctant because they do not understand this
new technology, then the whole purpose will be frustrated.
Besides, some judges, magistrates, and lawyers and police do not have science
background. At this moment many of them do not understand what is DNA and DNA
profiling and how it works. Over the period of time when people will know about this
technology more and more, then all parties related to the case including judges and
lawyers will readily accept the DNA test report or evidence. But in order to make them
aware, we regularly organise training programs, seminars and workshops for the judges,
lawyers, police, magistrates, forensic doctors. Another issue is that general public is
suspicious about this technology. There is a government fund for the poor victim. But
most of the ordinary people do not know about the fund. Besides, some human rights
organisation, or the NGOs provide their assistance towards the poor victims. But most of
them (poor victims) do not know how to get these funds. In addition we have lack of
professional skill at this moment.
18. What is the Future of this lab?
The NFDPL needs to be independent without any control from the part of government or
other body. Before getting it autonomy, the lab needs to have a constant source of fund or
financial stability. This is because after running out the Dandia funding, there is no
alternative source of fund for this lab.
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R3, Scientific Officer, NFDPL, Interview Date 29/08/2010, Time 10:20 am
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I am working here for about four and half years and I am involved in the DNA
sample collection process.
2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
Collection: there are two methods of collecting DNA samples:
(i) One is from the crime scene and this is collected by the police (that is Investigation
officers (IO)). We do not collect sample from the scene of crimes (SOC). Once police
obtain samples from the SOC, then we asked the IO to fill up some forms and then we
receive bodily substances or items collected by the IO, depending on the nature of the
crime, for further analysis.
(ii) Another way of sample collection is done inside the lab; in that case we collect bodily
substances (like, blood, semen, saliva etc) directly from the body of the victims or
suspects, in the presence of the police. We are only authorised to collect DNA samples
from the bodies of victims or suspects inside the lab. We do not collect samples from the
crime scene. DNA samples from the crime scene are only collected by the police.

In this process normally we give a separate identification number or file number for every
case. After opening a file for a particular case, the lab head assigned the case to one
scientific officer and one lab technician. Then we extract DNA from either of these
sources.
Analysis: After DNA extraction, we go for DNA analysis depending on the nature of the
case, for instance, if it is paternity testing, we do analysis for the identification of the
paternity. Normally it takes about a month to get the result. Mainly it depends on our
work load. However, if there is any urgency we try to finish the analysis as soon as
possible. We use PCR technology for analysing the DNA. It involves different kits, such
as, identity filer, y filer, X-plex, SGM plus etc. we try more than one method to draw an
accurate conclusion, or if there is any confusion about a particular method.
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Storage: after finishing the DNA profiling and delivering the results to the requested
body (normally the police or the court) then we store those DNA samples in a cold place
at 4 degree Celsius or frozen at -20 degree Celsius. We store it for 1-2 years. In case of
DNA Profile, we retained them for unlimited period of time.
3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
Yes, in a written way. I am explaining you how it happened:
Once a dispute arises or crime happens, victim or suspect is identified by the police at the
first instance, and at that time the police prepared and signed an order form. Subsequently
we receive that order form from the police along with that identified victim or suspect for
obtaining their sample. While collecting the sample, we provide an identification form to
the sample providers (whether the victim or suspect) and they sign it in front of the
police. By singing that form, sample providers are actually giving their consent.
In this process, we generally presume that the sample provider (victim or suspect) has
given his or her consent freely. We also presume that victim or suspect has given enough
information about the whole DNA sample collection process. So we do not explain the
process of sample collection and its related matters. Sometime we ask their opinion about
collection of their DNA, most of the time, victims or suspects are eager to get justice via
this technology. Normally they do not bother giving their bodily substances or samples.
Therefore, they even do not show any kind of reservation about its further use.
5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc)?
Mainly we record information like, his or her name, parents name, address, age, gender,
case number, purpose of the test, nature of the crime, source of the case (the court or the
police) etc.
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6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
We use PCR technology applying different methods or kits. Identity filer is the latest
method we are currently using.
7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
When new technology or methods arrive, there is an arrangement with an Indian lab for
providing training — we hire a technician from that lab, he installs the technology and
trains the lab scientific officers and lab technicians. He normally comes twice in a year.
But he can come anytime, if we feel the necessity during the contract period. There is a
lack of technician equal to his standard in Bangladesh.
8. Do you retain DNA sample, if yes, how long?
Yes, our lab retains DNA samples for 1 year.
9. Do you retain DNA profiles, if yes how long?
Yes, our lab retains DNA profiles for an indefinite period of time. DNA analysis results
are retained both in the computer and paper based files.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in (paper/PC/microfilm)?
We retain DNA data both in electronic and paper based files. There are personal
computers (PC) for the lab head as well as for the scientific officers; we store all files in
these computers. Paper based files are stored in the room of our lab head.

11. Who has access to those records?
No other person can access DNA records kept in the lab. Only lab head and scientific
officers can access this file. Scientific officers alone are able to access these data and files
but only with permission from the laboratory head.
12. In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what measure/s are
available?
No back up facility yet. Since our lab is a new initiative in Bangladesh, still we are in
process of organizing our lab. We do not have enough facilities and man powers.
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Currently our back up facilities and other security measures are very poor. We are in a
process of establishing a database, once it gets done, and then we will take proper step to
encounter physical threats.
13. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
Yes, I have Anti-virus for my computer. My PC is password protected as well.
14. Do you collect and store sample from Children or child offenders?
We collect and conduct DNA analysis from the juvenile offenders who are below 18
years old. They are sometime charged with rape or murder. We also collect sample from
new-born in order to resolve paternity disputes. We get regular cases for child offenders
(aged between 16-17 years old) similar to the adult offenders, though the number is very
low compare to the adult’s DNA profiling. We do not have any separate mechanism or
database to store or retain the child offenders or minor’s DNA data.
15. Who are allowed to access this lab?
No third parties are allowed. But in case of necessity or urgency, requested body (that is
police in most cases) can visit the lab and can collect some information related to DNA
analysis report with authorisation from court or concerned department.
16. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
Inside our lab there is no power of law enforcing agencies (police). Police exercise their
power while collecting the bodily substances or items from the crime scene. And also
while identifying the victim or suspects. While sending case and making the file they can
exercise monopoly as well. As Law enforcing agencies involved in this process vitally,
therefore we provide periodical training on regular basis. Moreover in order to enlighten
the service providers and some consumers, in this field such as judges, lawyers,
magistrate, forensic doctors we organise regular seminar, workshop and training
program.
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17. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, are there any other parties
who are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission,
hospitals or any other government departments)?
We get request from Immigration department for relationship establishment, also from
some divisional hospitals (occasionally) to identity dead bodies. No private request is
entertained in our lab. If we are allowed to entertain private cases it might corrupt the
whole system and there will be no transparency as well as checks and balances.
18. What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
There are various areas; mainly we get cases to resolve paternity disputes, rape and
murder cases, dead body and/ or disaster victim identification, relationship establishment
etc.
19. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes, of course, the draft DNA legislation is under process of enactment.
20. Do you have Privacy Policy?
There is no strong privacy policy at this moment. But normally we have a practice or
custom we do not share information with each other and also with outsiders.
21. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
I am satisfied and very happy with my lab. However there are some challenges or
uncertainties, such as currently we are serving under a project. We do not have any clear
and set organisational hierarchy. Moreover we have not got any promotion since our
appointment. Some of us have already left this job and have joined another organisation.
Therefore, once our job will come under government revenue budget as permanent
positions, we will be more motivated and feel secure for providing better service.
I am hopeful that it will be expanded in future. The fruits of the DNA testing have been
gradually appreciated by mass people. Generally people are happy with the positive
outcomes of DNA testing. Now peoples even do not consider its high cost compare to
revealing the truth and getting justice. After conducting DNA testing, most of the
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families are happy. On the other hand, there are lots of cases who are dissatisfied about
the test result as well.
22. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
This is very costly technology for a country like Bangladesh. Cases come from poor
victims mostly. For Bangladeshi poor people it is very high cost. There is a government
fund for the poor victim. But compare to other countries, this is cheaper. Economic and
technological shortcomings are the main challenges on the path to the future
sustainability of the NFDPL. I believe this is one of the main gaps between developed
and developing countries. If it can be removed, then the lab will function better.
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R4, Scientific Officer, NFDPL, Interview Date 21/09/2010, 12:58 am
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I am working here for more than two years. Normally my job is to supervise the
whole collection process. Lab technicians also assist us in DNA sample collection and its
related activities such as filling the forms etc. Lab technicians do their job under our
supervision.
2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
When we receive a case with the court order, for example, paternity testing, Subinspector of Police or Investigating Officer (IO) brings the alleged father, mother and
child in the lab. Then in the presence of that concerned IO, one scientific officer and one
lab technician collect the sample from these three persons. There is an assigned day for
every scientific officer to receive cases for that day. He or she will receive all cases for
the whole day and he is the responsible person for that particular day. For instance, I am
assigned for Tuesday and all cases are received under my supervision. There is an
identification form inquiring lots of personal information from the victim or suspects
(sample providers). Every detail is taken in that form. Before giving bodily substances or
samples, sample provider fill that form and sign it. IO also signs it as witness. In this
process, fingerprint of sample providers are also collected. We give a separate
identification number, case number and file number for that case and so that we can
identify the file easily.
After sample collection, DNA is extracted from that sample. Then we analyse the
extracted DNA with PCR technology. Finally we got the analysis result. This result is
cross checked by doing the same test by another scientific officer among us. After cross
checking this report is submitted to the lab head and once he approves it, then we make
ready the final report and then lab head, assigned scientific officer signed it and a counter
signed is taken from head of the forensic department. Finally we send the analysis result
directly to the court. IO gets one copy if she or he wants it.
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3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
When a suspect or victim arrives in the lab to have their DNA test conducted, we
presume that they already know everything therefore, we do not inform them the whole
DNA collection, storage, use and its related concerns and benefits. Generally sample
providers come to provide their sample being directed by the court. That is why we
presume that they already have sufficient information about the entire process.
5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc.)?
Name, parents name, address, gender, age, case details including case number, if it is rape
case how many people are involved, when the occurrence has happened, source of the
case (from one stop crisis centre in the six divisional lab or police or the court) etc.
6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
We use PCR based DNA analysis - STR marker, there are different kits for analysing
STR marker, like, identity filer (it is mostly used one), x plex, y filer. Depending on the
nature of the case we also use other types of kit. When there is any confusion about the
analysis result, then we apply one more kit in order to cross check that result.

7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
In the beginning we got all foundation training. But once a new kit arrives, and then we
use this kit reading the kit manual.
8. Do you retain DNA sample, if yes, how long?
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Yes. We retain blood samples for 2 years and DNA samples extracted from other bodily
substances or biological fluid are retained for 1year. After completion of 2 years, we
destroy those samples.
9. Do you retain DNA profiles?
DNA profiles are retained indefinitely.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in (paper/PC/microfilm)?
We store DNA data both in the electronic version as well as in the file. Paper files are
stored inside the room of our lab head under his custody. Electronic reports are stored in
the PC of our Lab head, as well as PCs of the scientific officers.
11. Who has access to those records?
Only our Lab head can access them. But in his absence or with his permission scientific
officers also are allowed or authorised to access stored data or files. No other third party
can access these records.

12. In order to In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what
measure/s are available?
We do not have adequate back up facility.
13. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
We have Anti-viral software and our all PCs are password protected. Those PCs are only
handled by us.

14. Do you collect and store sample from Children or child offenders?
Yes, even in case of new born DNA sample is collected and retained like the adult
persons sample. We treat equally all samples both minor’s and adult person’s DNA
samples. For instance, we receive almost fifty percent paternity testing cases. There is no
accurate statistics, but there are several cases filed in the NFDPL regarding the child
offender. 2-3 cases per day.
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15. Who are allowed to access this lab and stored data?
No third party is allowed, except authorization and in case of urgency.
16. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
In every case IO at first, identifies the victim or suspects or accused, they also collect
bodily substances from the crime scene. While collecting bodily substance from the body
of victims or suspects in the lab, they become witness. There is an identification form and
after signing the victim or suspects, police signed this form. During extraction and
analysis process, there is no involvement of police, but after getting result, we send a
copy of that result to the concerned IO.
17. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, is there any other parties who
are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission, hospitals
or any other Government departments)?
Court, police and some embassies are mainly our consumers. Besides, some NGOs are
interested about our service occasionally. There is no scope for private cases. All private
cases need to come via court. Court and police are the only channels.
18. What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
There are a number of cases, such as paternity testing, sibling testing, immigration
dispute, disaster victim identification, rape and murder cases etc.
19. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes of course. We have proposed a DNA law The Draft law is under review by the
government.
20. Do you have privacy policy?
We do not have any privacy policy, but normally we do not share information with
outsider. Only exception is IO and court.
21. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
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We are very hopeful about the future sustainability of our lab. In order to detect criminal
and innocent, this is a very important technology. However, there are some issues, if they
can be resolved, then this lab will perform and sustain in a better way. This lab is now
project based; we do not have any permanent organisational chart or organogram. Our
salary and bonus are not regular. We have not got any promotion till our appointment.
Some of us already left this job and have joined in another organisation. We do not get
promotion though our appointment is almost like Government officers. We are appointed
similar to the 11th grade under the National Pay Scale, 2005. Therefore this lab needs to
come under revenue budget, and then all of us will get certainty about our job and salary.
Skilled people and man power will be retained. Everyone will perform their duties
efficiently and will contribute to this lab in more efficient way.
22. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
In order to investigate a crime, there is no other better technology in Bangladesh than
DNA profiling. The NFDPL is very important for the case investigation process and
delivering justice. Now general people are getting justice. Therefore enforcement of
justice is more important compare to the high cost of DNA testing. In terms of costbenefit analysis, people consider that they are getting proper judgment. Sometime cost
really does not matter to them. But for very poor victims, there are some funds from some
human rights organisations. Therefore, this technology is very important even for a
developing country like Bangladesh.
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R5, Scientific Officer, NFDPL, Interview Date 22/09/2010, 02:00 pm
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I am working here since 2006. My main duty is DNA analysis, preparing analysis
report and then submission; maintain all correspondence of this lab with outsiders. From
the DNA sample collection, extraction, analysis up to the report submission is the
common assigned duties for all scientific officers and lab technicians working in this lab.
2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
When the court gives an order requiring for DNA profiling for any particular case, the IO
brings the alleged victim or suspect in the NFDPL. Then in the presence of that IO, one
scientific officer and one lab technician collect DNA sample from that person. There is an
assigned day for every scientific officer to receive all cases. There is an identification
form with various information to fill in. As part of the collection process, we asked the
alleged victim or suspect to fill the form and sign it. IO also signs the form as witness.
Fingerprint of the sample providers are also taken. Subsequently we give separate
identification number to that case or file.
The next step is extraction of DNA sample and finally we analyse the DNA applying the
PCR technology. If there is any confusion about a particular method used and also to
draw an accurate conclusion, generally, we use more than one method. We also use
another kit, depending on the type of case. That means when a DNA analysis result is
completed by a scientific officer, then we cross check that result by doing similar test by
another scientific officer. This cross checking is done confidentially under the guidance
of the head of the laboratory. After cross checking we submit the final report to our lab
head. Once he approves it, we send the final result directly to the court or to the IO (if he
or she requests).
The samples which are collected by the IO from the SOC, we follow the same analysis
process. But for rape and murder cases we maintain separate forms to keep the record of
this case.
3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
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No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
Yes, in the written form. We obtain informed consent from sample providers by taking
their signature in the identification form. We also inform that after the DNA sample
collected and its analysis will be used in order to prove the allegation against him or her.
A link will be established with the crime and it might prove him or her guilty or innocent.
5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc.)?
Court order, identification form, name, parents name, age, gender, address, case number,
whether he or she donated blood from his or her body within the last three months, if it is
rape case how many people are involved, when the occurrence has happened, source of
the case etc.
6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
We use PCR based DNA analysis that is- STR marker.
7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
When I first join in this lab, I got some foundation training. But when new kits arrive then
the practice is, we use kit reading manual. If any confusion arises, we consult it with our
lab head. So we get training on our need basis.
8. Do you retain DNA sample, if yes, how long?
Blood samples are retained for 1 year. DNA sample extracted from other bodily
substances or biological fluid is retained for 2 years or more than that, it depends on the
capacity of our lab. Once the capacity is full then we destroy DNA samples which are 2
years old.
9. Do you retain DNA profiles?
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Yes, we retain DNA profiles for unlimited period of time for convicted offenders. But
those who are acquitted we destroy their profiles. Our lab has a plan to create a DNA
database to retain DNA profiles of convicted offenders.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in paper/PC/microfilm?
We stored DNA data two ways: one is electronic and other is paper based file. Files are
mostly stored under the custody of our lab. There is no backup system for paper based
files, but for electronic version, we kept them both in the PCs of all scientific officers,
and in the PC of our lab head. Another copy of DNA profiling is stored in the analyser
machine.
11. In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what measure/s are
available?
No security measures are available so far.
12. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
In order to encounter logical threat, we use antiviral software and our computers are
password protected. Other than scientific officers, nobody is allowed to use these
computers. But sometime we share our computer and data with each other (between and
among scientific officers only) even though it is password protected.
13. Do you collect and store sample from Children or child offenders?
Yes, even in case of new born, we collect DNA sample and retain the collected like adult
person’s sample. In rape cases, there are some child offenders, age around 16-17 years
old. We also collect samples from them and retain with other adults persons DNA data.
14. Who has access to those records?
Only our lab head has the access to those records, but in his absence or in case of urgent
necessity of any case, with his permission scientific officers, can access those records.
We are going to set up a new mechanism, under this new set up, during DNA analysis, all
scientific officers and the lab head will have access to all data. But after the analysis is
completed and the report submitted, only the lab head will have access to all data related
to DNA profiling stored inside the lab.
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15. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes, of course. Draft DNA law is under review by the Ministry of Women and Children
Affairs.
16. Do you have privacy policy?
No we do not have any privacy policy but in our laboratory system there is no scope for
violation of privacy, as we do not share information with outsider (except the requesting
body). If any case arrives related to family or friends, then somebody from that family or
friend wants to know about DNA test results, because of proximity of relationship we
normally inform them about the test result. Though we do not tell them who is handling
the case in the laboratory.
17. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
From the crime scene to lab the whole situation is controlled by police. At first IO
determines who is victim, suspect or accused and they also collect bodily substances from
crime scene. In order to know the types of bodily sample, who are the victims and
suspects, we have to depend on the police. Police also becomes witness while collecting
DNA sample inside the lab.
18. Who are allowed to access this database?
No other third parties.
19. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, is there any other parties who
are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission, hospitals
or any other government departments)?
Other than court and police, some embassies and NGOs are interested about DNA testing.
Any private request needs to come via court. Court and police is the only channel. For
instance, once we got a request from Interpol (via Criminal Investigation Department of
Bangladesh) to look for a match of a DNA Profile of an international criminal in our lab.
20 What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
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Mainly we get request for DNA testing, for example, the paternity dispute, sibling testing,
immigration cases, rape and murder cases, and other identity related cases.
20. Do you have any concern regarding the overall management of this lab
Yes, there are some issues, if they can be resolved then this lab will perform and sustain
in a better way. We do not get promotion though our appointment is almost like
government officers. We are appointed similar to the 11th grade under the national pay
scale, 2005.
21. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
I am very hopeful. But as a new set up currently there are some challenges, for example,
there is no clear organogram for our positions. General public do not know about our lab
there is a lack of information, such as, how to do DNA test and to whom need to
approach, who is controlling the lab etc. Besides, there is a lack of awareness. Some
people hide it for their societal reputation; they do not want to share it publicly. Overall it
is well accepted technology from societal point of view. If the controlling authority is
positive about its future, then the lab has good prospects. In order to aware general people
and institutions related to this service (eg judges, Magistrates, police, lawyers, forensic
departments), we provide regular training to the law enforcing agencies. We also organise
regular seminars, workshop both at the urban and rural areas.

22. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
In order to investigate a case as well as to prevent crime, there is no other potential
technology in Bangladesh than the DNA profiling. General people are getting justice.
While cost benefit analysing, people consider that they getting justice smoothly and
fairly. This is very important even a developing country like Bangladesh. There are some
arrangements of government funds for poor victims, as well as some NGOs or human
rights organisations provide their assistance to the poor victims (specially for the
victimised women).
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R6, Scientific Officer, NFDPL, Interview Date 24/09/2010, 01:40 pm
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I am involved in the DNA sample collection and storage process. My main job
responsibilities include sample collection, analysis, preparing the file once a case is sent
to this lab, preparing the DNA analysis results and submitting to the lab head etc.

2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
We have an assigned day for each one of us (every scientific officer) to receive cases for
that day. When a case (for instance, paternity testing) comes with court order,
investigating officer brings the alleged father, mother and child. Then in the presence of
the IO, one scientific officer (like me) along with one lab technician, collect blood sample
or any other sample from these three persons. There is an identification form, before
collecting samples, we ask the victims or suspects to fill the form and sign it. IO also
signs the form as witness. There is a separate identification number, case number and file
number, every details are taken in that form so that we can identify the file separately. In
case of SOC samples, there are two other types of forms.
After collecting sample, we extract and analyse the DNA and finally the analysis result
determine who the father for this child is. In order to anayse the extracted DNA data, we
do the PCR method. Most of the times we cross check the result by doing the same test
by another scientific officer. After cross checking, this report is submitted to the lab head
and once he approves the result, the final report is signed by me (as scientific officer), the
lab head and a counter signature is taken from the head of the forensic department. Then
we send the final result directly to the court. We also give one copy to the IO, if he or she
wants it for the necessity of the case.
3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
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4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
Yes, we obtain consent by taking signature of the sample providers (that is victims or
suspects) in the identification form. According to general practice of this lab, when a
matter is referred to us with the Court order authorising sample collection from the
parties to the case, then these parties (whether suspect or victim) arrives at the laboratory
for giving their samples. We presume that the victim or suspect has given his or her
consent freely to the police or their lawyer before arriving to the lab. Therefore we do not
further explain about the reason and process of sample collection rather we only ask them
to sign the identification form.

5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc.)?
Name, parents name, address, case number, whether he or she donated blood in his or her
body within last three months, if it is rape case how many people are involved, when the
occurrence has happened, source of the case (either OCC in the six divisional lab/police
/court).
6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
We use PCR technology using different kits for analysing STR marker. We mostly use
identity filer, and sometime we also X plex, y filer.
7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
When we join this service, we got foundation trainings. But once a new kit arrives, and
then we use this kit reading its manual. When we face difficulty then we consult with lab
head. Actually we got training on our need basis.
8. Do you retain ‘DNA sample’, if yes, how long?
Yes. We retain DNA samples for 2 years.

9. Do you retain ‘DNA profiles’?
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Yes. We retain DNA profile for unlimited period of time.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in (paper/PC/microfilm)?
We store DNA data both in the electronic and paper based versions. Files are kept in the
room of the lab head under his custody. We kept electronic versions both in the pc of our
lab head as well as in our computers (Scientific officers).
11. Who has access to those records?
Only lab head has access to those stored records, but in his absence or with his
permission, the scientific office can also access these records or files.
12. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
We do not have any policy. But we have a working manual. By working with each other
we learn about the whole process maintained in this lab.
13. Do you collect and store sample from Children or child offenders?
Yes, we collect sample from children, even in case of new born, mainly for paternity
testing. We store DNA samples and profiles of child offenders along with adult’s
samples. Even in case of new born the sample is collected and retained like the adult
persons sample. We have no facility to provide different treatment for child offenders.
14. Do you have privacy policy?
No we do not have any privacy policy. But normally we do not share information with
outsiders.
15. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
Police identifies victims or suspects and they also collect bodily substances from the
crime scene. In that case we have nothing to do. We always have to rely on the police to
know about the sample type and also to identify the victim or suspect. Police also become
witness while we collect DNA sample inside the lab.
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16. In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what measure/s are
available?
We do not have adequate back up facility and protective measures. But we are in a stage
of building infrastructure for our lab.
17. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
We have anti-virus and our computers are password protected.
18. Who are allowed to access this database?
No third parties are allowed to access reports of this lab. But they can visit the lab
sometime with authorisation.
19. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, are there any other parties
who are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission,
hospitals or any other government departments)?
Judge and police are main consumers of the lab service. Some embassies and NGOs are
also interested. But no private request is allowed. Any kind of request must come via
Court and or police. If we allow private request, then there is undue number of cases, and
it will be difficult for us to handle and provide an accurate DNA results.
20. What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
Paternity dispute, sibling testing, immigration cases, rape, murder cases etc.
21. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes. Legislation is very important. Therefore we have prepared a Draft DNA Act. The
Draft DNA law is under review by the government.
22. Do you have any concern regarding the overall management of this lab
Yes, there are some issues, if they can be resolved, then this lab will perform in a more
efficient way. We do not get promotion though our appointment is almost like
government officers. We are appointed similar to the 11th grade under the national pay
scale, 2005.
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23. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
I am very hopeful about its future prospect. In order to detect criminal and exonerate
innocent, this is very important technology for the justice delivery system of Bangladesh.
Gradually we are getting positive responses both from general people as well as from the
service providers (eg judges, lawyers, and police).
24. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
In terms of cost-benefit analysis, I would say, general people are getting justice without
any harassment. This is very important compare to other challenges (such as the cost of
DNA testing). People mainly consider that they getting accurate judgment smoothly and
fairly. Cost is of course matter for poor victims. Therefore those who are poor, there is
some government as well NGO funds for them.
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R7, Lab Technician, NFDPL, Interview Date 28/09/2010, 11:30 am
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I joined in this lab in 2006. Since then I am involved in DNA sample collection
process.
2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
When we receive a case, we collect sample from the respective victim or suspect. After
collecting sample, at first, we conduct the screening, then we extract DNA from that
collected samples and finally we analyse the extracted DNA to get the DNA analysis
results or profiles.

In the collection process we maintain separate forms depending on the nature of the case.
The sources various samples are also different, for instance some samples are collected
from the SOC by the IO. We collect some other samples directly from the body of the
suspects or victims. In both types of collection we need a court order or permission from
the court for DNA collection and analysis.
3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
Yes, we provided the identification form. Sample providers (victim or suspects) filled and
signed that form in front of the police. By filling and signing the form they provide their
consent. We do not ask for their consent, or normally we do not explain the whole
process of sample collection to them.
5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc.)?
Name, parents name, age, gender, address, case number, if it is rape case how many
people are involved, when the occurrence has happened, source of the case etc.
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6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
PCR technology which is based on the STR marker and our mostly common used kit is
Identity Filer. We also use other kits such as, X-Plex, Y-Filer etc. depending on the type
of the case and also if there is any confusion about any test results.
7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
After joining this lab, I once got some training. I have not got any further training.
8. Do you retain ‘DNA sample’, if yes, how long?
We retain DNA sample for 1 year.
9. Do you retain ‘DNA profiles’?
We retain DNA profiles for unlimited time.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in (paper/PC/microfilm)?
We store DNA data both in electronic and paper based files. Paper files are mostly kept
under the custody of the lab head under his control and no other copies or back up for
paper based files are kept. But for electronic versions, we retain DNA data both in the
computer of our lab head as well as the computers of all scientific officers.
11. Who has access to those records?
Only Lab head has access to all stored records, but in his absence or in case or urgency,
with his permission scientific officer can access these files or records.
12. In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what measure/s are
available?
We do not have adequate facilities to encounter physical threats. We also do not have
back up facilities. Especially for paper based files.
13. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
We have password protected computer and antivirus software. And those computers are
only used by the scientific officers. For electronic records, we kept a copy in the CDs.
14. Who are allowed to access this database?
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No outsiders are allowed to access our DNA analysis records or results. They can only
visit the lab.
15. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, is there any other parties who
are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission, hospitals
or any other government departments)?
Judge and police are the main users of our service. Apart from that, occasionally, some
embassies and NGOs are also interested about our service. But who ever might be the
requesting body, any request for DNA testing must come via court order. We do not
allow private requests.
16. What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
Paternity dispute, sibling testing, immigration, rape case, murder case, disaster victim
identifications etc.
17. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
We do not have any written policy. But we have developed an in-house practice from our
colleagues doing work with each other.
18. Do you collect and store sample from juvenile or child offenders?
Yes, even in case of new born DNA sample is collected and retained like the adult
persons sample. We treat all DNA samples both from minor and adult person equally.
19. Do you have privacy policy?
We do not have any privacy policy, but normally we do not share information with
outsider. Only exception is IO and court.
20. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
In every case investigating officer at first, identifies the victim or suspect or accused, they
also collect bodily substances from the crime scene. While collecting bodily substance
from the body of victim or suspect in the lab, they become witness. There is an
identification form and after signing by victim or suspect, police signed this form. During
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extraction and analysis process, there is no involvement of police, but after getting result,
we send a copy of that result to the concerned IO.
21. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes, we do. We have proposed a draft DNA law and this draft law is under review by the
government.
22. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
There are lots of problems with the management of this lab. We have salary and job
discrimination. Initially we were appointed under MSP-VAW project but now our status
has been changed. At present we are appointed by a third party vendor company. Under
the current recruitment practices, we do not have any pay scale, no regular salary and
bonus. We are dissatisfied with that.
Besides, there is no adverse opinion in the mind of general people. Rather when a result
is published and parties get justice then their reliability on the justice delivery system,
particularly on the DNA lab, increase more than ever before. Some people are suspicious
about the lab and technology. Awareness building is important, especially for judges and
lawyers, because lots of judges do not understand the technology and they do not feel
interest about this technology.
23. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
In order to identify a criminal, at present, DNA profiling is the potential mechanism for
Bangladeshi judicial system. The NFDPL is very important platform for all. In terms of
opportunities and challenges, maintaining this lab is of course a big challenge for a
country like Bangladesh. Nevertheless enforcement of justice for all is more important
than any other things.
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R8, Lab Technician, NFDPL, Interview Date 29/09/2010, 12:15 pm
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I am working here for almost one and half year and I assist scientific officers in the
DNA sample collection and storage process.
2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
When the court sent a case with an order form, then we assist scientific officers in
collecting DNA sample from the victims or suspects or their child (if the case is related to
paternity testing). What would be the type of sample providers it always depends on the
type of the case. Police brings the victim or suspect in the lab and they present there as
witness while collecting DNA samples. After collecting samples, at first, we conduct
screening, then we extract DNA from that sample and finally we analyse the extracted
DNA for getting desired result. SOC is another source of samples and such samples are
collected by the police.
3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
When suspects or victims arrive in the lab to conduct their DNA test, we ask the victim or
suspect if they have any objection regarding this sample collection procedure and its
purpose of collection. By filling the identification form and signing it they provide their
consent on the collection process. We feel there is no necessity of giving any further
explanation. We believe this is not our job to explain everything to the sample providers.
We provide identification form and we believe it is self-explanatory. So we presume that
they are already informed.

5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc.)?
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Victim’s or suspects name, parent’s name, age, gender, address, case number, purpose of
the test, case type, if it is rape case how many people are involved, when occurrence has
happened, source of the case etc.
6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
We used PCR technology which is based on the STR marker and our mostly common
used kit is Identity Filer. I believe Identity filer is one of the most reliable one. We also
use other kits such as, X-Plex, Y-Filer etc. depending on the type of the case and also if
there is any confusion about any test results.
7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
After joining this service, we have got training one time. We the lab technicians do not
have got any further training. But when new technology arrives we tried to learn it using
kit manual and also we seek advice from our lab head.
8. Do you retain DNA sample, if yes, how long?
Yes, we retain DNA samples for one year.
9. Do you retain DNA profiles?
Yes, we retain DNA profiles for unlimited period of time.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in (paper/PC/microfilm)?
We keep record of the DNA analysis result both in the paper based files and in the
computers. All paper files are kept in the personal custody of the lab head. For electronic
copies DNA analysis results are stored in the computers of the lab head and the scientific
officers.
11. Who has access to those records?
No unauthorised person can access DNA data stored in the NFDPL, only lab head and
scientific officers can access them. But in case of scientific officers, they can do so, only
with the authorisation or permission from our head.
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12. In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what measure/s are
available?
I do not have any clear idea.
13. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
I do not have any clear idea.
14. Who are allowed to access this database?
Normally outsiders or third parties are not allowed to visit this lab, if there is any genuine
cause and urgency, only in that case police can visit this lab and collect information
related to the DNA analysis.
15. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, is there any other parties who
are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission, hospitals
or any other Government departments)?
Other than court and police, some embassies and NGOs are interested about our service
and they would like determine some cases via DNA test. All kinds of request must come
through court’s approval. Nobody directly can request us to conduct a DNA analysis.
16. What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
Paternity testing, rape case, immigration disputes, identification related cases, inheritance
disputes, murder cases and so on.
17. Do you collect and store sample from Children or child offenders?
Yes, even in case of new born we collect and retain DNA sample like the adult person’s
sample. We treat all samples equally. There is no accurate data on the number of cases
related to juvenile offenders but, on an average about 25–30% of the cases sent to our lab
for DNA profiling are of the juvenile offenders.
18. Do you have privacy policy?
We do not have any privacy policy, but normally we do not share information with
outsiders. Only exception is IO and court.
37

19. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
In every case at first, IO identifies the victim or suspect or accused, they also collect
bodily substances from the crime scene. There is an identification form and after signing
that form by victim or suspect, police also signed this form as witness. During extraction
and analysis process, there is no involvement of police, but after getting result, we send a
copy of that test result to the concerned IO. There is no influence of police inside our lab.
20. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes, we feel necessity of a law and So far I know one draft law is under process of
enactment.
21. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
The lab has a big future prospect for the country like Bangladesh. However, there are
some challenges such as; there is job discrimination among us. That means initially, we
were appointed under the MSP-VAW project but now our status has been changed. At
present, we are appointed under a different company. Under the current recruitment rule,
we do not have any pay scale, nor is our salary regularly paid or bonuses allocated.
If our salary and job discrimination issues get resolved, then I am hopeful about future
prospect of this lab.
22. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
The cost of DNA testing is higher for poor victims. If the cost of DNA testing could
lower than the existing one, then it would be beneficial for the general people.
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R9, Lab Technician, NFDPL, Interview Date 30/09/2010, 10:30 am
1. Are you involved with the DNA sample collection and storage process?
Yes, I have been working here for more than two years, and I am involved in the DNA
sample collection and storage process.
2. Please give me an idea about the whole process.
After receiving a case from the court, at first we obtain samples from the body of the
suspects or victims (as the case may be). We do not collect samples from the SOC. This
collection is conducted by the police. After obtaining the samples, we go for screening of
that sample. After completion of screening process, we extract DNA from that sample
and finally we conduct analysis for getting a result. In the whole process there are
separate forms and nature of the form depends on the nature of the case. Some of these
forms need to be signed by the sample providers, while others are signed by the IO.

3. Do you have an approved policy governing the collection of DNA samples?
No we do not have any policy but we have a working manual for guiding our sample
collection, storage and analysis process.
4. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA samples, If yes, what is the
procedure (written or oral)? If no, why?
Yes, we obtain consent from the sample providers in a written way that means we obtain
their signature in an identification form. Before starting the sample collection, filling that
form and then obtaining signature from the sample providers is the general practice of our
lab. Therefore, by filling and signing that form sample providers give their consent.
5. What information do you receive with a DNA sample (such as, name, address, age,
gender, ethnicity of the accused and, purpose of the test, nature of crime etc.)?
Name, parents name, age, gender, address, case number, if it is rape case how many
people are involved, when the occurrence has happened, source of the case (either from
one stop crisis centers in the six divisional labs or police etc.)

6. What kind of technology do you use in DNA profiling?
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We use PCR technology which is based on the STR marker. We mostly use the identity
filer. We also use other type of kits, but it depends on the nature of the case.
7. If new technology arrives, do you receive additional skill development training to be
able to use such technologies?
Once new method arrives then our lab head gives a briefing to the scientific officers and
train them how to use this kit or method. Then scientific officers convey their briefings to
us.
8. Do you retain DNA sample, if yes, how long?
Yes. We retain other type of samples for 1 year, blood samples for 2 years.

9. Do you retain DNA profiles?
Yes. We retain DNA profiles for unlimited period of time.
10. What medium do you store DNA data in (paper/PC/microfilm)?
We store DNA data both in paper based files as well as in the electronic versions. Paper
files are kept in the custody of the lab head. Electronic copies are kept in the computers
of our lab head as well as the computers of the scientific officers.
11. Who has access to those records?
Mainly our Lab head has access all kinds of stored or recorded DNA data. But in his
absence, scientific officer can access these data only with his permission. No other person
can access them.
12. In order to encounter physical threats (fire, water, larceny etc), what measure/s are
available?
In order to encounter physical threats, normally back up facilities are required to be
strong. Since our lab is a new one, our back facilities are not adequate enough. But we
will develop it soon.
13. If you store data on the computer, do you have logical security measures (antivirus,
firewall or others)?
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We have Antivirus software in our lab computers and these computers are password
protected. These computers are only handled by the scientific officers.

14. Do you collect and store sample from children or child offenders?
We collect and store DNA samples from children in the same way as adults. Even in case
of new born the sample is collected and retained like the adult person’s sample. We do
not have any separate storage facility for retaining the DNA data obtained from the child
or child offenders.
15. Who are allowed to access this database?
Nobody can access the records of DNA data, other than emergency and authorisation.

16. How far law enforcing agencies are involved and exercise their power in the whole
process?
Police identifies victim or suspect and they also collect DNA evidences from crime
scene. There is an identification form and after filling and obtaining signature by victim
or suspect, police signed that form as witness. From identifying parties of the case to
collecting evidence from the crime scene, the whole scenario is controlled by police. In
that case we have nothing to do. But once we received the sample, police have no
influence or control on our work.
17. Other than court and crime investigation authorities, is there any other parties who
are interested about DNA data (international body, election commission, hospitals
or any other government departments)?
Other than court and police some embassies are interested about DNA testing. All private
cases need to come via court. Court and police is the only channel.

18. What are the different cases/reasons you conduct DNA analysis for?
Paternity dispute, sibling determination, immigration disputes, rape cases, murder cases,
disaster victim identification etc.
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19. Do you feel the necessity of any legislation or policy framework for the management
of this lab?
Yes, a DNA Act is very important. A Draft DNA law is jointly proposed by our lab as
well as the MSP-VAW project office and that draft law is in the process of enactment.
20. Do you have privacy policy?
Our lab does not have any privacy policy, but we do not share information with outsiders.

21. How far are you hopeful about the future prospect of the lab?
I am very hopeful about its future prospect. In order to detect criminal and innocent, this
is very important technology. During the first phase of MSP-VAW project, we got
appointment under government. But from the second phase of this project, our job status
has been changed. Now our recruitment is outsourced, and our salary, bonus is processed
by a human resource company or a third party Vendor Company. Therefore, I feel we do
not have any job security. If our lab comes under Bangladesh government’s revenue
budget, then we will get certainty about our job, promotion and salary. It will actually
motivate us to perform our duties in a better way and will ensure lab sustainability.

22. Please tell me your idea about the cost-benefit of this lab in terms of the
opportunities and challenges associated with the lab for the developing country like
Bangladesh?
The use of DNA evidence for detecting actual offenders has revolutionised the whole
legal system of Bangladesh. Before people was harassed in terms of money, and time.
Now with the use of DNA evidence people are getting justice fairly within a reasonable
time span, and of course this has reduced the case related costs in many respects both for
the government as well as for the parties to the case. For example, it reduced the costs
related to investigation, trial, appeal and review.
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APPENDIX B
Free nodes and tree nodes addressed and represented two main research questions:
(i)

Human rights and privacy issues

(ii)

Gap between UK and Bangladesh DNA service system in the justice delivery
system

Tree nodes

Sub-Tree nodes

Further sub-tree nodes

Free
Nodes

1. Lack of Trust

Human
Rights

and

and

i.

Lack Awareness

Same

ii.

Lack of Trust

as

Privacy

Awareness

further

Issues

among Public

Sub-

2. Collection and
Retention
DNA

i.

of

DNA

sample

and

personal

information tree
nodes

collection

sample

(a) collection of personal information;

and profile

(b) no

written

policy

governing

sample

collection;
(c) sample collection by lab staff;
(d) sample collection from crime scene;

ii.

Retention of DNA sample
(a) DNA sample retention for 1 year;
(b) DNA samples are retained for 6 months;
(c) retention of blood sample for 2 years and
then destruction;

iii.

Retention of DNA Profile
(a) retention of DNA profile indefinitely;

iv.

Storage of DNA data both in the PC and Paper
files;

3. Lab Access

i.

No Lab access to outsiders;

ii.

no policy for right to access;

iii.

only lab head and scientific officers can access
DNA data;

4. Informed

iv.

police can access lab in case of urgency;

i.

consent collection, but not always informed;

1

Consent Issues

ii.

Lab Staff presume that consent has been given;

iii.

no additional explanation and information by
lab staff while consent collection;

iv.

sample provider informed a little bit about use
of their DNA;

v.

sample providers are more keen to get justice
than considering the importance of free
consent;

vi.

Sample providers are not aware about right to
informed consent;

5. Involvement,
Skill

vii.

Consent giving by signing identification form;

i.

Involvement of Police

and

Power

(a) Collection of sample from crime scene;

of

(b) IO brings the victim or suspect;

Police

(c) IO identifies victims or suspects;
(d) role of IO as witness;
ii.

power of police
(a) no power inside the lab, but can exercise
monopoly while dealing a case;

iii.

Skill of law enforcing agencies
(a) lack of knowledge about DNA evidence
collection;

6. Societal

i.

No private cases are entertained.

i.

No Special Treatment for Child's DNA data

i.

Current legislation set up hap hazardous;

concerns:
Reputation or
Stigma
7. Equal
Treatment
Both

Child

and

adults

DNA samples
8. Lack

of

Legislation

(a) legislation under process;

and Policies

(b) no comprehensive law;
(c) No Policy Governing DNA Collection
ii.

No Privacy Policy
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(a) Case information sharing with friendfamily;
(b) practice not sharing information with
outsiders;

Gap

1. Developm

Between

ent

Co-

Developed-

operation

i.

Economic-technological gaps;

ii.

lack of development cooperation;

Developing
Countries

2. Future of

i.

NFDPL

A reliable and good investigative tool
(a) effective role of judges is important;
(b) fund for poor victims;
(c) Justice is important high cost;
(d) Lab needs to come under revenue budget;
(e) Public Reliance is increasing;
(f) Reduction of DNA test cost is important;
(g) set up new mechanism-back up facility;

ii. Sustainability of Lab
(a) lab is potential and scope for future sustainability.
3. Job

i.

Job Discrimination;

Discrimin

ii.

Job Issues;

ation and

iii.

Low Payment and Irregular Benefits;

uncertaint

iv.

No clear Hierarchy;

y

v.

No Regular Promotion;

vi.

Recruitment by third party vendor company;

i.

Non-cooperation

4. lack

of

knowledge

service providers;

of judges
and
lawyers
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and

co-ordination

among

5. Shortage

i.

appointing technicians from other countries;

ii.

lab technicians are not skilled enough

i.

Lack of Information;

Challenge

ii.

logical securities are poor;

s

iii.

No adequate back up facilities;

iv.

physical security measures are not adequate;

v.

no scope for systematic and well defined

of
Technical
Hands

6. Other

training;
(a) No Scope for Regular Training;
vi.

Monitoring and Oversight Power is very poor
(a) Lack of Check and Balance;
(b) No Regular Meeting.
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APPENDIX D

(Note for Ethics Committee: This is an English translation for the Survey Questionnaire, it be
will in Bengali, where the participant does not understand English)
Survey Questionnaire

Name:

Gender:

Male

Female

Profession:
Age group:
16-20

21-25

26-30

31-35

36-40

41-45

46-50

51-55

56-60

60+
1. What are the hierarchies of this laboratory?
a) -------------

--------

b) -------------

--------

c) -------------

--------

d) ------------

--------

2. Please mention the type of employment status?
Permanent

Contractual

Casual

Project Life time

3. In which year the project was established?
0 -1Year

1-2 years

2-3 years

4-5 years

5. What types of support the lab is providing? (Please rank like 1,2,3….. according to priority)

2
Legal support for women--------

Various civil and criminal cases------

Serve the judiciary------

Research only---------

Others (if any)--------6. So far what kind of services provided from the lab?
Paternity proof
Relationship Proof
Identity related problems
Dead body identification
Immigration
Rape and/or Murder cases
All services mentioned above
Others if any

7. Which levels of employees are responsible for sample collection?
Lab Head

Scientific office

Lab technician

More than one person is responsible (like…………………………………………

8. How do you retain the DNA Profiles?
Paper based file
Electronic database
Both

9. How long do you retain DNA profiles?
0 -1Year

1-2 year

2-3 year

Unlimited

10. Do you retain DNA Samples?
Yes (if yes, go to question no 11)

No (if No, go to question No 12)

11. What is the maximum period for the retention of DNA samples?

3
0 -1Year

1-2 year

2-3 year

Unlimited

12. How often do you destroy the DNA samples?
0 -1Year

1-2 year

2-3 year

do not destroy (if not, please note the reason)

13. How do you store DNA samples and profiles?
Paper based file
Electronic database
Both

14. Is there any approved policy or other guideline to govern this lab?
No (if N, please note the reason)

Yes (if Y, please note the name)

14. Is there any supervisory body to run this lab?
Yes (if yes what is the name of the body…………………)

No

15. How often does the supervisory body meet in a year?
1 time

2 times

3 times

never meet

16. How often do you submit report to the supervisory body in a year?
1 time

2 times

3 times

do not submit yearly

17. What kind of assistance do you receive from the funding body (DANIDA)? ( if all, Please
rank like 1,2,3..according to priority)

Financial

Technical

Training

Others

18. The assistance providing by the funding body is adequate?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

19. Do you receive any support from the Bangladesh Government to run this lab?
Yes

No
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20. What kind of assistance does Bangladesh Government provide?
Financial

Technical

Physical/logistics

All

Others

21. The support from the Bangladesh Government is adequate enough to run the lab
smoothly?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

22. How long DANIDA will provide support or fund to run this lab?

0 -1Year

1-2 year

2-3 year

unlimited

23. If DANIDA funding is run out, is there any alternative source of funding for this lab?
Yes

No

24. In your opinion in which segment / where support need to be increased from all sources?
(You may rank for more options).
1…………………..
2…………………..
3………………….
4………………….

25. Who are the users/consumers of the Lab service? (Rank on the frequency of service
provided)

Judiciary……………………
Law enforcing agencies…….
Embassy…………………….
Govt. agencies………………
Private Organizations……….
Others………….

26. Can any government authority or funding body access the Lab?
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Yes

No

27. The NFDPL is highly significant in the Justice delivery system?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

28. The NFDPL is facing challenge to win the public trust about DNA testing?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

21. Please list the challenges that this new technology is facing?
a……………………..

b……………………………

c……………………..

d……………………………

e……………………..

f……………………………

g……………………..

h……………………………

29. General people have lack of information and awareness about DNA test?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

30. Is there any development co-operation between Bangladesh and other countries/
international organizations for better management and functioning of lab, other than
DANIDA?
Yes

No

31. Do you agree that taking informed consent before collecting DNA sample is necessary?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

32. Do you obtain informed consent before collecting DNA sample?
Yes

No

33. DNA sample providers are adequately informed about the sample collection process,
analysis, its use and associated risks (if any).
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

6
34.

List the information you receive with DNA Sample?

---------------------------------------------------------------35. How do you store personal information of the sample providers?
Paper based file
Electronic database
Both
36. Do you think the information collected during sample collection is sufficient?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

37. Do you cross validate the results with different test?
Yes

No

38. The training you received is adequate to learn about new technology?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

39. The Lab has adequate safety measures for stored information (e.g. DNA sample, DNA
profiles, personal information etc.) against all kinds of threats?
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

40. Do you think privacy policy is necessary to protect the sophisticated information?
Strongly Agree

Agree

41. Do you have privacy policy?
Yes

No

Thank you for your co-operation

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

